RESCATE DE ESPAÑA: LA TRAVESIA DEL DESIERTO HA COMENZADO (V)

[Petardazo Inminente]

Mientras tanto Soraya diciendo que que la prima esté por las nubes no encarece la deuda española. Van a dejar a ZP de gran, gran estadista a este paso.

Y en otro orden de cosas, volviendo a la seriedad:

http://www.athensnews.gr/portal/8/56320

Tsipras slams bailout, vows to stay in euro
The Syriza leader promised on Thursday to rip up the conditions attached to the bailout memorandum but keep Greece in the eurozone after Sunday's election, which he said were a referendum on the "memorandum or Syriza".
 
"The memorandum of bankruptcy will belong to the past on Monday," Syriza leader Alexis Tspiras told his last Athens campaign rally before the election, held on Omonia Square.
 
Attacking New Democracy and Pasok, he claimed that the Greek people are abandoning leaving behind the two parties that were trying to "extort the Greek people and steal votes".
 
He said corruption, vested interests and disaster were at the core of these parties and that they had "looted Greece".
 
He dismissed fears that reneging on the accord with the European Union and International Monetary Fund would drive the country from the single currency, warning "speculators" not to bet on Greece's exit.
 
"We will vote on Sunday with our eyes on Spain," he said, referring to the 100bn euro recapitalisation package offered by the EU to prop up the battered Spanish banking system.
 
"It negotiated and succeeded despite the lenders' threats and blackmail. It is still in the euro, without an austerity plan." (Reuters, AMNA)

[LVECP]

Apostoflant! Magnifico! Fantabuloso! el articulo de Satyajit Das. (me saco el sombrero, ese hombre es una machine)
Gracias por postearlo!


Acerca de los cds, estoy con pringaete. No se puede observar una causalidad entre los naked cds y el precio de los bonos.

El naked cds seria algo asi como una opcion put sobre acciones, sin ser propietario de las acciones. Compras el derecho de vender bonos a un precio digamos de 100€ (sin tener los bonos). En caso de default o reestructuracion de los bonos, acudirias al mercado secundario, donde comprarias los bonos al precio de cotizacion que seria muy bajo por el default o la reestructuracion y luego los venderias a 100€ usando el naked cds embolsando la diferencia.

Por muchos naked cds que compres, la influencia en el precio del bono no es directa. Otra cosa es que alguien aproveche informacion "insider" para comprar naked cds sabiendo que habra un evento de credito que forzara la ejecucion de los cds. Vamos, algo asi como lo que pasa en el mundo de las acciones o de las comodities (ver la pelicula de Eddie Murphy: Entre pillos anda el juego)

Esto no quiita que el ISDA este formado por los grandes financieros del mundo, y que sea un mercado OTC, donde ellos hacen como Juan Palomo, yo me lo guiso yo me lo como.

Por cierto, creo que la prohibicion de naked cds esta ya aprovada en la UE, y que entra en vigor este noviembre de 2012.

Slds!

[azkunaveteya]

http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2012/061512.htm

2012 Article IV Consultation with Spain
Concluding Statement of IMF Mission
Madrid, June, 14, 2012

Many major policy actions have been taken in recent months on several fronts. But market confidence remains weak and the outlook is very difficult. The economy is in the midst of an unprecedented double-dip recession with unemployment already unacceptably high, public debt increasing rapidly, and segments of the financial sector needing recapitalization. This calls for a commensurately ambitious policy response and communicating it within a comprehensive medium-term strategy. This strategy should be based around concrete measures to deliver the needed medium-term fiscal consolidation, a roadmap for restructuring the weak segments of the financial sector, and structural reforms to boost growth. The prospective Euro area financial sector support is an important opportunity to implement such a strategy. Spain’s prospects will also be helped by further progress at the European level.

1. Faced with great challenges on several fronts, the government reform momentum has been strong, with many major actions initiated in recent months:

    Banks. Provisions and capital requirements have been raised, independent valuations commissioned, the fourth largest bank is being restructured, and a credible backstop provided with support from Spain’s European partners.
    Fiscal. A package of measures was introduced in December, the 2012 budget is ambitious, the new budget stability and transparency laws provide for greater transparency and control over regional finances, and sub-national arrears are being cleared.
    Labor. A profound labor reform was introduced in February.

2. Despite these reforms and efforts, market confidence is weak. After a brief LTRO-induced respite, market tensions re-emerged in the spring. By mid-June, yields and spreads on Spanish government bonds were around their previous highs. Banks remain unable to tap private unsecured financing. And despite the announcement of the European backstop, market conditions remain weak.

3. The outlook is very difficult. The recession is deepening and unemployment is 24 percent (above 50 percent for the young) and rising. Headwinds from household and corporate deleveraging, combined with unavoidable fiscal consolidation, will likely translate into output contractions this year and next. But with an assumed stabilization in financing conditions and a better functioning labor market as the reform kicks in, private consumption and investment should recover modestly. Net exports are expected to continue to contribute strongly to growth. Downside risks dominate, in particular:

    Financial: while the Euro area financial backstop helps to mitigate short-term risks, market tensions could intensify, particularly if policies fail to stem capital outflows or due to further stress elsewhere in the Euro area.
    Macroeconomic: private sector deleveraging could be faster than envisaged, and the fiscal consolation may have larger than envisaged output costs.

4. But there is also upside potential. Reforms, including the successful implementation of the recent labor reform, the strengthening of the financial sector supported by the Euro area backstop, and faster competitiveness gains, could lead to a significantly better medium-term outlook.

