Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://orientalreview.org/2015/11/13/grandmaster-putins-trap-2/

[Mad Men]

http://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2015-11-15/escandinavia-avanza-hacia-una-sociedad-sin-cash_1091150/

Sin Cash???

No creo, ya se inventarán alguna neo-moneda para hacer negocios o comprar cosas ilegales.

[Lego]

El bitcoin ya está integrado en la fiscalidad oficial y recupera el anonimato en caso de que eliminaran el cash.  Sería interesante conocer datos sobre el posible auge del bitcoin en esos países, a ver si se aprecia correlación.

Es también electrónico, no devuelve la tranquilizadora tangibilidad a la moneda, pero si es verdad que hasta los mendigos ya llevan lector de tarjetas puede que ese problema no sea tan insuperable como muchos pensábamos.

 Aún así yo creo que hay una parte reptiliana de la mente que, somo decía antes, nunca se fiará del todo de un cachivache a pilas, cosa que me parece muy racional a la vez.  Podría ser que, si quitan el cash, mientras haya cierta estabilidad social (y militar) todo funcionará más o menos como estaba planeado pero apostaría a que a medio plazo pongamos, un 10% o  20% del ahorro se vaya a la acumulación de moneda extrajera, la que proceda.

Cuanto más oleaje planetario y ruido de sables, más ambición de control tendrá el sistema, pero también más incentivos tendrá la economía para hacer emerger sistemas paralelos de intercambio, y los individuos para encontrar una reserva de valor fiable.    Como el bitcoin, habrán de ser aceptados por el sistema si no quiere dejar fuera de la ley a media población (o sea, desaparecer).  Sobre la reserva de valor de las hormiguitas... esa tiene más posibilidades. Quizá en occidente sean los ladrillos y en asia el oro. El tiempo dirá qué pasa y qué funciona mejor.

[saturno]

http://orientalreview.org/2015/11/13/grandmaster-putins-trap-2/

El anterior era de

Grandmaster Putin’s Trap
Thu, Dec 25, 2014    (Russia, United States)
By Dmitry KALINICHENKO (Russia)

Éste es de:

Grandmaster Putin’s Trap – 2
Fri, Nov 13, 2015  ('The Others' Alliances, China, Russia, United States)
By ORIENTAL REVIEW

¿Han contratado a Fofoa (o uno de Foa, Fo, Another)? 
¿O entonces Kalinichenko es FOFOA?

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://orientalreview.org/2015/11/13/grandmaster-putins-trap-2/

El anterior era de

Grandmaster Putin’s Trap
Thu, Dec 25, 2014    (Russia, United States)
By Dmitry KALINICHENKO (Russia)

Éste es de:

Grandmaster Putin’s Trap – 2
Fri, Nov 13, 2015  ('The Others' Alliances, China, Russia, United States)
By ORIENTAL REVIEW

¿Han contratado a Fofoa (o uno de Foa, Fo, Another)? 
¿O entonces Kalinichenko es FOFOA?

Será el becario ruso, por lo visto...

http://cont.ws/post/92743

[ Gracias a  A. ]

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.elconfidencial.com/mercados/2015-11-16/japon-recesion-abenomics-nikkei_1098399/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

LONDON – The US Federal Reserve is almost certain to start raising interest rates when the policy-setting Federal Open Markets Committee next meets, on December 16. How worried should businesses, investors, and policymakers around the world be about the end of near-zero interest rates and the start of the first monetary-tightening cycle since 2004-2008?

Janet Yellen, the Fed chair, has repeatedly said that the impending sequence of rate hikes will be much slower than previous monetary cycles, and predicts that it will end at a lower peak level. While central bankers cannot always be trusted when they make such promises, since their jobs often require them deliberately to mislead investors, there are good reasons to believe that the Fed’s commitment to “lower for longer” interest rates is sincere.

The Fed’s overriding objective is to lift inflation and ensure that it remains above 2%. To do this, Yellen will have to keep interest rates very low, even after inflation starts rising, just as her predecessor Paul Volcker had to keep interest rates in the 1980s very high, even after inflation started falling. This policy reversal follows logically from the inversion of central banks’ objectives, both in America and around the world, since the 2008 crisis.

