Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[2 años]

No es coña, claro, pero para la opinión pública áfrica es pobreza. Yo no dije ni si ni no, porque recordé que un policía amigo me decía que en la academia hace bastantes años les decían que España iba a ser un pais de turismo, asilo de europa, servicios... lo que leia en burbuja cuando empecé pero mucho antes, vamos. Los caminos y el pescado esta vendido bastante antes de lo que nos pensamos los mindundis, me temo.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Chinese "New Normal"

MILAN – The world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, seem to be enduring secular slowdowns. But there remains considerable uncertainty about their growth trajectory, with significant implications for asset prices, risk, and economic policy.

The US seems to be settling into annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rates of around 2%, though whether this is at or below the economy’s potential remains a source of heated debate. Meanwhile, China seems to be headed for the 6-7% growth rate that the government pinpointed last year as the economy’s “new normal.” Some observers agree that such a rate can be sustained for the next decade or so, provided that the government implements a comprehensive set of reforms in the coming few years. Others, however, expect China’s GDP growth to continue to trend downward, with the possibility of a hard landing.

There is certainly cause for concern. Slow and uncertain growth in Europe – a major trading partner for both the US and China – is creating headwinds for the US and China.

Moreover, the US and China – indeed, the entire global economy – are suffering from weak aggregate demand, which is creating deflationary pressures. As central banks attempt to combat these pressures by lowering interest rates, they are inadvertently causing releveraging (an unsustainable growth pattern), elevated asset prices (with some risk of a downward correction, given slow growth), and devaluations (which merely move demand around the global economy, without increasing it).

For China, which to some extent still depends on external markets to drive economic growth, this environment is particularly challenging – especially as currency depreciation in Europe and Japan erode export demand further. Even without the crisis in major external markets, however, a large and complex middle-income economy like China’s could not realistically expect growth rates above 6-7%.

Yet, in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, China insisted on maintaining extremely high growth rates of 9% for two years, by relying on fiscal stimulus, huge liquidity injections, and a temporary halt in the renminbi’s appreciation. Had the government signaled the “new normal” earlier, expectations would have been conditioned differently. This would have discouraged undue investment in some sectors, reduced non-performing loans, and contained excessive leverage in the corporate sector, while avoiding the mispricing of commodities. Growth would still have slowed, but with far less risk.

In the current situation, however, China faces serious challenges. Given weak growth in external demand and an already-large market share for many goods, China cannot count on export growth to sustain economic performance in the short run. And, though support for infrastructure investment by China’s trading partners – especially through the “one belt, one road” policy – may help to strengthen external markets in the longer term, this is no substitute for domestic aggregate demand.

Investment can sustainably drive growth only up to the point when returns decline dramatically. In the case of public-sector investment, that means that the present value of the increment to the future GDP path (using a social discount rate) is greater than the investment itself.

The good news is that growing discipline seems to be pushing out low-return investment. And there is every reason to believe that investment will remain high as the economy’s capital base expands.

But, in order to boost demand, China will also need increased household consumption and improved delivery of higher-value services. Recent data suggest that, notwithstanding recent wage increases, consumption amounts to only about 35% of GDP. With a high household savings rate of around 30% of disposable income, per capita disposable income amounts to roughly half of per capita GDP. Expanded social-security programs and a richer menu of saving and investment options could go a long way toward reducing precautionary saving and boosting consumption. But what is really needed is a shift in the distribution of income toward households.

Without a concerted effort to increase households’ share of total income and raise consumption’s share of aggregate demand, growth of consumer products and services on the supply side will remain inadequate. Given that services are a significant source of incremental employment, their expansion, in particular, would help to sustain inclusive growth.

Another key challenge concerns China’s slumping property sector, in which construction and prices dropped rapidly last year. If highly leveraged developers are under stress, they could produce non-performing loans – and thus considerable risk – in both the traditional and shadow banking sectors.

Fortunately, Chinese households’ relatively low leverage means that the kind of balance-sheet damage that occurred in some advanced countries during the crisis, leading to a huge drop in demand, is unlikely, even if real-estate prices continue to decline. It also means that there remains some space for expanding consumer credit to boost demand.

That is not the only source of hope. Wages are rising, deposit insurance will be introduced, and deposit rates are being liberalized. Internet investment vehicles are growing. New businesses in the services sector – 3.6 million of which were started just last year – are generating incremental employment, thanks partly to a new streamlined licensing framework. And online platforms are facilitating increased consumption, while expanding market access and financing for smaller businesses.

China’s leaders should aim to accelerate and build upon these trends, rather than pursuing additional fiscal and monetary stimulus. Public investment is high enough; expanding it now would shift the composition of aggregate demand in the wrong direction. And, with the corporate sector already overleveraged, a broad-based expansion of credit is not safe.

Any fiscal stimulus now should focus on improving public services, encouraging consumption, and increasing household income. Accelerating the expansion of state-funded social security could bring down household savings over time. More generally, China must deploy its large balance sheet to deliver income or benefits that expand what households view as safely consumable income. Given that private investment responds mainly to demand, such measures would likely reverse its current downward path.