The policy agenda: restoring confidence

5. Continued strong reform momentum and a clear medium-term vision are needed to restore confidence so that imbalances can be unwound smoothly and jobs and growth fostered. This means strengthening the finances of the government and finalizing the banking reform. But it also means better functioning labor and product markets to support incomes, fiscal consolidation, banks’ asset quality, and social backing for reform. Intensifying the ongoing reversal of the large misalignment in prices and wages should be at the center of this agenda. A cooperative solution, where workers accept greater wage moderation, employers pass on the cost savings to prices and hire, and banks recapitalize, could result in a faster reallocation of resources to dynamic sectors and a better outcome for all.

6. The Euro area support for the financial sector backstop is an opportunity to complete the task. The government is to be commended for ensuring a credible backstop for the financial sector. This backstop will ease the financing of the clean-up, restructuring, and recapitalization of the weak segments of Spain’s banking sector once and for all. Doing this thoroughly and accompanied by a comprehensive package of reforms in other areas should help restore confidence and put the economy back on a path of growth and employment. It will be critical to communicate such a package clearly and cohesively.

7. Spain’s prospects will also be helped by further progress at the European level. There is an immediate need at the euro area level to ensure adequate bank funding and mitigate contagion. But a lasting resolution to the Euro area crisis will require a convincing and concerted move toward a complete and robust EMU. This requires a roadmap toward a banking union and fiscal integration. A clear commitment in this direction, in particular on area-wide deposit insurance and a bank resolution framework with common backstops, is essential to chart a credible path ahead.

Financial sector: a roadmap for restructuring the weak segments

8. The recent progress needs to be built upon to complete the restructuring. The IMF’s Financial Sector Stability Assessment identifies some key reform areas, many of which are along the lines envisaged by the government:

    Independent valuation. The quality and transparency of the independent valuations and stress tests should be assured (the inclusion of staff of independent institutions to advise on the process is encouraging).
    Triage. Banks should quickly be required to meet any resulting additional need for higher provisions and capital, drawing on the backstop as needed. Banks should be triaged into: (1) those that do not need support (2) viable banks that need government support, which will be provided subject to tightly-monitored restructuring plans, and (3) non-viable banks.
    Dealing with intervened banks. The new management of the fourth largest bank should quickly present their detailed restructuring strategy and timetable. The strategy for the other intervened banks should be announced, including their restructuring plans and estimated cost of government support. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the state’s ability to manage its large stakes in a substantial share of the banking system and to enhance its ability to eventually exit, and ideally profit, from such stakes.
    Using the backstop. The exact cost to the government will depend on many factors, including the results of the valuation exercise, the costs of restructuring intervened banks, and the specific strategy adopted. Even if the cost were to reach the full Eurogroup commitment of €100 billion, this would remain manageable from a debt sustainability perspective, provided the envisaged fiscal adjustment is undertaken.
    Legacy assets. A goal of dealing comprehensively with legacy real estate assets should be announced, with options to be developed and finalized after the independent valuations.

9. Banking supervision and the crisis management and resolution framework needs to be upgraded in key areas. The gradual approach in taking corrective action since the bursting of the real estate bubble has not been conducive to financial stability and requires, inter alia, measures to improve the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of remedial action. This improvement should include, for example, special tools to resolve banks, such as prompt recapitalizations and bridge banks.

Fiscal policy: implementing a robust medium-term consolidation strategy

10. The fiscal slippage in 2011 greatly undermined the credibility of Spain to deliver fiscal consolidation and increased the needed fiscal adjustment for 2012. The impact of the large overrun (almost 3 percent of GDP) was exacerbated by maintaining the message, until almost the end of the year, that the deficit was on track, and by the lack of timely and reliable data.

11. A large consolidation is in train for this year. Despite the considerable effort, the very ambitious 5.3 percent of GDP deficit target for 2012 will likely be missed. Revenue could be weaker than expected and the timeframe is short (in part because the budget was delayed). The envisaged adjustment would require deep structural changes for many of the regions. Given the weak growth outlook, however, slippage should not be made up in a compressed timeframe.

12. The bulk of the planned consolidation in 2013-15 is based on expenditure savings, many of which are yet to be specified. The revenue to GDP ratio is projected in the Stability Program to barely rise over the period. Primary spending is projected to fall by almost 4 percent of GDP, with only a part linked to specific measures, and interest spending is also projected to fall in the medium-term. Growth projections are in line with ours, but incorporating the fiscal consolidation envisaged in the Stability Program would entail lower growth under staff’s framework.

13. Further action needs to be taken to stabilize public debt and bring it down over time. Given the lack of detailed measures after 2012, staff projects the deficit to significantly overshoot targets and to fall only gradually over the medium term. This, plus debt from bank recapitalization and financing regional arrears, requires achieving the medium-term fiscal targets to maintain debt at manageable levels.

