Hablemos de Europa

[saturno]

Para que comparen (se rían un poco) y se digan que no todo es absurdo:


Son los sistemas de imposición a la plus-valía en Europa-



Especialmente dedicado para Republik.


No sé el sitio de origen. Lo encontré en un foro en v/FR
http://www.bulle-immobiliere.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=170&t=82619&
sid=586e5d3e31e874d79ec2c147d84e2ce4#p1636217

[españavabien]

La cuestión europea es complicada porque partimos de la base de que la idea de la UE surgió en la época de las Naciones-Estado cerradas (años '50 y '60) pero su evolución ha sido tan lenta que han aparecido nuevas realidades (la globalización, el libre comercio a escala mundial, etc.) no previstas.

Tampoco nadie hizo previsiones de que llegarían a integrarse los estados de Europa del Este. Hay que pensar que una UE como en los '70, con Francia, Alemania, el Benelu y, Dinamarca era fácilmente integrable, incluso es fácil pensar que en UK se entusiasmarían con la idea.

Pero de esa UE que naturalmente convergía en una en todos los sentidos, se ha pasado a una UE demasiado diversa.

[saturno]

Más diversos y con menos facilidades de integración que ahora, eran los Estados-Ciudad, nobiliarios o burgueses que dieron lugar a los Estados Nación. Unificar Europa es infantil comparado con lo de antes.

Lo de antes  tardó 11 o 12 siglos desde que los Imperios Germánico, Sajon o Franco (o Hispano, pero supongo que eso se mira desde la Rconquista) se sacudieron el poder de los papas, hasta parir el Estado moderno, cuando hoy basta con un par de directivas para que Europa deje de buscarse los piojos y de chuparse el dedo.

la Union Europea está formada por Estados de derecho, es condición sine-qua-non de adhesion y pertenencia.
Considerar que los Estados nación son un problema para la unificación Europea, es equivocarse de 2 siglos como poco.
El problema no está por ahí,

[españavabien]

Más diversos y con menos facilidades de integración que ahora, eran los Estados-Ciudad, nobiliarios o burgueses que dieron lugar a los Estados Nación. Unificar Europa es infantil comparado con lo de antes.

Lo de antes  tardó 11 o 12 siglos desde que los Imperios Germánico, Sajon o Franco (o Hispano, pero supongo que eso se mira desde la Rconquista) se sacudieron el poder de los papas, hasta parir el Estado moderno, cuando hoy basta con un par de directivas para que Europa deje de buscarse los piojos y de chuparse el dedo.

la Union Europea está formada por Estados de derecho, es condición sine-qua-non de adhesion y pertenencia.
Considerar que los Estados nación son un problema para la unificación Europea, es equivocarse de 2 siglos como poco.
El problema no está por ahí,

En cuanto a facilidad de unirse, no creo que la diversidad sea un problema. El problema es precisamente lo contrario: el mundo se está haciendo cada vez más pequeño y hoy en día cualquier país europeo puede comerciar con el que le dé la gana firmando un tratado de libre comercio.

Si UK se unió a la UE (los conservadores eran precisamente entonces los mayores defensores de estar en Europa) fue precisamente porque estaba sola tras el fin del Imperio y el libre comercio mundial no estaba ni en los mejores sueños eróticos de las grandes corporaciones de entonces.

Es tan fácil comerciar con cualquier país, que el sentido original de la UE (algo novedoso en su momento) pierde sentido. El único sentido que le queda a la UE es político. Lo económico ya está superado a una escala mucho mayor que la continental que ofrece la UE.

Y en temas políticos, lo esencial no es la divergencia actual sino la voluntad. Sería mejor dejar un núcleo fuerte europeo de países con verdadera voluntad de integración que prosiguiera la integración europea aunque dejara a un lado a muchos países que el estado actual. La UE-espacio-de-libre-comercio ya está superada por eso UK (que no tiene voluntad de integración política) ya no ve tan arriesgado marcharse. Al fin y al cabo, el libre comercio es la nueva sacrosanta ley internacional y no va a quedar aislada.

[muyuu]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32816454

Net migration to UK reaches 318,000

Net migration to the UK reached 318,000 last year - the highest total for a decade, new figures show.


The Office for National Statistics said this was a "statistically significant" rise of more than 109,000 from 2013.

There were increases in both EU and non-EU migration, with the total figure close to 2005's all-time high.

