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Britain and Canada sign post-Brexit rollover trade dealBritain and Canada struck a rollover trade deal on Saturday to protect the flow of $27 billion-worth of goods and services between them after Brexit, and vowed to start talks on a bespoke agreement next year.
No se si has visto la refutación a lo que ha dicho Giuliani. Parece que no hay pruebas de casi nada, a no ser un numero nimio de votos con error o fraude como pasa siempre. Cuando un juez le dice a Guiliani en el juzgado si el esta diciendo que hay fraude, Giuliani dice que no. Los testigos están al final achantando todos. Ni hubo camión, ni impidieron ver los votos ni nada de eso.
First, it's far from certain that Joe Biden will be sworn in as president in January. As more and more evidence mounts of Democrat election fraud and vote-stealing, that prospect dims. The mere possibility that Donald Trump will continue as president is not even considered in Europe. The "ever so smart" European elite believe all they've been told by their fellow American globalists and from their consumption of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and CNN. Accordingly, they are clueless.
Cita de: Maloserá en Noviembre 21, 2020, 16:00:02 pmNo se si has visto la refutación a lo que ha dicho Giuliani. Parece que no hay pruebas de casi nada, a no ser un numero nimio de votos con error o fraude como pasa siempre. Cuando un juez le dice a Guiliani en el juzgado si el esta diciendo que hay fraude, Giuliani dice que no. Los testigos están al final achantando todos. Ni hubo camión, ni impidieron ver los votos ni nada de eso.No podemos saberlo. Si los media mienten, estamos "ciegos"...No está tan claro para los propios americanos... CitarFirst, it's far from certain that Joe Biden will be sworn in as president in January. As more and more evidence mounts of Democrat election fraud and vote-stealing, that prospect dims. The mere possibility that Donald Trump will continue as president is not even considered in Europe. The "ever so smart" European elite believe all they've been told by their fellow American globalists and from their consumption of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and CNN. Accordingly, they are clueless. https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/rude-awakening-coming-europeHabrá que "esperar"... ("Wait and see", you know.)
Fed Now Owns More Treasuries Than All Other Central Banks CombinedThe following chart, from Bianco Research and via Liz Ann Sonders, reveals that the Federal Reserve now owns more treasury debt than all foreign central banks combined for the first time.Why is this a big deal? The US dollar is the world’s reserve currency and virtually all official dollar reserves are held in the form of treasury debt by foreign central banks.In other words, the official reserve currency preference for US dollars by foreign central banks is fast becoming a sideshow compared to the mind boggling scale of quantitative easing from the Fed.It would be hard to overstate just how much the Fed has made its QE-Infinity program the linchpin for the treasury market and, by extension, the entire global financial system. It’s endless QE or bust from here on out.
G20 to discuss post-pandemic world, back debt reliefLeaders of the 20 biggest world economies (G20) will debate this weekend how to deal with the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic that has caused a global recession and how to manage the recovery once the coronavirus is under control.High on the agenda are purchases and global distribution of vaccines, drugs and tests for low-income countries that cannot afford such expenses themselves. The European Union will urge the G20 on Saturday to invest $4.5 billion to help.“The main theme will be to step up global cooperation to address the pandemic,” said a senior G20 official taking part in the preparations for the two-day summit, chaired by Saudi Arabia and held virtually because of the pandemic.In his opening remarks to G20 leaders, 84-year-old Saudi ruler King Salman bin Abdulaziz stressed the need for equitable access to the tools to combat COVID-19, including vaccines.“We must work to create the conditions for affordable and equitable access to these tools for all peoples. At the same time, we must prepare better for any future pandemic,” he told the group via video link.To prepare for the future, the EU will propose a treaty on pandemics.“An international treaty would help us respond more quickly and in a more coordinated manner,” the chairman of EU leaders Charles Michel will tell the G20 on Sunday.While the global economy is recovering from the depths of the crisis earlier this year, momentum is slowing in countries with resurging infection rates, the recovery is uneven and the pandemic is likely to leave deep scars, the International Monetary Fund said in a report for the G20 summit.Especially vulnerable are poor and highly indebted countries in the developing world, which are “on the precipice of financial ruin and escalating poverty, hunger and untold suffering”, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said on Friday.To address this, the G20 will endorse a plan to extend a debt servicing moratorium for developing countries by six months to mid-2021, with a possibility of a further extension, said a draft G20 communique seen by Reuters.European members of the G20 are likely to push for more.