A further slowdown in China is a distinct possibility. China’s leaders must do what it takes to ensure that such a slowdown is not viewed as secular trend – a perception that could undermine the consumption and investment that the economy so badly needs.

[spainfull]

a raíz de nombrarlo en este hilo me estoy leyendo las entradas de FOFOA (de momento 2014), y la de Pensar como un gigante 3 me parece reveladora. Básicamente explica cómo ha servido el oro para preservar la riqueza de los realmente adinerados (gigantes) y el por qué de los precios del oro en la calle y sus variaciones. También la relación pretróleo/oro debido a que es lo que los saudíes querían a cambio. Las explicaciones tienen bastante sentido y casan bastante con lo que ha estado pasando. Me asaltan algunas dudas, pero las dejo para otro día cuando lo relea.

Por cierto, ¿alguien está suscrito al GEAB? ¿Merece la pena?

Gracias, saludos.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

a raíz de nombrarlo en este hilo me estoy leyendo las entradas de FOFOA (de momento 2014), y la de Pensar como un gigante 3 me parece reveladora. Básicamente explica cómo ha servido el oro para preservar la riqueza de los realmente adinerados (gigantes) y el por qué de los precios del oro en la calle y sus variaciones. También la relación pretróleo/oro debido a que es lo que los saudíes querían a cambio. Las explicaciones tienen bastante sentido y casan bastante con lo que ha estado pasando. Me asaltan algunas dudas, pero las dejo para otro día cuando lo relea.

Por cierto, ¿alguien está suscrito al GEAB? ¿Merece la pena?

Gracias, saludos.

A mi también me interesa la opinión de otros foreros sobre el GEAB. Yo estuve apuntado durante un año a STRATFOR, que es interesante aunque muy sesgado en mi opinión. Se aprenden cosas con ellos, aunque también introducen distorsiones...

Me alegro Spainfull que te animes a leer a Fofoa puedes ir contándonos tus impresiones!

[Frommer]

El GEAB tiene una parte bastante interesante en "abierto" creo...

[wanderer]

Festival del Humor (me recuerda a nuestro ínclito Miguel Sebastián y aquello de no puedes entrar a joder una fiesta quitando la música y las copas (o algo así, que no tengo interés en buscar la cita literal)):

Guess Who Predicted The Failure Of QE
Janet Yellen:

    "As Japan found during its quantitative easing program, increasing the size of the monetary base above levels needed to provide ample liquidity to the banking system had no discernible economic effects aside from those associated with communicating the Bank of Japan’s commitment to the zero interest rate policy.

    I think my views on this mirror those that you expressed in your opening comments, Mr. Chairman."

- FOMC Minutes from Dec 2008



How did that work out?

We assume principles go out the window when the orders come down from the banker-owners on high...

*  *  *

However, today we get more total hypocrisy from the newly found bond guru and hedge fund adviser via his blog...

Responding to The Wall Street Journal's questioning the efficacy of monetary policy (specifically ZIRP and QE), Bernanke scoffs:

    Where [monetary policy] can be helpful is in supporting the return to full employment, and there the record has been reasonably good. Indeed, it seems clear that the Fed's aggressive actions are an important reason that job creation in the United States has outstripped that of other industrial countries by a wide margin.

    The WSJ also argues that, because monetary policy has not been a panacea for our economic troubles, we should stop using it. I agree that monetary policy is no panacea, and as Fed chairman I frequently said so. With short-term interest rates pinned near zero, monetary policy is not as powerful or as predictable as at other times. But the right inference is not that we should stop using monetary policy, but rather that we should bring to bear other policy tools as well.

So while in 2008, QE had no discernible economic effects... in 2015 it is a powerful tool for lowering unemployment rates? What a farce!?
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-04-30/guess-who-predicted-failure-qe

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://online.barrons.com/articles/SB120917419049046805?tesla=y

WE'VE FOUND IT -- A COPY OF ALAN Greenspan's long-lost Ph.D. thesis! Or, more accurately, a rare copy of the elusive document, in Lassie-Come-Home-fashion, found us.

The dissertation, written in 1977 when Greenspan received his coveted degree from New York University, had been tucked away on a professor's sagging bookshelf for 31 years.

There are only two known copies: the Maestro's own and the one we viewed. As far as we can tell, Barron's is the only news organization ever to have seen the thesis since a third and now missing copy was removed from the public shelves of NYU's Bobst library at Greenspan's request in 1987, the year that Ronald Reagan appointed him chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. Glancing at the document, we momentarily felt like Indiana Jones at the dramatic moment in which he discovers the Lost Ark of the Covenant.

Greenspan purportedly was trying to deter news coverage of his personal life when he ordered the thesis into hiding. His anti-paparazzi subterfuge backfired: The stealth thesis became red meat for his critics, who smelled a cover-up. Magazine articles and a new book, Deception and Abuse at the Fed (reviewed here on March 31), have suggested that his degree was largely honorary and that the thesis was a cut-and-paste job, comprised of previously published, non-academic articles wrapped in a flimsy introduction.

TWO MAGAZINE ARTICLES IN THE late 1990s suggested that the thesis was entirely the work of Greenspan's staff at the Council of Economic Advisers, which he chaired from 1974-1977.