It comes as the Conservatives unveil new plans to seize the wages of illegal workers as proceeds of crime in an attempt to reduce the numbers.

Prime Minister David Cameron will say it has become "too easy" for migrants not entitled to be in the country to exploit loopholes.

At the moment, firms can be fined up to £20,000 for employing illegal workers.

However, the scale of the challenge facing ministers in reducing levels of legal immigration has been highlighted again by the new official figures on net migration.


The figures measure the difference between the numbers of people moving the UK for a year or more and those leaving the UK for a year or more.

They reveal:

641,000 people moved to the UK over the period, with 323,000 going the other way

284,000 people immigrated for work, a 70,000 increase

The number of Romanian and Bulgarians moving to the UK doubled to 46,000 in 2014


Employment of non-British EU nationals in the UK in January to March 2015 was 283,000 higher than the previous year

The Conservatives pledged before the 2010 election to reduce numbers to less than 100,000, a target they acknowledge they have failed to meet.

"There is no good news here for David Cameron," said BBC assistant political editor Norman Smith.

He said ministers were shifting the emphasis of the immigration debate away from numbers towards "blue collar concerns" like jobs, pay and housing.

Speaking on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, Home Secretary Theresa May said immigration in the tens of thousands remained the government's "aim".

"It's the ambition that we have set out in our manifesto," she said.

[video en el enlace]

Setting out how the target could be met, she said the Conservative government would "do some things that we wanted to do previously but we weren't able to do before because we were in coalition".
She also said the reforms would not necessarily need more investment in police and border services, saying they were about "making the system work better".
Mr Cameron will see first-hand efforts to combat illegal immigration on Thursday when he visits a premises in London shortly after it has been raided by immigration officials.
He will say the government is determined to "control and reduce" immigration, saying criminalising illegal workers must go hand-in-hand with other measures to lower demand for migrant labour, such as boosting the skills of UK workers.

The government says depriving illegal migrants of their wages will make it harder for them to remain in the UK.

A new criminal offence of illegal working will apply to migrants who have entered the country illegally and also those who came to the country legally but are in breach of their conditions or have overstayed.

At the moment, migrants with current leave to remain who are working illegally in breach of their conditions may be prosecuted and are liable, if convicted, to a six months' custodial sentence and-or an unlimited fine.

But migrants who entered the UK illegally or have overstayed their leave are not subject to the same sanctions, and the police do not have the same powers of confiscation in all cases.



'Less attractive'


Mr Cameron will say that "making Britain a less attractive place to come and work illegally" is a crucial part of a fair immigration policy - adding that a "strong country is one that controls immigration... not one that pulls up the drawbridge".

"The truth is it has been too easy to work illegally and employ illegal workers here," he will say in a speech in London.

"So we'll take a radical step - we'll make illegal working a criminal offence in its own right.

"That means wages paid to illegal migrants will be seized as proceeds of crime… and businesses will be told when their workers' visas expire… So if you're involved in illegal working - employer or employee - you're breaking the law."

However, lawyer Saira Grant, director of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, questioned how the new measure would be enforced.

"We're talking about people who're illegally here, working cash-in-hand below the radar," she said.

"Are the wages going to be seized retrospectively? But more importantly we are talking about very vulnerable people, with very little money as it is, often supporting families."
She added that extending the "deport first, appeal later" principle to all non-asylum cases, another measure set to feature in a forthcoming immigration bill, would be "extremely detrimental to access to justice".

Among other proposed measures are new powers for councils to deal with unscrupulous landlords and to evict illegal migrants more quickly, while all foreign criminals awaiting deportation will be fitted with satellite tracking tags.
It will also become an offence for businesses and recruitment agencies to hire abroad without first advertising in the UK - a policy which featured prominently in Labour's election manifesto.


'Tackling exploitation'


Ministers say the package builds on the progress made over the past five years but critics say the Conservatives' tough rhetoric has not been matched by action on the ground, either in tackling illegal immigration or curbing legal immigration.
Labour welcomed the action but said it did not go far enough.

"A lot of this will look very familiar to anyone who read Labour's manifesto," shadow immigration minister David Hanson said.

"It is clear the measures outlined here will not be sufficient to tackle exploitation. There needs to be a clear offence of exploitation that undercuts local jobs and wages, which the police and other experts have called for."

Figures published in February showed that not only is net migration 50,000 higher than when Mr Cameron came to power, but even non-EU migration - which ministers had claimed to have brought under control - has been increasing rapidly.

