Hablemos de Europa

[Маркс]

El franquismo golpista con todo lo cutre, casposo, burro, gris, asesino y mediocre que llegó a ser tenía conciencia de Estado.

Lo de ahora es de una oligofrenia brutal.

Que tenga que decir yo esto... 

[sudden and sharp]

Es un fenómeno conocido: "memoria selectiva". (Se te pasará.)

 

[Saturio]

El franquismo golpista con todo lo cutre, casposo, burro, gris, asesino y mediocre que llegó a ser tenía conciencia de Estado.

Lo de ahora es de una oligofrenia brutal.

Que tenga que decir yo esto... 

Bahhh, tas pasao.

Tenía conciencia de cortijo único perdurable.

Ahora tenemos múltiples cortijos transitorios.

[NosTrasladamus]

http://www.sinpermiso.info/articulos/ficheros/vargal.pdf

[muyuu]

No sé si alguien ha puesto lo de Stratfor por el foro, por si acaso:
https://www.stratfor.com/sample/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025

[...]

The Decade Ahead

The world has been restructuring itself since 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia and the subprime financial crisis struck. Three patterns have emerged. First, the European Union entered a crisis that it could not solve and that has increased in intensity. We predict that the European Union will never return to its previous unity, and if it survives it will operate in a more limited and fragmented way in the next decade. We do not expect the free trade zone to continue to operate without increasing protectionism. We expect Germany to suffer severe economic reversals in the next decade and Poland to increase its regional power as a result.

The current confrontation with Russia over Ukraine will remain a centerpiece of the international system over the next few years, but we do not think the Russian Federation can exist in its current form for the entire decade. Its overwhelming dependence on energy exports and the unreliability of expectations on pricing make it impossible for Moscow to sustain its institutional relations across the wide swathe of the Russian Federation. We expect Moscow's authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia. The security of Russia's nuclear arsenal will become a prime concern as this process accelerates later in the decade.

We have entered a period in which the decline of the nation-states created by Europe in North Africa and the Middle East is accelerating. Power is no longer held by the state in many countries, having devolved to armed factions that can neither defeat others nor be defeated. This has initiated a period of intense internal fighting. The United States is prepared to mitigate the situation with air power and limited forces on the ground but will not be able or willing to impose a settlement. Turkey, whose southern border is made vulnerable by this fighting, will be slowly drawn into the fighting. By the end of this decade, Turkey will emerge as the major regional power, and Turkish-Iranian competition will increase as a result.

China has completed its cycle as a high-growth, low-wage country and has entered a new phase that is the new normal. This phase includes much slower growth and an increasingly powerful dictatorship to contain the divergent forces created by slow growth. China will continue to be a major economic force but will not be the dynamic engine of global growth it once was. That role will be taken by a new group of highly dispersed countries we call the Post-China 16, which includes much of Southeast Asia, East Africa and parts of Latin America. China will not be an aggressive military force either. Japan remains the most likely contender for the dominant position in East Asia, both because of its geography and because of its needs as a massive importer.

The United States will continue to be the major economic, political and military power in the world but will be less engaged than in the past. Its low rate of exports, its increasing energy self-reliance and its experiences over the last decade will cause it to be increasingly cautious about economic and military involvement in the world. It has learned what happens to heavy exporters when customers cannot or will not buy their products. It has learned the limits of power in trying to pacify hostile countries. It has learned that North America is an arena in which it can prosper with selective engagements elsewhere. It will face major strategic threats with proportional power, but it will not serve the role of first responder as it has in recent years.

It will be a disorderly world, with a changing of the guard in many regions. The one constant will be the continued and maturing power of the United States — a power that will be much less visible and that will be utilized far less in the next decade.

Europe

The European Union will be unable to solve its fundamental problem, which is not the eurozone, but the free trade zone. Germany is the center of gravity of the European Union; it exports more than 50 percent of its GDP, and half of that goes to other EU countries. Germany has created a productive capability that vastly outstrips its ability to consume, even if the domestic economy were stimulated. It depends on these exports to maintain economic growth, full employment and social stability. The European Union's structures — including the pricing of the euro and many European regulations — are designed to facilitate this export dependency.