Not true, says Paul Wachtel, an NYU economics professor who was on Greenspan's thesis committee. Though the work is, in fact, a collection of previously published articles, he says that it is hardly unusual, as some critics assert, for a collection of articles to be submitted as a thesis. "There's no requirement that a Ph.D. thesis be a single magnum opus, based on the German 19th-century model," Wachtel maintains, noting that Greenspan also had to vigorously defend his work to earn his degree. (Greenspan wouldn't comment publicly to Barron's on the matter.)

The thesis, which runs close to 180 pages, isn't for the casual reader. Two chapters that had been published as articles in the American Statistical Association's annual proceedings contain several pages of algebraic equations that, frankly, made our head ache.

We were tickled to find that the work's introduction includes a discussion of soaring housing prices and their effect on consumer spending; it even anticipates a bursting housing bubble. Writes Greenspan: "There is no perpetual motion machine which generates an ever-rising path for the prices of homes."

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-01/too-big-fail-license-recklessness-americas-banking-system-fragile-house-cards

Anat Admati teaches finance and economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and is co-author of The Bankers' New Clothes, a classic account of the problem of Too Big to Fail banks. On May 6th, at the Finance and Society Conference sponsored by the Institute for New Economic Thinking, she will join Brooksley Born, former chair of Chair of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, to discuss how effective financial regulation can make the system work better for society. Seven years after the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Admati warns that we are not doing nearly enough to confront a bloated, inefficient, and dangerous financial system. The system can't fix itself. Here's what you need to know.

Lynn Parramore: How would you describe the problem of Too Big to Fail banks. Whey does it matter to an ordinary person?

Anat Admati: Too Big to Fail is a license for recklessness. These institutions defy notions of fairness, accountability, and responsibility. They are the largest, most complex, and most indebted corporations in the entire economy.
 
We all have to be really alarmed by the fact that not only do we still have such institutions, but many of them are ever-larger and more complex and at least as dangerous, if not more so, than they were before the financial crisis.
 
They are too big to manage and control. They take enormous risks that endanger everybody. They benefit from the upside and expose the rest of us to the downside of their decisions. These banks are too powerful politically as well.
 
As they seek profits, they can make wasteful and inefficient loans that harm ordinary people, and at the same time they might refuse to make certain business loans that can help the economy. They can even break the laws and regulations without the people responsible being held accountable. Effectively we're hostages because their failure would be so harmful. They're likely to be bailed out if their risks don't turn out well.
 
Ordinary people continue to suffer from a recession that was greatly exacerbated or even caused by recklessness in the financial system and failed regulation. But the largest institutions, especially their leaders — even in the failed ones — have suffered the least. They're thriving again and arguably benefitting the most from efforts to stimulate the economy.
 
So there's something wrong with this picture. And there's also increasing recognition that bloated banks and a bloated financial system – these huge institutions—are a drag on the economy.

LP: Have we made any progress in dealing with the problem?

AA: The progress has been totally unfocused and insufficient. Dodd-Frank claims to have solved the problem and it gives plenty of tools to regulators to do what needs to be done (many of these tools they actually already had before). But this law is really complex and the implementation of it is very messy. The lobbying by the financial industry is a large part of the reason that the law has been implemented so poorly and inefficiently with so much difficulty. We are failing to take simple steps and at the same time undertaking extremely costly steps with doubtful benefits.
 
So we've had far from enough progress. We are told things are better but they are nowhere near what we should expect and demand. Much more can be done right now.

LP: Banks, compared to other businesses, finance an enormous portion of their assets with borrowed money, or debt – as much as 95 percent. Yet bankers often claim that this is perfectly fine, and if we make them depend less on debt they will be forced to lend less. What is your view? Would asking banks to rely more on unborrowed money, or equity, somehow hurt the economy?

AA: Sometimes when I don't have time to unpack everything I use a quote from a book called Payoff: Why Wall Street Always Wins by Jeff Connaughton. He relates something Paul Volcker once said to Senator Ted Kaufman: "You know, just about whatever anyone proposes, no matter what it is, the banks will come out and claim that it will restrict credit and harm the economy…It's all bullshit."
 
Here's one obvious reason such claims are, in Volcker's vocabulary, bullshit: Lending suffered most when banks didn't have enough equity to absorb their losses in the crisis — and then we had to bail them out. The loss they suffered on the subprime fiasco was relatively small by comparison to losses to investors when the Internet bubble burst, but there was so much debt throughout the system, and indeed in the housing markets, and so much interconnection that the entire financial system almost collapsed. That's when lending suffered. So lending and growth suffers when the banks have too little equity, not too much.
 
Now, banks naturally have some debt, like deposits. But they don't feel indebted even when they rely on 95 percent debt to finance their assets. No other healthy company lives like that, and nobody, even banks, needs to live like that — that's the key. Normally, the market would not allow this to go on; those who are as heavily indebted feel the burden in many ways. The terms of the debt become too burdensome for corporations, and reflect the inefficient investment decisions made by heavily indebted companies. But banks have much nicer creditors, like depositors, and with many explicit and implicit guarantees, banks don't face trouble or harsh terms. They only have to convince the regulators to let them get away with it. And they do.
 
