Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[wanderer]

Muy llamativo:

It's Official: America Is Not The Greatest Country On Earth... It's 28th!

It's Official: America Is Not The Greatest Country On Earth... It's 28th!

Lo más notable, ésto:



Vean en particular, dónde está España, Alemania, Dinamarca, y también USA, claro.

[pobrecitohablador]

How an Aging Population Will Completely Upend the Finance Industry

[wanderer]

How an Aging Population Will Completely Upend the Finance Industry

Muy buen artículo, gracias. Me quedo ante todo con ésto:

...
Through a certain lens, it's all grandma's fault. Aging populations are associated with the slower growth that monetary policy is trying (and in many cases, failing) to tackle, and therefore responsible for suppressing the interest rates that have sent almost half of G-10 sovereign bonds into negative territory.
...

que liga la Era Cero con el Ataúd Demográfico (R.G.C.I.M^TM) y que no es exclusivo en absoluto de España, sino que es generalizado (aquí es sólo más acentuado). Por eso y otras causas, que también se tocan en el artículo, la inflación ni está ni se la espera.

Malos tiempos para los gestores DoP, que están que trinan desde hace tiempo, pero la ideología i-CEO también tiene los días contados, porque es un corolario de que los DoP puedan ocupar un nicho ecológico (como parásitos) dentro del econosistema.

[Republik]

Y sin embargo la inflación se continúa buscando . Draghi ha dicho que quiere salarios más altos en Europa , en Espñaa una subida importante en los sueldos de menor importe es casi imprescindible para que aguanten enteras muchas piezas del sistema.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/aprender-a-invertir/2016-09-30/day-trader-inversion-dinero-rapido_1267943/

(y luego el primer comentarista se ha quedao a gusto)

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stronger-fiscal-policy-to-boost-growth-by-michael-spence-2016-09

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

WASHINGTON, DC – At the start of October, China’s currency, the renminbi, was added to the basket of currencies that make up the International Monetary Fund’s Special Drawing Rights, or SDR. Previously, the SDR had been defined as a weighted average of the dollar, euro, British pound, and Japanese yen. Now that the renminbi has been added, it can claim to be one of just five truly global currencies.

Should we care? The Chinese certainly do. In Beijing, where I was late last month, joining the rarefied SDR club was all people wanted to talk about. (Okay, truth be told, they also wanted to talk about Donald Trump.)

John Andrews views the country’s civil war in the context of the Middle East’s strategic disarray, assessing how Shlomo Ben-Ami, Christopher Hill, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others think the outcome will reshape the region.

Seeing the renminbi added to the SDR basket was a matter of national pride. It symbolized China’s emergence as a global power. And it vindicated the government’s efforts to encourage use of the renminbi in cross-border transactions, freeing China and the rest of the world from over-dependence on the dollar.

But the fact of the matter is that adding the renminbi to the SDR basket has little practical significance. The SDR is not a currency; it is just the unit in which the IMF reports its financial accounts. Only a small handful of international bonds are denominated in SDRs, because banks and firms do not find this option particularly attractive. The main issuer of SDR bonds is the IMF’s sister organization, the World Bank (the Fund itself is not authorized to issue bonds).

The only practical implication of adding the renminbi to the SDR basket is that it now becomes a currency that countries can draw, along with the SDR’s other four constituent currencies, when they borrow from the IMF. Only time will tell how many wish to do so.

The Chinese argue that the renminbi’s addition to the SDR basket should be seen in a broader context. It is one of a series of steps to encourage use of the renminbi in international transactions.

This agenda includes negotiating currency swap agreements, now more than two dozen, between the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and foreign central banks. It also includes designating a Chinese financial institution to provide clearing and settlement services for transactions in renminbi in each leading financial center (in September, for example, the Bank of China was chosen as the official clearing bank for New York). And foreign entities are being authorized to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in China itself. Toward the end of August, Poland became the first European government to do so.

But the reality, again, is that these steps are more about symbolism than substance. The PBOC’s renminbi swaps are almost entirely unused. Designated clearing banks have not exactly been flooded with business. Offshore renminbi bank deposits are falling. The proportion of China’s merchandise trade settled in renminbi has been declining since mid-2015. And there is no sign that where the Polish government has so boldly ventured, other governments will soon follow.

The fault, to paraphrase Shakespeare, lies not in the stars but in China’s own financial markets. Since mid-2015, the country’s stock market has been on a rollercoaster. Every international organization worth its salt, from the IMF to the Bank for International Settlements, has been warning of problems in China’s corporate bond market. And if defaults on loans to corporations are widespread, as these organizations predict, the implications for the banks could be dire.

The problem is mistaken tactics by the Chinese government. The government and the PBOC believe that relaxing capital controls and allowing financial capital to flow more freely in and out of the country will force financial market participants to up their game. Companies will have to upgrade their accounting standards, and banks their risk-management practices, to cope with the faster pace of financial transactions. The result will be more liquid and stable financial markets, in turn making the renminbi more attractive as a unit of account, means of payment, and store of value for residents and foreigners alike.

