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NUEVA YORK – En su obra de teatro Murder in the Cathedral, T. S. Eliot describe el asesinato del Arzobispo de Canterbury, Thomas Becket, como un atentado ordenado tácitamente. El Rey inglés Enrique II no tuvo que dar una orden expresa; sus caballeros sabían lo que se debía hacer con alguien que aparentemente estaba socavando el Estado.Eliot ambientó su obra en la Inglaterra del siglo XXII, pero la escribió en 1935, apenas dos años después de la llegada de Adolf Hitler al poder en Alemania. Así pues es, al menos en parte, una historia de aviso sobre el auge del fascismo en Europa. Lamentablemente, sigue siendo pertinente. Hoy, la obra maestra de Eliot puede leerse como una advertencia sobre el camino que ha emprendido Rusia, donde la política bajo el presidente Putin se ha vuelto cada vez más sanguinaria al estilo medieval.Uno por uno, los críticos de Putin han sido eliminados. En 2006, la periodista Anna Politkovskaya fue asesinada a tiros en un elevador y Alexander Litvinenko, un ex agente de la KGB que había criticado a Putin, murió envenenado con plutonio cuando estaba en el exilio en Londres. En 2009, Sergei Magnitsky, un abogado que llevaba a cabo una campaña contra la corrupción, murió en la cárcel después de que se le negara atención médica para tratar enfermedades mortales. Ese mismo año, otro abogado, Stanislav Markelov, defensor de los derechos humanos, fue baleado después de una conferencia de prensa.El asesinato de Boris Nemtsov, una de las principales figuras de la oposición y ex viceprimer ministro durante la administración de Boris Yeltsin, acaecido la semana pasada no debería sorprender a nadie. Pero sí debe ser una conmoción – y una llamada de alerta para todos aquellos rusos que hasta la fecha han tolerado una cultura de ilegalidad e impunidad que no se había visto desde los días del gobierno personal de Stalin en la Unión Soviética.Se dice que antes de su muerte Nemtsov estaba escribiendo un informe llamado “Putin y la guerra” en el que ofrecía pruebas de la participación rusa en el conflicto de Ucrania oriental. Estaría por encabezar una protesta contra la guerra dos días después de su asesinato. Algunas personas se han preguntado si Putin temía lo que Nemtsov había descubierto y por lo tanto ordenó el asesinato.Eso es poco probable, al menos en cuanto a que alguien haya recibido una orden directa de Putin. Dicho simplemente, organizar el asesinato de Nemtsov no valía la pena. Después de todo, para la maquinaria propagandística del Kremlin no habría sido difícil tergiversar el informe de Nemtsov en beneficio de Putin.En efecto, incluso es poco probable que el descarado asesinato de Nemtsov dañe a Putin. Su popularidad es del 86% actualmente. Para muchos rusos, la oposición de Nemtsov a la guerra en Ucrania lo convertía en un traidor cuya muerte estaba justificada – y de hecho casi solicitada – por motivos de necesidad nacional.Putin ha anunciado que él supervisará personalmente la investigación del asesinato. Sin embargo, quienes la están llevando a cabo ya han sugerido la conclusión probable: el asesinato de Nemtsov fue un intento para desestabilizar a Rusia. Es casi seguro que se “encontrará” algún culpable y que su crimen habrá sido parte de una conspiración de la CIA o de las autoridades ucranianas.Para el Kremlin no es nuevo tergiversar la verdad para acomodarla a sus necesidades. Antes de la anexión de Crimea por Rusia, el Kremlin afirmó que los Estados Unidos habían contratado francotiradores para que dispararan contra las personas que se manifestaban a favor de Occidente en Kiev a fin de culpar a Rusia de sus muertes. Cuando un avión de Malasia fue derribado sobre Ucrania – muy probablemente por los rebeldes prorrusos – la versión oficial del Kremlin fue que los servicios secretos occidentales lo habían derribado para dañar la reputación de Putin. Este tipo de afirmaciones han alentado el nacionalismo, el odio y la histeria contra Occidente y distraen a los rusos de la responsabilidad de Putin por la crisis económica de su país.Por amenazadora que pueda ser la Rusia de Putin, sin embargo, no tiene nada de original. En 1934, Joseph Stalin también ordenó que se realizara una investigación minuciosa del asesinato de uno de sus rivales, Sergei Kirov, el líder del partido comunista en Leningrado. La NKVD, precursor de la KGB, organizó el asesinato por órdenes de Stalin, pero la investigación le dio al dictador soviético un pretexto para eliminar a otros oponentes. La búsqueda de los asesinos de Kirov