In the 1980s, Volcker’s historic responsibility was to reduce inflation and prevent it from ever rising again to dangerously high levels. Today, Yellen’s historic responsibility is to increase inflation and prevent it from ever falling again to dangerously low levels.

Under these conditions, the direct economic effects of the Fed’s move should be minimal. It is hard to imagine many businesses, consumers, or homeowners changing their behavior because of a quarter-point change in short-term interest rates, especially if long-term rates hardly move. And even assuming that interest rates reach 1-1.5% by the end of 2016, they will still be very low by historic standards, both in absolute terms and relative to inflation.

The media and official publications from the International Monetary Fund and other institutions have raised dire warnings about the impact of the Fed’s first move on financial markets and other economies. Many Asian and Latin America countries, in particular, are considered vulnerable to a reversal of the capital inflows from which they benefited when US interest rates were at rock-bottom levels. But, as an empirical matter, these fears are hard to understand.

The imminent US rate hike is perhaps the most predictable, and predicted, event in economic history. Nobody will be caught unawares if the Fed acts next month, as many investors were in February 1994 and June 2004, the only previous occasions remotely comparable to the current one. And even in those cases, stock markets barely reacted to the Fed tightening, while bond-market volatility proved short-lived.

But what about currencies? The dollar is almost universally expected to appreciate when US interest rates start rising, especially because the EU and Japan will continue easing monetary conditions for many months, even years. This fear of a stronger dollar is the real reason for concern, bordering on panic, in many emerging economies and at the IMF. A significant strengthening of the dollar would indeed cause serious problems for emerging economies where businesses and governments have taken on large dollar-denominated debts and currency devaluation threatens to spin out of control.

Fortunately, the market consensus concerning the dollar’s inevitable rise as US interest rates increase is almost certainly wrong, for three reasons.

First, the divergence of monetary policies between the US and other major economies is already universally understood and expected. Thus, the interest-rate differential, like the US rate hike itself, should already be priced into currency values.

Moreover, monetary policy is not the only determinant of exchange rates. Trade deficits and surpluses also matter, as do stock-market and property valuations, the cyclical outlook for corporate profits, and positive or negative surprises for economic growth and inflation. On most of these grounds, the dollar has been the world’s most attractive currency since 2009; but as economic recovery spreads from the US to Japan and Europe, the tables are starting to turn.

Finally, the widely assumed correlation between monetary policy and currency values does not stand up to empirical examination. In some cases, currencies move in the same direction as monetary policy – for example, when the yen dropped in response to the Bank of Japan’s 2013 quantitative easing. But in other cases the opposite happens, for example when the euro and the pound both strengthened after their central banks began quantitative easing.

For the US, the evidence has been very mixed. Looking at the monetary tightening that began in February 1994 and June 2004, the dollar strengthened substantially in both cases before the first rate hike, but then weakened by around 8% (as gauged by the Fed’s dollar index) in the subsequent six months. Over the next 2-3 years, the dollar index remained consistently below its level on the day of the first rate hike. For currency traders, therefore, the last two cycles of Fed tightening turned out to be classic examples of “buy on the rumor; sell on the news.”

Of course, past performance is no guarantee of future results, and two cases do not constitute a statistically significant sample. Just because the dollar weakened twice during the last two periods of Fed tightening does not prove that the same thing will happen again.

But it does mean that a rise in the dollar is not automatic or inevitable if the Fed raises interest rates next month. The globally disruptive effects of US monetary tightening – a rapidly rising dollar, capital outflows from emerging markets, financial distress for international dollar borrowers, and chaotic currency devaluations in Asia and Latin America – may loom less large in next year’s economic outlook than in a rear-view glimpse of 2015.

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/no-fear-of-fed-interest-rate-increase-by-anatole-kaletsky-2015-11

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

y aquí v/FR:

http://youtu.be/witHN8nDwgA
	Small | Large

! No longer available	Small | Large

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://www.bullionstar.com/blogs/koos-jansen/the-mechanics-of-the-chinese-gold-market/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/perlas-de-kike/2015-11-19/el-mercado-de-swaps-se-vuelve-loco_1100960/

Según las últimas estadísticas publicadas por el Banco Internacional de Pagos, los derivados sobre tipos de interés (comúnmente conocidos como IRS por sus siglas en inglés) alcanzaban a finales del primer semestre de 2015 un montante de 435 billones de dólares. Sí, billones de los de aquí, o trillones anglosajones si lo prefieren. Por ello, si algo extraño ocurre en este mercado, sin duda debemos conocerlo. Hablamos de un lugar en donde operan las manos más fuertes de entre las manos fuertes. Y ese lugar está emitiendo señales, está comportándose de forma aparentemente irracional… tan irracional que nadie entiende el porqué.