This has already fragmented Europe into at least two parts. Mediterranean Europe and countries such as Germany and Austria have completely different behavioral patterns and needs. No single policy can suit all of Europe. This has been the core problem from the beginning, but it has now reached an extreme point. What benefits one part of Europe harms another.

Nationalism has already risen significantly. Compounding this is the Ukrainian crisis and Eastern European countries' focus on the perceived threat from Russia. Eastern Europe's concern about Russia creates yet another Europe — four, total, if we separate the United Kingdom and Scandinavia from the rest of Europe. Considered with the rise of Euroskeptic parties on the right and left, the growing delegitimation of mainstream parties and the surging popularity of separatist parties within European countries, the fragmentation and nationalism that we forecast in 2005, and before, is clearly evident.

These trends will continue. The European Union might survive in some sense, but European economic, political and military relations will be governed primarily by bilateral or limited multilateral relationships that will be small in scope and not binding. Some states might maintain a residual membership in a highly modified European Union, but this will not define Europe.

What will define Europe in the next decade is the re-emergence of the nation-state as the primary political vehicle of the continent. Indeed the number of nation-states will likely increase as various movements favoring secession, or the dissolution of states into constituent parts, increase their power. This will be particularly noticeable during the next few years, as economic and political pressures intensify amid Europe's crisis.

Germany has emerged from this mass of nation-states as the most economically and politically influential. Yet Germany is also extremely vulnerable. It is the world's fourth-largest economic power, but it has achieved that status by depending on exports. Export powers have a built-in vulnerability: They depend on their customers' desire and ability to buy their products. In other words, Germany's economy is hostage to the economic well-being and competitive environment in which it operates.

There are multiple forces working against Germany in this regard. First, Europe's increasing nationalism will lead to protectionist capital and labor markets. Weaker countries are likely to adopt various sorts of capital controls, while stronger countries will limit the movement of foreigners — including the citizens of other EU countries — across their borders. We forecast that existing protectionist policies inside the European Union, particularly on agriculture, will be supplemented in coming years by trade barriers created by the weaker Southern European economies that need to rebuild their economic base after the current depression. On a global basis, we can expect European exports to face increased competition and highly variable demand in the uncertain environment. Therefore, our forecast is that Germany will begin an extended economic decline that will lead to a domestic social and political crisis and that will reduce Germany's influence in Europe during the next 10 years.

At the center of economic growth and increasing political influence will be Poland. Poland has maintained one of the most impressive growth profiles outside of Germany and Austria. In addition, though its population is likely to contract, the contraction will most probably be far less than in other European countries. As Germany undergoes wrenching shifts in economy and population, Poland will diversify its own trade relationships to emerge as the dominant power on the strategic Northern European Plain. Moreover, we expect Poland to be the leader of an anti-Russia coalition that would, significantly, include Romania during the first half of this decade. In the second half of the decade, this alliance will play a major role in reshaping the Russian borderlands and retrieving lost territories through informal and formal means. Eventually as Moscow weakens, this alliance will become the dominant influence not only in Belarus and Ukraine, but also farther east. This will further enhance Poland's and its allies' economic and political position.

Poland will benefit from having a strategic partnership with the United States. Whenever a leading global power enters into a relationship with a strategic partner, it is in the global power's interest to make the partner as economically vigorous as possible, both to stabilize its society and to make it capable of building a military force. Poland will be in that position with the United States, as will Romania. Washington has made its interest in the region obvious.

Russia

It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form. Russia's failure to transform its energy revenue into a self-sustaining economy makes it vulnerable to price fluctuations. It has no defense against these market forces. Given the organization of the federation, with revenue flowing to Moscow before being distributed directly or via regional governments, the flow of resources will also vary dramatically. This will lead to a repeat of the Soviet Union's experience in the 1980s and Russia's in the 1990s, in which Moscow's ability to support the national infrastructure declined. In this case, it will cause regions to fend for themselves by forming informal and formal autonomous entities. The economic ties binding the Russian periphery to Moscow will fray.

