Evolución económica y política USAna

[Reiter]

The most important chart about the American economy you'll see this year

Pavlina Tcherneva's chart showing the distribution of income gains during periods of economic expansion is burning up the economics internet over the past 24 hours and for good reason. The trend it depicts is shocking:



For a long time, most of the gains from economic growth went to the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. And, after all, the bottom 90 percent includes the vast majority of people. Since 1980, that hasn't been the case. And for the first several years of the current expansion, the bottom 90 percent saw inflation-adjusted incomes continue to fall.

The data series ends in 2012 and we don't know how long the expansion will last, so that negative income trend may evaporate before all is said and done. But unless there's a massive break with the previous three expansions we will continue to have an economy where the typical family's living standards grow much more slowly than GDP growth per se would allow.

http://www.vox.com/xpress/2014/9/25/6843509/income-distribution-recoveries-pavlina-tcherneva?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=vox&utm_...

Esa gráfica no tiene nada de sorprendente, la otra que publica su autora en twitter sí.


https://twitter.com/ptcherneva/status/514972067184537600

No cuesta imaginar esa gráfica elaborada con nuestros datos.

 

[Republik]

Gráfico demoledor porque son muy visibles las ingenierías sociales de la era Reagan, muy anteriores a la "globalización" o la irrupción de la TIC a las que intereasada y falazmente se atribuye el movimiento de rentas ("Es que el mundo ahora pertenece a los cualificados" -el audaces fortuna iuvat revisitado-, "son cosas del mercado abierto y el crecimiento de las oportunidades", etc).

Esto es más apreciable cuando se constata que las grandes masas profesionales que han despegado retributivamente en USA son las ligadas a sanidad, abogacía y finanza, sectores por todos conocidos como desreguladísimos, altamente abiertos a la competencia, separadísimos del sector público y sin barreras de entrada ni, por supuesto, acción de lobby/captura del regulador.

[Mad Men]

Gráfico demoledor porque son muy visibles las ingenierías sociales de la era Reagan, muy anteriores a la "globalización" o la irrupción de la TIC a las que intereasada y falazmente se atribuye el movimiento de rentas ("Es que el mundo ahora pertenece a los cualificados" -el audaces fortuna iuvat revisitado-, "son cosas del mercado abierto y el crecimiento de las oportunidades", etc).

Esto es más apreciable cuando se constata que las grandes masas profesionales que han despegado retributivamente en USA son las ligadas a sanidad, abogacía y finanza, sectores por todos conocidos como desreguladísimos, altamente abiertos a la competencia, separadísimos del sector público y sin barreras de entrada ni, por supuesto, acción de lobby/captura del regulador.

Curiosamente las tres hablan de seguridad, la primera de la salud, la segunda de seguridad legal, la tercera de la seguridad económica.

Hay que claro indicio de decadencia!!!!!!!!!

[Taliván Hortográfico]

Es un grado de decadencia realmente difícil de imaginar hace pocos años.

Bueno, ya se decía hace diez años que con los acuerdos de libre comercio, la calidad de vida de Estados Unidos y la de México se irían igualando. 

[polov]

No viajéis a los EEUU con efectivo, por si acaso.

The Canadian government has had to warn its citizens not to carry cash to the USA because the USA does not presume innocence but guilt when it comes to money. Over $2.5 billion has been confiscated from Canadians traveling to the USA funding the police who grab it.
If you are bringing cash to the land of the free, you will find that saying really means they are FREE to seize all your money under the pretense you are engaged in drugs with no evidence or other charges. It costs more money in legal fees to try to get it back so it is a boom business for unethical lawyers to such an extent than only one in sixth people ever try to get their money back and the cops just pocket it. That’s right. Money confiscated is usually allowed to be kept by the department who confiscated it. This is strangely working its way into funding police and pensions. This is identical to the very issue that resulted in the final collapse of Rome when the armies began to sack cities to pay for their pensions. We are at that level now with respect to seizing whatever they want knowing you will have to spend more in legal fees to assert your rights that do not really exist.

http://armstrongeconomics.com/2014/09/24/canada-warns-its-citizens-not-to-take-cash-to-usa/

No hace falta viajar, la policía directamente roba a sus ciudadanos el dinero  y lo que haga falta:

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-10-07/common-people-do-not-carry-much-currency-%E2%80%93-how-police-justify-stealing-american-citi

Police confiscating Americans’ hard earned cash, as well as a wide variety of other valuables, without an arrest or conviction is a disturbing and growing practice throughput these United States. Since cops get to keep the seized funds and use the money on pretty much anything they want, the practice is becoming endemic in certain parts of the nation. The theft is often referred to simply as civil forfeiture, or civil asset forfeiture. Incredibly, under civil forfeiture laws your property is incredibly “guilty until you prove it innocent.”

The extent of the problem came to my attention last summer after reading an excellent article by Sarah Stillman in the New Yorker. The article struck such a chord with me, I penned a post highlighting it and addressing the issue, titled: Why You Should Never, Ever Drive Through Tenaha, Texas. That article ended up being one of my most popular posts of 2013.

Fast forward a year, and many mainstream publications have also jumped on the topic. Most notably, the Washington Post published an excellent article last month titled, Stop and Seize, which I strongly suggest reading if you haven’t already.

Fortunately for us all, the issue has also caught the eye of the always hilarious, John Oliver of Last Week Tonight. The following clip from his show is brilliant. Not only is it hilarious, but it will hopefully educate a wider audience about this insidious practice so that it can be stopped once and for all.

As one officer admitted in an affidavit justifying his confiscation of an innocent driver’s cash:

--------------

No se pierdan este vídeo:

Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO)

gracias por sus posts

[Mad Men]

No entiendo una cosa, y me gustaría plantear-les la pregunta.

