Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

El mercado de bonos de 100 trillion $ y sus derivados 550 trillion $

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/100-trillion-bond-bubble-just-burst

Los griegos eluden el euro y el patacón neodracma, apuntándose al bitcoin

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-03/greeks-turn-bitcoin-dodge-capital-controls

Bail-ins en Grecia? Solo a los ricos: rico es cualquiera con más de 8.000 euros, recortes del 30% Varoufakis lo niega, es la Guerra de Mentiras actual, aunque no creo que nadie con más de 8.000 euros en un banco griego duerma demasiado tranquilo

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9963b74c-219c-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79.html#axzz3euDmIijD

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

¡Qué misterio!

http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/06/oilpricesinflation.asp

The price of oil and inflation are often seen as being connected in a cause and effect relationship. As oil prices move up or down, inflation follows in the same direction. The reason why this happens is that oil is a major input in the economy - it is used in critical activities such as fueling transportation and heating homes - and if input costs rise, so should the cost of end products. For example, if the price of oil rises, then it will cost more to make plastic, and a plastics company will then pass on some or all of this cost to the consumer, which raises prices and thus inflation.

The direct relationship between oil and inflation was evident in the 1970s, when the cost of oil rose from a nominal price of $3 before the 1973 oil crisis to around $40 during the 1979 oil crisis. This helped cause the consumer price index (CPI), a key measure of inflation, to more than double from 41.20 in early 1972 to 86.30 by the end of 1980. Let's put this into perspective: while it had previously taken 24 years (1947-1971) for the CPI to double, during the 1970s it took about eight years.

However, this relationship between oil and inflation started to deteriorate after the 1980s. During the 1990's Gulf War oil crisis, crude prices doubled in six months from around $20 to around $40, but CPI remained relatively stable, growing from 134.6 in January 1991 to 137.9 in December 1991. This detachment in the relationship was even more apparent during the oil price run-up from 1999 to 2005, in which the annual average nominal price of oil rose from $16.56 to $50.04. During this same period, the CPI rose from 164.30 in January 1999 to 196.80 in December 2005. Judging by this data, it appears that the strong correlation between oil prices and inflation that was seen in the 1970s has weakened significantly.

http://econ.ccu.edu.tw/academic/master_paper/091019seminar.pdf

First of all, evidence from the analysis supports the existence long-run asymmetric responses
of inflation (entire sample) to real oil price increases and decreases for a majority of countries.

However, the impacts of real oil price changes on inflation are nearly linear in all the three
sub-periods. A possible explanation for this outcome may emanate from a lack of structural breaks
taken place in sub-periods. In other words, after dividing the time series according to important
events, a linear model is much more acceptable for each sub-period. Needless to say, this outcome further gives us a convincing argument for the division of our sample period.

Second, results of the oil price transmission mainly suggest that current responses of inflation
to real oil price changes are larger than that in the lagged periods. Generally, the cumulative impact
of real oil price increase is greater than the cumulative impact of real oil price decrease.

Third, results from the Granger causality* indicate that the direction from real oil price
changes to the inflation is almost completely predictable in both asymmetrical and linear case. In
addition, test results of the Granger causality are most statistically significant when a cointegration
relationship is included in the model.

 Finally, by separating the data into three periods based on the important events, the oil price
transmission is typically higher in Period I than that in both Period II and III: a result in line with
the empirical observations that the oil price transmission is more profound in the 1970s-1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s. As is well known, the global economy experienced two major oil crises in the 1970s and 1980s that ushered in significant inflation. Furthermore, the recent oil price hike is mainly the result of robust** world economy and thus the degree of oil price transmission into inflation is relatively low and very stable in the last decade. Our finding is also consistent with the result of Blanchard and Galí (2007) and De Gregorio et al. (2007) that a decline in pass-through from oil price shocks to inflation has became more evident in the last ten years.

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Granger_causality (basado en históricos claro)
**  (2007)

http://www.macrotrends.net/1373/oil-prices-vs-the-cpi-historical-chart

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-05/presenting-ecbs-tools-stem-contagion

On Sunday, Greek PM Alexis Tsipras put his political future and, more importantly, the future of the common currency in the hands of Greek voters. It was the political equivalent of pushing one’s chips all in at the poker table and after Sunday’s referendum, Tsipras appears to have been holding a better hand than Junker, Dijsselbloem, and Merkel.