Don Flynn, of the Migrants' Rights Network, said seizing wages would force some people into "systems of modern slavery without hope of protection from the law".

"Irregular migrants in the UK fit no one's image of a law-breaker living on the proceeds of crime," he said.

"Their vulnerable status means they are confined to the most insecure and exploitative forms of employment, usually earning scarcely enough to maintain themselves on a day-to-day basis."

The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants said the measures would do nothing to ease the pressure on public services.

[saturno]

Muy bueno el GEAB. Muy bueno, por el análisis y las conclusiones. La parte pública del artículo incluye a Europa.

http://geab.eu/es/euukus-union-dislocacion-reinvencion-la-gran-transformacion-sistemica-de-occidente-2/

[muyuu]

[muyuu]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11622754/Merkel-doubts-Greek-deal-as-leaders-decide-over-euro-fate.html

'We can't just throw Greece out of the euro' - Juncker warns ahead of crunch summit
German finance minister opens up rift with Brussels after reportedly touting parallel currency plan for Greece


An agreement over Greece's eurozone future continued to elude European leaders, as late night talks failed to bridge the gap between Athens' Leftist government and its creditor partners.

Meeting until 1am in Riga, Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Francois Hollande came no closer to a breakthough with Greek premier Alexis Tsipras on the sidelines of a European summit.

Describing talks as "friendly" and "constructive", Ms Merkel dashed hope that a deal could be struck between Europe's heads of state.

"A conclusion needs to be found with the three institutions and there needs to be very, very intensive work," the German premier said on Friday morning.

Athens' Syriza government has failed to extract any concessions from its international lenders after four months of fruitless talks.

German finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble has hinted the country should not remain in the euro at all costs, pressuring Mr Tsipras to back down over his Leftist "red lines" on labour and pensions reform.

In contrast to Ms Merkel's comments in Riga, Mr Schaeuble is thought to have touted the possibility of a "parallel currency" for Greece at a recent meeting of European officials, according to reports in Bloomberg.

The German number two is reported to have cited the example of Montenegro, which uses the euro but sits outside the currency union, without explicitly advocating it as a blueprint for Greece. In an interview with Les Echos earlier this week, Mr Schaeuble refused to either support or deny plans for a parallel currency.

The introduction of an alternative currency, to help Greece make its domestic obligations in the form of IOU's, is seen as the first step towards ejecting the country from the single currency.

Any plans for Greece to drop the euro would cause "havoc" in Greece, according to Willem Buiter, chief economist at Citi.

"The notion that Greece exits with or without a shadow currency or a proper currency [is rubbish]. Greece has not, historically, been good at managing an independent currency," Mr Buiter told CNBC.

He also dismissed the notion of a Montenegro-style arrangement for Greece as "rubbish" but insisted a default to international lenders would not be "the end of the world" for the country.


In a signs of a rift between Brussels and hard-liners in Berlin, European Commission chief Jean-Claude Juncker warned the single currency was "not just about monetary policy and economic reasons, but also the dignity of the Greeks".

"You can not just throw a country out from the monetary union", Mr Juncker told Wirtschaftswoche

Mr Tsipras, who is due to meet the former Luxembourg chief at noon, said he was "optimistic" the country's partners would come to an agreement with his government.

"I am hopeful that we will soon be able to reach a stable, long-term and sustainable solution without the mistakes of the past – and that Greece will return, cohesively, to growth.”

The three leaders are thought to have agreed on the continued involvement of the International Monetary Fund in any new deal for Greece. IMF chief Christine Lagarde however ruled out any partial deal for Greece, saying the Fund would not agree to a "quick and dirty" arrangement that could delay the country's fate until the Autumn.

Mr Tsipras and Ms Merkel are both facing domestic backlashes from their respective parties over the bail-out negotiations.

The Greek premier is facing down the Left Platform of Syriza, who have called for Greece to default on its international lenders and continue making its social security and salary payments to public sector workers.

Outspoken leader of the Left faction, Panagiotis Lafazanis vowed not to sign-up to any deal that would jettison pre-election pledges.

"We will not accept an agreement that puts our program on the fringe," warned the firebrand energy minister.

Ms Merkel meanwhile has seen resistance to Greek aid grow within her Christian Democrat party.

Athens, which has been without international aid since August 2014, faces a series of repayments worth €1.5bn to the IMF in the first two weeks of June.