Si en EEUU imprimen papel moneda en cantidad, si EEUU tiene un déficit brutal, si EEUU está en decadencia , si el Dolar sera substituido....

Entonces,porque baja el valor del Euro respecto al Dolar? Porqué no se dispara la inflación?

Tanta austeridad y reforma proclamada por la UE, pero el Euro baja y la economía europea estancada.

No lo entiendo.

[Маркс]

Burbujas, macarras, chorizos de guante blanco, la mafia en el Estado, la decadente norteamérica, la asesina México...

En fin.

Incineración para los cleptócratas del poder  Keiser Report en español

http://youtu.be/hw1ufnfjeKA
	Small | Large

[Currobena]

Marx, te va a encantar. La evolución del saqueo neoliberal, denunciada por uno de los gestores de fondos más importantes de los Estados Unidos.

Rather in this essay I want to explore the problems that surround the concept of shareholder value and its maximization. I’m aware that expressing skepticism over this topic is a little like criticizing motherhood and apple pie. I grew up in the U.K. watching a wonderful comedian named Kenny Everett. Amongst his many comic creations was a U.S. Army general whose solution to those who “didn’t like Apple Pie on Sundays, and didn’t love their mothers” was “to round them up, put them in a field, and bomb the bastards,” so it is with no small amount of trepidation that I embark on this critique.
Before you dismiss me as a raving “red under the bed,” you might be surprised to know that I am not alone in questioning the mantra of shareholder value maximization. Indeed the title of this essay is taken from a direct quotation from none other than that stalwart of the capitalist system, Jack Welch. In an interview in the Financial Times from March 2009, Welch said “Shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world.”
 A Brief History of a Bad Idea Before we turn to exploring the evidence that shareholder value maximization (SVM) has been an unmitigated failure and contributed to some very undesirable economic outcomes, let’s spend a few minutes tracing the intellectual heritage of this bad idea.
From a theoretical perspective, SVM may well have its roots in the work of Arrow-Debreu (in the late 1950s/early 1960s). These authors demonstrated that in the presence of ubiquitous perfect competition and fully complete markets (neither of which assumption bears any resemblance to the real world, of course – break these assumptions and you break the link between SVM and social welfare; but trivial details like the critical realism of assumptions never seem to bother the average economist) a Pareto optimal outcome will result from situations where producers and all other economic actors pursue their own interests. Adam Smith’s invisible hand in mathematically obtuse fashion.
However, more often the SVM movement is traced to an editorial by Milton Friedman in 1970. Given Friedman’s loathing of all things Keynesian, there is a certain delicious irony that the corporate world is so perfectly illustrating Keynes’ warning of being a slave of a defunct economist! In the article Friedman argues that “There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits…”
(It is quite staggering just how many bad ideas in economics appear to stem from Milton Friedman. Not only is he culpable in the development of SVM, but also for the promotion of that most facile theory of inflation known as the quantity theory of money. Most egregiously of all, he is the father of the doctrine of the “instrumentalist” view of economics, which includes the belief that a model should not be judged by its assumptions but by its predictions.)
Friedman argues that corporates are not “persons,” but the law would disagree: firms may not be people but they are “persons” in as much as they have a separate legal status (a point made forcefully by Lynn Stout in her book, The Shareholder Value Myth). He also assumes that shareholders want to maximize profits, and considers any act of corporate social responsibility an act of taxation without representation – these assumptions may or may not be true, but Friedman simply asserts them, and comes dangerously close to making his argument tautological.
Following on from Friedman’s efforts, along came Jensen and Meckling in 1976. They argued that the key challenge when it came to corporate governance was one of agency theory – effectively how to get executives (agents) to focus on maximizing the wealth of the shareholders (principals). This idea can be traced all the way back to Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776) where he wrote:
The directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give them a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.
Under an “efficient” market, the current share price is the best estimate of the expected future cash flows (intrinsic worth) of a company, so combining EMH with Jensen and Meckling led to the idea that agents could be considered to be maximizing the principals’ wealth if they maximized the stock price.
This eventually led to the idea that in order to align managers with shareholders they need to be paid in a similar fashion. As Jensen and Murphy (1990) wrote, “On average, corporate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats.” They argued that “Monetary compensation and stock ownership remain the most effective tools for aligning executive and shareholder interests. Until directors recognize the importance of incentives and adopt compensation systems that truly link pay and performance, large companies and their shareholders will continue to suffer from poor performance.”
 Widespread Adoption of the Bad Idea So far we have traced only the rise of SVM amongst academics and, frankly, who cares what a bunch of academics think? Of considerably more concern is the evidence that the tenet of SVM has become conventional wisdom (an oxymoron if ever there was one) amongst those who inhabit the real world. For instance, take a look at the statements issued by the Business Roundtable (an association of CEOs of leading U.S. companies). In 1981 they stated, “Corporations have a responsibility, first of all, to make available to the public quality goods and services at fair prices, thereby earning a profit that attracts investment…provide jobs, and build the economy.”
By 1997, this concern for the role of the corporation at large had transmuted into a single-minded focus on SVM as represented by the following edict: “The principal objective of a business…is to generate economic returns to its owners…if the CEO and the directors are not focused on shareholder value, it may be less likely the corporation will realize that value.”
In many ways that bluest of blue chips, IBM, represents a perfect microcosm of the general pattern of obsession with SVM. Cast your eyes over Exhibit 1. It charts the total returns to an investor in IBM since 1973. In those early days, IBM’s mission statement was outlined by Tony Watson (the son of the founder) and was based on three principles (in descending order of importance): 1) respect for individual employees; 2) a commitment to customer service; and 3) achieving excellence.
By the early 1990s, IBM had pretty much been flat in total nominal return terms since the 1970s. Lou Gerstner arrived as CEO and stated, “Our primary measures of success are customer satisfaction and shareholder value.” In their Roadmap 2010, under Samuel Palmisano, the goal shifted to the primary aim of doubling earnings per share over the next five years!