14. The medium-term fiscal plan should be strengthened around three dimensions.

    Path. The deficit path envisaged in the Stability Program should be less front-loaded (in agreement with European partners). The medium-term targets are broadly appropriate, but a smoother path would be appropriate during a period of extreme weakness, when multipliers are likely to be particularly large and the tax base soft, to reduce the risk of creating a negative feedback loop with growth and NPLs, which may also undermine market confidence, especially if targets are missed. Such a smoother path should also be embedded in a prudent macroeconomic framework.
    Composition. Given the size of the needed consolidation, no options should be ruled out. Revenue measures should play a larger role. In particular, there is considerable scope to reduce tax expenditures and increase indirect tax revenue by broadening the base and raising and unifying rates, especially on VAT and excises—actions that should be taken now. Reducing social security contributions is desirable, but should be contingent on first reducing the deficit (to, say, below 3 percent of GDP). The reintroduced deduction for mortgage payments should be eliminated. It is also critical that the measures deliver permanent and not one-off gains (for example, there should be no further amnesties or transitory rate increases). Spending on the most vulnerable should be protected.
    Certainty. Spending reductions are planned for the right areas. But they will take time to identify, be difficult to implement, and their yields uncertain. To give assurance that the envisaged savings will materialize, future public wage cuts and VAT/excise increases could be legislated now and only cancelled if the targets are hit. Privatization should be more aggressively pursued to give upside risk to debt projections.

15. An improved fiscal framework would facilitate the envisaged adjustment. It is important that the new provisions in the Budget Stability Law be fully implemented (for example, immediately warning some regions and quickly intervening if they fail to respond promptly). But the framework still needs improvement, and the stronger the framework, the more likely markets would accept a smoother consolidation path.

    While significant progress has been made in recent months, including publishing quarterly regional government outturns in national accounting terms for the first time, greater fiscal transparency is essential. For example, providing monthly consolidated general government accounts on a cash basis within six weeks. Regional budgets, fiscal plans and reporting should be made more homogenous and user-friendly. A durable framework for funding regional governments also needs to be established.
    Moving to a fully-fledged medium-term budget framework with expenditure ceilings and detailing measures covering at least 2013 and 2014, alongside measures that would aid sub-national consolidation (for example by introducing savings in health spending).
    We continue to recommend an independent fiscal council. This could, for example, analyze budgets and provide their key macroeconomic assumptions, develop comparative regional performance indicators, and conduct nationwide expenditure reviews of major programs.

Structural policies: going for growth

16. Spain urgently needs job-rich growth and further gains in competitiveness. Domestic demand is likely to be weak for quite some time and the external current account needs to improve further. This means focusing on policies to facilitate the expansion of the tradable sector, raise productivity and lower costs. These are inherently complex and difficult reforms but critical if growth is to be inclusive and job-rich. Establishing a clear goal, such as getting Spain into the “Top 10” list of global indices of competitiveness and business environment could help focus policy and popular understanding.

17. The recent labor reform is most welcome as it has the potential to substantially improve the functioning of the labor market. Spain’s labor market stands out for its high unemployment, segmentation, wage rigidity, and inflexible working conditions. The recent labor reform should allow firms to adapt more nimbly to market conditions, for example, by adjusting wages and hours rather than employment. The reform needs time to take effect and it is too soon to tell if the reform is working: while there are some tentative positive signs, wages are still insufficiently sensitive to the very high level of unemployment.

18. The reform’s success hinges on its implementation. The reform could, however, be strengthened, for example, by reducing the difference between protection for permanent and temporary contracts to make the labor market more inclusive and eliminating the practice of indexation and “ultra-activity”. The new flexibility options could also be better communicated to firms. And if sufficient firm-level flexibility is not quickly forthcoming, policymakers should prepare contingency plans, for example, moving to an opt-in system for collective bargaining. The planned review of active employment policies is welcome. It should carefully consider whether the unemployed are being given sufficient training and incentive to secure employment and whether the use of subsides offers best value for money.

19. Delivering the envisaged other structural reforms will be important to complement the labor reform. Retail licensing has already been eased and the government’s reform agenda appropriately targets a common regulatory framework in all regions, boosting the rental market, liberalizing retail hours and professional services, and eliminating the tariff deficit. It would be important that these reforms are rapidly and effectively implemented – a detailed and ambitious timetable would help structure and communicate the efforts. Further reforms, such as policies to help small firms grow, also seem necessary to foster inclusive and job-rich growth.

[nora]

El informe del FMI
http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2012/06/15/28203a21975aaf06b018939eb455602a.pdf

La intensificación de la actual reversión de los grandes desajustes en precios y salarios debería estar en el centro de la agenda ejem...

Iba a poner esto en el hilo de energías renovables, pero creo que está mejor aquí. No todo son los salarios...

Alcoa cerrará en España si no se rebaja la tarifa eléctrica

"La energía supone el 40% del coste de fabricación y en nuestro entorno el precio de la luz es menor; cualquiera entiende que así la actividad es inviable"

En España, hoy por hoy, no hay electricidad a precios competitivos que nos permita seguir operando. Esa es la realidad.

Más adelante le echa la culpa a las renovables y pide más energía nuclear, pero bueno..
http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/economia/2012/06/14/alcoa-cerrara-espana-rebaja-tarifa-electrica/618115.html

[Petardazo Inminente]

El informe del FMI
http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2012/06/15/28203a21975aaf06b018939eb455602a.pdf

La intensificación de la actual reversión de los grandes desajustes en precios y salarios debería estar en el centro de la agenda ejem...

Iba a poner esto en el hilo de energías renovables, pero creo que está mejor aquí. No todo son los salarios...

Alcoa cerrará en España si no se rebaja la tarifa eléctrica

"La energía supone el 40% del coste de fabricación y en nuestro entorno el precio de la luz es menor; cualquiera entiende que así la actividad es inviable"

En España, hoy por hoy, no hay electricidad a precios competitivos que nos permita seguir operando. Esa es la realidad.