culminó en la era del Gran Terror, purga masiva de líderes del partido, comandantes militares e intelectuales.Es posible que Putin no haya ordenado el asesinato de Nemtsov ni ninguno de los demás. Pero, al igual que Stalin, ha alimentado un ambiente de miedo e ilegalidad en el que aquellos que apoyan al Kremlin sienten la obligación de eliminar a quienes se oponen al líder por cualquier método y anticipándose a sus deseos.Un ambiente en el que los actos ilegales se convertían en acciones heróicas fue una de las características distintivas del gobierno de Stalin. Esa dinámica asfixiante ha vuelto con Putin. En los días más aciagos de la Unión Soviética, los jefes de la NKVD ocupaban el segundo lugar en importancia en el país. Actualmente, Andrei Lugovoi, el agente de la KGB que los agentes del gobierno británico sospechan que fue el que administró el polonio que mató a Litvinenko, es miembro de la Duma rusa.Así, pues, ¿qué pasará ahora? ¿Putin, al igual que Stalin, desatará su propio terror, y perseguirá hasta la muerte a supuestos adversarios? ¿O la muerte de Nemtsov finalmente provocará la reacción de los obedientes y complacientes rusos?En la primera década de este siglo era fácil apreciar a Putin, pues hizo ricos a los rusos, así como cosmopolitas, y dignos de respeto en todos lados. Ahora, como los precios del petróleo están bajos y las sanciones de Occidente ya son perjudiciales, Putin vuelve pobres a sus compatriotas y hace que casi todo el mundo los desprecie. El 1 de marzo, el día que Nemtsov encabezaría su protesta, miles y miles de rusos salieron a las calles con mensajes como este: “Nemtsov es paz, Putin es guerra”.¿Podría ser que la cultura de impunidad de Rusia ha llegado a un punto de inflexión? El régimen de Putin se sustenta en la promesa de la prosperidad económica, sin ella, su régimen puede desmoronar –si no mediante manifestaciones masivas, entonces porque los beneficiados ya no tienen nada qué ganar con la supervivencia política del régimen. En ese momento, cuando Putin se encuentre en su etapa más vulnerable, sus aliados tendrán que actuar con gran mesura –y seguir viendo por ellos.
It was quiet in eastern Ukraine last Wednesday. Indeed, it was another quiet day in an extended stretch of relative calm. The battles between the Ukrainian army and the pro-Russian separatists had largely stopped and heavy weaponry was being withdrawn. The Minsk cease-fire wasn't holding perfectly, but it was holding.On that same day, General Philip Breedlove, the top NATO commander in Europe, stepped before the press in Washington. Putin, the 59-year-old said, had once again "upped the ante" in eastern Ukraine -- with "well over a thousand combat vehicles, Russian combat forces, some of their most sophisticated air defense, battalions of artillery" having been sent to the Donbass. "What is clear," Breedlove said, "is that right now, it is not getting better. It is getting worse every day."German leaders in Berlin were stunned. They didn't understand what Breedlove was talking about. And it wasn't the first time. Once again, the German government, supported by intelligence gathered by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency, did not share the view of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).The pattern has become a familiar one. For months, Breedlove has been commenting on Russian activities in eastern Ukraine, speaking of troop advances on the border, the amassing of munitions and alleged columns of Russian tanks. Over and over again, Breedlove's numbers have been significantly higher than those in the possession of America's NATO allies in Europe. As such, he is playing directly into the hands of the hardliners in the US Congress and in NATO.The German government is alarmed. Are the Americans trying to thwart European efforts at mediation led by Chancellor Angela Merkel? Sources in the Chancellery have referred to Breedlove's comments as "dangerous propaganda." Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even found it necessary recently to bring up Breedlove's comments with NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg.(...)
Putin lleva sin aparecer una semana. Hay todo tipo de rumores, que combinados con el incremento de las hostilidades en la línea de contacto Novorrusia-Ucrania, aumentan la incertidumbre.
Le 14 avril, la Commission a annoncé que des négociations commerciales avec l'Ukraine et la Russie auront lieu à Bruxelles les 20 et 21 avril et qu'elles seront rapidement suivies par des contacts au niveau politique.