Historically, the Russians solved such problems via the secret police — the KGB and its successor, the Federal Security Services (FSB). But just as in the 1980s, the secret police will not be able to contain the centrifugal forces pulling regions away from Moscow this decade. In this case, the FSB's power is weakened by its leadership's involvement in the national economy. As the economy falters, so does the FSB's strength. Without the FSB inspiring genuine terror, the fragmentation of the Russian Federation will not be preventable.

To Russia's west, Poland, Hungary and Romania will seek to recover regions lost to the Russians at various points. They will work to bring Belarus and Ukraine into this fold. In the south, the Russians' ability to continue controlling the North Caucasus will evaporate, and Central Asia will destabilize. In the northwest, the Karelian region will seek to rejoin Finland. In the Far East, the maritime regions more closely linked to China, Japan and the United States than to Moscow will move independently. Other areas outside of Moscow will not necessarily seek autonomy but will have it thrust upon them. This is the point: There will not be an uprising against Moscow, but Moscow's withering ability to support and control the Russian Federation will leave a vacuum. What will exist in this vacuum will be the individual fragments of the Russian Federation.

This will create the greatest crisis of the next decade. Russia is the site of a massive nuclear strike force distributed throughout the hinterlands. The decline of Moscow's power will open the question of who controls those missiles and how their non-use can be guaranteed. This will be a major test for the United States. Washington is the only power able to address the issue, but it will not be able to seize control of the vast numbers of sites militarily and guarantee that no missile is fired in the process. The United States will either have to invent a military solution that is difficult to conceive of now, accept the threat of rogue launches, or try to create a stable and economically viable government in the regions involved to neutralize the missiles over time. It is difficult to imagine how this problem will play out. However, given our forecast on the fragmentation of Russia, it follows that this issue will have to be addressed, likely in the next decade.

The issue in the first half of the decade will be how far the alliance stretching between the Baltic and Black seas will extend. Logically, it should reach Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea. Whether it does depends on what we have forecast for the Middle East and Turkey.

The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East — particularly the area between the Levant and Iran, along with North Africa — is experiencing national breakdowns. By this we mean that the nation-states established by European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries are collapsing into their constituent factions defined by kinship, religion or shifting economic interests. In countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq, we have seen the devolution of the nation-state into factions that war on each other and that cross the increasingly obsolete borders of countries.

This process follows the model of Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, when the central government ceased to function and power devolved to warring factions. The key factions could not defeat the others, nor could they themselves be defeated. They were manipulated and supported from the outside, as well as self-supporting. The struggle among these factions erupted into a civil war — one that has quieted but not ended. As power vacuums persist throughout the region, jihadist groups will find space to operate but will be contained in the end by their internal divisions.

This situation cannot be suppressed by outside forces. The amount of force required and the length of deployment would outstrip the capacity of the United States, even if dramatically expanded. Given the situation in other parts of the world, particularly in Russia, the United States can no longer focus exclusively on this region.

At the same time, this evolution, particularly in the Arab states south of Turkey, represents a threat to regional stability. The United States will act to mitigate the threat of particular factions, which will change over time, through the use of limited force. But the United States will not deploy multidivisional forces to the region. At this point, most countries in the area still expect the United States to act as the decisive force even though they witnessed the United States fail in this role in the past decade. Nevertheless, expectations shift more slowly than reality.

As the reality sinks in, it will emerge that, because of its location, only one country has an overriding interest in stabilizing Syria and Iraq, is able to act broadly — again because of its location — and has the means to at least achieve limited success in the region. That country is Turkey. At this point, Turkey is surrounded by conflicts in the Arab world, in the Caucasus and in the Black Sea Basin. But Turkey has avoided taking risks so far.