So the abnormality of this incredible indebtedness is that they get away with it. There's nothing good about it for society. If they had more equity then they could do everything that they do better —more consistently, more reliably, in a less distorted fashion.
 
Today's credit market is distorted. A key reason is that bankers love the high risk and chase returns. They are less fond of some of the lending where they are needed the most — like business lending, for example. Instead, most people get many credit cards in the mail and too many people live on expensive revolving credit. Effectively, the poor may end up subsidizing the credit card of the person who pays on time and has zero interest (and we all end up paying the enormous fees merchants are charged). So we can have too much or too little lending and live through inefficient booms and busts. Part of the reason for that is that banks are continually living on the edge in a way that nobody else in the economy would, and regulations meant to correct it are insufficient and flawed in their design.

LP: Banking has been a very profitable business. Is it profitable because the risks are born by the taxpayer? Do you think the bank bonus system is part of the problem?

AA: Yes, banking is partly profitable because of subsidies from taxpayers. There are probably other reasons, and not all of them good ones, in terms of the way competition works and other things. The bonus system encourages recklessness, and recklessness increases the value of the subsidies from taxpayers. Bankers are effectively paid to gamble.
 
It is profitable for the banks to become big even when this is inefficient, because they can do so with subsidized borrowing on easy terms. Guarantees, explicit and implicit, are a form of free or subsidized insurance. We don't control whether what banks do with the cheap funding benefits the economy or just bankers and some of their investors. We must reduce these large subsidies that end up rewarding recklessness and harming us. (See Admati's July 2014 testimony before Congress on bank subsidies).

LP: We often hear about financial innovations that helped bring the global economy to its knees in 2008. Back in December, Congress rolled back a key taxpayer protection concerning derivatives, which Robert Lenzner of Forbes Magazine called a "Christmas present for the banks." What do Americans need to know about derivatives? How do they affect the Too Big to Fail problem?

AA. The Christmas present was just one more small thing in a much bigger problem. The largest financial firms in America can hide an enormous amount of risk in derivatives. That's very dangerous because it makes banks more interconnected, since much of the derivatives trading happens within the financail system. It creates a house of cards — a very fragile system.
 
We also have bankruptcy laws in this country that perversely give unusual priority to derivatives contracts and other reckless practices.
 
Derivatives exacerbate Too Big to Fail dramatically because there's so much opacity in the system. Policy-makers get scared into bailing our or guaranteeing a lot of their commitments made in those markets because they won't quite know the consequences of letting them fail. It's very intimately related to Too Big to Fail. It's as if they hold a gun to your head. You don't konw whether they have bullets so you may get scared into paying the ransom.

LP: Is breaking up the banks is a solution?

AA: People say those words but what does it mean? How would you do it? That's the big problem. Banks are multiple times bigger than most of the corporations you think of as big. I once made a mistake rushing through a HuffPost piece in 2010 saying that Jamie Dimon wants to be as big as Walmart. Well, at the time, JP Morgan was already 10 times bigger than Walmart by assets! When it comes to the financial sector, big is really big. People don't even appreciate how big we're talking about. Nobody else gets to be as big, and in fact, In other parts of the economy, companies that get so big often break up on their own. But that doesn't happen in banking partly because of the perverse subsidies taxpayers provide.
 
The most sensible approach is to force banks and other financial institutions to have more equity, which is actually going to expose their inefficiencies and bring more investor pressure for a break-up to happen naturally without us doing it actively. Regulators can also put significantly more pressure on banks to simplify their structure and divest unnecessary lines of businesses such as commodities (energy, aluminum, etc.). The size appears unmanageable and makes regulation difficult.

LP: What would make banking regulation more effective?

AA: First of all there could be simpler regulation in some places and some cost-ineffective things could be used a bit less. Right now, we know too little about the risk and we have too little margin for error. We must reduce the opacity and increase the safety margins dramatically. Regulators make it complicated because we are unnecessarily living at the edge of a cliff all the time. We live so dangerously! There's no need for that. We are told that we have to live like that, but it's that's completely false. The system has to be made a lot more resilient. Then we can worry less and sleep better.
 
In addition to making things simpler, it's very important that we are able to see more of the risk and then to enforce much stronger and simpler rules. And, of course, regulators need to be watching where the risks are going. They should not believe that just because the risks are off the accounting balance sheets that they are gone. That was a trick to get around regulations and get around accounting rules in cases like Enron. A lot of the risks were hiding — but they can be traced. Some laws that are counterproductive and make regulation harder should also be examined, including the tax code that encourages debt over equity, and the bankruptcy law that overly protects certain financial practices.

LP: If we don't deal with the problem of Too Big to Fail, what happens?

AA: An ordinary person doesn't realize it, but the impact of this unhealthy system on them happens every day. It's doesn't feel as acute as something like leakage from a nuclear facility because harm from the financial system is a little more abstract. You only see it when it blows. But it's an unhealthy, inefficient, bloated and dangerous system. Because this system is so fragile, it can implode again, and our options next time will be dire again. We will either suffer a lot or bail out the system to suffer a little bit less.
 
