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EDITORIALhttps://elpais.com/elpais/2019/07/21/opinion/1563719379_956353.html
Cita de: Negrule en Julio 22, 2019, 11:47:38 amEDITORIALhttps://elpais.com/elpais/2019/07/21/opinion/1563719379_956353.htmlAlgunos os lo tenéis que hacer mirar.O se defiende que los políticos tengan poder para gestionar el urbanismo de la ciudad, COMO SE HACE CUANDO GOBIERNA CARMENA, o se defiende que los políticos tengan menos poder. Lo que es de parvulario es defender una cosa u otra, según el color del gobierno.Además, que mil y pico viviendas de suburbio de extrarradio (como corresponde a la gama "público/social") no tienen la culpa del precio de la vivienda ni en Madrid, ni en España. Ya resulta cansino el temita.A todo esto: ¿como va la burbuja por Barcelona, donde no hay fondos buitreando?
De esta noticia solo me interesa esta frase: pide a gritos una explicación política y jurídica más profunda.
Este país se está convirtiendo en una extensión de sudamérica a velocidad de vértigo.
With So Many Vacant Stores, E-Commerce Is Only Part of the Problem Although commercial retail rents are down from recent peaks, they haven’t fallen as fast as sales at struggling chains. The rents remain higher than prerecession levels in many prime shopping areas such as Manhattan, Los Angeles and Dallas.
Desear que la tierra se convierta en un lugar inhóspito, tampoco es delito por ahora.Lo digo porque similar futuro lleva la reciente resoluciòn de un juzgado de Madrid revocando la anulación de Madrid Central, bajo el argumento extrajurídico de que "el cambio climático no-se-qué"
A clear example of the logic that underpins the Palma ratio is found in thecomparison of Finland and Uruguay (Figure . According to their Gini (27and 40) they don’t have much in common. However, the Palma ratio — anda new simple statistic of inequality that I am introducing here, and calling‘d10+’ — point in a different direction, which is characterized by as manysimilarities as contrasts.The apparent considerable distributional difference between them (13Gini percentage points) is all about the extra share of the rich in Uruguay(d10+)—gainedentirelyat the expense of the bottom 40 per cent. Theactual size of d10+will of course vary according to the benchmark. Thebenchmark I suggest is what is necessary in order to achieve a Palma ratioof 1 (as in Finland) — that is, what must be transferred from D10 to D1–D4in order to achieve this. Following Pigou (1920: 81), this transfer should bewelfare-improving since:[It] is evident that any transference of income from a rich to a relatively poor man ofsimilar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expenseof less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. The old ‘law ofdiminishing utility’ thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which increases theabsolute share of real income in the hands of the poor . . . will, in general, increase economicwelfare.Figure 8 also shows how the information provided by d10+complementsthat of the Palma ratio, as both statistics together provide fairly comprehen-sive information regarding a given country’s degree of inequality. While itis not intuitively clear where Uruguay’s extra Gini inequality comes from,knowing that its Palma ratio is almost twice that of Finland, and that its d10+is 7 per cent of national income, tells a much more focused, transparent andinformative story. And (with very few tail-end exceptions) its thrust is thatthe distributive struggle relates mostly to D10 trying to appropriate an extraincome share by shrinking D1–D4’s share (that is, by increasing d10+).Therefore, the size of d10+is also a proxy for the capacity or otherwise of D1–D4 to resist D10’s insatiable appetite.As suggested above, the 64,000 dollar question is obviously whetherthe size of d10+in Uruguay is the fairly inevitable outcome of its‘fundamentals’, or whether d10+isself-constructed, reflectingchoiceandthe nature of a more unfair political settlement, characterized by Uruguay’sgreater tolerance for inequality. If the former, as discussed above, this wouldstill require an explanation for why these fundamentals impact only on theincome share of one half of the population. If, alternatively, what reallymatters is the nature of political settlements and the (often) ‘tailor-made’market failures supporting them, then d10+would reflect the specificity ofUruguay’s political economy and (convenient) inequality-driving market failures. The distributional information provided jointly by the Palma ratio andd10+— especially by focusing the distributional struggle on a fairly specificarena, a phenomenon that is blurred by all those veils obscuring our vision ofinequality — can help illuminate this message, while also helping to create awareness of the dimensionsand specificityof