Turkey will continue to need U.S. involvement for political and military reasons. The United States will oblige, but there will be a price: participation in the containment of Russia. The United States does not expect Turkey to assume a war-fighting role and does not intend one for itself. It does, however, want a degree of cooperation in managing the Black Sea. Turkey will not be ready for a completely independent policy in the Middle East and will pay the price for a U.S. relationship. That price will open the path to extending the containment line to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

We expect the instability in the Arab world to continue through the decade. We also expect Turkey to be drawn in to the south, inasmuch as its fears of fighting so close to its border — and the political outcomes of that fighting — will compel it to get involved. It will intervene as little as possible and as slowly as possible, but it will intervene, and its intervention will eventually increase in size and breadth. Whatever its reluctance, Turkey cannot withstand years of chaos across its border, and there will be no other country to carry the burden. Iran is not in a position geographically or militarily to perform this function, nor is Saudi Arabia. Turkey is likely to try to build shifting coalitions ultimately reaching into North Africa to stabilize the situation. Turkish-Iranian competition will grow with time, but Turkey will keep its options open to work with both Iran and Saudi Arabia as needed. Whatever the dynamic, Turkey will be at the center of it.

This will not be the only region drawing Turkey's attention. As Russia weakens, European influence will begin inching eastward into areas where Turkey has historical interests, such as the northern shore of the Black Sea. We can foresee Turkey projecting its power northward certainly commercially and politically but also potentially in some measured military way. Moreover, as the European Union fragments and individual economies weaken or some nations become oriented toward the East, Turkey will increase its presence in the Balkans as the only remaining power able to do so.

Before this can happen, Turkey must find a domestic political balance. It is both a secular and Muslim country. The current government has attempted to bridge the gap, but in many ways it has tilted away from the secularists, of whom there are many. A new government will certainly emerge over the coming years. This is a permanent fault line in contemporary Turkey. Like many countries, its power will expand in the midst of political uncertainty. Alongside this internal political conflict, the military, intelligence and diplomatic service will need to evolve in size and function during the coming decade. That said, we expect to see an acceleration of Turkey's emergence as a major regional power in the next 10 years.

East Asia

China has ceased to be a high-growth, low-wage economy. As China's economy slows, the process of creating and organizing an economic infrastructure to employ low-wage workers will be incremental. What can be done quickly in a port city takes much longer in the interior. Therefore, China has normalized its economy, as Japan did before it, and as Taiwan and South Korea did in 1997. All massive expansions climax, and the operations of the economies shift.

The problem for China in the next decade are the political and social consequences of that shift. The coastal region has been built on high growth rates and close ties with European and American consumers. As these decline, political and social challenges emerge. At the same time, the expectation that the interior — beyond parts of the more urbanized Yangtze River Delta — will grow as rapidly as the coast is being dashed. The problem for the next decade will be containing these difficulties.

Beijing's growing dictatorial tendencies and an anti-corruption campaign, which is actually Beijing's assertion of its power over all of China, provide an outline of what China would like to see in the next decade. China is following a hybrid path that will centralize political and economic powers, assert Party primacy over the military, and consolidate previously fragmented industries like coal and steel amid the gradual and tepid implementation of market-oriented reforms in state-owned enterprises and in the banking sector. It is highly likely that a dictatorial state coupled with more modest economic expectations will result. However, there is a less likely but still conceivable outcome in which political interests along the coast rebel against Beijing's policy of transferring wealth to the interior to contain political unrest. This is not an unknown pattern in China, and, though we do not see this as the most likely course, it should be kept in mind. Our forecast is the imposition of a communist dictatorship, a high degree of economic and political centralization and increased nationalism.

China cannot easily turn nationalism into active aggression. China's geography makes such actions on land difficult, if not impossible. The only exception might be an attempt to take control of Russia's maritime interests if we are correct and Russia fragments. Here, Japan likely would challenge China. China is building a large number of ships but has little experience in naval warfare and lacks the experienced fleet commanders needed to challenge more experienced navies, including the U.S. Navy.

Japan has the resources to build a significantly larger navy and a more substantial naval tradition. In addition, Japan is heavily dependent on imports of raw materials from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. Right now it depends on the United States to guarantee access. But given that we are forecasting more cautious U.S. involvement in foreign ventures and that the United States is not dependent on imports, the reliability of the United States is in question. Therefore, the Japanese will increase their naval power in the coming years.