“More debt relief is needed,” Michel told reporters on Friday.Debt relief for Africa will be an important theme of the Italian presidency of the G20 in 2021.TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGEEuropean nations in the G20 will also seek fresh impetus to the stalled reform of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), hoping to capitalise on the upcoming change of U.S. administration.“We must also continue to support the global economy and reopen our economies and borders to facilitate the mobility of trade and people,” King Salman said.Earlier on Saturday, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Investment, Khalid al-Falih, said this year’s crisis had highlighted the importance of multilateral organisations.“The G20, its essence, is activating multilateralism, and of course this has taken a backseat over the last few years,” Falih said.Outgoing U.S. President Donald Trump favoured bilateral trade deals over working through international bodies.The change of U.S. leadership also raises hopes of a more concerted effort at G20 level to fight climate change.Following the example of the European Union, already half of the G20 members, including Japan, China, South Korea and South Africa, plan to become climate- or at least carbon-neutral by 2050 or soon after.Under Trump, the United States pulled out of the Paris Agreement on fighting climate change, but the decision is likely to be reversed by President-elect Joe Biden.“We expect, of course, new momentum from the new U.S. administration on this issue, thanks to the President-elect’s declaration that the U.S. would join the Paris Agreement once again,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said.To help finance the fight again climate change the EU will push for the G20 to agree on common global standards on what constitutes “green” investment.This would help attract the massive private investment needed because many investment funds are keen to invest in environmentally sustainable projects, but there is no agreed way of selecting them. The EU is already working on such standards to have them in place by 2022.
Manu,No se si has visto la refutación a lo que ha dicho Giuliani. Parece que no hay pruebas de casi nada, a no ser un numero nimio de votos con error o fraude como pasa siempre. Cuando un juez le dice a Guiliani en el juzgado si el esta diciendo que hay fraude, Giuliani dice que no. Los testigos están al final achantando todos. Ni hubo camión, ni impidieron ver los votos ni nada de eso.Yo veo la dirección de todo esto exactamente al revés. Trump ha estado meses diciendo que va a haber fraude para deslegitimizar su mas que posible derrota. La Fox y la prensa de Murdoch (que es totalmente establishment) le han dado bola siempre. El dice que los mass media estan contra el cuando no es así. Ahora pierde y dice... lo veis, fraude. Muchos lo creen. La Fox y breitbart dicen que la gente cree que hay fraude generalizado, por eso hay que investigar. Claro que hay sospecha, porque Fox y New york post y Breitbart llevais en eso seis meses... Un gobernador republicano dice que se recuenten todos los votos manualmente, porque la diferencia es menor al 0.5%. Vuelve a ganar Biden. Trump llama a dos electores republicanos de Michigan .. al salir de la reunion los dos dicen que no van a cambiar el voto popular. Estan ofreciendo recompensas con dinero para el que lleve pruebas de fraude. Y los bufetes de abogado no se atreven a ir al juzgado porque las reclamaciones son obviamente absurdas. Tucker Carlson en la Fox tiene que pedir perdon por haber dicho que un muerto habia votado. Donde está libertad digital informando a sus lectores de esto?Pero la duda queda, Trump se siente mejor al no ser un 'loser' como le encanta repetir insultando a otros, y posiblemente se vuelva a presentar como el 'lider' de los descamisados y robados republicanos. Con el cristo economico que viene, puede que gane. Yo veo triste es que Giuliani haya acabado así. Y libertad digital tambien. Y que se les de credibilidad. Y me pasa como a Wanderer, tampoco soporto a la mayoria de los politicos republicanos ni a lo que se ha dedicado la izquierda desde hace una decada o así. Y que han jugado sucio seguro. Como todos. Son politicos. Pero si quieres ver fraude electoral, con estudiar la supresión de votos a negros, o el valor del voto por estado para el senado, de como los republicanos ganan las elecciones sin ganar el voto popular y por que no se cambia eso (pista - porque el cambio de una cosa depende del de la otra) ... toda la evidencia va en la otra dirección. Los democratas han sido el partido mas votado en 5 de las ultimas 6 elecciones. Y sin embargo, los democratas han elegido a su presidente tres veces, y los democratas tres. Por que no escriben de eso que sí es tremendo y está probado ... tanto libertad digital como Giuliani.. Defender a un personaje como Trump debe ser difícil. Pero claro, no puedes morder la mano que te da de comer en el caso de Giuliani. LD ha visto desde hace algun tiempo que los que le mantienen son un tipo de lectores, y les da lo que quieren. Intereses tenemos todos. En el caso de Giuliani me da igual. En el caso de LD es una pena. En cuanto al decline de occidente. 'Ya saben que...' jejeje. No. Eso no lo sabemos. Ni tu, ni yo. Ni cuando ni donde. Ni siquiera si va a ocurrir se puede saber con seguridad. Afirmar que la civilización occidental esta en lento pero seguro colapso es una petición de principio. Al final cuando el sol estalle seguro que es el final. Pero no es esto de lo que estamos hablando.Spengler habló de la decadencia de occidente en 1918. Le puso fecha en 2000. Unos cachondos han usado ideas de Spengler en un programa de ordenador que calcula el futuro de la sociedad occidental hasta 2603 donde llega el fin del mundohttp://www.benespen.com/spenglers-future