Más adelante le echa la culpa a las renovables y pide más energía nuclear, pero bueno..
http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/economia/2012/06/14/alcoa-cerrara-espana-rebaja-tarifa-electrica/618115.html

Claro. La solución es la nuclear... no que las electricas, dominadas por las participaciones cajeriles ( y estas en manos de quien ya sabemos ), apechuguen con las pérdidas por sus erráticas y birriosas inversiones. Que paguemos el resto para que sigan repartiendo dividendos y bonus y la santísima ... me callo 
Seguro que no soy yo el único usuario al que  hace tres meses que no le llega la factura de la luz... para que llegue toda de golpe añadiendo la última subida.

Remen y callen, coño !!

[nora]

Claro. La solución es la nuclear... no que las electricas, dominadas por las participaciones cajeriles ( y estas en manos de quien ya sabemos ), apechuguen con las pérdidas por sus erráticas y birriosas inversiones. Que paguemos el resto para que sigan repartiendo dividendos y bonus y la santísima ... me callo 
Seguro que no soy yo el único usuario al que  hace tres meses que no le llega la factura de la luz... para que llegue toda de golpe añadiendo la última subida.

Remen y callen, coño !!

Tienes razón.

Pero ponía la noticia de Alcoa más como ejemplo de que, por mucho que no hablen más que de salarios, de bajar salarios para ganar competitividad hay otros costes como los energéticos o los inmobiliarios...y de esos no se acuerdan nunca o qué!!

[Maple Leaf]

...Iba a poner esto en el hilo de energías renovables, pero creo que está mejor aquí. No todo son los salarios...

Alcoa cerrará en España si no se rebaja la tarifa eléctrica

"La energía supone el 40% del coste de fabricación y en nuestro entorno el precio de la luz es menor; cualquiera entiende que así la actividad es inviable"

En España, hoy por hoy, no hay electricidad a precios competitivos que nos permita seguir operando. Esa es la realidad.

Más adelante le echa la culpa a las renovables y pide más energía nuclear, pero bueno..
http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/economia/2012/06/14/alcoa-cerrara-espana-rebaja-tarifa-electrica/618115.html

Carburantes, luz y generación
Soria subirá tres impuestos energéticos para recaudar 4.300 millones de euros

http://www.libremercado.com/2012-06-15/soria-baraja-subir-3-impuestos-electricos-para-recaudar-4300-millones-1276461398/

Ya lo avanzó ayer el ministro de Industria, Energía y Turismo, José Manuel Soria, el Gobierno ultima una nueva reforma eléctrica que incluye una subida de impuestos sobre la electricidad para atajar el déficit de tarifa. Pero, según informa el diario Cinco Días, éste no va a ser el único incremento impositivo que prepara el departamento de Soria.

 La aplicación del llamado 'céntimo verde' ya está en marcha. Se trata de un aumento de entre 3 y 4 céntimos en el precio de los hidrocarburos con el que Gobierno pretende ingresar unos 1.500 millones de euros. Las petroleras llevan varios días rechazando públicamente esta posibilidad. En concreto, la Asociación Española de Operadores de Productos Petrolíferos (AOP) asegura que el establecimiento de un 'céntimo verde' a los carburantes para financiar las energías renovables "carece de rigor" y recuerda que desde 2008 los impuestos a la gasolina y el gasóleo han subido un 18% y un 20%, respectivamente.

 Ante la posibilidad de que imponga este nuevo gravamen en los combustibles, la AOP indica que los hidrocarburos aportaron en 2010 un total de 11.085 millones de euros a la Agencia Tributaria a través del impuestos especiales y del Impuesto sobre Ventas Minoristas de Determinados Hidrocarburos (IVMDH), mientras que el impuesto especial de la electricidad apenas recaudó 1.370 millones.

 Otra de las medidas que podría anunciar Soria sería la imposición de una tasa general a la producción eléctrica que gravaría cualquier tipo de producción. También, en este caso su coste podría ser trasladado por las empresas al precio final de la energía, salvo la nuclear, la hidráulica y cierta renovable. Tres inminentes subidas de impuestos que podrían ser anunciadas en los próximos días con las que el Gobierno espera recaudar unos 4.300 millones de euros en total.

[Republik]

Apostoflant! Magnifico! Fantabuloso! el articulo de Satyajit Das. (me saco el sombrero, ese hombre es una machine)
Gracias por postearlo!


Acerca de los cds, estoy con pringaete. No se puede observar una causalidad entre los naked cds y el precio de los bonos.

El naked cds seria algo asi como una opcion put sobre acciones, sin ser propietario de las acciones. Compras el derecho de vender bonos a un precio digamos de 100€ (sin tener los bonos). En caso de default o reestructuracion de los bonos, acudirias al mercado secundario, donde comprarias los bonos al precio de cotizacion que seria muy bajo por el default o la reestructuracion y luego los venderias a 100€ usando el naked cds embolsando la diferencia.

Por muchos naked cds que compres, la influencia en el precio del bono no es directa. Otra cosa es que alguien aproveche informacion "insider" para comprar naked cds sabiendo que habra un evento de credito que forzara la ejecucion de los cds. Vamos, algo asi como lo que pasa en el mundo de las acciones o de las comodities (ver la pelicula de Eddie Murphy: Entre pillos anda el juego)

Esto no quiita que el ISDA este formado por los grandes financieros del mundo, y que sea un mercado OTC, donde ellos hacen como Juan Palomo, yo me lo guiso yo me lo como.

Por cierto, creo que la prohibicion de naked cds esta ya aprovada en la UE, y que entra en vigor este noviembre de 2012.