With his grip on power in Greece now virtually unassailable (at least in the short-term), the PM will need to switch gears quickly. Having won the political battle, they must now fight the economic war, and while Sunday’s plebiscite may have given the world some clarity in terms of what the Greek government’s mandate truly is, we are no closer to solving the stalemate which has brought the Greek banking sector to its knees and threatens to plunge the country even deeper into depression.

In fact, Sunday’s vote represents a kind of worst case scenario for financial markets. The fact that Greeks’ resounding repudiation of austerity may well have been influenced by the IMF’s tacit admission that the country should indeed hold out for debt relief from EU creditors sets a dangerous precedent for Europe. Christine Lagarde effectively forced Brussels and Berlin to blink on the eve of the referendum and you can bet that Podemos in Spain, the Socialists in Portugal, and the Five Star movement in Italy are watching closely to see what happens next.

If Greece proves that the will of the people and the threat of a voter-supported EMU exit is sufficient to secure debt writedowns, the experiment that is the currency bloc will begin to crack as soon as this fall when elections are expected in Spain and Portugal. This threat alone will likely be enough to push spreads on periphery bonds wider in the short-term and may well introduce quite a bit of unwanted volatility in EU equities as well.

But that only captures half of the story.

In addition to the negative impact on capital markets from the political turmoil that Sunday’s vote may well spark, the market will now have to cope with the economic fallout as well. The Greek banking sector is teetering on the edge of outright collapse, as is the Greek economy where consumers will soon face a shortage of imported goods as credit dries up and ATMs go dark. Any spillover from this — and make no mistake, there will be some spillover — will exert still more pressure on financial markets as negotiations between Athens and Brussels drag into their sixth month.

Through it all we’re told that Mario Draghi will save the day and that the ECB has the “tools” in place to combat contagion. Here with a rundown of those tools and a look at when and how quickly they can be deployed, is Soc Gen.   

Tools to stem contagion:

Accelerating QE. QE is not designed to assist individual countries, but with a monthly firepower of €60bn, it remains a powerful force. Moreover, contrary to the OMT that requires agreement on an ESM programme to be activated for a specific member state, the QE tool is already fully active. Should contagion from Greece become more substantial, the ECB could front-load QE without further notice. The ECB could also seek to step-up QE from its €60bn pace, officially to fight an unwarranted tightening of monetary conditions but within the 25% issue limit and 33% issuer limit. We are doubtful, however, that the national central banks (NCBs), where the bulk of the risk of the QE programme is assumed, would buy anything other than their own national debt. Moreover, were the ECB to substantially increase QE it may be open to criticism of monetary financing at a time when the German Constitutional Court is still reviewing the OMT. If contagion is limited to a few member states, arguing on the grounds of deflation risks for the broader euro area – the justification for QE – may also be more complex.               

ESM and MoU for countries facing tension. Different facilities exist in the ESM: loan, credit lines, bank recapitalisation and primary or secondary market purchase. The latter is likely to be the most efficient and easiest option. The ESM may buy bonds either in the primary or secondary market of any Member States that requested it. The primary market facility is only opened to countries under a programme (i.e. only Cyprus as of now) while the secondary market is also available for non-programme countries whose economic and financial situation is sound. However, in that case a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) detailing the conditions attached to the facility would need to be approved.   

OMT. The tool to deal with the risk pertaining to individual sovereigns is the still untested OMT (purchases of bills and bonds having a maturity lower than three years). The OMT programme requires the backing of an ESM programme as well as a clean bill of health on debt sustainability. If that is not the case, step one in the prescribed process as set out in the ESM Treaty is restructuring.

The implication here certainly seems to be that the preferred contagion containment tool is the acceleration of QE ("more cowbell" so to speak).

This will come as no surprise to the Zero Hedge faithful. Less than two weeks ago in “Goldman’s Conspiracy Theory Stunner", we remarked that the bank (and Mario Draghi's former employer) seemed to be suggesting that the ECB would actually be just fine with Grexit, because it would give the central bank an opportunity to expand QE. Sure enough, just a little over a week later, the ECB effectively primed the pump by expanding the list of PSPP-eligible SSA bonds.