The Impact of the New Asian Trade Mega-Deal on the European UnionAlthough the economic implications of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for the EU are modest, the geopolitical and strategic implications are not. With the arrival of a new US administration and the central role of China in the bloc, the EU needs to outline an Asian commercial strategy that reconciles the importance of China and the transatlantic relationship.The 15 November agreement to form the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the 10 members of ASEAN and Australia, China, Japan, Korea and New Zealand has only modest immediate economic effects for the European Union. However, with China playing a central role in the new arrangement, the long-term strategic and geopolitical implications are major. Europeans tend to look inwards and when they look outwards tend to look mainly west, riveted, for example, by the recent US elections. But, increasingly, most economic activity, most economic growth and some of the more significant geopolitical shifts are occurring in the east.EconomicsViewed from the standpoint of European firms, RCEP is best understood as a free trade agreement between three manufacturing powerhouses – China, Japan and the Republic of Korea– and their joint outreach towards a vast periphery in Asia. For example under RCEP, China commits to eliminate tariffs on 86% of Japan’s exports, including auto parts. The three nations together generated $5.3 trillion of value added in manufacturing in 2019, over $1 trillion more than the United States and the EU combined. In addition to the China/Japan/Korea population of 1.6 billion, RCEP enables outreach to 675 million more people in ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, a population larger than that of the European Union. In this region, the Asia Pacific, GDP is projected by the World Bank to grow at two to three times the rate in Europe and the United States over the next ten years. India, which was until recently the world’s fastest growing large economy, dropped out of RCEP last year, mainly out of concern about Chinese competition in manufacturing and Australian and South-East Asian competition in agriculture, but it is not impossible that it will rejoin at some future date.Harmonisation of rules of origin across the many preceding trade agreements among the 15 signatories of RCEP is a crucial aspect of the new arrangement. Common and simplified rules of origin are designed to facilitate the integration of regional value chains. Given the differences in resource endowments across the group and large gaps in wages and incomes – differences which are far larger than those in the EU and the US-Mexico-Canada agreement (USMCA) – there will be considerable opportunity to enhance efficiency and specialise along lines of comparative advantage. As my colleague Alicia Garcia Herrero has argued, though China and Japan will play a central role as the biggest manufacturing centres by far, the large population and low wage nations in South East Asia will likely see an enhanced role in global value chains.The direct economic effects of RCEP on the European economy are likely to be small – though they are certainly not negligible – and will be felt only gradually. With the China/Japan/Korea group a major exception, the agreement entails only limited trade liberalisation since numerous trade agreements exist already among the signatories. Agriculture is only modestly affected by the deal and the tariff reductions in manufacturing are subject to many exceptions, with detailed country schedules that carve out sensitive sectors. Moreover, the implementation period is unusually long for an agreement of this kind, extending to 20 years. Customs and other types of trade-enhancing regulatory reform provisions will help accelerate the region’s integration, but the deal will do little to free trade in services, where only selected sectors will benefit. There are no provisions for environmental and labour standards, which are always demanded in negotiations involving the EU and US. The agreement is subject to a ratification process, which – if experience is a guide – will turn out to be arduous and drawn out in several instances, especially given the diffidence of many of the RCEP members to China. It must be noted, however, that ASEAN members, which were the originators of the RCEP idea about a decade ago, have a long history of gradually extending and deepening their trade agreement in an evolutionary process, and RCEP may prove to be a dynamic process, not only a one-time deal.The greatest worry for the EU is displacement of its exports to RCEP members due to the preference margins accorded to the other signatories, known in economic jargon as trade diversion. The table below shows that the EU has important trade agreements in force in Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, indicating