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Cita de: alpha en Julio 08, 2016, 12:01:09 pmLa propuesta Varoufakis era ingenua, no por si misma, sino por la actitud cerril de los interlocutores.Pero reitero que yo busco el debate en lo concreto, tu a mi entender te vas por las ramas. Tu sabrás por qué.¿interlocutores? Es que creo que todavía no lo has entendido No hay interlocución posible.Que Varoufakis insista en eso de la negociación sólo demuestra lo perdido que está en su fracasado delirio nacionalista.Hay que ser más realista.Es ingenuo pensar que Pizarro y Cortés van a sentarse con Moztezuma a escuchar los fantásticos y maravillosos beneficios de darse la vuelta por donde han venido. Estoy diciendo que los negociadores del Eurogrupo (=TODOS LOS PAÍSES DE EUROPA) fueron a Grecia a integrarla en la nueva concepción de área supranacional. Punto.A partir de ahí, lo que opine Varoufakis y los griegos, ya no importa nada; como de hecho se demostró cuando Tsipras pasó olímpicamente del resultado del referéndum que él mismo había convocado Probablemente lo único inteligente que hizo en su carrera como político. Y no es alemán, ni francés. Es griego.Yo no puedo ser más claro. La "interlocución" de Varoufakis es pura fantasía en la mente de un sacerdote azteca que ve como su mundo de fantasía se desmorona ante una realidad mucho más poderosa que sus rituales indígenas. Nunca ha habido interlocución en esos términos, ni similares. Ha habido una absorción directa que comenzó con el primer tratado de la Unión en 1986. A partir de esta realidad, como unidad de destino en lo universal (seas inca o maya) caben dos opciones:1ª.- Aceptar el avance de la historia y aprovechar las redes de saneamiento, las tres comidas al día, la agricultura y la ganadería del hombre blanco como beneficiosas para tu desarrollo. No es casualidad que en Ecuador hablen castellano.2ª.- No aceptarlo, montar una pataleta y que se acabe demostrando lo equivocado que estabas por pura consumación de los hechos. Adorando a un dios proscrito, con tu orgullo nacionalista roto y tu descendencia pasando necesidades básicas.Por suerte en Grecia no se llega a estos extremos porque hablamos de una FUSIÓN.Creo que estoy siendo bastante explícito.La fusión se realizará SI o SI, a partir de ahí tenemos dos opciones: aceptarla con todo lo bueno que trae, que no es poco (vida del primer mundo) o insistir en el mismo error de las COLONIAS en 1800, elevadas a lomos de un pueblo inculto e ignorante, lideradas por paletos locales, retrocedieron 200 años en el nivel de vida por estúpido amor a una bandera inventada y el orgullo de un pueblo que nunca existió como tal (¿república bolivariana? ¿pero estamos locos?)Pongo como ejemplos a Nicaragua o Guinea, por decir dos países miserables que renunciaron al bienestar de provincia anexa al primer mundo, por una estúpida bandera que simbolizaba no se sabe bien que, ni donde, ni cuando, ni porqué.Realmente creo que Europa le está haciendo un favor al atrasado y tercermundista país griego.Varoufakis simplemetne se ha equivocado de lugar para librar su batalla. Lo que tenía que haber hecho era luchar por los intereses de su pueblo desde el interior de Europa. Hacer carrera interna, reconocer los beneficios del nuevo Dios Globalización, los avances tecnológicos del hombre blanco, y facilitar la fusión de los pueblos. Lo que viene siendo una actitud inteligente.Escogió lo contrario. Y se convirtió en un proscrito, ridiculizado en todos los salones del parlamento europeo. Y a punto estuvo de retrotraer a su país 200 años, si no fuera porque su compañero de viaje -un tal Tsipras- fue capaz de comprender lo que yo te estoy explicando.Y se sentó a asimilar la realidad, porque esa era su función histórica. Y se la envainó. Y con ello permitió que los viejecitos de su país pudieran seguir teniendo un plato de comida en la mesa a final de mes, agua caliente, calefacción y medicinas.Para mi, es un héroe.Por eso me sorprende lo de la superioridad moral, cuando precisamente mi argumento es el contrario. Métanse todos la moral por donde les quepa, y quédense con quien les proporcione mejor nivel de vida hoy, ahora.Sean capitalistas, europeos, alemanes o americanos. Las banderitas, el "pueblo unido", y las unidades de destino en lo universal que defienden los caudillitos tipo Varoufakis sólo traen miseria.