Slds!

 El tema es complejo, yo causalidad  creo que tampoco es demostrable que exista. Pero sí veo en muchos estudios que hay cierta precedencia (claro que no para todos los CDS, aunque sí en casos significativos de grandes movimientos) del movimiento en el mercado de CDS frente al de deuda (que es más caro de mover, por ejemplo el nocional neto de CDS sobre la deuda soberana griega anda por US$3.000M y el stock total son €370.000M) y ahí es donde el juego tramposo de "yo lo emito y yo califico el evento de crédito que puede dispararlo", sumado al extraño carácter de este producto que tiene aspecto de seguro pero no cuenta con regulación sobre recursos propios y provisiones del pseudoasegurador, hace sospechar que aunque en inicio esto se inventara con un fin lógico y hasta decente (también los futuros y se cometen excesos con ellos), en determinadas circunstancias se pueda utilizar como arma de guerra financiera, por ejemplo tratando de forzar un rescate para España (aunque si Angela quiere el BCE esto lo evita sin mayores problemas).

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100015444/and-the-losers-from-greek-cds-contracts-are-german/

Entonces es posible que en situaciones bien precalentadas (esto contra Francia seguramente no funcionaría) y con una realidad subyacente que al menos lo haga plausible, una manipulación en el mercado de CDS con cantidades moderadas permitiera de modo derivado perturbar seriamente el mercado de deuda elevando sustancialmente la prima de riesgo.

Prohibir los naked no es mala cosa porque acota  más el problema.

[CHOSEN]

Respecto al artículo del tal Aristóbulo:

Tras leerlo, YO ya me voy a negar a leer cualquier artículo que no empiece señalando que la actual situación de parálisis y agonía viene derivada de la crisis inmobiliaria.
A estas alturas todo lo demás ya es perder el tiempo.
Se les ve el plumero, solo preocupados por lash ventash, que fluya el crédito, y que sea otro el que se coma el marrón que tengo encima, que ya no se como sacármelo sin perder la camisa.

ES PATÉTICO.

Ahora están como locos deseando que el contribuyente alemán les saque las castañas del fuego. Y lo que es PEOR, y ya lo dije hace años: lo que están haciendo es una jugada de DOBLE beneficio, porque esos monises no debería entrar en caja HASTA que el agujero se haya materializado.
Las cosas tienen que ir en orden. Todo lo demás será la chabacanería latina de siempre.
Primero deshágase de ese pasivo que está lastrando sus balances, una vez hecho esto veremos el tamaño real del agujero, entonces procedamos a sanearlo con la aportación del FROB, del MES, el MAS o maruja la churrera.

PERO EN ESTE ORDEN.

No puede ser que ustedes reciban su rescate, mantengan en cartera sus "pasivos" en la columna de activos (balances mas falsos que un duro de madera), y encima se crean los reyes del mambo porque están saneados y con la cartera intacta. Porque en España somos tan chabacanos -si, lo somos- que alguno será capaz de ir sacando pecho y lanzando OPAS a empresas europeas (como hizo Floren a crédito con Hochtieff).

Que no.
Que me niego a leer NADA que no empiece diciendo: EL PROBLEMA ES INMOBILIARIO

Y quiebras coño ya!!!
Que tener ficha bancaria no es sinónimo de vida eterna joder!!!
Al fogasa con ellos ya, coño!!!

[CHOSEN]

PD: Para acogerse al programa Hartz IV tienes que haberte desecho previamente de todas tus posesiones (piso, coche...) si las tuvieras.

Solo pasa en España que la gente paga su hipoteca de 600 euros el lunes y el martes se pone en la cola de cáritas. Por supuesto que la culpa no la tienen ellos, sino el esquizoide sistema inmobiliario nacional que les impide encontrar un techo por 300 euros... so pena de dormir al raso!!! 

Apliquemos lo mismo a la banca para recibir las ayudas. Desháganse de todo lo accesorio, dejen sus balances limpios, y entonces, solo entonces, las entidades viables recibirán ayuda. El resto se cierren y punto final.
Ni que hicieran falta 20 entidades bancarias en este país!!!

[azkunaveteya]

El informe del FMI
http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/2012/06/15/28203a21975aaf06b018939eb455602a.pdf

La intensificación de la actual reversión de los grandes desajustes en precios y salarios debería estar en el centro de la agenda ejem...

Iba a poner esto en el hilo de energías renovables, pero creo que está mejor aquí. No todo son los salarios...

Alcoa cerrará en España si no se rebaja la tarifa eléctrica

"La energía supone el 40% del coste de fabricación y en nuestro entorno el precio de la luz es menor; cualquiera entiende que así la actividad es inviable"

En España, hoy por hoy, no hay electricidad a precios competitivos que nos permita seguir operando. Esa es la realidad.

Más adelante le echa la culpa a las renovables y pide más energía nuclear, pero bueno..
http://www.laopinioncoruna.es/economia/2012/06/14/alcoa-cerrara-espana-rebaja-tarifa-electrica/618115.html

Claro. La solución es la nuclear... no que las electricas, dominadas por las participaciones cajeriles ( y estas en manos de quien ya sabemos ), apechuguen con las pérdidas por sus erráticas y birriosas inversiones. Que paguemos el resto para que sigan repartiendo dividendos y bonus y la santísima ... me callo 
Seguro que no soy yo el único usuario al que  hace tres meses que no le llega la factura de la luz... para que llegue toda de golpe añadiendo la última subida.