So get ready, because just as we predicted before we knew what the results of Sunday's referendum would be, "€60 billion/month is about to become €70 or €80 billion and then, once the EGB and SSA markets have been sufficiently cornered, it will be on to euro IG corporate credit before Draghi finally becomes Kuroda by throwing the ECB's balance sheet at the DAX, CAC, and IBEX at the first sign of trouble."

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loi_de_janvier_1973_sur_la_Banque_de_France

La loi n°73-7 du 3 janvier 1973 sur la Banque de France est une loi française, qui modifie le statut de la Banque de France et précise notamment les conditions autorisant l'État à emprunter à la Banque de France. Cette loi est parfois surnommée loi Pompidou-Giscard ou loi Rothschild.

Cette loi est élaborée à l'initiative conjointe du gouverneur de la Banque de France, Olivier Wormser, et du ministre de l'Économie et des Finances, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Ces dernières années, cette loi est au cœur d’un débat sur l’endettement public et la création monétaire.

(sólo hay wiki-versión en francés y en ruso)

http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/12/29/la-loi-pompidou-giscard-rothschild-votee-en-1973-empecherait-l-etat-de-battre-monnaie_1623299_3232.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

[juancoco]

.....recesión en el horizonte.....la n-esima correción de la burbuja.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hysteresis#In_economics

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

La Pirámide de Exter

John Exter was an American economist and a member of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System. Exter is known for creating Exter's Pyramid - useful for visualizing the organization of asset classes in terms of risk and size.
 
When the credit system is expanding most money flows to the top of the pyramid - the increasingly speculative and illiquid investments. When the credit system comes under pressure and debt cannot be repaid, the items at the top of the pyramid get sold and money flows towards the bottom.

“In order to make use of it though, we must first make the distinction between real wealth and claims on wealth. Real wealth is represented by actual items that people want or need. This can be food, land, natural resources, buildings, factories etc. Financial assets, shown as layers in the pyramid, represent claims on real wealth. In a fully developed financial system, in good perceived standing, there is a high ratio of claims on wealth to actual underlying real wealth. In this environment the average buying power of the financial assets is lower. This can best be observed by looking at the purchasing power at the bottom of the pyramid. Gold is at a minimum here. It is competing with all of the other claims on wealth for a relatively constant amount of underlying real assets.
 
According to Exter’s theory of money, when economies get into trouble through the accumulation of too much debt, the levels of the pyramid disappear in order from highest to lowest. As the pyramid contracts downward, the remaining layers represent a proportionally higher claim on the real underlying wealth. In other words their value increases. Using gold as our reference point, it’s relative purchasing power increases as the pyramid contracts. Gold finds itself in a secular bull market.
 
In the extreme hypothetical case where all other asset classes are destroyed, including the currency itself, only gold remains. In this case the holders of gold compete with no other financial assets for claims on the underlying wealth. This scenario represents the ultimate clearing of the economy. All currency denominated debts have been wiped clean.
 
If a market economy remains in place then the pyramid begins to expand and grow again. The wealth claims represented in gold will be deployed as investments and a new currency will emerge that garners the faith of those who use it. As this new economy grows and expands, the previous instruments of credit and financing will appear again. Layer upon layer are added back to the pyramid. From the perspective of gold, its relative purchasing power decreases as it competes with these new financial assets for claims on the underlying real wealth. Gold is in a secular bear market as the newest levels of the pyramid are in their growth phase. This model provides a useful intuitive understanding of the alternating secular bull and bear markets of commodities vs. equities.” Trace Mayer, The Paper Empire

http://aheadoftheherd.com/Newsletter/2013/Buying-Dead-Flowers.htm

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Global%20Trade%20Slowdown_nocover.pdf

[Currobena]

http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Global%20Trade%20Slowdown_nocover.pdf

Parece raro que no mencione FATCA en ningún momento.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Account_Tax_Compliance_Act#Controversy

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-09/are-big-banks-using-derivatives-suppress-bullion-prices

Are Big Banks Using Derivatives To Suppress Bullion Prices?

