Los administradores de TransicionEstructural no se responsabilizan de las opiniones vertidas por los usuarios del foro. Cada usuario asume la responsabilidad de los comentarios publicados.
0 Usuarios y 1 Visitante están viendo este tema.
MILAN – With interest rates at all-time lows and central banks buying everything that moves, the world is awash with credit. Yet, paradoxically, a dangerous shortage of international liquidity is putting the global economy at risk.“International liquidity” refers to high-quality assets accepted around the world for paying import bills and servicing foreign debts. These are the same assets that central banks use when intervening in foreign-exchange markets. They serve as reliable stores of value for international investors. They provide pricing benchmarks in financial markets. And they are widely accepted as collateral for cross-border loans.The key difference between these international assets and liquid assets in general, then, is that only the former are accepted in a large number of different countries and regularly used in transactions between them.The single most important form of international liquidity is, of course, US government bonds, which are held by banks, firms, and other countries’ governments. More generally, international liquidity comprises the liabilities of OECD countries’ central banks (their “high-powered money”), those countries’ AAA-rated and AA-rated central-government bonds, the debt securities of supranational organizations like the World Bank and regional development banks, and gold in official and private hands.But add them up and you immediately come to a startling conclusion. International liquidity has plummeted from nearly 60% of global GDP in 2009 to barely 30% today. This change is due, equally, to downgrades in the ratings of heavily indebted crisis countries’ government bonds, which make them unattractive for use in international transactions, and the inelasticity of other sources of supply.Observers are perplexed by why global trade, having long grown faster than world GDP, is now expanding more slowly. They are also struggling to understand an unprecedented decline in global capital flows. A shortage of international liquidity, by making it harder to finance and settle these cross-border transactions, is one explanation.Urging the US government to issue more debt is no solution; doing so would only threaten rating downgrades and make foreign investors reluctant to hold US Treasury bonds. Alternatively, one could urge crisis countries whose bonds have lost their investment-grade status to repair their finances so that these securities are again attractive for financing international transactions. But financial strengthening takes time even for the most committed government, as any Greek official can tell you.Can privately-issued obligations – high-grade corporate bonds, for example – supplement official forms of international liquidity? This question dates back to the 1990s, when observers quaintly worried that the US government, by running surpluses, might retire its entire stock of debt.It turned out that central banks and governments, in particular, were reluctant to hold private-label securities, even when these instruments had investment-grade ratings. The reason is simple: Privately-issued assets without the backing of a government with the power of the purse might look safe in normal times; but, following a shock, they could quickly be reassessed as risky.Others suggest that the International Monetary Fund could augment the supply of international liquidity by issuing Special Drawing Rights. SDRs are accounting units made up of US dollars, British pounds, euros, Japanese yen, and Chinese renminbi. They can be credited to the accounts of IMF member countries, which are obliged to accept them in cross-border transactions under the Fund’s Articles of Agreement. Voilà: problem solved.Or not. There are no private markets in SDRs. To use them, a holder has to exchange them for, say, dollars in a transaction with the US government. As a result, no additional liquidity is created. The corresponding amount of dollar currency or deposits is simply transferred from one set of hands to another – from the US Treasury to the foreign holder. Meanwhile, the world as a whole has gained no additional liquid resources.Things would be different if, instead of allocating SDRs to governments, the IMF could sell them directly to central banks like the Fed, which, in return, would provide the Fund with additional dollars, which the Fund could then distribute among its members. But while this is a neat solution in principle, the Fed and its political masters would surely be reluctant to cede control of the money printing press in practice.Probably the most practical solution is to permit the IMF to borrow on private financial markets and use the proceeds to issue additional SDRs. With member governments collectively guaranteeing its obligations, its bonds would be as good as gold. To be sure, for their guarantee to be credible, members would have to commit to recapitalizing the Fund if it ever took losses on its loans. But, then, nothing is free.Globalization’s benefits are sometimes exaggerated, but there have been important benefits. Failure to address the international liquidity problem could jeopardize all that has been accomplished.