I recently shared with my students a quote by the Rothschild brothers of London, writing to associates in New York in 1863: "The few who understand the system will either be so interested in its profits or be so dependent upon its favours that there will be no opposition from that class, while the great body of people, mentally incapable of comprehending the tremendous advantage that capital derives from the system, will bear its burdens without complaint, and perhaps without even suspecting that the system is inimical to their interests."
 
This is a great quote! We get tricked into thinking that we have a great financial system because we have our credit cards and whatnot. We don't see the enormous risks that are taken in derivatives markets and some of the other practices that can topple the entire system again and which extracts fees and bonuses. The truth is that we can have a safer system that serves the economy and society better. But getting there requires that better laws and regulations are implemented and enforced. The system will not correct itself; we must demand that policymakers do a better job for the public.

[Mad Men]

Too Big To Fail.

Excusa barata para no tener que hacer los cambios necesarios en el sistema, y así poder mantener el status quo.

[wanderer]

Vivieron por encima de su derecho a la existencia...

[spainfull]

A mi también me interesa la opinión de otros foreros sobre el GEAB. Yo estuve apuntado durante un año a STRATFOR, que es interesante aunque muy sesgado en mi opinión. Se aprenden cosas con ellos, aunque también introducen distorsiones...

Me alegro Spainfull que te animes a leer a Fofoa puedes ir contándonos tus impresiones!

varias cosas. Primero sobre el GEAB. Ya me había pasado por la web varias veces y había visto lo mismo que se ha puesto por el foro en algunas ocasiones, es decir, parte de artículos abiertos, nada más. Lo cierto es que siempre me han parecido interesantes, con una línea coherente y leyendo de forma razonada y nada fanática los acontecimientos. A raíz del mensaje de Frommer volví a buscar y encontré 3 pdf descargables de otros años (2012 y 2013). Son unas 30 páginas cada número y la verdad que al menos lo que vi no me acabó de convencer (porque no es lo que me interesa). Me ha dado la impresión de que son artículos no excesivamente largos más pensados para gente con pasta (incluso empresas) que puede invertir en varios mercados y sectores. Seguro que algún artículo hay sobre la situación macro más generalizada que es lo que realmente buscaba pero en esas revistas que me bajé no abundaban.

Luego FOFOA. Aunque no creo que mi opinión sea demasiado relevante en un foro donde hay gente mucho más experta en economía que yo que vengo de otro campo, daré mis impresiones de aprendiz . Creo que es un parresiastés al estilo de ppcc. De hecho, me ha producido la misma impresión que cuando empecé a leer a ppcc allá por el 2007, y eso me ha pasado con muy poquita gente. Tienen una capacidad de análisis extraordinaria y saben ver a través de la maraña de información, datos y mentiras en las que vivimos. Y lo comparten con el resto. Muchos podrán pensar que FOFOA tiene intereses y que vende la moto porque se beneficia de alguna manera de que se compre oro. Pero opino lo mismo que los que acusan a ppcc de tener intereses ocultos.

La forma de escribir de ambos, lo que cuentan y dónde lo cuentan solo llega a una tremenda minoría (muy afortunada). Para entender lo que dicen hay que tener cierta base y mucho interés por leer, releer, comprender y aprender. Cosas que sabemos que no abundan en la población. Además, normalmente quien llega a FOFOA en su mayor parte son los ya convencidos del oro, así que no creo que gane demasiados clientes. Demasiada molestia para tan poco beneficio directo. No sé, hay varios puntos esenciales para leer a alguien con atención y me parece que FOFOA cumple la mayoría (otro día los expongo que no creo que sea el sitio y me va a quedar un mensaje excesivamente largo ya).

En cualquier caso, lo que me interesa del fenómeno no es tanto la solución planteada o el final que cuenta sino toda la historia que se ha recorrido, sus causas y los razonamientos de por qué ha pasado lo que ha pasado. Es fascinante y verdaderamente plausible. Además aunque no lo parezca porque ppcc siempre dice que el dinero se acaba vengando de todos los que lo desprecian (por ejemplo el oro), en el resto de cosas es sorprendentemente coincidente con FOFOA (cuando digo FOFOA me refiero a todos, Another, FOA y FOFOA), y sus estilos con por ejemplo muchas repeticiones de sus ideas principales son hasta cierto punto similares.

Sin ir más lejos, ppcc siempre dice que: "- El que comprende la relación que hay entre inflación, tipo de interés y tipo de cambio, sabe de Economía." y en los artículos que he leído de FOFOA se centra muchísimo en estos puntos, son parte fundamental de la tesis principal (y los explica maravillosamente bien). O como cuando Another dice hablando de la economía en USA: "After operating on a fiat system for 20+ years people are starting to realize that the only thing that backs a currency is the real productive efforts of their people. Yes, over time we always borrow more than our productive efforts can pay back and proceed to crash the money system. But what else is new?". A mí me suena mucho a ppcc y su verdadero valor (Renta y Capital) que no es más que el Trabajo. E incluso en lo que parecen más alejados (el oro) tampoco lo es tanto porque FOFOA dice (si lo he entendido bien) que al final el oro va a desligarse completamente del dinero, como debe ser en el nuevo paradigma de la economía donde todos los Tipos de Cambio van a ser flotantes.