Fighting over the minor islands producing low-cost and unprofitable energy will not be the primary issue in the region. Rather, an old three-player game will emerge. Russia, the declining power, will increasingly lose the ability to protect its maritime interests. The Chinese and the Japanese will both be interested in acquiring these and in preventing each other from having them. We forecast this as the central, unsettled issue in the region as Russia declines and Sino-Japanese competition increases.

Post-China Manufacturing Hubs

International capitalism requires a low-wage, high-growth region for high rewards on risk capital. In the 1880s it was the United States, for example. China was the most recent region, replacing Japan. No one country can replace China, but we have noted 16 countries with a total population of about 1.15 billion people where entry-level manufacturing has gone after leaving China.

[muyuu]

http://jakubmarian.com/map-of-the-results-of-pisa-student-assessment-studies-in-mathematics-reading-and-science-in-europe/







(lo pongo en infográficos también)

[Маркс]

El vídeo habla a partir de un municipio de Babiera (la región más rica seguramente de Alemania), una zona preciosa, por cierto, lindando con Salzburgo (Austria) a la que les aconsejo la paseen cuando puedan. Yo suelo visitarla asíduamente.

http://youtu.be/BGAW_SwYkTw
	Small | Large

Bueno pues.., ¡Mira tu por dónde! No sólo en Bolivia se nacionaliza la distribución de la electricidad. En Alemania lo están haciendo y no nos dicen nada ¿Por qué será?

¿Será el espíritu de Hugo Chavez que ha abducido a los alemanes?
¿Serán bolivarianos los alemanes?
¿Rosa Luxemburgo ha resucitado?
¿Es Merkel una izquierdista radical?
¿A qué huelen las nubes?

72 eléctricas municipales en Alemania, promovidas por sus vecinos y subiendo... ¡Qué peligro! La gente organizándose por una vida mejor.

Populistas de mierda... 

[Republik]

Rotos los efectos de escala gracias a la caída de costes de las renovables está claro que la electricidad verá morir más pronto que tarde el modelo centralizado. en Alemania han hecho con cabeza lo de la FV al animar animar a ponerla en las casas y subsidiarla desde el presupuesto . España quiso hacer algo grandioso pero como el presupuesto no aguantaba lo echó todo a la factura y de paso metieron más conceptos dudosos  y así estamos como estamos.

[Lego]

¿Porqué ha de ser bolivariano? No hay nada que le guste más a un liberal que una cooperativa energética local, y si encima el ayuntamiento está por ayudar a los vecinos (allí será lo normal) mejor que mejor.  No la han nacionalizado, la han "cooperativizado".

Su primer paso fue igualar, de su bolsillo, la prima que la compañía eléctrica tentaba a la ciudad por "acelerar" la prórroga del contrato jeje.    Poner pasta, trabajo y unión para conseguir cambiar algo en beneficio de todos.  Ah, si aprendiéramos. 

[CHOSEN]

Bueno pues.., ¡Mira tu por dónde! No sólo en Bolivia se nacionaliza la distribución de la electricidad. En Alemania lo están haciendo y no nos dicen nada ¿Por qué será?
[...]
72 eléctricas municipales en Alemania, promovidas por sus vecinos y subiendo...

Un ayuntamiento gestionando su recogida de basuras no es "nacionalizar" el servicio. El engaño con el cambio de escala es muy burdo, de todas formas es una iniciativa aplaudible en la pequeña escala.

Pero me queda la duda de porqué cuando el pueblo decide privatizar esos mismos servicios, salís en tromba a decir "ej que no hay democracia". Lo vimos en Bankia, cuando políticos, empresarios y sindicalistas hacían de la "democracia" su forma de vida.