inequality. This can be veryuseful for policy making, since with these two indicators it becomes evidentwhere inequality is located,and what must be doneif one wants to eradicatethe ‘extra’ inequality (i.e., that above a Palma ratio of 1) in countries suchas Uruguay. In other words, its minimalism — purposely avoiding all thealgebraic sophistication of alternative inequality statistics — becomes itsmain strength, as transparent information such as this can be crucial. As Gramsci rightly said, more often than not battles of this kind are won orlost on the field of ideology (something triumphant 1970s’ neoliberals knowbetter than anyone).Consequently, I would likewise venture that d10+is also a proxy for the size of Uruguay’s ‘distributional failure’, as I cannot see any (positiveor normative) reason why a country such as this should have a level ofdisposable income inequality greater than a Palma ratio of 1. That is, I see d10+ as a ‘distortion’; therefore, I shall henceforth call d10+‘distributionalfailure 1’. This new evidence suggests that we all still have some analyticalwork to do — especially those who argue that the ‘extra’ inequality, suchas Uruguay’s, somehow reflects the inevitable outcome of its (given) inputs.And even more work is required from those who still support high inequalityfrom an economic efficiency point of view. Of course, as in any other area of economics, one can always constructa suitable shopping list of potential fundamentals that might be statisticallyassociated in a significant way (from an econometric point of view) with thevery different levels of inequality found across the world, and then specu-late about how (say) globalization might have impacted on them (keepingeverything else constant, of course). But even in this scenario, some expla-nation is required as to why they affect the two halves of the population sodifferently.At the same time, an explanation is also required as to why only some governments are willing and able to tackle market inequality systematically via taxes and transferences and whether, when they do so, they are violating some distributional order of the universe, at the cost ofefficiency [=el ortograma no es un arcano, sino una idea legisladora compartida universalmente](see more on this below).For a long time analysts (especially those justifying higher levels of in-equality) were reluctant to study the share of the rich, the most likely driverof inequality. This was the trademark of the classical Washington Consen-sus. As John Kenneth Galbraith remarked: ‘Of all classes the rich are themost noticed and the least studied’ (Galbraith, 1977: 44). Fortunately, it isbeginning to look as though a certain cat is finally out of a certain bag.In fact, since the sum of all shares has to be equal to 100, and given thedistributional homogeneity ofand withinD5–D9, the share of decile 10alone could be a very simple but highly informative statistic forthe wholedistribution.
Junio 09, 2019, 13:47:51 pmNOSOTROS LO QUE PEDIMOS ES JUSTICIA.-
La usura inmobiliaria popularcapitalista es el gran problema del capitalismo. Es un problema de Justicia, pero no de justicia social, que también, sino de justicia propiamente capitalista —justicia conmutativa en las relaciones sinalagmáticas—, y empezamos a dudar muy seriamente de que el capitalismo pueda resolverlo sin mutar en neofeudalismo, para mayor gloria del sistema socialista.
El economista hoy:Las agencias advierten de un cambio de ciclo inmobiliario: las compraventas caen el 12%....mas abajoPiden un pacto de Estado de Vivienda para estabilizar el mercado...lo que hay que ver, no se que mas pacto de estado quieren para apuntalar los precios.https://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/9996778/07/19/Las-agencias-advierten-de-un-cambio-de-ciclo-inmobiliario-las-compraventas-caen-el-12.html
según los datos de la Federación Nacional de Asociaciones Inmobiliarias (FAI)
en caso de un gobierno PSOE-Podemos, el PSOE podrá desviar la culpa de la Rerrecesión/Repinchazo hacia el 'perroflautismo' de Podemos y salir indemne
Los 8 motivos que inquietan a los analistas de un Gobierno que incluya a Podemos[…]Sector inmobiliario. Por otra parte, el programa de Podemos afecta directamente al mercado inmobiliario, al poner coto a los alquileres que pueden fijar los propietarios, a los pisos turísticos y prometer acabar con las Socimis, al tiempo que pretende supeditar los desahucios a la existencia de una alternativa habitacional. Todo ello supone un golpe en la línea de flotación de estas empresas.[…]https://www.expansion.com/economia/politica/2019/07/23/5d361c84e5fdea771d8b465c.html
Pedro Sánchez ayer en el parlamento dijo:"Quiero una sociedad en el que los hombres y las mujeres sean iguales y estén en armonía con la naturaleza"
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