One might be tempted to conclude that the evidence offered by IBM strongly supports the power of SVM. After all, after languishing for a prolonged period, when Gerstner and his focus on SVM arrived on the scene IBM enjoyed a significant revival. However, before you conclude I’ve shot myself in the foot by showing this example, take a look at Exhibit 2, which compares the SVM champion IBM with a company with an altogether different perspective, Johnson & Johnson.

In contrast to IBM’s transient objectives, Johnson & Johnson has stuck with a mission statement written by its founder (Robert Wood Johnson) as part of its IPO documentation in 1943, which reads as follows: “We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products…We are responsible to our employees…We are responsible to the communities in which we live and to the world community as well…Our final responsibility is to our stockholders…When we operate according to these principles, the stockholders should realize a fair return.”
The contrast between the two firms couldn’t be much greater. Whilst IBM targeted SVM, Johnson & Johnson thought shareholders should get a “fair return.” Yet, Johnson & Johnson has delivered considerably more return to shareholders than IBM has managed over the same time period.
 Prima Facie Case Against SVM To move from the micro to the macro, we can contrast the returns achieved by shareholders in the era of managerialism (defined here as 1940-90, although the results are robust to the exact sample chosen) with those achieved in the era of SVM (1990-2014). Exhibit 3 shows the results of this comparison in two different ways. The first pair of bars shows the total real returns (p.a.) in the two periods. They are virtually identical (the era of managerialism actually produced slightly higher real returns). So much for the horror that was visited upon investors by this experience.
The second set of bars adjusts the total real return data to account for shifts in valuation, which effectively have nothing to do with the underlying return generation of companies, but rather reflect the price that the market is willing to put upon those returns. As you can see, the adjustment barely impacts the returns achieved during the era of managerialism. However, a significant proportion of the returns achieved in the era of SVM actually came from the price investors were willing to pay. If we remove this element, then the underlying return generation of companies has fallen significantly under SVM.

 What Went Wrong? Given this data, the natural follow-on question is, of course, what went wrong? I think one of the most obvious candidates concerns the pay of CEOs. When one casts even a cursory glance over Exhibit 4 (CEO median pay) the increasing dominance of stock-related pay becomes obvious. During the era of managerialsim, the vast majority (i.e., over 90%) of the total compensation for CEOs came through salary and bonus. In the last two decades one can see the increasing dominance of stock-related pay. In the last decade some two-thirds of total CEO compensation has come through stock and options.

This has certainly aligned managers and shareholders à la Jensen and Murphy, but doesn’t seem to have generated the kind of impact that one might have expected. At least two reasons for this stand out. Firstly, as is now well known, options aren’t the same thing as stock. They give executives all of the upside and none of the downside of equity ownership. Effectively they create a heads I win, tails you lose situation. (The asymmetry of options and their excessive use in CEO remuneration have been pet peeves of mine (and many others for a long time). I recently came across a note I wrote in 2002 moaning about exactly this.)
In addition, incentives don’t always work in the way that one might expect (yet more evidence of the law of unintended consequences). Economists tend to have complete faith in the concept of incentives, driven by their obsession with a very specific definition of rationality. However, the evidence on the way incentives work may surprise you (and recently raises questions for many economists).
In 2005, Dan Ariely and coauthors set up some intriguing experiments to test the power of incentives. They journeyed to rural India to conduct their experiments because in this setting they could offer the participants meaningfully large incentives, in a way that just isn’t possible on tight research budgets when applied to first world countries. (In case you are wondering about the relevance of rural Indians to CEOs, Ariely et al. also tested their findings on the more orthodox cash-strapped U.S. student, and found similar patterns of behaviour.)
Participants were asked to play six games and were told that their pay would relate to their performance on the various tasks. In the low incentive version, participants received 4 rupees if they reached the “very good” level in a game, under the medium incentive version they got 40 rupees for reaching the same level, and under the high incentive version they received 400 rupees for attaining the “very good” level.
Now 400 rupees was close to the all-India average monthly per capita consumption. Thus, if players in the high incentive condition reached the “very good” standard in all six games they stood to win the equivalent of half a year’s consumption – not an insignificant amount.
Exhibit 5 shows the percentage of the maximum available earnings that were achieved by each of the groups. Those who faced the lowest incentives captured around 35% of the maximum possible. Under the medium incentive version, 37% of the maximum was attained. But under the high incentive only 19.5% of the maximum possible was reached.

From the collected evidence on the psychology of incentives, it appears that when incentives get too high people tend to obsess about them directly, rather than on the task in hand that leads to the payout. Effectively, high incentives divert attention away from where it should be.
One of the other features that stands out as having changed significantly between the era of managerialism and the era of SVM is the lifespan of a company and the tenure of the CEO. Both have shortened significantly.