Supongo que será que en Alemania hay democracia y aqui no.
Aunque el resto de los 12.000 municipios tengan "privatizados" los servicios energéticos.
Será que a ellos la democracia todavía no ha llegado 

[Маркс]

Bueno pues.., ¡Mira tu por dónde! No sólo en Bolivia se nacionaliza la distribución de la electricidad. En Alemania lo están haciendo y no nos dicen nada ¿Por qué será?
[...]
72 eléctricas municipales en Alemania, promovidas por sus vecinos y subiendo...

Un ayuntamiento gestionando su recogida de basuras no es "nacionalizar" el servicio. El engaño con el cambio de escala es muy burdo, de todas formas es una iniciativa aplaudible en la pequeña escala.

Pero me queda la duda de porqué cuando el pueblo decide privatizar esos mismos servicios, salís en tromba a decir "ej que no hay democracia". Lo vimos en Bankia, cuando políticos, empresarios y sindicalistas hacían de la "democracia" su forma de vida.

Supongo que será que en Alemania hay democracia y aqui no.
Aunque el resto de los 12.000 municipios tengan "privatizados" los servicios energéticos.
Será que a ellos la democracia todavía no ha llegado 

Yo te lo explico para que lo entiendas.

En España (por diversas razones a las que no me extenderé) tenemos y hemos tenido históricamente un gran déficit en cuanto a todo tipo de asociaciones civiles. No es algo casual, ni mucho menos, es más, parte de nuestro subdesarrollo social viene por ahí, el franquismo ya se cuidó muy mucho de desactivarlo.., de ahí también nuestro déficit democrático, algo que, por cierto, parece despertar en no pocos sectores por fin (debe ser por eso de que la letra con sangre entra).

Esto se estudia, eh, no vayas a creerte otra cosa. Lo digo por tus risotadas.., ya sabes. 

[Mad Men]

Respecto al tema eléctrico. Existe un gran límite técnico/tecnológico y es el almacenamiento, el problema de las renovables es que producen cuando producen ,es decir si hay sol o viento, en cambio la demanda es constante , aunque varía 100% del día (mas consumo) a la noche(menos consumo. Los costes de crear un sistema de almacenaje a base de baterías de ion-litio,níquel-cadmio o del tipo que sean son estratosféricos aparte de que la producción mundial no puede suplir actualmente una demanda tan grande. La única solución es la existente, complementar la energía renovable con las convencionales y esto solo se consigue con grandes infraestructuras (centrales nucleares, ciclos combinados, centrales de carbón...) que difícilmente pueden ser controladas por cooperativas. Eso no quita que plante unas cuantas placas solares el que lo desee.

A  veces veo que se critica la privatización de las eléctricas como causa del coste energético que estamos soportando, y de hecho lo que ha provocado el caos actual ha sido la mala política energética de los sucesivos gobiernos. Se ha creado un sistema sobredimensionado, con un déficit tarifario para competir en costes con nuestros vecinos, y también , pero en menor medida, se han pagado unos sueldos excesivos en el sector energético, aunque eso,actualmente se está resolviendo en subcontratas. Todo esto unido a un descenso de consumo debido a la crisis, ha hecho muy difícil amortizar las centrales montadas.

Que ha pasado? Pues que subían el precio, pero entonces la gente consumía menos, y así sucesivamente. Solución? Pues subir la parte fija, es decir la potencia contratada.

No mezclemos privatización con mala gestión.

Eso no quiere decir que este o no esté a favor de la privatización. De lo que estoy a favor es de la buena gestión.


El problema es que ahora tenemos un problemón con la energía eléctrica en españa, que difícilmente se puede salir de él sin pagar el pato por la mala gestión

[2 años]

Respecto al tema eléctrico. Existe un gran límite técnico/tecnológico y es el almacenamiento, el problema de las renovables es que producen cuando producen ,es decir si hay sol o viento, en cambio la demanda es constante , aunque varía 100% del día (mas consumo) a la noche(menos consumo. Los costes de crear un sistema de almacenaje a base de baterías de ion-litio,níquel-cadmio o del tipo que sean son estratosféricos aparte de que la producción mundial no puede suplir actualmente una demanda tan grande. La única solución es la existente, complementar la energía renovable con las convencionales y esto solo se consigue con grandes infraestructuras (centrales nucleares, ciclos combinados, centrales de carbón...) que difícilmente pueden ser controladas por cooperativas. Eso no quita que plante unas cuantas placas solares el que lo desee.