Remen y callen, coño !!

detenidos 2 reactores y un herido

http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/06/15/natura/1339783069.html

[Petardazo Inminente]

detenidos 2 reactores y un herido

http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/06/15/natura/1339783069.html

Nada, problemas menores, propaganda perroflautica, bla bla bla ...

[chester]

http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2012/061512.htm

2012 Article IV Consultation with Spain
Concluding Statement of IMF Mission
Madrid, June, 14, 2012

Many major policy actions have been taken in recent months on several fronts. But market confidence remains weak and the outlook is very difficult. The economy is in the midst of an unprecedented double-dip recession with unemployment already unacceptably high, public debt increasing rapidly, and segments of the financial sector needing recapitalization. This calls for a commensurately ambitious policy response and communicating it within a comprehensive medium-term strategy. This strategy should be based around concrete measures to deliver the needed medium-term fiscal consolidation, a roadmap for restructuring the weak segments of the financial sector, and structural reforms to boost growth. The prospective Euro area financial sector support is an important opportunity to implement such a strategy. Spain’s prospects will also be helped by further progress at the European level.

1. Faced with great challenges on several fronts, the government reform momentum has been strong, with many major actions initiated in recent months:

    Banks. Provisions and capital requirements have been raised, independent valuations commissioned, the fourth largest bank is being restructured, and a credible backstop provided with support from Spain’s European partners.
    Fiscal. A package of measures was introduced in December, the 2012 budget is ambitious, the new budget stability and transparency laws provide for greater transparency and control over regional finances, and sub-national arrears are being cleared.
    Labor. A profound labor reform was introduced in February.

2. Despite these reforms and efforts, market confidence is weak. After a brief LTRO-induced respite, market tensions re-emerged in the spring. By mid-June, yields and spreads on Spanish government bonds were around their previous highs. Banks remain unable to tap private unsecured financing. And despite the announcement of the European backstop, market conditions remain weak.

3. The outlook is very difficult. The recession is deepening and unemployment is 24 percent (above 50 percent for the young) and rising. Headwinds from household and corporate deleveraging, combined with unavoidable fiscal consolidation, will likely translate into output contractions this year and next. But with an assumed stabilization in financing conditions and a better functioning labor market as the reform kicks in, private consumption and investment should recover modestly. Net exports are expected to continue to contribute strongly to growth. Downside risks dominate, in particular:

    Financial: while the Euro area financial backstop helps to mitigate short-term risks, market tensions could intensify, particularly if policies fail to stem capital outflows or due to further stress elsewhere in the Euro area.
    Macroeconomic: private sector deleveraging could be faster than envisaged, and the fiscal consolation may have larger than envisaged output costs.

4. But there is also upside potential. Reforms, including the successful implementation of the recent labor reform, the strengthening of the financial sector supported by the Euro area backstop, and faster competitiveness gains, could lead to a significantly better medium-term outlook.

The policy agenda: restoring confidence

5. Continued strong reform momentum and a clear medium-term vision are needed to restore confidence so that imbalances can be unwound smoothly and jobs and growth fostered. This means strengthening the finances of the government and finalizing the banking reform. But it also means better functioning labor and product markets to support incomes, fiscal consolidation, banks’ asset quality, and social backing for reform. Intensifying the ongoing reversal of the large misalignment in prices and wages should be at the center of this agenda. A cooperative solution, where workers accept greater wage moderation, employers pass on the cost savings to prices and hire, and banks recapitalize, could result in a faster reallocation of resources to dynamic sectors and a better outcome for all.

6. The Euro area support for the financial sector backstop is an opportunity to complete the task. The government is to be commended for ensuring a credible backstop for the financial sector. This backstop will ease the financing of the clean-up, restructuring, and recapitalization of the weak segments of Spain’s banking sector once and for all. Doing this thoroughly and accompanied by a comprehensive package of reforms in other areas should help restore confidence and put the economy back on a path of growth and employment. It will be critical to communicate such a package clearly and cohesively.

7. Spain’s prospects will also be helped by further progress at the European level. There is an immediate need at the euro area level to ensure adequate bank funding and mitigate contagion. But a lasting resolution to the Euro area crisis will require a convincing and concerted move toward a complete and robust EMU. This requires a roadmap toward a banking union and fiscal integration. A clear commitment in this direction, in particular on area-wide deposit insurance and a bank resolution framework with common backstops, is essential to chart a credible path ahead.

Financial sector: a roadmap for restructuring the weak segments

8. The recent progress needs to be built upon to complete the restructuring. The IMF’s Financial Sector Stability Assessment identifies some key reform areas, many of which are along the lines envisaged by the government:

    Independent valuation. The quality and transparency of the independent valuations and stress tests should be assured (the inclusion of staff of independent institutions to advise on the process is encouraging).
    Triage. Banks should quickly be required to meet any resulting additional need for higher provisions and capital, drawing on the backstop as needed. Banks should be triaged into: (1) those that do not need support (2) viable banks that need government support, which will be provided subject to tightly-monitored restructuring plans, and (3) non-viable banks.
    Dealing with intervened banks. The new management of the fourth largest bank should quickly present their detailed restructuring strategy and timetable. The strategy for the other intervened banks should be announced, including their restructuring plans and estimated cost of government support. Consideration should also be given to strengthening the state’s ability to manage its large stakes in a substantial share of the banking system and to enhance its ability to eventually exit, and ideally profit, from such stakes.
    Using the backstop. The exact cost to the government will depend on many factors, including the results of the valuation exercise, the costs of restructuring intervened banks, and the specific strategy adopted. Even if the cost were to reach the full Eurogroup commitment of €100 billion, this would remain manageable from a debt sustainability perspective, provided the envisaged fiscal adjustment is undertaken.
    Legacy assets. A goal of dealing comprehensively with legacy real estate assets should be announced, with options to be developed and finalized after the independent valuations.