In the 1970s, the average lifespan of a company in the S&P 500 was 27 years (already down massively from the 75 years seen in the 1920s!). In the latter half of the last decade, the lifespan of a corporate in the S&P 500 had declined still further to a paltry 15 years.
In parallel to this trend, the average tenure of a CEO has fallen sharply as well. In the 1970s, the average CEO held his position for almost 12 years. More recently this has almost halved to an average tenure of just six years. It is little wonder that CEOs may be incentivized to extract maximum rent in the minimum time possible given the shrinkage of their time horizons (not independent of the shrinkage in time horizons for investors perhaps).
 SVM and the Damage Done*
 *With apologies to Neil Young. Let’s now turn to the broader implications and damage done by the single-minded focus on SVM. In many ways the essence of the economic backdrop we find ourselves facing today can be characterized by three stylized facts: 1) declining and low rates of business investment; 2) rising inequality; and 3) a low labour share of GDP (evidenced by Exhibits 7 through 9).



I’m going to argue that SVM has played a role in each of these characteristics. That isn’t to say that SVM alone is responsible, rather it is part of broader set of policies that have magnified these effects, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
(In my opinion, SVM is part of the quartet of neoliberal policies that have led to the current economic situation. The others include the abandonment of full employment and its replacement with inflation targeting, globalization, and drive towards so-called flexible labour markets. I intend to return to these other policies in future notes. It is important to realize that all of these are policy choices; in as much as they are behind what has been called “secular stagnation” I’d argue that the outcome is itself a policy choice.)
Let me now turn to describing how SVM has played a significant part in generating these stylized facts. We will start with low and declining rates of business investment.
Given the shortening lifespan of a corporate and the decreasing tenure of the CEO, the finding that many managers are willing to sacrifice long-term value for short-term gain probably shouldn’t be a surprise. Nonetheless, an insightful survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) was conducted by John Graham et al. in 2005. They asked CFOs the following question: “Your company’s cost of capital is 12%. Near the end of the quarter, a new opportunity arises that offers a 16% internal rate of return and the same risk as the firm. The analyst consensus EPS estimate is $1.90. What is the probability that your company will pursue this project in each of the following scenarios?” The scenarios were based on how far short of expectations taking the project would leave quarterly EPS. Exhibit 10 shows the results.

If they take the project and exceed the earnings estimate, 80% would willingly invest (which obviously leaves you wondering about the other 20%!) However, a miss of even 10c reduced this from 80% to 59%. By the time the miss was at 60c short of expectations, only approximately half of the CFOs would invest in the project.
More evidence of the pernicious impact of SVM can be found in a recent study conducted by Asker et al. (2013). They compared the investment rates of public (listed) and private (unlisted) companies. Asker et al. uncovered the startling fact that when one compares the two groups (controlling for size and stage of the life cycle) “the average investment rate among private firms is nearly twice as high as among public firms, at 6.8% versus 3.7% of total assets per year.”

This preference for low investment tragically “makes sense” given the “alignment” of executives and shareholders. We should expect SVM to lead to increased payouts as both the shareholders have increased power (inherent within SVM) and the managers will acquiesce as they are paid in a similar fashion. As Lazonick and Sullivan note, this led to a switch in modus operandi from “retain and reinvest” during the era of managerialism to “downsize and distribute” under SVM.
Evidence of the rising payout amongst nonfinancial firms can be found in Exhibit 12. As one would expect under SVM, we have witnessed a marked increase in payouts over time. In the era of managerialism, somewhere between 10% and 20% of cash flow was regularly returned to shareholders. Under the rule of SVM this has risen significantly, reaching 50% of cash flows just prior to the Global Financial Crisis.

This diversion of cash flows to shareholders has played a role in reducing investment. A little known fact is that almost all investment carried out by firms is financed by internal sources (i.e., retained earnings). Exhibit 13 shows the breakdown of the financing of gross investment by source in five-year blocks since the 1960s. The dominance of internal financing is clear to see (a fact first noted by Corbett and Jenkinson in 1997).
From the mid 1980s onwards, equity issuance has been net negative as firms have bought back an enormous amount of their own equity (and geared themselves by issuing debt – a massive debt for equity swap). One of the most common raison d’êtres for stock markets that gets offered up is that they are providing vital capital to the corporate sector – the evidence suggests that this is nothing more than a fairy tale. Far from providing capital to the corporate sector,8 shareholders have been extracting it from corporates.

Now, if one were feeling charitable, one might choose to suggest that there just weren’t many new investment opportunities, and thus this return of capital was a perfectly reasonable thing to do. If this were the case, one might hope that the buybacks were done at prices that were below intrinsic value (since this would have genuinely improved the lot of shareholders). However, as Exhibit 14 shows, this hasn’t been the case. When market valuations were high (prior to the financial crisis) a record number of buybacks were conducted. Conversely, at the market lows, firms were hardly doing any buybacks at all. As Warren Buffett said in his letter to shareholders back in 1999, “Buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not a good business for those who stick around.”

The obsession with returning cash to shareholders under the rubric of SVM has led to a squeeze on investment (and hence lower growth), and a potentially dangerous leveraging of the corporate sector.
To see how this is related to the rising inequality that we have seen it is only necessary to understand who benefits from a rising stock market (i.e., who gets the “benefits” of SVM and its buyback frenzy). The identity of this group is revealed in Exhibit 15. The top 1% own nearly 40% of the stock market, and the top 10% own 80% of the stock market. These are the beneficiaries of SVM.

Another reflection of the role of SVM in creating inequality can be seen by examining the ratio of CEO-to-worker compensation. Before you look at the evidence, ask yourself what you think that ratio is today and what you think is “fair.” A recent study by Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014) asked these exact questions. The average American thought the ratio was around 30x, and that “fair” would be around 7x.
The actual ratio is shown in Exhibit 16. It turns out the average American was off by an order to magnitude! If we measure CEO compensation including salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, options exercised, and long-term incentive payouts then the ratio has increased from 20x in 1965 to a peak of 383x in 2000, and today sits somewhere just short of 300x!