A  veces veo que se critica la privatización de las eléctricas como causa del coste energético que estamos soportando, y de hecho lo que ha provocado el caos actual ha sido la mala política energética de los sucesivos gobiernos. Se ha creado un sistema sobredimensionado, con un déficit tarifario para competir en costes con nuestros vecinos, y también , pero en menor medida, se han pagado unos sueldos excesivos en el sector energético, aunque eso,actualmente se está resolviendo en subcontratas. Todo esto unido a un descenso de consumo debido a la crisis, ha hecho muy difícil amortizar las centrales montadas.

Que ha pasado? Pues que subían el precio, pero entonces la gente consumía menos, y así sucesivamente. Solución? Pues subir la parte fija, es decir la potencia contratada.

No mezclemos privatización con mala gestión.

Eso no quiere decir que este o no esté a favor de la privatización. De lo que estoy a favor es de la buena gestión.

El asunto es que esa mala gestión revela la extrema inutilidad de la casta, y lo digo asi, casta politica y empresarial, que era tan inutil para creerse de verdad que esto ya era pa siempre.
Porque ampliar potencia y tener esas previsiones de crecimiento no se vota, lo cual revela la cruda realidad, que tenemos una casta que se creyo el mismo tinglado que creaba (tenemos hasta una princesa visillera) , luego viene CHOSEN y nos dice que mejor que la gente no decida... pues hoyga seguro que peor no lo hubiese hecho.

[Mad Men]

Respecto al tema eléctrico. Existe un gran límite técnico/tecnológico y es el almacenamiento, el problema de las renovables es que producen cuando producen ,es decir si hay sol o viento, en cambio la demanda es constante , aunque varía 100% del día (mas consumo) a la noche(menos consumo. Los costes de crear un sistema de almacenaje a base de baterías de ion-litio,níquel-cadmio o del tipo que sean son estratosféricos aparte de que la producción mundial no puede suplir actualmente una demanda tan grande. La única solución es la existente, complementar la energía renovable con las convencionales y esto solo se consigue con grandes infraestructuras (centrales nucleares, ciclos combinados, centrales de carbón...) que difícilmente pueden ser controladas por cooperativas. Eso no quita que plante unas cuantas placas solares el que lo desee.

A  veces veo que se critica la privatización de las eléctricas como causa del coste energético que estamos soportando, y de hecho lo que ha provocado el caos actual ha sido la mala política energética de los sucesivos gobiernos. Se ha creado un sistema sobredimensionado, con un déficit tarifario para competir en costes con nuestros vecinos, y también , pero en menor medida, se han pagado unos sueldos excesivos en el sector energético, aunque eso,actualmente se está resolviendo en subcontratas. Todo esto unido a un descenso de consumo debido a la crisis, ha hecho muy difícil amortizar las centrales montadas.

Que ha pasado? Pues que subían el precio, pero entonces la gente consumía menos, y así sucesivamente. Solución? Pues subir la parte fija, es decir la potencia contratada.

No mezclemos privatización con mala gestión.

Eso no quiere decir que este o no esté a favor de la privatización. De lo que estoy a favor es de la buena gestión.

El asunto es que esa mala gestión revela la extrema inutilidad de la casta, y lo digo asi, casta politica y empresarial, que era tan inutil para creerse de verdad que esto ya era pa siempre.
Porque ampliar potencia y tener esas previsiones de crecimiento no se vota, lo cual revela la cruda realidad, que tenemos una casta que se creyo el mismo tinglado que creaba (tenemos hasta una princesa visillera) , luego viene CHOSEN y nos dice que mejor que la gente no decida... pues hoyga seguro que peor no lo hubiese hecho.