Ambos tienen una obsesión, para uno son los pisitos y para el otro el oro, pero en el fondo lo que más interesa son sus explicaciones y razonamientos, en la conclusión puedes estar más o menos de acuerdo pero no invalida todo el resto. Bueno, esto es lo que me ha parecido tras leer algo a FOFOA, la verdad es que ha sido todo un descubrimiento.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Muchas gracias Spainfull por compartir tus impresiones, que veo que comparto al 100% para el post que acabas de escribir 

varias cosas. Primero sobre el GEAB. Ya me había pasado por la web varias veces y había visto lo mismo que se ha puesto por el foro en algunas ocasiones, es decir, parte de artículos abiertos, nada más. Lo cierto es que siempre me han parecido interesantes, con una línea coherente y leyendo de forma razonada y nada fanática los acontecimientos. A raíz del mensaje de Frommer volví a buscar y encontré 3 pdf descargables de otros años (2012 y 2013). Son unas 30 páginas cada número y la verdad que al menos lo que vi no me acabó de convencer (porque no es lo que me interesa). Me ha dado la impresión de que son artículos no excesivamente largos más pensados para gente con pasta (incluso empresas) que puede invertir en varios mercados y sectores. Seguro que algún artículo hay sobre la situación macro más generalizada que es lo que realmente buscaba pero en esas revistas que me bajé no abundaban.

Yo el GEAB lo conocí a través de Sufrido, comentarista en el Confidencial (ahora en Voz Populi) como "contraste" a STRATFOR. Los veo "en paralelo" y me interesan aunque nunca me creo lo que dicen, desde luego no al 100%. Pero como me dijo otro forero del Confi, A., que es quien más me ha enseñado, las posturas contrarias ayudan a identificar los puntos débiles de la opuesta.

Luego FOFOA. Aunque no creo que mi opinión sea demasiado relevante en un foro donde hay gente mucho más experta en economía que yo que vengo de otro campo, daré mis impresiones de aprendiz . Creo que es un parresiastés al estilo de ppcc. De hecho, me ha producido la misma impresión que cuando empecé a leer a ppcc allá por el 2007, y eso me ha pasado con muy poquita gente. Tienen una capacidad de análisis extraordinaria y saben ver a través de la maraña de información, datos y mentiras en las que vivimos. Y lo comparten con el resto. Muchos podrán pensar que FOFOA tiene intereses y que vende la moto porque se beneficia de alguna manera de que se compre oro. Pero opino lo mismo que los que acusan a ppcc de tener intereses ocultos.

Es curioso pero... FOFOA tampoco tiene estudios formales en economía, tenía otra profesión y no fue hasta 2008 o así que se puso a investigar

La forma de escribir de ambos, lo que cuentan y dónde lo cuentan solo llega a una tremenda minoría (muy afortunada). Para entender lo que dicen hay que tener cierta base y mucho interés por leer, releer, comprender y aprender. Cosas que sabemos que no abundan en la población. Además, normalmente quien llega a FOFOA en su mayor parte son los ya convencidos del oro, así que no creo que gane demasiados clientes. Demasiada molestia para tan poco beneficio directo. No sé, hay varios puntos esenciales para leer a alguien con atención y me parece que FOFOA cumple la mayoría (otro día los expongo que no creo que sea el sitio y me va a quedar un mensaje excesivamente largo ya).

En cualquier caso, lo que me interesa del fenómeno no es tanto la solución planteada o el final que cuenta sino toda la historia que se ha recorrido, sus causas y los razonamientos de por qué ha pasado lo que ha pasado. Es fascinante y verdaderamente plausible. Además aunque no lo parezca porque ppcc siempre dice que el dinero se acaba vengando de todos los que lo desprecian (por ejemplo el oro), en el resto de cosas es sorprendentemente coincidente con FOFOA (cuando digo FOFOA me refiero a todos, Another, FOA y FOFOA), y sus estilos con por ejemplo muchas repeticiones de sus ideas principales son hasta cierto punto similares.

Sin ir más lejos, ppcc siempre dice que: "- El que comprende la relación que hay entre inflación, tipo de interés y tipo de cambio, sabe de Economía." y en los artículos que he leído de FOFOA se centra muchísimo en estos puntos, son parte fundamental de la tesis principal (y los explica maravillosamente bien). O como cuando Another dice hablando de la economía en USA: "After operating on a fiat system for 20+ years people are starting to realize that the only thing that backs a currency is the real productive efforts of their people. Yes, over time we always borrow more than our productive efforts can pay back and proceed to crash the money system. But what else is new?". A mí me suena mucho a ppcc y su verdadero valor (Renta y Capital) que no es más que el Trabajo. E incluso en lo que parecen más alejados (el oro) tampoco lo es tanto porque FOFOA dice (si lo he entendido bien) que al final el oro va a desligarse completamente del dinero, como debe ser en el nuevo paradigma de la economía donde todos los Tipos de Cambio van a ser flotantes.