La propuesta Varoufakis era ingenua, no por si misma, sino por la actitud cerril de los interlocutores.Pero reitero que yo busco el debate en lo concreto, tu a mi entender te vas por las ramas. Tu sabrás por qué.
si a eso fueramos, desacuerdo en la narrativa monocolor de la UE-parte norte como buena, y la UE-parte sur como mala y retrograda.
En este caso, no es que no se respetaran, es que no había ni protocolo definido.
V. se salió, y trabaja en crear las bases de lo que deberían ser esos protocolos UE que hoy no existen.
Sólo por decir que V. y la UE no se opusieron sobre tesis contrarias, sino sobre la legitimidad de las decisiones tomadas.
Bueno Chosen, aprovecho para saludar y despedirme, ya sin argumentar.Es que ultimamente no me meto en fregaos de los que no sale nada, y de aqui no sale (ojo, y no hablo de ganar la discusion, sino de sacar en claro, que yo entro aqui a que me tireis del caballo y y me hagais dudar)Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.
Cita de: alpha en Julio 09, 2016, 21:52:05 pmBueno Chosen, aprovecho para saludar y despedirme, ya sin argumentar.Es que ultimamente no me meto en fregaos de los que no sale nada, y de aqui no sale (ojo, y no hablo de ganar la discusion, sino de sacar en claro, que yo entro aqui a que me tireis del caballo y y me hagais dudar)Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.Hay que tener más paciencia. Ya saldrá la respuesta. (No sé por ejemplo, por qué no aceptas la hipótesis de que varufaquis sea lo que parece, un fraude, un discurso vacío.)Tu verás.
[...]De VF solo me interesa bajar a las propuestas concretas que hizo y como las hizo. Su posterior discurso de DiEM25 me guste mas o menos es mas dificilmente baremable. En ningun momento nadie me ha dicho que su propuesta tal estaba equivocada o era demagogica por este y aquel motivos. Utilizando un simil pugilistico, estoy intentando que se pelee en un ring (las acciones de VF como ministro griego de finanzas), pero los oponentes no se deciden a entrar, pero, desde fuera, sostienen que mis argumentos no tienen media ostia, eso si, sin subir al ring y confrontarlos con los suyos. Me importa un rabano recibir una paliza, pero ha de ser en ese ring. ¿Que puede haber mas facil que decir que la propuesta de superavit primario para 2017 de la CE del 3.5% era realista y cojonuda, y que el 2% de VF era una tomadura de pelo? Se puede valorar muy facilmente algo asi. [...]
Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.
Encontré un articulo en Forbes y además Keen hace un buen resumen del Modest Proposal. Vale la pena releerlo.http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevekeen/2015/05/20/greek-deception-greek-tragedy-german-farce-german-myth/7/Citar 5/20/2015 @ 2:42AM 30,166 viewsTheir first proposal addressed the real cause of the crisis: the parlous state of many Greek (and Spanish and Cypriot) private banks after the crisis. The current arrangement requires the Greek government to borrow on their behalf from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); they propose instead that the ESM should take over: Citar Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.Their second recognised the Maastricht Treaty’s limit on government debt of 60% of GDP, and proposed that this could also be an obligation of the ECB (European Central Bank). Since a 60% of GDP level was allowed, this should be funded by bonds backed by the ECB which would still be serviced by the Greek government. With the ECB issuing the bonds, the interest rate on them would reflect the credit rating of the ECB—which is absolute—rather than the tenuous credit rating of Greece. Rates on these bonds would fall from over 10% now to just above zero—and what holders would lose in returns they would gain in the certainty that the bonds would be honoured.The third proposal was to use the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the almost dormant European Investment Fund (EIF) to fund infrastructure investments throughout Europe. Bonds used to finance this investment would be debt of the European Union in general, which is quite low, rather than of any member states. The fourth was to start a Emergency Social Solidarity Programme to undo some of the enormous harm that austerity progams have done to living standards in Europe. This program would:Citar guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.These proposals are both modest and separable, and only the third and fourth proposals breach Schäuble’s uncompromising assertion that “Stimulus—both in fiscal and monetary policy—is not part of the plan”. Varoufakis expected that, when he became Finance Minister for Greece, he would be able to raise these proposals with his counterparts. Surely they could agree to the first two proposals—and certainly to the second, which would involve no cost to other EU partners? But instead he has found that his fellow Finance Ministers are unwilling to discuss anything except compliance with the existing, failing, program of austerity. For his exasperation at this, he is accused of “hectoring” his fellow Finance Ministers.Hay una crítica a la postura de Keen & all de Tim Worstall aquí http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/05/20/steve-keens-interesting-view-of-the-greek-debt-crisis/CitarOr alternatively, could we please have some more of your taxpayers’ money to spend on our voters? Great politics domestically in Greece, not so hot in other eurozone countries. Y esta crítica sigue razonando sobre la UE como si no pudiera tener un presupuesto común.Fusión de acreedores y deudores (claro que para eso, hace falta un FMIxit previo).