We can see this has been a driving force behind the rise of the 1% thanks to a study by Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012). The rise in incomes of the top 1% has been driven largely by executives and those in finance. In fact, executives and those in finance accounted for some 58% of the expansion of the income for the top 1%, and 67% of the increase in incomes for the top 0.1% between 1979 and 2005. Thus, there can be little doubt that SVM has played a major role in the increased inequality that we have witnessed.

This makes the decline in the labour share even more dramatic for those outside of the top 1%. Exhibit 9 includes the top 1%, so if we were to exclude them the share of GDP going to the rest of labour would be even lower. In fact, if we look at the bottom 90% we would see their labour share of GDP going from around 42% in the late 1940s to approximately 27% today.
If one looks at the income gains during expansions as Pavlina Tcherneva (2014) has done, one will find that during the last two expansions the income gains have gone entirely (and most recently more than entirely) to the top 10%.

The problem with this (apart from being an affront to any sense of fairness) is that the 90% have a much higher propensity to consume than the top 10%. Thus as income (and wealth) is concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer, growth is likely to slow significantly. A new study by Saez and Zucman (2014) provides us with the final exhibit in this essay. It shows that 90% have a savings rate of effectively 0%, whilst the top 1% have a savings rate of 40%.
The role of SVM in declining labour share should be obvious, because it is the flip-side of the profit share of GDP. If firms are trying to maximize profits, they will be squeezing labour at every turn (ultimately creating a fallacy of composition where they are undermining demand for their own products by destroying income).

 Conclusions So what is one to conclude from this tirade? Three things stand out to me, each addressing a different constituency:
Shareholder’s Lesson
Firstly, SVM has failed its namesakes: it has not delivered increased returns to shareholders in any meaningful way, and may actually have led to poorer corporate performance!
Corporate’s Lesson
Secondly, it suggests that management guru Peter Drucker was right back in 1973 when he suggested “The only valid purpose of a firm is to create a customer.” Only by focusing on being a good business are you likely to end up delivering decent returns to shareholders. Focusing on the latter as an objective can easily undermine the former. Concentrate on the former, and the latter will take care of itself. As Keynes once put it, “Achieve immortality by accident, if at all.”
Everyone’s Lesson
Thirdly, we need to think about the broader impact of policies like SVM on the economy overall. Shareholders are but one very narrow group of our broader economic landscape. Yet by allowing companies to focus on them alone, we have potentially unleashed a number of ills upon ourselves. A broader perspective is called for. Customers, employees, and taxpayers should all be considered. Raising any one group to the exclusion of others is likely a path to disaster. Anyone for stakeholder capitalism?

Parece que aún quedan personas honestas e inteligentes en el mundo financiero estadounidense.

P.D: también aplica a ppcc. El SVM (gestión de valor para el accionista) no es más que el saqueo de empresas por los superCeos con supersalarios, lo  que implica un  saqueo adicional del estado vía impuestos reducidos  y el tremendo aumento de la desigualdad durante los últimos treinta años de capitalismo popular.

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2014/12/the-worlds-dumbest-idea/

[Маркс]

Gracias, Curro, me ha encantado.

Y sí, el artículo no tiene desperdicio, desde luego. Toca prácticamente todos los puntos clave a nivel económico y social en cuanto a la interpretación que él postula de la gestión neoliberal tanto de la empresa como de las personas.

Bueno.., es lo que hay. Fíjate si han calado que hasta que nos deshagamos de tanta basura ideológica vamos a tener que sufrir lo nuestro. Y ojalá que lo veamos.

Me lo archivo. 

[Currobena]

Una nota de humor sobre Ayn Rand, de John Oliver.

http://youtu.be/_8m8cQI4DgM
	Small | Large

[Currobena]

[Currobena]

Las protestas contra el gobierno son terrorismo, también en USA. Y ojo, que es un examen de oposición para funcionarios del ministerio de defensa.

Bingo. I have been waiting for this. Our government has now slipped over the line to convert peaceful protesters into terrorists, as I predicted would happen over a year ago. More is to come.
 
 This is a major landmark.
 
 Increasingly in the future, peaceful protesters who offend will simply be labeled terrorists. Watch. That plugs them into a whole other body of law and makes them eligible for detention and re-education, among other things. The legal systems, detention facilities and reeducation programs are already in place, manned and ready to go, thanks to efforts of Obama and congress over the last six years. Now we wait for the proverbial shit to hit the fan. It is only a question of time until, with a little dependable bad judgment, all hell will break loose. The government has tipped its hand on its true thinking about occupy protesters and the like.
 
 The Department of Defense (DOD) considers protests an example of "low-level terrorism," at least according to an exam DOD employees were required to take this year. A multiple choice question on the 2009 DOD Anti-terrorism Awareness training exam asked which of the following was an example of low-level terrorism:
 
 -Attacking the Pentagon
 -Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
 -Hate crimes against racial groups
 -Protests
 
 The correct answer is "protests."

http://www.sailblogs.com/member/thewanderer/?xjMsgID=342630

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-01-05/we-are-extremely-over-retailed-picturing-death-americas-malls



Starting in the mid-1990s, "the mall genie was out of the bottle," says one mall analyst, "and it was never going to come back." While about 80% of the country’s 1,200 malls are considered healthy (vacancy rates of 10% or less), that compares with 94% in 2006; and more than 30 million square feet of malls are more than 40% empty, a threshold that signals the beginning of what one one analyst called "the death spiral."

[No Logo]

Creo que este es el hilo donde debe ir esto, que me parece interesante.