that exports to those countries are unlikely to be displaced. However, of the EU’s total exports to RCEP in 2019, most are not covered by trade agreements, including to China, the EU’s second largest export destination, where the applied trade-weighted tariff was 9.15% in 2017 (since reduced by about 2%). Other significant markets include Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, where the EU faces high tariffs, and Australia, where the EU faces lower tariffs. Considering that the EU’s exports to China are composed mainly of machinery and other manufactures, some displacement of exports by Japan and South Korea on the Chinese markets can be expected.Other effects on the European economy should not be overlooked. They come in three forms:-Consumers and the many firms dependent on imports of intermediate inputs from RCEP are likely to benefit from lower prices, reflecting the boost to efficiency in value chains based in the region;-Exporters to RCEP will benefit at the margin from the region’s higher income and – most likely – faster sustained growth;-Firms competing with RCEP, whether in Europe or on third markets, will be put at some disadvantage, especially if they are not drawing benefits from the region’s integrated value chains.Analysts have tried to evaluate the net impact of these various effects using sophisticated models, but their conclusions are based on many assumptions and must be taken with a grain of salt. The conclusion of the most widely cited study (Petri and Plummer, 2020), for example, indicates that the EU could be a small net gainer from RCEP, about 0.1% of GDP. While detailed calculations are not reported, it is likely that the net gain is due mainly to lower prices of imports from RCEP, which more than offset the effect of trade diversion. One should bear in mind that this is an aggregate effect, and that individual firms may see significant losses if they are displaced in important markets such as China, and that this may well happen.GeopoliticsThe more important implications of the RCEP deal are geopolitical. Many observers have noted that, despite American opposition, China’s trade and inward foreign direct investment have continued to thrive in recent years. The RCEP deals shows quite conclusively that the Trump Administration’s strategy to isolate China and to cut it off from global value chains has failed. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan are US allies who harbour deep concerns about China’s rising influence in the region. However, by joining RCEP, they signal that they do not want to, and cannot, sever their economic ties with China, and, indeed, that they see these ties growing stronger. China’s neighbours can hardly ignore the fact that China’s manufacturing sector is today almost twice as big as that of the US and growing about twice as fast.Following the Trump Administration’s abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Japan is now placed at the centre of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), whose membership overlaps with RCEP but also includes Canada, Mexico and several economies in Latin America. Among the countries that have expressed an interest in joining CPTPP is China, although that is a long shot, since the reforms required in China in relation to the CPTPP as currently structured would be far-reaching compared to RCEP (1). It is worth noting that Japan has played its trade cards well. Japan joined RCEP not long after it concluded a trade mini-deal with the United States, and even as it sided with the EU and the US in calling for World Trade Organisation reforms that address issues including industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprise trade, targeting China.President-elect Biden has promised to be tough on China, but it is unclear at this stage what that means and what shape his Asian strategy will take. Surely, the arrival of RCEP will increase the likelihood of the United States resurrecting the TPP in the shape of a modified CPTPP. Either way, Biden is unlikely to continue Trump’s approach of outright confrontation with China on all fronts (trade, technology, people movement, diplomatic, military). That approach does not work, as the recent trade and investment data and the RCEP deal show. Nor is breaking with China consistent with Biden’s intention to deal with the climate emergency and to restore the US position in multilateral institutions.More important still, as Henry Kissinger and others have argued recently, hostility between the great powers has reached dangerous levels. Competition between China and the US is one thing, enmity is another. Enmity may, sooner or later, lead to war in Asia – however unintended that outcome might be.Policy optionsAt the technical level of trade negotiations, the RCEP deal and the arrival of a new US Administration should prompt the EU to define a new Asian commercial strategy. Such a course should aim to preserve its transatlantic alliance but also reflect China’s rising importance in the region and the integration of value chains centred on China, Japan and South Korea.Such a strategy should consider one of three broad non-exclusive options or a combination of them:-Closer ties with China, the most challenging but also potentially the most beneficial course;-Joining CPTPP and-Acceleration of bilateral agreements elsewhere in Asia.Taken