¡100% de acuerdo! Tal y como me ha parecido comprenderlo leyendo a FO(FO(A)), el Freegold no consiste en la acumulación de oro cual Tío Gilitos, sino que las cantidades relativas de oro en las reservas de los Bancos Centrales serían, en ausencia de una moneda de reserva fiat "hegemónica", la consecuencia o síntoma de cuánto va acumulando cada Área Monetaria después de zanjar "en oro" sus déficits con el resto de áreas. Dichos déficits reflejarían qué áreas están consumiendo más de lo que producen, y no serían camuflables con "más deuda" (como ha hecho Occidente en los últimos lustros bajo fiat) porque al zanjarlas en oro físico desconectado de la deuda, esa "solución" estaría automáticamente descartada.

Es por ello que yo veo el Freegold como la Globalización pero registrando en tiempo real, en lugar de con un decalaje, sus efectos. Con Freegold también Oriente habría subido y Occidente bajado, pero la pérdida de empleos occidentales a favor de los orientales se habría ido reflejando, vía reservas de cada Banco Central, y luego por libre flotación de sus monedas entre sí, como una bajada "inmediata" del estándar de vida occidental y una subida "inmediata" (o en tiempo real) del estándar de vida y poder de compra oriental.

El Consumo & Efecto Riqueza por Pisito, que nos señala PPCC, no habría sido posible sobre el "vacío" en este caso, ya que el Freegold lo va corrigiendo "en tiempo real". Por tanto, se habría imposibilitado el fenómeno que narró Milanovic de retardo de los efectos sobre la población occidental mediante deuda:

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/two-views-global-crisis

Por tanto, yo lo entiendo como:

1. Distinta productividad entre Áreas Monetarias ->
2. Déficits / superávits de cada una de ellas con las demás en sus balanzas ->
3. En ausencia de moneda de reserva fiat "internacional" (aunque sí dentro de cada área) y zanjando estos desequilibrios entre unas áreas y otras en oro-físico por su función monetaria de reserva o almacén de valor (Store of Value), se van modificando de manera continua las reservas de oro en los balances de los bancos centrales de cada área ->
4. Esto se reflejaría, previsiblemente, en los valores relativos de las monedas fiat de cada área en su libre flotación y en el "reequilibrado", más continuo y en tiempo real que ahora, del Poder de Compra de los habitantes de cada Área Monetaria (dólar, euro, yuan, etc.)

Por tanto, el Freegold en realidad no sería en mi opinión, más que la forma de reflejar, a largo plazo, las distintas productividades de cada Área Monetaria en tiempo real, y por tanto como síntoma o consecuencia de éstas, al desvincular la función de Almacén de Valor de la de Medio de Intercambio, con las consecuencias que de ello se derivan.

Ambos tienen una obsesión, para uno son los pisitos y para el otro el oro, pero en el fondo lo que más interesa son sus explicaciones y razonamientos, en la conclusión puedes estar más o menos de acuerdo pero no invalida todo el resto. Bueno, esto es lo que me ha parecido tras leer algo a FOFOA, la verdad es que ha sido todo un descubrimiento.

Efectivamente!

***

En realidad, esto de FOFOA no es sino la actualización del debate entre Jacques Rueff y Robert Triffin. Como dijo Jacques Rueff en su libro, que incluye entrevistas a los dos, ambos estaban de acuerdo en un 99% en su diagnóstico del problema del US$ como moneda de reserva, y la diferencia entre ambos radicaba solamente en su solución (SDRs / bancors para Triffin, re-evaluación del oro para Rueff)

Aunque Rueff se distingue del Freegold de FOFOA y es partidario del patrón oro (en los 60, cuando era una idea mainstream y de hecho, era lo que había), en mi opinión el Freegold es la "actualización" de su pensamiento, en cierto modo.

De Rueff, en inglés:

http://www.cmi-gold-silver.com/pdf/monetarysin.pdf

De Triffin:

https://matrixsentry.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/triffin_1978.pdf

Y en general, sobre el Dilema de Triffin (o de Triffin-Rueff):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triffin_dilemma

Saludos y gracias de nuevo!

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dollar-joins-currency-wars-by-nouriel-roubini-2015-05

NEW YORK – In a world of weak domestic demand in many advanced economies and emerging markets, policymakers have been tempted to boost economic growth and employment by going for export led-growth. This requires a weak currency and conventional and unconventional monetary policies to bring about the required depreciation.

Since the beginning of the year, more than 20 central banks around the world have eased monetary policy, following the lead of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan. In the eurozone, countries on the periphery needed currency weakness to reduce their external deficits and jump-start growth. But the euro weakness triggered by quantitative easing has further boosted Germany’s current-account surplus, which was already‎ a whopping 8% of GDP last year. With external surpluses also rising in other countries of the eurozone core, the monetary union’s overall imbalance is large and growing.

In Japan, quantitative easing was the first “arrow” of “Abenomics,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s reform program. Its launch has sharply weakened the yen and is now leading to rising trade surpluses. The upward pressure on the US dollar from the embrace of quantitative easing by the ECB and the BOJ has been sharp. The dollar has also strengthened against the currencies of advanced-country commodity exporters, like Australia and Canada, and those of many emerging markets. For these countries, falling oil and commodity prices have triggered currency depreciations that are helping to shield growth and jobs from the effects of lower exports.