5/20/2015 @ 2:42AM 30,166 viewsTheir first proposal addressed the real cause of the crisis: the parlous state of many Greek (and Spanish and Cypriot) private banks after the crisis. The current arrangement requires the Greek government to borrow on their behalf from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); they propose instead that the ESM should take over: Citar Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.Their second recognised the Maastricht Treaty’s limit on government debt of 60% of GDP, and proposed that this could also be an obligation of the ECB (European Central Bank). Since a 60% of GDP level was allowed, this should be funded by bonds backed by the ECB which would still be serviced by the Greek government. With the ECB issuing the bonds, the interest rate on them would reflect the credit rating of the ECB—which is absolute—rather than the tenuous credit rating of Greece. Rates on these bonds would fall from over 10% now to just above zero—and what holders would lose in returns they would gain in the certainty that the bonds would be honoured.The third proposal was to use the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the almost dormant European Investment Fund (EIF) to fund infrastructure investments throughout Europe. Bonds used to finance this investment would be debt of the European Union in general, which is quite low, rather than of any member states. The fourth was to start a Emergency Social Solidarity Programme to undo some of the enormous harm that austerity progams have done to living standards in Europe. This program would:Citar guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.These proposals are both modest and separable, and only the third and fourth proposals breach Schäuble’s uncompromising assertion that “Stimulus—both in fiscal and monetary policy—is not part of the plan”. Varoufakis expected that, when he became Finance Minister for Greece, he would be able to raise these proposals with his counterparts. Surely they could agree to the first two proposals—and certainly to the second, which would involve no cost to other EU partners? But instead he has found that his fellow Finance Ministers are unwilling to discuss anything except compliance with the existing, failing, program of austerity. For his exasperation at this, he is accused of “hectoring” his fellow Finance Ministers.
Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.
guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.
Or alternatively, could we please have some more of your taxpayers’ money to spend on our voters? Great politics domestically in Greece, not so hot in other eurozone countries.
Las fantasías revolucionarias antinaturales de Varoufakis sólo valen para vender sus libros (de papel, que lo aguanta todo). Su moto la tuvo que pagar. Y su casa. Y su corte de pelo. ¿A que vienen sus propuestas heterodoxas para el resto del universo?