Empecemos por el principio, ¿qué es un 'swap' sobre los tipos de interés? Pongamos un ejemplo que resulte fácil de entender para todo el mundo. Si una persona tiene una hipoteca referenciada a un tipo de interés variable, y teme una subida de los tipos de interés en un futuro, puede preferir pagar algo más todos los meses a cambio de disfrutar de la tranquilidad de un tipo fijo. De ser así, esta persona necesitaría un 'swap', en concreto un IRS, cuyo valor de mercado a un determinado plazo sería, para entendernos, ese ‘algo más’ que se paga.

Técnicamente las cosas son algo más complejas, pero para entendernos es suficiente. Aquí pueden consultar el valor de los IRS en dólares, euros y otras divisas para multitud de plazos, si lo hacen comprobarán que los valores son, en un vistazo superficial, bastante bajos. Por ejemplo, el IRS a 10 años en euros cotiza a 0,88 puntos, por lo que podríamos cambiar un variable Euribor 6m+diferencial, por un fijo 0,88+diferencial (más una pequeña comisión por los servicios recibidos) durante la próxima década. ¿No está nada mal, no?

Incluso si observamos el IRS a 30 años en euros, vemos que cotiza a 1,53 puntos. Solo con estos datos podemos llegar a una conclusión bastante rápida: o los mercados se han vuelto locos, o el mundo ha cambiado para siempre. Y es que, o el mercado se está equivocando reaccionando de forma extrema a los acontecimientos económicos, y por tanto apostando por unos tipos de interés demasiado bajos durante décadas, o bien el mundo ha cambiado para siempre y no volveremos a ver tipos de interés ‘normales’ (según el estándar anterior) en mucho, mucho tiempo. Muchísimo.

Si bien, los tipos de interés extremadamente bajos no son ninguna novedad, véase la deuda pública en donde estamos viendo rentabilidades negativas incluso a varios años, algo considerado imposible por muchos profesores de finanzas hasta hace bien poco.

Lo realmente desconcertante es otra cosa. Lo inexplicable es que, a lo largo del mundo, el valor de los IRS está bajando tanto que cotizan por debajo de la rentabilidad de la deuda soberana a un plazo equivalente. Algo comúnmente conocido como ‘swap spread’. ¿Y por qué este hecho deja boquiabiertos a los expertos? ¿Qué hay de malo en que el ‘swap spread’ sea negativo y por tanto los gobiernos paguen más por su deuda de lo que ofrece el IRS?

Si nos paramos a pensar, los IRS y la deuda pública tienen muchas cosas en común, ya que ambos dependen en parte de las expectativas futuras de los tipos de interés. Así, por ejemplo, a pesar de que todos coincidiremos en que la deuda pública estadounidense tiene una prima de riesgo menor que la deuda pública española, el mercado exige un tipo de interés superior al Tesoro estadounidense que al nuestro. Allí se espera que suban los tipos, y aquí que Draghi flexibilice aún más su política monetaria. Los tipos condicionan las rentabilidades.

Por otra parte, alguien puede querer recibir la parte fija de un IRS, no para cubrirse, sino simplemente para invertir como en cualquier otro producto financiero (de hecho su ‘nocional’ supera a la totalidad de activos financieros del mundo). Pagando el Euribor a 6m se obtiene el IRS a un plazo superior, al igual que se compran bonos soberanos a largo plazo financiándolos a corto plazo con repos. Las rentabilidades de la deuda pública y del IRS están muy relacionadas en los mercados desarrollados, siendo muy parecidas, y de ahí que el mentado ‘swap-spread’ sea un indicador interesante, e importante, por relacionar a los más influyentes mercados del mundo.

Lo normal sería que el tipo de interés exigido al IRS sea superior a la deuda pública a un plazo equivalente, ya que si bien ambos dependen del tipo de interés, la prima de riesgo debería de ser superior para una contraparte en el mercado de derivados que para, por ejemplo, el Tesoro estadounidense. En teoría un ‘swap-spread’ negativo (IRS inferior a la rentabilidad de la deuda pública) no es posible: en ambas rentabilidades cotizan las expectativas de tipo de interés, pero la prima de riesgo debería de ser siempre superior en el IRS en comparación con su respectivo Estado.