The government is also battling to convince lenders of its planned reforms to VAT and agreeing to softer budgetary targets for the next two years.

Finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has also insisted the state will prioritise its workers and pensioners over the Fund if no emergency cash is released, raising the spectre of an unprecedental international default.

[Republik]

Esta claro que el sistema francés de imposición a las plusvalías tiene por objeto dar trabajo a mucha gente en lo privado asesorando  y en lo públoco gestionando. Y se ve tambien por que los ricos franceses residen en la Suisse Romande  o EN Bélgica . Es compicado esto de unificar fiscalidades en europa.

[saturno]

Esta claro que el sistema francés de imposición a las plusvalías tiene por objeto dar trabajo a mucha gente en lo privado asesorando  y en lo públoco gestionando. Y se ve tambien por que los ricos franceses residen en la Suisse Romande  o EN Bélgica . Es compicado esto de unificar fiscalidades en europa.

No es nada difícil unificar fiscalidad. En el caso de Francia, basta recortar caciques y municipios con representantes. Ya se va haciendo, sí.

Creo que con Francia tenemos una visión idílica de sus Grandes Ecoles (Grandes Escuelas) y funcionarios que no conseguimos quitarnos de encima

Con la "Marca Francia" nos hemos topado, eh.

Leyendo a PPCC y TE.net, lo que era una sospecha (que comparto con toda la población) es casi una certeza: el caciquismo, el enchufismo, el vaciado de fondos están tan implantados en Francia como en España. Implantados a nivel estructural.

La ventaja de España es que es mucho más legible, grosera o simplificada dentro considerando que hablamos de un sistema de disimulación generalizado. Pero todas y cada una de las taras (y seguramente de las virtudes) de España tienen su equivalente galo.

Pero consolémonos: se puede decir lo mismo de Italia, Grecia, Irlanda, Bélgica, Suecia Alemania  (+27)

Realmente, Europa ya es una Union de hecho que sólo mantiene diferencias en las modalidades de corrupción publica. Es que olvidamos que la corrupción necesita ocultarse, levantar barreras, muros, fronteras para que no se sepa cómo funciona la gestión de lo público

Si corregimos la forma de entender Europa, en lugar de decir eso de que "los Estados Nación" impiden la Unión, comprenderíamos que lo único que nos distingue son las formas de corrupción pública.

Entonces, nuestra forma de actuar, sería mucho, mucho, mucho más eficaz.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Varoufakis VS Austeridad

ATENAS – Una falacia común permea en la cobertura informativa de la prensa mundial sobre las negociaciones entre el gobierno griego y sus acreedores. La falacia, que se ilustra en un comentario reciente de Philip Stephens del diario Financial Times, es que “Atenas no logra o no quiere –o las dos– poner en aplicación un programa de reforma económica.” Una vez que esta falacia se presenta como hecho es natural que la cobertura se centre en que nuestro gobierno, en palabras de Stephens, “está desperdiciando la confianza y buena voluntad de sus socios de la eurozona”.

No obstante, la realidad de las negociaciones es muy distinta. Nuestro gobierno está dispuesto a aplicar un programa que incluya todas las reformas económicas que señalan los grupos de reflexión económica de Europa. Además, estamos en una posición única para conservar el apoyo del público griego para un programa económico sólido.

Consideremos lo que eso significa: un organismo fiscal independiente; superávits fiscales primarios razonables permanentes; un programa sensato y ambicioso de privatización combinado con un organismo de desarrollo que utilice los activos públicos para crear flujos de inversión; una reforma verdadera de las pensiones que garantice la sostenibilidad a largo plazo del sistema de seguridad social; la liberalización de los mercados de bienes y servicios, etc.

Así pues, si nuestro gobierno está dispuesto a adoptar las reformas que nuestros socios esperan, ¿por qué no han producido las negociaciones un acuerdo? ¿En qué punto están bloqueadas?
El problema es sencillo: los acreedores de Grecia insisten en una austeridad incluso mayor para este año y más adelante –enfoque que impediría la recuperación, obstruiría el crecimiento, agravaría el ciclo deuda-deflación, y al final erosionaría la disponibilidad y capacidad de Grecia para aplicar el programa de reforma que el país necesita con tanta urgencia. Nuestro gobierno no puede aceptar –y no aceptará– un remedio que mostró durante más de cinco años ser peor que la enfermedad.