Washington se rebela contra Obama

La crisis que atraviesa el aparato estatal estadounidense amenaza directamente la supervivencia del Imperio. Y no se trata simplemente de la opinión de Thierry Meyssan sino del tema que hace temblar a la clase dirigente en Washington, tanto que el presidente honorario del Council on Foreign Relations está exigiendo la renuncia de los principales consejeros del presidente Obama y la nominación de un nuevo equipo de gobierno. Este conflicto no tiene nada que ver con la normal oposición entre demócratas y republicanos, ni siquiera con la que existe entre “palomas” y “halcones”. Lo que está en peligro es el liderazgo en Estados Unidos y la OTAN.

Hace meses que vengo señalando que ya no hay política exterior en Washington sino dos facciones que se oponen en todo y que están aplicando, por separado, políticas contradictorias e incluso incompatibles [1].

Esta situación alcanzó su momento culminante en Siria, donde la Casa Blanca organizó primeramente la muda de piel del Emirato Islámico, lo envió a Irak para emprender la limpieza étnica y después comenzó a combatirlo, mientras que la CIA sigue apoyándolo. Esta incoherencia ha contagiado poco a poco a los aliados de Washington. Francia, por ejemplo, se unió a la coalición conformada para luchar contra el Emirato Islámico mientras que miembros de su Legión Extranjera forman parte de la oficialidad de ese grupo yihadista [2].

Cuando el secretario de Defensa, Chuck Hagel, pidió una clarificación escrita, no sólo no recibió respuesta sino que además fue expulsado de la administración [3].

El desorden se extendió rápidamente a la OTAN, alianza creada para luchar contra la URSS y mantenida en contra de Rusia, cuando el presidente turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan firmó gigantescos acuerdos económicos con Vladimir Putin [4].

Saliendo de su silencio, el presidente honorario del Council on Foreign Relations [5], Leslie H. Gelb, ha dado el toque de alarma [6]. Según Gelb, «el equipo de Obama carece de los instintos básicos y del juicio necesarios para dirigir la política de seguridad nacional durante los 2 próximos años». Y luego dice, en nombre de todo el conjunto de la clase dirigente estadounidense:

    «El presidente Obama tiene que reemplazar su equipo por personalidades fuertes y estrategas experimentados. También tiene que poner nuevas personas como consejeros principales de los secretarios de Defensa y de Estado. Y finalmente tiene que instaurar consultas periódicas con Bob Corker, el presidente de la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores, y con John McCain [7], el presidente de la Comisión de los Servicios Armados.»

Nunca antes, desde su creación en 1921, el Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) había adoptado este tipo de actitud. Y es que la división reinante en el seno del aparato estatal federal conduce directamente a la pérdida de la influencia de Estados Unidos.

Al enumerar los principales consejeros que, en su opinión, tendrían que irse, Gelb menciona a 4 personas intelectual y afectivamente muy cercanas al presidente: Susan Rice, consejera de Seguridad Nacional; Dennis McDonough, director del equipo de la Casa Blanca; Benjamin Rhodes, a cargo de las relaciones con los medios de prensa; y Valerie Jarrett, consejera de política exterior. La clase dirigente de Washington les reprocha su total ausencia de proposiciones originales al presidente y también que nunca lo contradicen, limitándose a confirmar los prejuicios del principal mandatario.

La única personalidad que el Council on Foreign Relations ve con buenos ojos es Anthony Blinken, un «halcón liberal» que funge como nuevo número 2 en el Departamento de Estado.

Como el Council on Foreign Relations es un órgano bipartidista, Gelb propone que el presidente Obama se rodee de 4 demócratas y 4 republicanos correspondientes al perfil anteriormente descrito. Aparecen primero los demócratas Thomas Pickering, ex embajador en la ONU; Winston Lord, ex asistente de Henry Kissinger; Frank Wisner, uno de los patrones no oficiales de la CIA y, dicho sea de paso, padre adoptivo del ex presidente francés Nicolas Sarkozy; y Michele Flournoy, la presidenta del Center for a New American Security [8]. Vienen después los republicanos Robert Zoellick, ex jefe del Banco Mundial [9]; Richard Armitage, ex asistente de Colin Powell [10]; Robert Kimmitt, probablemente el próximo patrón del Banco Mundial; y Richard Burt, ex representante de Estados Unidos en las negociaciones sobre la reducción del armamento nuclear.

En la secretaría de Defensa, Gelb propone al rabino Dov Zakheim para que maneje las reducciones del presupuesto [11]; el almirante Mike Mullen, ex jefe del estado mayor conjunto; y el general Jack Keane, ex jefe del estado mayor del ejército.

Para terminar, Gelb propone que la estrategia de seguridad nacional se elabore en coordinación con 4 «sabios»: Henry Kissinger [12]; Brent Scowcroft; Zbigniew Brzezinski [13]; y James Baker [14].

Al analizar esta lista puede verse que el Council on Foreign Relations no quiso optar por uno de los dos grupos que actualmente se enfrentan en el seno de la administración sino que quiere poner orden desde arriba.

Por cierto, no está de más observar que en un país hasta ahora dirigido por los WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, o sea “Blancos Anglosajones Protestantes”, 2 de los consejeros cuyo despido se exige son mujeres negras mientras que 14 de los 15 personajes cuya entrada se propone a la administración Obama son hombres blancos protestantes o judíos askenazis. El reordenamiento político es también una recuperación del control en el plano étnico y religioso.

Thierry Meyssan

http://www.voltairenet.org/article186509.html

salud

[No Logo]

Otro más de Meyssan. Poco "currado" -le falta poner emoticonos- pero supongo que publicará algo más elaborado al respecto.