En el caso energético creo que se mezcla casta ( bien primario=se puede sacar dinero),incompetencia ( España va pa arriba y se necesitan mil centrales porque todos viviremos en mansiones con el fancoil a tope en verano),cortoplacismo ( no saber ver la escasez energética).

La buena gestión se crea fusionando políticos (bien intencionados) con tecnócratas ( que de verdad sepan sobre el tema a tratar).

En el fondo, la gestión eléctrica explica perfectamente como ha funcionado este país. Cámbiese KWh por pisos y verá muchas coincidencias.

[Dan]

Respecto al tema eléctrico. Existe un gran límite técnico/tecnológico y es el almacenamiento, el problema de las renovables es que producen cuando producen ,es decir si hay sol o viento, en cambio la demanda es constante , aunque varía 100% del día (mas consumo) a la noche(menos consumo. Los costes de crear un sistema de almacenaje a base de baterías de ion-litio,níquel-cadmio o del tipo que sean son estratosféricos aparte de que la producción mundial no puede suplir actualmente una demanda tan grande. La única solución es la existente, complementar la energía renovable con las convencionales y esto solo se consigue con grandes infraestructuras (centrales nucleares, ciclos combinados, centrales de carbón...) que difícilmente pueden ser controladas por cooperativas. Eso no quita que plante unas cuantas placas solares el que lo desee.

No es del todo asi, en hidroelectricas siempre se ha almacenado energia de superavit bombeando agua a depositos elevados para compensar la demanda y ha funcionado toda la vida muy bien. En termosolar de concentracion ahora esta el sistema de sales liquidas que hace que la central siga funcionando hasta bien entrada la noche por el calor residual. Y para los otros metodos las soluciones de almacenaje ya estan casi ahi, desde los acumuladores de grafeno que no les queda tanto hasta soluciones antiguas "low tech" actualizadas a materiales modernos como las baterias inerciales y que no necesitan de ningun elemento raro ni estrategico.

Lo de los ciclos combinados por si solo daria para un hilo. Hace falta tener a la chusma politica comiendo de la mano para que se te pague por no producir nada mas que una mala excusa.

A  veces veo que se critica la privatización de las eléctricas como causa del coste energético que estamos soportando, y de hecho lo que ha provocado el caos actual ha sido la mala política energética de los sucesivos gobiernos. Se ha creado un sistema sobredimensionado, con un déficit tarifario para competir en costes con nuestros vecinos, y también , pero en menor medida, se han pagado unos sueldos excesivos en el sector energético, aunque eso,actualmente se está resolviendo en subcontratas. Todo esto unido a un descenso de consumo debido a la crisis, ha hecho muy difícil amortizar las centrales montadas.

Hombre, es que se privatizaron de aquella manera...

Lo de los sueldos excesivos es totalmente cierto, doy fe por parte de familia que los que entraron en las empresas alla por los 60-70 viven y han vivido muy bien, habiendo tenido casa, economato, medico, escuelas y hasta cura pagados por la empresa, amen de electricidad en casa a precio de coste y se estan jubilando igualmente bien mientras sus hijos y nietos (en muchos casos es literal, porque la cosa ha pasado por la familia, algo tiene que tener trabajar 40 anyos en el mismo sitio) sudan la gota gorda por menos de la mitad de su sueldo.

En cuanto al descenso de consumo y el impacto para amortizar las nuevas centrales voy a ser conciso:  que se jodan, vendan la maquinaria fuera y dediquen la nave a secar salchichones. Sus servicios ya no son necesarios.

Que ha pasado? Pues que subían el precio, pero entonces la gente consumía menos, y así sucesivamente. Solución? Pues subir la parte fija, es decir la potencia contratada.

No mezclemos privatización con mala gestión.

Eso no quiere decir que este o no esté a favor de la privatización. De lo que estoy a favor es de la buena gestión.

El problema es que ahora tenemos un problemón con la energía eléctrica en españa, que difícilmente se puede salir de él sin pagar el pato por la mala gestión

Hay mala gestion, buena gestion y cortijos. Lo nuestro no es que este mal gestionado precisamente, de hecho lo hacen de maravilla.