Por ejemplo, cuando el ‘swap-spread’ es muy positivo, se interpreta que la desconfianza sobre el sector financiero (habitual contraparte de los IRS) es muy elevada en relación a un activo teóricamente seguro como es el Estado. Si el ‘swap-spread’ es positivo pero bajo, se interpreta como un signo de normalidad y confianza en el sistema financiero: este último es casi tan seguro como la deuda soberana, ya que su prima de riesgo es similar. ¿Qué interpretar entonces cuando ocurre lo que van a ver en la siguiente gráfica?

He realizado esta gráfica en la famosa aplicación ‘FRED’ mostrando la evolución del ‘swap-spread’ en dólares durante los últimos años en los plazos más característicos: uno, cinco, 10 y 30 años. Podemos observar que, salvo en los plazos más cortos, el diferencial entre el IRS y la deuda pública es negativo, brutalmente negativo a plazo de 30 años. Este fenómeno no es algo exclusivo de Estados Unidos, sino que se está dando por todo el mundo: Reino Unido, Australia… ¿Qué nos está diciendo?

Si un 'spread' alto refleja incertidumbre sobre el sector financiero, ¿qué refleja un 'spread' negativo? Tan desconcertante es la pregunta que (se rumorea) cuando se dieron los primeros casos de cifras negativas durante el estallido de la presente crisis, gran parte de los sistemas informáticos no estaban preparados para asimilar lo que ocurría, pues consideraban las cifras negativas imposibles. A pesar de que ya han pasado algunos años, nadie sabe a ciencia cierta qué está ocurriendo ni qué quiere decir esto.

El razonamiento más inmediato es que, si un diferencial positivo daba a entender ‘stress’ financiero, un diferencial negativo podría dar a entender ‘stress’ soberano. Esto es, que por algún motivo que desconocemos las manos fuertes hayan comenzado a descontar que la presente crisis pasará factura a las finanzas de los estados occidentales. Como dando por hecho que el enorme aumento del endeudamiento público tendrá consecuencias, no hoy ni mañana, pero sí a largo plazo.

Otra posibilidad es que la creciente negociación de IRS en cámaras de contrapartida, donde los riesgos son compartidos en lugar de exponerse a una única contraparte, muestre al sistema financiero como algo más fiable de cara al mercado que los teóricos activos libres de riesgos como la deuda pública estadounidense. Podría ser, aunque resulta difícil de creer que una cámara de este tipo sea más solvente que la impresora de la Reserva Federal.

Existen explicaciones más pragmáticas. Una de ellas es la creciente emisión de deuda que podría haber hecho sobrerreaccionar al mercado de forma puntual. Hay quien apunta que nos acercamos al cierre de ejercicio, que financiarse es cada día más favorable… ¿pero por qué el ‘swap-spread’ a 30 años es negativo desde que estalló la crisis? Aunque ciertos efectos sean puntuales, esta rareza a largo plazo demuestra que algo ha cambiado tras la crisis y que no estamos ante algo coyuntural.

Por último, una explicación en que todo el mundo parece coincidir, aunque no sea culpable de todo lo que vemos, es la regulación. Las normativas impuestas a raíz del estallido de la crisis han propiciado que, según numerosas voces, a las entidades financieras ya no les interese intermediar en ciertos mercados, provocando, en este caso, que un diferencial aparentemente irracional no se corrija. Algo de esto seguro que hay, lo que no sabemos es si es responsable de la totalidad del efecto, o solo la punta del iceberg.

Hay hipótesis, pero no respuestas. El mayor mercado del mundo está hablando, pero no lo estamos escuchando. Quizás estemos ante un fenómeno temporal, quizá sea algún desequilibrio soberano oculto, quizá la excesiva emisión de deuda, las cámaras de contrapartida o la regulación, pero también podríamos estar ante desequilibrios desconocidos que estén mostrando sus primeros síntomas. Tras las rentabilidades negativas, llega el 'swap spread' negativo… ¿En qué mundo vivimos que cuando más sensato y racional debieran ser los mercados, por su tamaño e importancia, más irracionalmente se comportan?