El rearme de Obama


Thierry Meyssan

Mientras la prensa atlantista saluda la nueva Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos como una voluntad de recurrir primero a las vías no militares para la solución de conflictos, Thierry Meyssan ve en esa doctrina una profesión de fe imperialista así como una declaración de guerra al resto del mundo. Nuestros lectores podrán comprobar quién tiene la razón al consultar por sí mismos el documento original, disponible para su descarga al final de este artículo.

Red Voltaire | Damasco (Siria) | 9 de febrero de 2015


El presidente Obama acaba de hacer pública su Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional (National Security Strategy), documento que expresa las ambiciones de su país y cuya publicación se hizo esperar por largo tiempo. Recurriendo a la jerga tradicional de los peores politiqueros, Obama define en esa doctrina su propia visión del imperialismo. ¿Cómo interpretarla?

A— Los 8 obstáculos que enfrenta la dominación imperial

El primer obstáculo es la reducción del gasto militar. «La fuerza no es la primera opción de Estados Unidos» pero a veces es necesario optar por ella, lo cual implicaría que ese país tiene que conservar su aplastante superioridad militar [el presupuesto militar de Estados Unidos es superior a la suma de los presupuestos militares de todos los demás países del mundo] y debe renunciar a tratar de economizar dinero en ese aspecto.

El segundo obstáculo es el peligro de rebelión armada interna. Desde los atentados del 11 de septiembre de 2001, el miedo al terrorismo permitió fortalecer la vigilancia sobre la ciudadanía. La «Patriot Act» ha «protegido a personas vulnerables de ciertas ideologías extremistas que hubiesen podido llevarlas a [realizar] acciones en suelo» estadounidense.

El tercero es el terrorismo transnacional que Estados Unidos creó y que ahora se ve constantemente obligado a tratar de controlar. Como medio de evitar que la lucha contra ese obstáculo sea utilizada como pretexto para ajustes de cuentas internos, ese combate tendrá que desarrollarse en el marco de un riguroso respeto de las leyes estadounidenses [no del derecho internacional que interpreta el hecho de orquestar el terrorismo como un crimen internacional].

El cuarto obstáculo es la recuperación del poderío ruso y adicionalmente las provocaciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, designada como Corea del Norte para que la gente recuerde que Estados Unidos no ha podido vencerla y que bien pudiera reanudar la guerra contra ese país.

El quinto es el posible acceso de nuevos Estados al rango de potencia nuclear, lo cual los pondría en condiciones de oponer resistencia a los designios de Washington. Cuando se aborda este tema, la opinión pública internacional piensa en Irán. Pero el presidente Obama está pensando en Corea. Y poco importa que el actual ocupante de la Casa Blanca nunca haya respetado sus promesas de desnuclearización, ni que la OTAN le sirva para violar el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear firmado por Estados Unidos.

El sexto obstáculo es el cambio climático, que está obligando las poblaciones a emigrar y que, por lo tanto, amenaza el statu quo.

El séptimo es el hecho que Estados Unidos está perdiendo el control exclusivo que venía ejerciendo sobre los espacios comunes.
Primeramente, el ciberespacio: por ser propietario de internet y disponer a la vez de un gigantesco sistema de escuchas ilegales, Estados Unidos no previó que alguien pudiera llegar a utilizar ese modo de comunicación para escapar al pago de patentes, derechos de autor y derechos sobre las marcas, que hoy constituyen su primera fuente de ingresos.
Viene después el espacio exterior: Estados Unidos respalda el proyecto europeo de Código de Conducta sobre las Actividades Espaciales, lo cual es una vía para escapar al proyecto ruso-chino de Tratado de Prohibición de Instalación de Armas en el Espacio.
Y, para terminar, el espacio aéreo y el mar: Desde la aprobación de la Carta del Atlántico, Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido se autoproclamaron policía del aire y de los mares, garantizando la libre circulación de las mercancías y extendiendo así su talasocracia.

El octavo obstáculo es el riesgo de aparición de una epidemia: Desde hace un año, Estados Unidos instauró, con una treintena de aliados, la Global Health Security Agenda que tiene como objetivos detectar y contener las epidemias así como responder al bioterrorismo.

B— Los objetivos económicos

El primero es garantizar trabajo a los estadounidenses, no para que gocen de un mejor nivel de vida sino para que garanticen el poderío económico del país.

En segundo lugar, Estados Unidos está ante un problema de seguridad energética, no porque tenga problemas de aprovisionamiento –hoy por hoy dispone de más petróleo del que necesita, gracias al petróleo mexicano cuyo control ha logrado discretamente– sino porque Rusia pretende seguir el ejemplo estadounidense haciéndose del control del mercado mundial del gas.

El tercer objetivo es que, en lo adelante, el liderazgo estadounidense en materia de ciencia y tecnología no debe depender de la inmigración de cerebros, que tiende a disminuir, sino del sistema escolar nacional estadounidense.

El cuarto objetivo es que el nuevo orden económico haga de Estados Unidos el primer destino de la inversión a nivel mundial. Eso significa que todos los llamados a estimular la inversión aquí y allá serán, en lo adelante, puramente formales.

Quinto y último, Estados Unidos debe utilizar la pobreza extrema existente en el mundo para imponer el consumo de sus propios productos.

C— La ideología

Estados Unidos es un país irreprochable en materia de «Derechos Humanos», que deben interpretarse en el sentido anglosajón, o sea como la protección del individuo ante la arbitrariedad de los Estados. Pero habrá que evitar que se imponga la concepción de la Revolución Francesa, donde los revolucionarios consideraban que el primer «Derecho del Hombre y del Ciudadano» no era el derecho a elegir sus dirigentes entre los miembros de las élites sino el derecho a ser su propio dirigente.