Foreword by the Saker: The analysis below is, by far, the best I have seen since the beginning of the conflict in the Ukraine. I have regularly posted analyses by Ishchenko on this blog before, because I considered him as one of the best analysts in Russia. This time, however, Ishchenko has truly produced a masterpiece: a comprehensive analysis of the geostrategic position of Russia and a clear and, I believe, absolutely accurate analysis of the entire “Putin strategy” for the Ukraine. I have always said that this conflict is not about the Ukraine but about the future of the planet and that there is no “Novorussian” or even “Ukrainian” solution, but that the only possible outcome is a strategic victory of either Russia or the USA which will affect the entire planet. Ishchenko does a superb overview of the risks and options for both sides and offers the first comprehensive “key” to the apparently incomprehensible behavior of Russia in this conflict. Finally, Ishchenko also fully understands the complex and subtle dynamics inside Russian society. When he writes “Russian power is authoritative, rather than authoritarian” he is spot on, and explains more in seven words than what you would get by reading the billions of useless words written by so-called “experts” trying to describe the Russian reality. We all owe a huge debt of gratitude to Denis, Gideon and Robin for translating this seminal text, which was very difficult to translate. The only reason why we can read it in such a good English is because the innumerable hours spent by these volunteers to produce the high quality translation this analysis deserves. I strongly recommend that you all read this text very carefully. Twice. It is well worth it. The Saker[...]http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-02/what-does-putin-want
As Ukraine continues its battle against separatists, corruption and a collapsing economy, it has taken a dangerous step that could further tear the country apart: Ukraine’s parliament, the Supreme Rada, passed a draft law last month honoring organizations involved in mass ethnic cleansing during World War Two.The draft law - which is now on President Petro Poroshenko’s desk awaiting his signature - recognizes a series of Ukrainian political and military organizations as “fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century” and bans the criticism of these groups and their members. (The bill doesn’t state the penalty for doing so.) Two of the groups honored - the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) - helped the Nazis carry out the Holocaust while also killing close to 100,000 Polish civilians during World War Two.
Reform-minded Ukraine merits debt reductionUkraine, the international community and its creditors will soon have to reach a conclusion about how to handle the country’s debt. The case for debt reduction is as strong as any that I have encountered over the past quarter century. How the issue is resolved will say much about the extent of international commitment to Ukraine and to resisting Russian aggression. Failure to achieve debt reduction would also confirm the view of those who believe that private financial interests disproportionately influence public policy.Ukraine is in a state of quasi-war with Russia. Other former Soviet republics, as well as the nations of central Europe are watching anxiously. How this episode is regarded in history will depend as much on what is done for Ukraine as what is done to Russia.This is especially true as Ukraine has its most reform-minded economic team since independence in 1991. It has shown real political courage in combating corruption and moving aggressively to curb energy subsidies that generated vast waste. Ukraine has done more in the past 12 months to reform its subsidies than most nations do in 12 years.The moral, geopolitical, and economic case for the provision of strong support is compelling. The International Monetary Fund has done as much as can reasonably be asked with a programme totalling $17.5bn. While bilateral support from the US and Europe could be increased and the World Bank is missing a major opportunity, Ukraine’s viability ultimately depends on what happens to its debts.The question of debt rescheduling or reduction is not a new one. When countries require assistance, it can always be argued that debt service obligations be delayed or partially cancelled. Usually — as in the case of European countries in recent years, or Asian countries during the 1997 financial crisis — this argument is rejected. The grounds are that with proper adjustment countries can meet their obligations, maintain access to markets and restore growth. Also, a world in which countries were willy nilly encouraged to default in order to meet budget obligations would be inimical to the effective flow of capital.Over the years a number of international norms have evolved as to when it is appropriate to accept debt reduction. The most important is when a country’s debts are sufficiently large and its prospects sufficiently poor that there is no realistic prospect of repayment. Things become clearer when debt reduction would not be a source of systemic risk to the financial system or license widespread defaults.All of this suggests a compelling case for debt reduction for Ukraine. The IMF has made clear that for its finances to be sustainable Kiev needs to reduce its current debt service payments and to avoid an excessive build-up of debt over the next five years. On even optimistic assumptions of Ukrainian economic performance and the avoidance of further conflict, this is not possible without debt reduction. Ukraine’s debt is not nearly large enough for a reduction to pose a threat to the world financial system. And why not set a precedent that if you lend money at a high spread to a country that is then invaded, you should not expect the world’s taxpayers to ensure that you are paid back in full?So Ukraine’s debt should be reduced. Will it happen? Despite the merits, it is not clear. Ukraine’s creditors — led by the investment firm Franklin Templeton, but also with the support of a number of major US fund managers, who are sufficiently embarrassed by their selfish and unconstructive position that they avoid public identification — are playing hardball and refusing any write-offs. Understandably, if there are a substantial group of such free riders, other debt holders including the Russians will not accept writedowns.It should be unacceptable to taxpayers around the world that their money be put at risk on loans to Ukraine in order that plans be made to pay back creditors in full. The IMF and national authorities should call out the recalcitrant creditors on their irresponsible behaviour. If necessary, Ukraine should be prepared to go into default and not meet its obligations, while at the same time the international community should make clear that it will continue to provide support to Kiev. In the context of these steps, creditors will have little choice but to accept the economic reality of the situation.There is much in Ukraine that the rest of the world cannot control. But we can make sure that the country’s scarce resources are put to use restoring its economy rather than paying off those who made loans they now regret. And we can seize the opportunity to make clear that the world financial system will be operated to support the global economy not the other way round. The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary
Parece salido de el mundo today, pero no puede ser, está escrito en inglés... CitarReform-minded Ukraine merits debt reductionUkraine, the international community and its creditors will soon have to reach a conclusion about how to handle the country’s debt. The case for debt reduction is as strong as any that I have encountered over the past quarter century. How the issue is resolved will say much about the extent of international commitment to Ukraine and to resisting Russian aggression. Failure to achieve debt reduction would also confirm the view of those who believe that private financial interests disproportionately influence public policy.Ukraine is in a state of quasi-war with Russia. Other former Soviet republics, as well as the nations of central Europe are watching anxiously. How this episode is regarded in history will depend as much on what is done for Ukraine as what is done to Russia.This is especially true as Ukraine has its most reform-minded economic team since independence in 1991. It has shown real political courage in combating corruption and moving aggressively to curb energy subsidies that generated vast waste. Ukraine has done more in the past 12 months to reform its subsidies than most nations do in 12 years.The moral, geopolitical, and economic case for the provision of strong support is compelling. The International Monetary Fund has done as much as can reasonably be asked with a programme totalling $17.5bn. While bilateral support from the US and Europe could be increased and the World Bank is missing a major opportunity, Ukraine’s viability ultimately depends on what happens to its debts.The question of debt rescheduling or reduction is not a new one. When countries require assistance, it can always be argued that debt service obligations be delayed or partially cancelled. Usually — as in the case of European countries in recent years, or Asian countries during the 1997 financial crisis — this argument is rejected. The grounds are that with proper adjustment countries can meet their obligations, maintain access to markets and restore growth. Also, a world in which countries were willy nilly encouraged to default in order to meet budget obligations would be inimical to the effective flow of capital.Over the years a number of international norms have evolved as to when it is appropriate to accept debt reduction. The most important is when a country’s debts are sufficiently large and its prospects sufficiently poor that there is no realistic prospect of repayment. Things become clearer when debt reduction would not be a source of systemic risk to the financial system or license widespread defaults.All of this suggests a compelling case for debt reduction for Ukraine. The IMF has made clear that for its finances to be sustainable Kiev needs to reduce its current debt service payments and to avoid an excessive build-up of debt over the next five years. On even optimistic assumptions of Ukrainian economic performance and the avoidance of further conflict, this is not possible without debt reduction. Ukraine’s debt is not nearly large enough for a reduction to pose a threat to the world financial system. And why not set a precedent that if you lend money at a high spread to a country that is then invaded, you should not expect the world’s taxpayers to ensure that you are paid back in full?So Ukraine’s debt should be reduced. Will it happen? Despite the merits, it is not clear. Ukraine’s creditors — led by the investment firm Franklin Templeton, but also with the support of a number of major US fund managers, who are sufficiently embarrassed by their selfish and unconstructive position that they avoid public identification — are playing hardball and refusing any write-offs. Understandably, if there are a substantial group of such free riders, other debt holders including the Russians will not accept writedowns.It should be unacceptable to taxpayers around the world that their money be put at risk on loans to Ukraine in order that plans be made to pay back creditors in full. The IMF and national authorities should call out the recalcitrant creditors on their irresponsible behaviour. If necessary, Ukraine should be prepared to go into default and not meet its obligations, while at the same time the international community should make clear that it will continue to provide support to Kiev. In the context of these steps, creditors will have little choice but to accept the economic reality of the situation.There is much in Ukraine that the rest of the world cannot control. But we can make sure that the country’s scarce resources are put to use restoring its economy rather than paying off those who made loans they now regret. And we can seize the opportunity to make clear that the world financial system will be operated to support the global economy not the other way round. The writer is Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasury secretary ¡Ya lo encontré!Fuente: (click to show/hide)http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ff3634fc-fa44-11e4-a41c-00144feab7de.html#axzz3aQygOFQrNo se pierdan los comentarios !
El expresidente de Georgia es nombrado gobernador de OdessaLa región rusófona, codiciada por el presidente Vladímir Putin, es una de las zonas clave en el conflicto ucranianohttp://www.abc.es/internacional/20150530/abci-georgia-ucrania-odessa-201505302014.html
With Ukrainian "Blockade," Drums Of War Sounding In TransnistriaTwo weeks ago Ukraine canceled the agreement that allowed Russia to supply its roughly 1,500 troops stationed in Transnistria through Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian route was the only way by which Russian forces in Transnistria could be reached by land; the territory's only other land border is with Moldova, which also has been restricting what limited access it was giving Russian forces to Transnistria.http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73726
Russian reconnaissance troops hold exercises in Transnistriahttp://sputniknews.com/military/20150604/1022955987.html