En v/F, para explicar el problema de los fondos de pensiones alemanes, nada mejor que mirar lo que está pasando con su equivalente galo, que supongo será lo mismo en Bégica y otros países del Norte de UE.Hay que entender que cuando pensamos "fondos de pensiones" hay que englobar cualquier tipo de depósito, seguro de vida, productos de cartera incluso de renta variable o fija, cuyo demonidador común es:-- rentabilidad más o menos fija o a plazo suficientemente largo -- inversiones en obligaciones del Estado o en obligaciones de empresas y algunos en bolsa, etc. Y,,,,, ahí está el punto-- deducción fiscal incitativa sobre +valías-- impuestos decrecientes cuanto más tiempo se deje el dinero -- deduccion fiscal en sucesionesNo hay diferencia con los productos normales, lo que los hace especiales es que todas esas carteras están declaradas como S.de vida, aunque no lo sean realmente, para ofrecer las deducciones fiscales (en ES sólo lo he visto para f.de pensiones que no puedes rescatar, y limitados en cuanto a carteras.Cuando tienes tributacion normal, en FR esa tributacion se te come el 45-60% de la +valia)Es decir, una máquina para embalsamar el dinero de la burbuja, pero que nunca llega hasta la E.O. Son los ahorritos de los himbersores desde los 80.Este artículo es sencillo y didáctico para quien no conozca la legislacion extranjera:http://www.insolentiae.com/suspendre-retarder-ou-limiter-votre-acces-a-votre-assurance-vie-la-nouvelle-loi-dont-personne-ne-vous-a-parle-ledito-de-charles-sannat/La represión financiera hace que los bancos empiecen a prohibir renovar los plazofijos con fondos de obligaciones porque los tipos están a cero. Los vencimeintos de obligaciones antiguas se acaban, y con ellas, las rentabilidades de esos fondos.Los bancos ya solo admiten aperturas o realimentaciones si la inversión es a medias en renta variable. Como la rentabilidad de las obligaciones se ajusta a la del BCE y se irán cerrando poco a poco, (interés 0%)Finalmente, está el riesgo del que avisa el artículo: que ante la avalancha de cancelaciones de SVida, los bancos no dispongan de fondos suficientes para cubrir los reembolsos. Por eso acaban de modificarse la ley para permitir a los bancos denegar el reembolso de tu cartera.La rentabilidad caerá a 0% (+ comisiones = -1,5% ) y el banco te denegará el reembolso, supongo que aconsejándote que esperes a que suban los tipos del BCE !!!! ¿Entendido? Eutanasia de rentistas, v.2.0----Es por tanto, el mismo problema que tienen los Alemanes pero éstos, además, tienen un régimen de pensiones más bien mixto (la de reparto es miserable). En Francia es principalmente de reparto, también es miserable, pero no baja del límite de pobreza.Ante la pregunta: ¿Van los Franceses a desviar el pastón extraido de la burbuja a lo inmobiliario?Están algunos en el foro burbuja galo con los ojos brillantes, pero son cada vez menos (algo se encarga la v/FR de ppcc de explicarles que no tienen esperanza ) Respuesta: -- el Gobierno está dando largas a los que piden exenciones a las directrices de la BCE que prohiben a los bancos respaldar en la BCE sus préstamos hipotecarios a particulares (si les interesa les busco el artículo sobre los lobbies de agentes inmobiliarios que presentaron un informe al Senado con muchos argumentos sobre la "excepción gala")Es tiempo de exorcismos.
TOKYO – In the early years of the twentieth century, Charles Ponzi, an Italian migrant to North America, had a seemingly brilliant moneymaking idea. He would offer huge returns on worthless investments, thereby convincing a growing number of people to give him their money, which was used, in lieu of profit, to pay off earlier investors. Ponzi’s eponymous scheme was essentially a way to enable businesses to rack up debt forever. But, of course, it was ultimately just a scam – and, indeed, it landed Ponzi in prison.A century later, pyramid schemes like Ponzi’s are still regarded as fraud, at least when they are pursued by private businesses. Yet few seem to recognize the role such schemes play in the public sector. In fact, governments in many countries, including the United States and Japan, survive on what are essentially Ponzi schemes.Of course, there are crucial differences. A traditional private-sector Ponzi scheme, despite its potential short-run returns, always breaks down for a simple reason: the number of potential investors is finite. But in a government-run Ponzi scheme, the investor is the taxpayer. And a stable government, with all the coercive means at its disposal, can reasonably expect to continue collecting taxes, which it can use to repay its earlier debts, for generations to come.But the fact that a public-sector Ponzi scheme can be sustained for a longer time does not make it foolproof. Excessive public debt weighs down an economy, leaving it vulnerable to shocks. Given this, many analysts have called for aligning the rules for public debt more closely with those governing the private sector. Yet it is important to take a nuanced approach.
Peor que Lehman:http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-06-24/worse-lehman-european-bank-bloodbath-sparks-dollar-funding-crisisThe Federal Reserve is carefully monitoring developments in global financial markets, in cooperation with other central banks, following the results of the U.K. referendum on membership in the European Union. The Federal Reserve is prepared to provide dollar liquidity through its existing swap lines with central banks, as necessary, to address pressures in global funding markets, which could have adverse implications for the U.S. economy.Los leones hoy se deben haber puesto las botas...
Es que no se que pinta mencionar a Ponzi cuando se habla de impuestos.Podría perfectamente haber empezado hablando de una silla, un plátano o una lavadora, y el argumento sería igual de inconsistente Es muy burdo.
El sistema ponzi es matemáticamente inestable, no tiene asíntota.Su representación gráfica es una función exponencial clásica como ésta:Por contra los impuestos se comportan como una función polinómica, donde el límite a los impuestos viene determinado por la capacidad de los ciudadanos para pagarlos.Como caso extremo supongamos que dicho límite viene representado por la propiedad privada y la expropiación total de la misma por parte del Estado, con la conversión de los ciudadanos en esclavos (trabajo es riqueza, trabajo futuro es riqueza futura).Matemáticas oxidadas de bachiller Aunque parezca lo mismo o muy parecido, no lo es, porque sí existe asíntota.Y vaya si existe. La prima de riesgo y los TdC son indicadores de dicho límite (límite de endeudamiento del país). Véase Grecia, pegadita a la asíntota, con impuestos altos, prestaciones ínfimas, y prima de riesgo al límite -sostenida por el BCE- aunque sin tipos de cambio aplicables por estar en el euro.
I'm known as a gold bug and everyone laughs at me, but why do central banks own gold now?