9. Banking supervision and the crisis management and resolution framework needs to be upgraded in key areas. The gradual approach in taking corrective action since the bursting of the real estate bubble has not been conducive to financial stability and requires, inter alia, measures to improve the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of remedial action. This improvement should include, for example, special tools to resolve banks, such as prompt recapitalizations and bridge banks.

Fiscal policy: implementing a robust medium-term consolidation strategy

10. The fiscal slippage in 2011 greatly undermined the credibility of Spain to deliver fiscal consolidation and increased the needed fiscal adjustment for 2012. The impact of the large overrun (almost 3 percent of GDP) was exacerbated by maintaining the message, until almost the end of the year, that the deficit was on track, and by the lack of timely and reliable data.

11. A large consolidation is in train for this year. Despite the considerable effort, the very ambitious 5.3 percent of GDP deficit target for 2012 will likely be missed. Revenue could be weaker than expected and the timeframe is short (in part because the budget was delayed). The envisaged adjustment would require deep structural changes for many of the regions. Given the weak growth outlook, however, slippage should not be made up in a compressed timeframe.

12. The bulk of the planned consolidation in 2013-15 is based on expenditure savings, many of which are yet to be specified. The revenue to GDP ratio is projected in the Stability Program to barely rise over the period. Primary spending is projected to fall by almost 4 percent of GDP, with only a part linked to specific measures, and interest spending is also projected to fall in the medium-term. Growth projections are in line with ours, but incorporating the fiscal consolidation envisaged in the Stability Program would entail lower growth under staff’s framework.

13. Further action needs to be taken to stabilize public debt and bring it down over time. Given the lack of detailed measures after 2012, staff projects the deficit to significantly overshoot targets and to fall only gradually over the medium term. This, plus debt from bank recapitalization and financing regional arrears, requires achieving the medium-term fiscal targets to maintain debt at manageable levels.

14. The medium-term fiscal plan should be strengthened around three dimensions.

    Path. The deficit path envisaged in the Stability Program should be less front-loaded (in agreement with European partners). The medium-term targets are broadly appropriate, but a smoother path would be appropriate during a period of extreme weakness, when multipliers are likely to be particularly large and the tax base soft, to reduce the risk of creating a negative feedback loop with growth and NPLs, which may also undermine market confidence, especially if targets are missed. Such a smoother path should also be embedded in a prudent macroeconomic framework.
    Composition. Given the size of the needed consolidation, no options should be ruled out. Revenue measures should play a larger role. In particular, there is considerable scope to reduce tax expenditures and increase indirect tax revenue by broadening the base and raising and unifying rates, especially on VAT and excises—actions that should be taken now. Reducing social security contributions is desirable, but should be contingent on first reducing the deficit (to, say, below 3 percent of GDP). The reintroduced deduction for mortgage payments should be eliminated. It is also critical that the measures deliver permanent and not one-off gains (for example, there should be no further amnesties or transitory rate increases). Spending on the most vulnerable should be protected.
    Certainty. Spending reductions are planned for the right areas. But they will take time to identify, be difficult to implement, and their yields uncertain. To give assurance that the envisaged savings will materialize, future public wage cuts and VAT/excise increases could be legislated now and only cancelled if the targets are hit. Privatization should be more aggressively pursued to give upside risk to debt projections.

15. An improved fiscal framework would facilitate the envisaged adjustment. It is important that the new provisions in the Budget Stability Law be fully implemented (for example, immediately warning some regions and quickly intervening if they fail to respond promptly). But the framework still needs improvement, and the stronger the framework, the more likely markets would accept a smoother consolidation path.

    While significant progress has been made in recent months, including publishing quarterly regional government outturns in national accounting terms for the first time, greater fiscal transparency is essential. For example, providing monthly consolidated general government accounts on a cash basis within six weeks. Regional budgets, fiscal plans and reporting should be made more homogenous and user-friendly. A durable framework for funding regional governments also needs to be established.
    Moving to a fully-fledged medium-term budget framework with expenditure ceilings and detailing measures covering at least 2013 and 2014, alongside measures that would aid sub-national consolidation (for example by introducing savings in health spending).
    We continue to recommend an independent fiscal council. This could, for example, analyze budgets and provide their key macroeconomic assumptions, develop comparative regional performance indicators, and conduct nationwide expenditure reviews of major programs.

Structural policies: going for growth

16. Spain urgently needs job-rich growth and further gains in competitiveness. Domestic demand is likely to be weak for quite some time and the external current account needs to improve further. This means focusing on policies to facilitate the expansion of the tradable sector, raise productivity and lower costs. These are inherently complex and difficult reforms but critical if growth is to be inclusive and job-rich. Establishing a clear goal, such as getting Spain into the “Top 10” list of global indices of competitiveness and business environment could help focus policy and popular understanding.

17. The recent labor reform is most welcome as it has the potential to substantially improve the functioning of the labor market. Spain’s labor market stands out for its high unemployment, segmentation, wage rigidity, and inflexible working conditions. The recent labor reform should allow firms to adapt more nimbly to market conditions, for example, by adjusting wages and hours rather than employment. The reform needs time to take effect and it is too soon to tell if the reform is working: while there are some tentative positive signs, wages are still insufficiently sensitive to the very high level of unemployment.