Unfortunately, assuming a result doesn’t make it so. If Chinese banks and firms are slow to adjust, liberalizing international capital flows will lead only to more volatility, fewer offshore deposits, and less reliance on the renminbi for settling merchandise transactions – exactly as has been the case recently.

Chinese policymakers must now put the horse before the cart. The most important step they can take to foster renminbi internationalization is to strengthen domestic financial markets, modernize regulation, and streamline contract enforcement. If China wants to transform the renminbi into a first-class global currency, it should pay less attention to renminbi trading in New York and the currency’s weight in the SDR basket, and more to the development of deep, liquid, and stable financial markets at home.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-renminbi-internationalization-by-barry-eichengreen-2016-10

[pobrecitohablador]

Un detalle importante que recuerdo haber leído por ahí es que la inclusión del renminbi en el invento ese del FMI no se ha hecho a costa del dólar, sino quitando relevancia a las otras monedas.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-10-18/saudis-china-dump-treasuries-foreign-central-banks-liquidate-record-346-billion-us-p

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Donde dije bail-in, digo...

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-06/italian-government-prepares-nationalize-monte-paschi

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Multa para la banca que no pactó

http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/12/07/actualidad/1481108536_418347.html

[ERB]

Donde dije bail-in, digo...

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-06/italian-government-prepares-nationalize-monte-paschi

El Gobierno italiano prepara otros tres rescates de bancos para 2017

El rescate de Monte dei Paschi (MPS), aprobado por el Gobierno italiano antes de Navidad, es sólo el primer paso, después de que el Banco Central Europeo haya ampliado las necesidades de capital a 8.800 millones. Tal y como ha explicado el ministro transalpino de Economía, Pier Carlo Padoan, a la hora de pedir al Parlamento la asignación de 20.000 millones de euros para intervenir la banca transalpina, el cortafuegos de Roma no servirá solo para MPS, sino para dar al mercado la "señal" de que Italia hará lo que pueda para proteger a sus bancos.

Por ello es muy probable que 2017 empiece con nuevas intervenciones, en un sector que se había paralizado a la espera de ver si MPS conseguía llevar a cabo su ampliación de capital. Aunque, de momento, hay varios cabos sueltos que atar. El primero es el destino de dos bancos medianos: Veneto Banca y Popolare di Vicenza.

http://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/8050001/12/16/El-Gobierno-italiano-prepara-otros-tres-rescates-de-bancos-para-2017.html

[sudden and sharp]

Donde dije bail-in, digo...

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-12-06/italian-government-prepares-nationalize-monte-paschi

El Gobierno italiano prepara otros tres rescates de bancos para 2017

El rescate de Monte dei Paschi (MPS), aprobado por el Gobierno italiano antes de Navidad, es sólo el primer paso, después de que el Banco Central Europeo haya ampliado las necesidades de capital a 8.800 millones. Tal y como ha explicado el ministro transalpino de Economía, Pier Carlo Padoan, a la hora de pedir al Parlamento la asignación de 20.000 millones de euros para intervenir la banca transalpina, el cortafuegos de Roma no servirá solo para MPS, sino para dar al mercado la "señal" de que Italia hará lo que pueda para proteger a sus bancos.

Por ello es muy probable que 2017 empiece con nuevas intervenciones, en un sector que se había paralizado a la espera de ver si MPS conseguía llevar a cabo su ampliación de capital. Aunque, de momento, hay varios cabos sueltos que atar. El primero es el destino de dos bancos medianos: Veneto Banca y Popolare di Vicenza.

http://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/8050001/12/16/El-Gobierno-italiano-prepara-otros-tres-rescates-de-bancos-para-2017.html

A falta de noticias, me las invento.

[Deadzoner]

Conceptos "Interesantes" en los que agradecería mucho que alguien me ilustrara:

1. Carry trade en la era cero. Qué pasa con el Yen? Que está haciendo el BCE con esto? He oído alguna cosilla.
https://blog.bankinter.com/economia/-/noticia/2016/8/26/prevision-euro-yen

2. Paridad Euro-Dolar. ¿No da la sensación de estar trabajando al revés en función de los tipos de interes?

[saturno]

Conceptos "Interesantes" en los que agradecería mucho que alguien me ilustrara:

1. Carry trade en la era cero. Qué pasa con el Yen? Que está haciendo el BCE con esto? He oído alguna cosilla.
https://blog.bankinter.com/economia/-/noticia/2016/8/26/prevision-euro-yen

2. Paridad Euro-Dolar. ¿No da la sensación de estar trabajando al revés en función de los tipos de interes?

La explicacion puede estar en Grecia /y todos los Estados que firmaron un convenio de "rescate" con la UE.
Si los tipos UE fueran los de USA, Grecia estaría en llamas y otros tantos irrecuperables.