La insistencia de nuestros acreedores en aplicar una mayor austeridad es sutil y al mismo tiempo firme. Se pone de manifiesto en su exigencia de que Grecia mantenga superávits primarios elevados que no son sostenibles (más del 2% del PIB en 2016 y superiores al 2.5% o incluso al 3% en los años siguientes). Para lograrlo, tendríamos la obligación de aumentar la carga global del impuesto al valor agregado al sector privado, reducir pensiones ya de por sí reducidas en todos los sectores; y compensar las ganancias de la privatización (debido a los precios deprimidos de los activos) con medidas de consolidación fiscal “equivalentes”.

La opinión de que Grecia no ha logrado una consolidación fiscal suficiente no solo es falsa, es patentemente absurda. La gráfica (ver abajo) no solo lo muestra sino también explica sucintamente por qué Grecia no ha tenido resultados tan positivos como por ejemplo, España, Portugal, Irlanda o Chipre desde la crisis financiera de 2008. En comparación con los demás países de la periferia de la eurozona, Grecia ha sido objeto de una austeridad de al menos el doble. Eso es todo.

Después de la reciente victoria del primer ministro, David Cameron en Reino Unido, mi buen amigo, Lord Norman Lamont, ex ministro de Finanzas, comentó que la recuperación económica británica respalda la posición de nuestro gobierno. Recordó que en 2010, Grecia y Reino Unido tenían déficits fiscales más o menos similares (en comparación con el PIB). Grecia volvió a tener superávits primarios (que excluyen los pagos de intereses) en 2014, mientras que el gobierno británico consolidó de forma mucho más gradual y aún no tiene superávit.

Asimismo, Grecia ha enfrentado una contracción monetaria (que recientemente se ha convertido en asfixia monetaria), a diferencia del Reino Unido, donde el Banco de Inglaterra ha respaldado cada acción del proceso. El resultado es un continuo estancamiento de Grecia, mientras que el Reino Unido ha registrado un crecimiento sólido.

Observadores objetivos de las negociaciones entre Grecia y sus acreedores que han durado cuatro meses, no pueden evitar llegar a una simple conclusión: el mayor obstáculo, lo único que impide llegar a un acuerdo, es la insistencia de los acreedores en que se aplique una austeridad incluso mayor, aún a expensas del programa de reforma que nuestro gobierno está dispuesto a aplicar.

Evidentemente, la demanda de nuestros acreedores de una mayor austeridad no tiene que ver con preocupaciones sobre una reforma verdadera o avanzar hacia un camino fiscal sostenible en Grecia. Su única motivación es algo que solo los historiadores futuros – quienes sin duda examinarán gran parte de la cobertura de los medios actuales con algo de escepticismo– podrán averiguar.

[Republik]

Yo creo que el gradualismo en la consolidación fiscal es realmente necesario, y de hecho España no se ha hundido en el fango precisamente porque procrastina lo que le dejan, que no es poco, en estos temas. El gasto nominal español no empezó a caer hasta 2013 y lo ha hecho en menos de un 5% (y ya esto ha creado malesatar).

Pero el problemilla griego tiene  más tela que cortar porque sus cuentas, para empezar, eran muy falsas (dato.PIB incluido), con lo que se sobreestima groseramente la contracción debida al ajuste. Y sus deficit historicos son descomunales desde los años 70, es que en 4 décadas su único ejercicio presupuestario medio presentable ha sido 2014. Yo creo que solamente se podría pensar en reprimir un poco más su deuda (está al 1,8% efectivo, que se la reestructuren al 1%), pero un cierto orden es necesario en el país.

[saturno]

Está cambiando el discurso en Francia sobre la lectura de la crisis

L'immobilier, ce parasite de la croissance
http://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/l-immobilier-ce-parasite-de-la-croissance-478823.html

Une tendance orchestrée par les pouvoirs publics

Néanmoins, tout a été fait et orchestré par les pouvoirs publics pour forcer la main des banques à se montrer généreuse en termes de prêts immobiliers, comme pour motiver les achats à crédit de la part des citoyens. En effet, si les déductions fiscales accordées aux contribuables stimulent à l'évidence les acquisitions - voire la spéculation - immobilières. C'est les modifications des règles prudentielles dès les années 1970, et surtout dès 1988 (Bâle I), qui jetèrent littéralement les banques dans le précipice des crédits hypothécaires, à la faveur d'un assouplissement notable des ratios capitalistiques exigés pour toute opération immobilière, considérée nettement moins risquée par le régulateur qu'un prêt consenti à une entreprise.