Paul Craig Roberts and Dave Kranzler

We have explained on a number of occasions how the Federal Reserve’s agents, the bullion banks (principally JPMorganChase, HSBC, and Scotia) sell uncovered shorts (“naked shorts”) on the Comex (gold futures market) in order to drive down an otherwise rising price of gold. By dumping so many uncovered short contracts into the futures market, an artificial increase in “paper gold” is created, and this increase in supply drives down the price.

This manipulation works because the hedge funds, the main purchasers of the short contracts, do not intend to take delivery of the gold represented by the contracts, settling instead in cash. This means that the banks who sold the uncovered contracts are never at risk from their inability to cover contracts in gold. At any given time, the amount of gold represented by the paper gold contracts (“open interest’) can exceed the actual amount of physical gold available for delivery, a situation that does not occur in other futures markets.

In other words, the gold and silver futures markets are not a place where people buy and sell gold and silver. These markets are places where people speculate on price direction and where hedge funds use gold futures to hedge other bets according to the various mathematical formulas that they use. The fact that bullion prices are determined in this paper, speculative market, and not in real physical markets where people sell and acquire physical bullion, is the reason the bullion banks can drive down the price of gold and silver even though the demand for the physical metal is rising.

For example last Tuesday the US Mint announced that it was sold out of the American Eagle one ounce silver coin. It is a contradiction of the law of supply and demand that demand is high, supply is low, and the price is falling. Such an economic anomaly can only be explained by manipulation of prices in a market where supply can be created by printing paper contracts.

Obviously fraud and price manipulation are at work, but no heads roll. The Federal Reserve and US Treasury support this fraud and manipulation, because the suppression of precious metal prices protects the value and status of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and prevents gold and silver from fulfilling their role as the transmission mechanism that warns of developing financial and economic troubles. The suppression of the rising gold price suppresses the warning signal and permits the continuation of financial market bubbles and Washington’s ability to impose sanctions on other world powers that are disadvantaged by not being a reserve currency.

It has come to our attention that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives also play a role in price suppression and simultaneously serve to provide long positions for the bullion banks that disguise their manipulation of prices in the futures market.

OTC derivatives are privately structured contracts created by the secretive large banks. They are a paper, or derivative, form of an underlying financial instrument or commodity. Little is known about them. Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation (CFTC) during the Clinton regime said, correctly, that the derivatives needed to be regulated. However, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary and Deputy Secretary Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Arthur Levitt, all de facto agents of the big banks, convinced Congress to prevent the CFTC from regulating OTC derivatives.

The absence of regulation means that information is not available that would indicate the purposes for which the banks use these derivatives. When JPMorgan was investigated for its short silver position on Comex, the bank convinced the CFTC that its short position on Comex was a hedge against a long position via OTC derivatives. In other words, JPMorgan used its OTC derivatives to shield its attack on the silver price in the futures market.

During 2015 the attack on bullion prices has intensified, driving the prices lower than they have been for years. During the first quarter of this year there was a huge upward spike in the quantity of precious metal derivatives.

If these were long positions hedging the banks’ Comex shorts, why did the price of gold and silver decline?

More evidence of manipulation comes from the continuing fall in the prices of gold and silver as set in paper future markets, although demand for the physical metals continues to rise even to the point that the US Mint has run out of silver coins to sell. Uncertainties arising from the Greek No vote increase systemic uncertainty. The normal response would be rising, not falling, bullion prices.

The circumstantial evidence is that the unregulated OTC derivatives in gold and silver are not really hedges to short positions in Comex but are themselves structured as an additional attack on precious metal prices.

If this supposition is correct, it indicates that seven years of bailing out the big banks that control the Federal Reserve and US Treasury at the expense of the US economy has threatened the US dollar to the extent that the dollar must be protected at all cost, including US regulatory tolerance of illegal activity to suppress gold and silver prices.

Hace poco:

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-04/why-did-citigroups-precious-metals-derivative-exposure-just-soar-1260

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-10/why-moar-qe-inevitable-2-simple-charts

[Currobena]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-10/why-moar-qe-inevitable-2-simple-charts

Moar por more?

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-10/why-moar-qe-inevitable-2-simple-charts

Moar por more?