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Y Shiller ha venido hoy a hablar de su libro, à la SNB:

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sec-crowdfunding-regulations-by-robert-j--shiller-2015-11

! No longer available	Small | Large

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

There is no way Fed policy can be win-win-win for all participants.

One result of the global dependence on central bank interventions is a unhealthy fixation on the slightest changes in those interventions, oops I meant policies.

Since the slightest pull-back in central bank inflation of asset bubbles could spell doom for the global economy and everyone holding those assets, the world now hangs on every pronouncement of the Federal Reserve in a state of extreme anxiety.

Why the extreme anxiety? Because any change in Fed intervention creates both winners and losers. There is no way Fed policy can be win-win-win for all participants, and to understand why we turn to Triffin's Paradox, a.k.a. Triffin's Dilemma.

The core of Triffin's Paradox is that the issuer of a reserve currency must serve two quite different sets of users: the domestic economy, and the international economy.

Triffin’s Paradox has two basic parts:

1. Any nation that issues the reserve currency must run a trade deficit to supply the world with surplus currency to hold in reserve and as a result,

2. The issuing nation faces the paradox that the needs of global trading community are generally different from the needs of domestic policy makers.

The global trading community requires that the issuer of the reserve currency run trade deficits large enough to satisfy the demand for reserves, while domestic audiences want a strong export sector, i.e. a trade surplus.

You can’t have it both ways: if you want to issue a reserve currency, you have to run a trade deficit that is commensurate in size with the global demand for your currency.

Since supply and demand set price, this push-pull affects the value of the U.S. dollar: U.S. exporters want a weak dollar to spur foreign demand for their products, while foreign holders of the USD want a strong dollar that holds its value/purchasing power.

It is impossible for any nation to maintain the reserve currency and run trade surpluses. If you run trade surpluses, you cannot supply the global economy with the currency it needs for reserves, payment of debt denominated in the reserve currency and domestic credit expansion.

Were the Fed to raise interest rates, as it has essentially promised to do, it will do so to pursue multiple objectives:

1. It's attempting to preserve its credibility, which is threatened by a zero-interest-rate forever policy.
2. It's attempting to maintain its political capital, which is eroding as even the mainstream media has accepted the reality that Fed policy has enriched the already-wealthy at the expense of everyone else.
3. It's attempting to "normalize" interest rates without killing its favorite child, the stock market.
4. It's attempting to raise rates without upsetting the fragile global currency/debt cart.
Note the use of the word attempting. The Fed's success is not pre-ordained (despite its implicit claims to otherworldly powers).

If the Fed raises rates a tiny .25%, the actual impact on debtors is rather modest. But even this tiny increase has the potential to sour carry trades, i.e. speculations based on borrowing U.S. dollars (USD) and investing the money in higher-yielding (but oh-so risky) emerging market gambles.

Those emerging market bets are denominated in the home-country currency, and as those currencies decline against the USD, the carry trade's gains are offset by foreign exchange (FX) losses.

The losers of any Fed hike in interest rates are already clear: U.S. global corporate profits have already been hit by the stronger dollar, and should interest rates click higher, that will only further strengthen the USD.

As the dollar strengthens, the $7 trillion in dollar-denominated debt in emerging markets increases in value relative to depreciating local currencies.

The Fed can't please everyone. That's the dilemma. Some commentators have suggested China seeks a higher USD (i.e. a Fed rate hike) because that lowers the value of China's currency the RMB (yuan), making it cheaper for Americans to buy more goods from China.

But any increase in yields will push down the value of existing Treasury bonds, so China's still-vast hoard of Treasuries will lose value should rates rise.

As I have often noted, many people assume a weakening dollar is a good thing because it makes U.S. exports cheaper. But the larger truth is that a strengthening currency raises the global purchasing power of the currency, enriching every owner of the currency and the issuing nation.

There are many cross-currents in play here, and a variety of opinions on the consequences. I join my long-time colleague Gordon T. Long and fellow blogger/writer Rick Ackerman for a wide-ranging discussion in the hour-long video What to Expect From the Fed:

http://youtu.be/q2rXk0tpc-c

http://charleshughsmith.blogspot.com.es/2015/11/the-federal-reserve-interest-rates-and.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

In effect, a currency crisis is simply the abrupt revaluation of the currency to reflect new realities.
I have long maintained that the structural imbalances of debt and risk that triggered the Global Financial Meltdown of 2008-2009 have effectively been transferred to the foreign exchange (FX) markets.