LaTribune es un media economico "mainstream"  (el otro es les Echos)

(me da pereza traducir, pero básicamente, parece ppcciano: el cambio de la banca en los años 80 (Bale I) que empezó a preferir prestar para inmuebles en lugar de hacerlo a empresas, con el acuerdo de las AAPP. Ahora la perpetuacion por EEUU de lo mismo está volviendo a levantar la burbuja, pero Economia productiva, CERO.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-26/graccident-will-trigger-demise-ecb-and-worlds-toxic-regime-keynesian-central-banking

It is not surprising that in a few short months Yanis Varoufakis has proven himself to be a thoroughgoing Keynesian statist. After all, what would you expect from an economics PhD who co-authored books with Jamie Galbraith? The latter never saw an economic malady that could not be cured with bigger deficits, prodigious printing press “stimulus” and ever more intrusive state intervention and redistribution.

In what is apparently a last desperate game theory ploy, however, Varoufakis has done his countrymen, Europe and the world a favor. By informing his Brussels paymasters that they must continue to subsidize his bankrupt Greek state because it is the only way to preserve the European Project and vouchsafe the Euro, the Greek Finance minister blurted out the truth of the matter, albeit perhaps not intentionally:

“It would be a disaster for everyone involved, it would be a disaster primarily for the Greek social economy, but it would also be the beginning of the end for the common currency project in Europe,” he said.

“Whatever some analysts are saying about firewalls, these firewalls won’t last long once you put and infuse into people’s minds, into investors’ minds, that the eurozone is not indivisible,” he added.

He sure got that right. People who believe in democracy and economic liberty anywhere in the world should pray for a Graccident. During the next several weeks, when $1.8 billion in IMF loans come due that Greece cannot possibly pay, there will occur a glorious moment of irony for Syriza.

If it holds firm to its leftwing statist agenda and takes Greek democracy back from the clutches of the EU/IMF apparatchiks, Syriza will strike a blow for democracy and capitalism in one great historic volte-face. That is to say, defiance of the Germans and the troika would amount to a modern monetary Marathon; it would trigger a thundering collapse of the ECB and the cancerous superstate regime built upon it in Frankfurt and Brussels—–and, along with it, cast a mortal blow upon the worldwide Keynesian central banking regime, too.

The hour comes none to soon. In a few short years under Draghi and in the context of Europe’s fiscal and economic enfeeblement, the ECB has been transformed into a hideous reverse Robin Hood machine. So doing, it has gifted financial gamblers and front-runners with hundreds of billions of ill-gotten gains in the euro debt markets.

In the days shortly before Draghi issued his “whatever it takes” ukase, for example, the Italian 10-year bond was trading at 7.1%. So speculators who bought it then have made a cool 350% gain if they were old-fashioned enough to actually buy the bonds with cash. And they are laughing all the way to their estates in the South of France if their friendly prime broker had arranged to hock these deadbeat Italian bonds in the repo market even before payment was due. In that case, Mario’s front-runners are in the 1000% club and just plain giddy.



While it is extremely difficult to think of a reason that would justify such wanton redistribution to financial gamblers, the ECB rationale is so astoundingly threadbare as to be laughable. In a word, Draghi and his minions claims that Europe’s economic torpor stems from too little inflation and too little borrowing by private households and businesses. Hence, they have no choice except to drastically falsify prices in Europe’s entire $20 trillion bond market in order to rekindle 2% inflation and get economic growth off the flat line.

Oh, puleeze. The Eurozone economies have had no problem whatsoever in generating an ample quotient of inflation ever since the inception of the single currency—-as if that had anything to do with the growth of real production and wealth anyway.

In fact, the european CPI has gained an average of 2.1% per annum during the last decade and one-half. Self-evidently, the temporary flattening of the inflation curve in the last year is a consequence of the plunge of oil and other commodity prices, not anything that could possibly account for Europe’s languishing growth rate.



In fact, the euro area core CPI is up by nearly 1% during the last year, and has gained about 1.5% per annum during the past eight years during which time global oil prices have soared and collapsed twice. Quite simply, low-flation is a myth invented by the Keynesian money printers to justify massive monetization of the public debt.



So there is really nothing behind the low-flation mantra except the spurious argument that consumers will defer purchases unless assured that prices will continue to rise and eat away at their paychecks.