18. The reform’s success hinges on its implementation. The reform could, however, be strengthened, for example, by reducing the difference between protection for permanent and temporary contracts to make the labor market more inclusive and eliminating the practice of indexation and “ultra-activity”. The new flexibility options could also be better communicated to firms. And if sufficient firm-level flexibility is not quickly forthcoming, policymakers should prepare contingency plans, for example, moving to an opt-in system for collective bargaining. The planned review of active employment policies is welcome. It should carefully consider whether the unemployed are being given sufficient training and incentive to secure employment and whether the use of subsides offers best value for money.

19. Delivering the envisaged other structural reforms will be important to complement the labor reform. Retail licensing has already been eased and the government’s reform agenda appropriately targets a common regulatory framework in all regions, boosting the rental market, liberalizing retail hours and professional services, and eliminating the tariff deficit. It would be important that these reforms are rapidly and effectively implemented – a detailed and ambitious timetable would help structure and communicate the efforts. Further reforms, such as policies to help small firms grow, also seem necessary to foster inclusive and job-rich growth.

To give assurance that the envisaged savings will materialize, future public wage cuts and VAT/excise increases could be legislated now and only cancelled if the targets are hit. Privatization should be more aggressively pursued to give upside risk to debt projections.

HDLGP!!!!!! y dicen que no es un rescate!!!! no, es una intervención en toda regla

[Maple Leaf]

http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/amarina/2012/06/15/promotores-barreiros-quejan-entidad-bancaria-venda-pisos-partir-19900-euros/00031339773407320105776.htm

Promotores de Barreiros se quejan de que una entidad bancaria venda pisos a partir de 19.900 euros
Aprobar, la asociación que tienen constituida, estudia presentar alguna reclamación judicial contra el banco al considerar que «se está alterando el precio de las cosas»

La oferta de pisos que acaba de sacar a la venta Inmobiliaria Altamira, del grupo Santander, en el municipio mariñano de Barreiros, ha provocado rechazo, inquietud y críticas entre constructores y promotores de este municipio. El presidente del colectivo, Manuel Villamartín, explicaba ayer que están consultando con sus asesores jurídicos la posibilidad de iniciar algún tipo de reclamación judicial «por malversación de caudales públicos», al entender que la entidad bancaria «no hace frente al pago de su fondo inmobiliario y, sin embargo, hace este tipo de actuaciones».

Lo que ha desatado la polémica es el precio que ha marcado la sección inmobiliaria del Santander para los pisos de la Urbanización Lua, que se pueden adquirir desde 19.900 euros a 31.900 euros. Sus dimensiones oscilan entre los 30 metros cuadrados y los 54 metros cuadrados; además, la urbanización cuenta con piscina y jardín privado, parque infantil y zonas verdes y garaje opcional. El precio, según los promotores, está por debajo del coste de construcción.

Los pisitos de 30m2 los están vendiendo a 666 euros/m2, los de 54 a mas de 590 euros/m2. Teniendo en cuenta que, hoy, un promotor puede construir por algo menos de 500 euros/m2, le están sacando un beneficio industrial mas que suficiente.

¿Cuanto vale un pisito en un barrio medio, para una familia, en un país que no produce casi nada, y donde hay un 25% de paro?

Muy poco, casi nada, para el absurdo que hemos vivido.

[chester]

http://www.lavozdegalicia.es/noticia/amarina/2012/06/15/promotores-barreiros-quejan-entidad-bancaria-venda-pisos-partir-19900-euros/00031339773407320105776.htm

Promotores de Barreiros se quejan de que una entidad bancaria venda pisos a partir de 19.900 euros
Aprobar, la asociación que tienen constituida, estudia presentar alguna reclamación judicial contra el banco al considerar que «se está alterando el precio de las cosas»

La oferta de pisos que acaba de sacar a la venta Inmobiliaria Altamira, del grupo Santander, en el municipio mariñano de Barreiros, ha provocado rechazo, inquietud y críticas entre constructores y promotores de este municipio. El presidente del colectivo, Manuel Villamartín, explicaba ayer que están consultando con sus asesores jurídicos la posibilidad de iniciar algún tipo de reclamación judicial «por malversación de caudales públicos», al entender que la entidad bancaria «no hace frente al pago de su fondo inmobiliario y, sin embargo, hace este tipo de actuaciones».

Lo que ha desatado la polémica es el precio que ha marcado la sección inmobiliaria del Santander para los pisos de la Urbanización Lua, que se pueden adquirir desde 19.900 euros a 31.900 euros. Sus dimensiones oscilan entre los 30 metros cuadrados y los 54 metros cuadrados; además, la urbanización cuenta con piscina y jardín privado, parque infantil y zonas verdes y garaje opcional. El precio, según los promotores, está por debajo del coste de construcción.

Los pisitos de 30m2 los están vendiendo a 666 euros/m2, los de 54 a mas de 590 euros/m2. Teniendo en cuenta que, hoy, un promotor puede construir por algo menos de 500 euros/m2, le están sacando un beneficio industrial mas que suficiente.

¿Cuanto vale un pisito en un barrio medio, para una familia, en un país que no produce casi nada, y donde hay un 25% de paro?

Muy poco, casi nada, para el absurdo que hemos vivido.

  No les vi quejarse cuando no paraban de subir 

300.000 leros a pagar en 40 años