This creates a problem for the central banks that have orchestrated the "recovery" by goosing asset bubbles in stocks, real estate and bonds: unlike these markets, the currency-FX market is too big for even the Federal Reserve to manipulate for long.

The FX market trades roughly the entire Fed balance sheet of $4.5 trillion every day or two.

Currencies are in the midst of multi-year revaluations that will destabilize the tottering towers of debt, leverage and risk that have propped up global growth since 2009.

Though the relative value of currencies is discovered in the global FX market, there are four fundamental factors that influence the value of any currency:

1. Capital flows into and out of the currency (and the nation that issues the currency).
2. Perceived risk, specifically, will this currency preserve my global purchasing power (i.e. capital) or erode it?
3. The yield or interest rate paid on bonds denominated in this currency.
4. The scarcity or over-abundance of the currency.

If we dig even deeper, we find that currencies reflect the income streams and assets of the issuing nation. Consider the currency of an oil exporting nation that has seen both its income from selling oil and the underlying value of its oil in the ground fall by more than 50%.

Why shouldn't that nation's currency decline in parallel with the erosion of income and asset valuation? As a nation's income and asset base decline, there is less national income to pay interest on sovereign bonds, less private income to tax, and a reduced asset base for additional borrowing.

This is especially true if the nation issued debt and/or currency profligately in good times. Recall that debt and currency are one in the same: if someone trades euros for a U.S. Treasury bond, they don't just own a bit of sovereign debt--they own the currency of the nation that issued the bond (in this case, the U.S. dollar).

This is equally true of corporate bonds--all the debt is denominated in a specific currency, and owners of the bonds are not just betting that the interest will be paid and the bond redeemed at maturity, but that the underlying currency will not lose much of its global purchasing power.

One proxy for the absolute destruction of commodity-based income streams and assets is the CRB Index. No wonder emerging economies that depend heavily on the export of commodities are cratering, along with the currencies they issue.

Once participants become aware of the rising risk of holding a depreciating currency, the trickle out of a currency quickly becomes a torrent of fleeing capital.

Once the perceived risk switches from risk-on to risk-off, the only way to prop up the currency is to raise the interest rates that bonds denominated in that currency yield.

But raising interest rates has a brutally negative effect on the domestic economy, as higher rates choke off domestic lending, which then pushes the economy into recession.

It's a no-win double bind, though, for doing nothing and letting one's currency implode drains the nation of capital and makes imports unaffordable. That matters when the imports are energy and/or food.

When those become scarce and unaffordable, social disorder soon follows.
The currency that has benefited from this reversal of capital flows is the U.S. dollar (USD):

Debt/currency crises tend to trigger defaults and weakness in other currencies.We have a recent example of such a crisis: the Asian Contagion of 1997-98:

Though that crisis was linked to Thailand's failed bid to support its currency's peg to the U.S. dollar, the current situation is actually far more fragile as the destruction of commodity income and valuation raises the risk of sovereign defaults, corporate bond defaults, and capital flight that deepens already severe emerging-market recessions.

The bone-dry half-dead forest awaiting an igniting lightning strike is the global mountain of debt--debt which is no longer supported by current valuations of commodities and risk.

In effect, a currency crisis is simply the abrupt revaluation of the currency to reflect new realities. That revaluation then raises the risk premium on debt denominated in that currency or owed in other currencies.

As emerging market currencies decline, the income streams needed to service all the debt denominated in U.S. dollars declines, a self-reinforcing dynamic: as income and valuations fall, capital flees, pushing the relative value of the currency down even more, which further raises the risk premium that then triggers even more capital flight.

The sums in play are so staggering (an estimated $11 trillion in emerging market debts denominated in other currencies) that even the Fed won't be able to stop the meltdown.

http://charleshughsmith.blogspot.com.es/2015/11/is-this-how-next-global-financial.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gita_Gopinath

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fed-interest-rates-dollar-appreciation-by-gita-gopinath-2015-11

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/adding-renminbi-to-sdr-a-mistake-by-benjamin-j--cohen-2015-11/spanish