No, Mario, European consumers are not spending owing to the fact that their incomes are not growing. Household “demand” is tepid because take home pay everywhere in the eurozone is being eviscerated by high taxes. And consumers are not borrowing because their balance sheets are already saturated with more debt than they can sustain.

Indeed, private sector borrowing nearly tripled during the decade before the financial crisis. That it has flattened out since then only means that the supply of credit worthy borrowers has been exhausted, not that there exists some mysterious economic malady that can be cured by the ECB’s printing press.

Stated differently, even after accounting for the stagnation of loan growth in the last few years, private sector loans outstanding still represent a 6.0% per annum gain since 1997. And that compares to an average nominal GDP growth rate in the eurozone countries of just 3.3% annually. At some point, every debt addicted economy runs out of balance sheet runway——a condition that Europe attained long ago.



The good thing is that this whole misbegotten euro project cannot survive the impending Greek default. The ECB alone is now on the hook for $138 billion of Greek liabilities—–an amount that is equal to the remaining deposits in its entire banking system. Needless to say, when the impending “Graccident” explodes onto the front pages, there will be pandemonium at the ECB, and in Brussels and capitals throughout the 19-nation Eurozone.

Did the German politicians and voters really understand that their Bundesbank representatives in Frankfurt were not ferocious watchdogs of monetary rectitude after all; and that in crab-like fashion they backed their nation’s central bank into $35 billion of liabilities——–debts that are owed by a Greek banking system and central bank that is hopelessly insolvent?

No, the Greek banking system is actually such a complete financial zombie as to make the US savings and loan industry of the late 1980s look like a paragon of financial health in comparison.  For crying out loud, most of the Greek banking system’s so-called “capital” consists of deferred tax assets; and the collateral posted for its $87 billion of ELA loans consists of  the debt and guaranteed bonds of a Greek government that is self-evidently insolvent.

Never has such a gargantuan scam been pulled off in plain sight by official national and superstate institutions. Never has a central bank accepted such outright financial trash as collateral for massive advances to its member banks.

Yet week-by-week the clueless apparatchiks in Frankfurt have been metering out a couple of billions of ELA funding to keep the Greek banking zombie alive. When the scam finally blows, there will be a witch-hunt in the halls of the ECB’s grandiose new $2 billion palace like Europe hasn’t seen in generations.



The fact is, the ECB can’t survive the coming Graccident. It will not only be technically insolvent, but, more importantly, it will also be stripped of every vestige of credibility. How in the world, it will be demanded, did Draghi and his clueless posse loan $138 billion to the massively insolvent banking system of a bankrupt economy which is on the verge of economic and civic anarchy?

Moreover, it will also become swiftly evident that there was no Draghi miracle at all—-just a giant, preposterous con job. Accordingly, the front runners parade of the last three years will turn into a panicked selling rout among the fast money gamblers who have made a killing on paper, and the dim-witted bond managers and European bank investors which went along for the ride.

The truth is, Europe is a socialist fiscal time bomb waiting to explode. There is not one honest price left in the European sovereign debt market, including the 10-year German bund trading at 58 bps. Its all been an illusion conjured by the foolish Mario Draghi, who had no clue that all that soaring peripheral debt about which he was taking endless victory laps was actually being rented by the day by heavily leveraged speculators with their fingers on the sell button.

In short, when the taxpayers of Europe wake up to the $350 billion euros they have loaned the bankrupt state of Greece, and when the feckless politicians of Spain, Italy, Portugal, France and much of central Europe discover they can’t fund their bloated state budgets with 1% money after all, the financial furies will be unleashed throughout the continent.

Nor is there any hope for escape. The euro-19 area is now close to having a 100% debt to GDP ratio, and that’s flattered by German surpluses from an export boom that is rapidly cooling, and the fact the for a few quarters Mario’s printing press has conferred huge interest rate subsidies on their depleted fiscal accounts.



The pending Graccident will puncture that illusion, tipping most of Europe into acute fiscal crisis and political upheaval of the type that has already roiled Greece and was starkly evident in Spain’s elections last weekend. The odds that the European superstate and the ECB’s Keynesian monetary regime will survive the resulting upheaval are, thankfully, somewhere between slim and none.

And there is a silver-lining, too.  Someday the historians will point to the image below and say that the end game of Keynesian central banking started here. It could not commence too soon.

[muyuu]

Estamos en el grupo "vulnerable", según parece. Chipre, Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Portugal, Eslovenia y España.