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/yanis-varoufakis-why-we-must-save-the-eu"From the day I assumed office I strove to put together sensible, moderate proposals that would create common ground between my government, the troika of Greece’s lenders and Schäuble’s people. The idea was to go to Brussels, put to them our own blueprint for Greece’s recovery and then discuss with them their own ideas and objections to ours.My own Athens-based team worked hard on this, together with experts from abroad, including Jeff Sachs of Columbia University, Thomas Meyer, a former chief economist at Deutsche Bank, Daniel Cohen and Matthieu Pigasse, leading lights of the French investment bank Lazard, the former US treasury secretary Larry Summers, and my personal friend Lord Lamont – not exactly a group of leftist recalcitrants.Soon we had a fully-fledged plan, whose final version I co-authored with Jeff Sachs. It consisted of three chapters. One proposed smart debt operations that would make Greece’s public debt manageable again, while guaranteeing maximum returns to our creditors. The second chapter put forward a medium-term fiscal consolidation policy that would ensure the Greek government would never get into deficit again, while limiting our budget surplus targets to levels low enough to be credible and consistent with recovery. Finally, the third chapter outlined deep reforms to public and tax administration, product markets, and the restructure of a broken banking system as well as the creation a development bank to manage public assets at an arm’s length from politicians.I am often asked: Why were these proposals of your ministry rejected? They were not. The Eurogroup and the troika did not have to reject them because they never allowed me to put them on the table. When I began speaking about them, they would look at me as if I were singing the Swedish national anthem. And behind the scenes they were exerting pressure on the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, to repress these proposals, insinuating that there would be no agreement unless we stuck to the troika’s failed programme.What was really going on, of course, was that the troika could simply ignore our proposals, tell the world that I had nothing credible to offer them, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and then force the prime minister to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is at least double the size Greece would have required under our proposals."
https://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/18/greeces-proposals-to-end-the-crisis-my-intervention-at-todays-eurogroup/In our proposals to the institutions we have offered:- An extensive (but optimised) privatisation agenda spanning the period 2015-2025- The creation of a fully independent Tax and Customs Authority (under the aegis and supervision of Parliament)- A Fiscal Council that oversees the state budget- A short-term program for limiting foreclosures and managing non-performing loans- Judicial and civil procedure code reforms- Liberalising several product markets and services (with protections for middle class values and professions that are part and parcel of society’s fabric)- Elimination of many nuisance charges- Public administration reforms (introducing proper staff evaluation systems, reducing non-wage costs, modernising and unifying public sector payrolls).In addition to these reforms the Greek Authorities have engaged the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help Athens design, implement and monitor a second series of reforms. Yesterday I met with the OECD’s Secretary General Mr Angel Gurria and his team to announce this joint reform agenda, complete with a specific roadmap:- A major Anti-corruption Drive and relevant institutions to support it – especially in the area of procurement- Liberalising the construction sector, including the market and standards of construction materials- Wholesale trade liberalisation- Media – electronic and press code of practice- One-Stop Business Centres that eradicate the bureaucratic impediments to doing business in Greece- Pension System Reform – where the emphasis is on a proper, long-term, actuarial study, the phasing out of early retirements, the reduction in the operating costs of the pensions funds, pension fund consolidation – rather than mere pension cuts.Yes, colleagues, Greeks need to adjust further. We desperately need deep reforms. But, I urge you to take seriously under consideration this important difference between:- reforms that attack parasitic, rent-seeking behaviour or inefficiencies, and- parametric changes that jack up tax rates and reduce benefits to the weakest.We need a lot more of the real reforms and a lot less of the parametric type.
http://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/proyecto-europeo/propuestas-Varoufakis-eurozona_0_352415401.html"El documento está firmado en Julio de 2013, y muchas cosas han ocurrido desde entonces. Los posteriores desarrollos de la UE en la gestión de la crisis no sólo están en consonancia con las propuestas de Varoufakis, Holland y Galbraith, sino que en algunos casos incluso las han superado.En el ámbito bancario, la Unión Europea ha culminado su proceso de puesta en marcha de la Unión Bancaria, adelantándose de esta manera los presagios de los autores. La gestión del MEDE y del Banco Central Europeo en el Mecanismo Único de supervisión y de resolución bancaria, así como la utilización del MEDE como instrumento de recapitalización bancaria, suponen un paso en una dirección similar a la propuesta por el documento. ...En el plano del plan de inversiones, la propuesta de Juncker para la elaboración de un plan de inversiones en la Unión Europea va de hecho más allá del planteado por los autores, usando no sólo el Banco Europeo de Inversiones (BEI), sino también la garantía del presupuesto comunitario y la de aquellos países que, de manera voluntaria, quieran contribuir al mismo sin que estas contribuciones sean consideradas déficit público por la comisión. Adicionalmente, la compra, por parte del Banco Central Europeo, de bonos del BEI en el marco del QE rebajarán sus costes de financiación y le permitirán ampliar su propio balance."