The dollar has also risen relative to currencies of emerging markets with economic and financial fragilities: twin fiscal and current-account deficits, rising inflation and slowing growth, large stocks of domestic and foreign debt, and political instability. Even China briefly allowed its currency to weaken against the dollar last year, and slowing output growth may tempt the government to let the renminbi weaken even more. Meanwhile, the trade surplus is rising again, in part because China is dumping its excess supply of goods – such as steel – in global markets.

Until recently, US policymakers were not overly concerned about the dollar’s strength, because America’s growth prospects were stronger than in Europe and Japan. Indeed, at the beginning of the year, there was hope that US domestic demand would be strong enough this year to support GDP growth of close to 3%, despite the stronger dollar. Lower oil prices and job creation, it was thought, would boost disposable income and consumption. Capital spending (outside the energy sector) and residential investment would strengthen as growth accelerated.

But things look different today, and US officials’ exchange-rate jitters are becoming increasingly pronounced. The dollar appreciated much faster than anyone expected; and, as data for the first quarter of 2015 suggest, the impact on net exports, inflation, and growth has been larger and more rapid than that implied by policymakers’ statistical models. Moreover, strong domestic demand has failed to materialize; consumption growth was weak in the first quarter, and capital spending and residential investment were even weaker.

As a result, the US has effectively joined the “currency war” to prevent further dollar appreciation. Fed officials have started to speak explicitly about the dollar as a factor that affects net exports, inflation, and growth.‎ And the US authorities have become increasingly critical of Germany and the eurozone for adopting policies that weaken the euro while avoiding those – for example, temporary fiscal stimulus and faster wage growth – that boost domestic demand.

Moreover, verbal intervention will be followed by policy action, because slower growth and low inflation – partly triggered by a strong dollar – will induce the Fed to exit zero policy rates later and more slowly than expected. That will reverse some of the dollar’s recent gains and shield growth and inflation from downside risks.

Currency frictions can lead eventually to trade frictions, and currency wars can lead to trade wars. And that could spell trouble for the US as it tries to conclude the mega-regional Trans-Pacific Partnership. Uncertainty about whether the Obama administration can marshal enough votes in Congress to ratify the TPP has now been compounded by proposed legislation that would impose tariff duties on countries that engage in “currency manipulation.” If such a link between trade and currency policy were forced into the TPP, the Asian participants would refuse to join.

The world would be better off if most governments pursued policies that boosted growth through domestic demand, rather than beggar-thy-neighbor export measures. But that would require them to rely less on monetary policy and more on appropriate fiscal policies (such as higher spending on productive infrastructure). Even income policies that lift wages, and hence labor income and consumption, are a better source of domestic growth than currency depreciations (which depress real wages).

The sum of all trade balances in the world is equal to zero, which means that not all countries can be net exporters – and that currency wars end up being zero-sum games. That is why America’s entry into the fray was only a matter of time.

[saturno]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dollar-joins-currency-wars-by-nouriel-roubini-2015-05

(si el objetivo es...)

 Capital spending (outside the energy sector) and residential investment would strengthen as growth accelerated.

...

But things look different today, and US officials’ exchange-rate jitters are becoming increasingly pronounced. The dollar appreciated much faster than anyone expected; and, as data for the first quarter of 2015 suggest, the impact on net exports, inflation, and growth has been larger and more rapid than that implied by policymakers’ statistical models. Moreover, strong domestic demand has failed to materialize; consumption growth was weak in the first quarter, and capital spending and residential investment were even weaker.

....


Even income policies that lift wages, and hence labor income and consumption, are a better source of domestic growth than currency depreciations (which depress real wages).

The sum of all trade balances in the world is equal to zero, which means that not all countries can be net exporters – and that currency wars end up being zero-sum games. That is why America’s entry into the fray was only a matter of time.

¿Está pidiendo otra burbuja inmobiliaria?

Echo de menos otra solucion:  reducir los costes inmobiliarios empotrados conlleva un aumento real de salarios e inversiones de capital productivo

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dollar-joins-currency-wars-by-nouriel-roubini-2015-05

(si el objetivo es...)

 Capital spending (outside the energy sector) and residential investment would strengthen as growth accelerated.

...

But things look different today, and US officials’ exchange-rate jitters are becoming increasingly pronounced. The dollar appreciated much faster than anyone expected; and, as data for the first quarter of 2015 suggest, the impact on net exports, inflation, and growth has been larger and more rapid than that implied by policymakers’ statistical models. Moreover, strong domestic demand has failed to materialize; consumption growth was weak in the first quarter, and capital spending and residential investment were even weaker.

....


Even income policies that lift wages, and hence labor income and consumption, are a better source of domestic growth than currency depreciations (which depress real wages).

The sum of all trade balances in the world is equal to zero, which means that not all countries can be net exporters – and that currency wars end up being zero-sum games. That is why America’s entry into the fray was only a matter of time.

¿Está pidiendo otra burbuja inmobiliaria?

Echo de menos otra solucion:  reducir los costes inmobiliarios empotrados conlleva un aumento real de salarios e inversiones de capital productivo

Hmmm...

Nouriel, pisitófilo? No sería su primera filia o "vicio" conocido... 

http://gawker.com/economist-nouriel-roubini-accidentally-tweets-booty-cal-1668751401