La administración Obama puso fin al uso de la tortura y garantizó los derechos de los prisioneros que tenía en su poder. Poco importa que los hombres de la CIA que utilizaron a los prisioneros como conejillos de Indias no hayan sido juzgados por sus crímenes, o que no se haya realizado ninguna investigación para determinar por qué 80 000 personas estuvieron ilegalmente detenidas en aguas internacionales a bordo de barcos de la marina de guerra estadounidense en tiempos de la administración Bush. También nos piden que creamos que la NSA [1] no recoge información para reprimir las opiniones políticas. También tendríamos que creer que la NSA no transmite esa información al Advocacy Center para favorecer a las empresas estadounidenses en los procesos de licitaciones internacionales.

Estados Unidos defiende principios universales, como la libertad de expresión (menos la de las televisiones de Serbia, Irak, Libia y Siria destruidas por órdenes de Washington), la libertad de culto (pero no la libertad de conciencia) y la libertad de reunión, la libertad de elegir a los líderes democráticamente (menos en el caso del 88% de electores sirios que votó por Bachar al-Assad) y el derecho a un juicio justo y a un sistema judicial imparcial (claro, únicamente en materia de derecho penal y en países que no sean Estados Unidos). También defiende las comunidades más vulnerables, como las minorías étnicas y religiosas (pero no a los yazidíes, ni a los católicos y cristianos ortodoxos del Medio Oriente), como los discapacitados, los homosexuales, lesbianas y transexuales (en definitiva eso no cuesta nada), las personas desplazadas (menos los mexicanos que tratan de cruzar la frontera estadounidense) y los trabajadores emigrantes.

Estados Unidos apoya las democracias emergentes, sobre todo desde que comenzaron las primaveras árabes. Por eso apoyó la revolución de al-Qaeda contra la Yamahiria Árabe Libia y sigue apoyando a esa nebulosa terrorista en contra de la República Árabe Siria.

Estados Unidos lucha también contra la corrupción seguro de que nadie puede criticarlo ya que los miembros del Congreso estadounidense no reciben dinero a escondidas para que voten a favor o en contra de tal o mas cual proyecto sino que declaran esas sumas en un registro.

Estados Unidos seguirá financiando asociaciones en el exterior y escogiendo sus interlocutores para poder maquillar los golpes de Estados que orquesta como «revoluciones de colores».

Estados Unidos se empeñará además en prevenir las masacres (pero no en evitar cometerlas, como sucedió con los 160 000 libios a los que bombardeó cuando recibió un mandato para protegerlos). Para ello apoyará la Corte Penal Internacional (a condición de que no persiga a ningún funcionario estadounidense).

D— El Nuevo Orden regional

Extremo Oriente: Aunque China está compitiendo con Estados Unidos, este último evitará el enfrentamiento y «tratará de desarrollar una relación constructiva» con Pekín. Sin embargo, como siempre hay que ser prudente, también seguirá desplazando sus tropas hacia el Extremo Oriente y preparándose para la guerra mundial.

Europa: Estados Unidos seguirá apoyando la Unión Europea que impuso a los pueblos europeos y que es su principal cliente. Tampoco dejará de utilizar a la Unión Europea, su «socio indispensable», en contra de Rusia.

Medio Oriente: Estados Unidos garantiza la supervivencia de la colonia judía en Palestina. Para ello seguirán dotándola de una importantísima ventaja tecnológica militar. Y sobre todo seguirá construyendo una alianza militar entre Israel, Jordania y las monarquías del Golfo encabezadas por Arabia Saudita, enterrando así definitivamente el mito del conflicto israelo-árabe.

África: Estados Unidos subvencionará «jóvenes líderes» y los ayudará a ser electos «democráticamente».

Latinoamérica: Estados Unidos luchara por la democracia en Venezuela y Cuba, países que se obstinan en resistirse a Washington.

E— Conclusión

Concluyendo su exposición, el presidente Obama subraya que ese programa sólo podrá cumplirse restaurando la cooperación entre republicanos y demócratas, lo cual es una manera de recordar su propio proyecto de aumento de los gastos militares.

Para entender la nueva Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional hay que situarla en su contexto. En 2010, el presidente Obama había abandonado la teoría de la «guerra preventiva», o sea el derecho del más fuerte a asesinar a quién mejor le parezca. Ahora abandona el proyecto de «rediseño del Medio Oriente ampliado». Teniendo en cuenta los objetivos anteriormente enunciados, podemos concluir que Estados Unidos empujará el Emirato Islámico hacia Rusia, que finalmente no reconocerá la independencia del Kurdistán iraquí y que pondrá la seguridad de Israel en manos de Jordania y Arabia Saudita en vez de confiarla a Rusia, como había proyectado hacerlo en 2012.  Alguien que sea tan amable de darme norte.....

La Doctrina Obama pasará a la historia como el reconocimiento de un fracaso y el anuncio de una catástrofe: Washington abandona su proyecto de reorganización militar y opta nuevamente por el desarrollo de sus ejércitos. Durante los 70 últimos años, el presupuesto militar estadounidense ha estado en constante aumento, con excepción del periodo 1991-1995, cuando Washington creyó poder conquistar el mundo sólo a través de los mecanismos económicos, y en 2013-2014, cuando Estados Unidos tomó conciencia de su desorganización. En efecto, desde hace años, mientras más dinero dedican a sus fuerzas armadas peor funcionan estas. Pero nadie logra reformar el sistema. No pudo hacerlo Donald Rumsfeld ni tampoco lo ha logrado Chuck Hagel.

Así que habrá que seguir alimentando el monstruo, tanto en el plano presupuestario como inventando guerras para mantenerlo ocupado.

http://www.voltairenet.org/article186682.html

salud