in reverse order, acceleration of bilateral agreements would require reviving those on hold with Malaysia and Thailand (see Table 1) and making progress in negotiations with Indonesia and the Philippines, and dealing with highly sensitive agriculture issues in those with Australia and New Zealand. This is the business as usual course, but one pursued with greater alacrity.Joining CPTPP is potentially a promising option for the EU given the deal’s comprehensive and ambitious provisions. CPTPP already spans Asia and the Americas, and could cover Europe as well. The fact that the EU already has trade agreements with the largest members, including Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Korea and Vietnam, could make negotiations easier, but also yield relatively limited new trade liberalisation. The UK has already expressed an interest in joining CPTPP.The hole in the EU’s trade policy doughnut is China, where the risk of trade diversion due to RCEP is also greatest. The EU is China’s largest trading partner, while China is the EU’s second largest export market and the fastest growing. Progress on trade with China would require accelerating negotiations on the Investment Agreement with China that has been under negotiation since 2014 and has proven highly problematic due to a combination of stringent demands from the EU and China’s unwillingness to budge on important market-access issues. But if a way were found to break the impasse, an agreement on investment could pave the way towards a trade agreement. After all, if Japan, South Korea and Switzerland – high-income industrial economies – can strike limited free trade deals with China, imagining one between China and the EU is not impossible.If the EU decides to pursue the China option, it should learn from Japan’s adept economic diplomacy, which has so far navigated successfully between China and the United States, striking trade deals with both (and with the EU) while retaining its close security alliance and trade ties with the United States. In the EU’s case, that course is unlikely to take the form of a major deal with the US along the lines of the defunct Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, but rather of a series of limited agreements such as on digital trade.As Biden takes office, the dangerously strained relations between China and the United States need urgent attention, and the EU is not powerless to influence the outcome with its words and actions. The EU has no interest in a generations-long conflict between the two superpowers, which could lead to the outbreak of war in the Pacific, and nor does the EU see China as an enemy. Closer economic ties between the EU and China will be conditional on China’s efforts to limit the trade distortions caused by its state-dependent competitive model. As Japan has showed in Asia, such a stance is not inconsistent with resisting China’s human-rights infractions and countering its growing economic influence in the near abroad.A clear European position that it intends to maintain and strengthen its economic relationship with China under stringent conditions would deliver an important message to China. It would also strengthen the resolve of the many internationalists likely to hold key positions in the Biden team and of those in the US Congress who want to adopt a more constructive approach towards China. This is a stance that – judging by his long involvement in foreign relations and with China – the President-elect would be inclined towards anyway, despite the election rhetoric.The signing of the RCEP mega-trade deal does not point unequivocally to any one of the EU’s three strategic options outlined here. But, together with the arrival of a new US Administration, it does call on the EU to clarify its Asian commercial strategy soon.
‘I don’t think the PM knows’: Boris Johnson and the Brexit endgameAt 9pm on Wednesday November 11, a grey-faced Boris Johnson scurried past staffers in 10 Downing Street and into the office of David Frost, the man he has entrusted with trying to secure a trade deal with the EU. “The PM knew that David was unhappy — he thought he might resign,” says one of Mr Johnson’s aides. The Vote Leave group was breaking up. The Brexit hardliners who campaigned to take Britain out of the EU in 2016 and now sustained the prime minister in office had fallen out of favour. Dominic Cummings, the iconoclastic chief adviser, was among those ousted. A few minutes later, a relieved Mr Johnson returned to tell staff that Lord Frost, his pro-Brexit chief Europe adviser since July 2019, would not be walking out in sympathy.Lord Frost, ennobled by Mr Johnson in June in recognition of his loyalty and tenacious negotiating style, tells colleagues he never intended to quit at such a key moment in trade talks and that the tactics have not changed. But the chaotic events of recent days in Downing Street have compounded a sense of bewilderment in European capitals, as diplomats try to work out what it all means for trade talks that are entering the endgame.Are Mr Johnson and Lord Frost now ready to make compromises in the next few days to secure a trade deal with the EU — without having Mr Cummings’ favourite refrain “fuck ’em” ringing in their ears? Or will they double down to prove to Eurosceptics they are willing to embrace the hardest of all hard Brexits in the name of national sovereignty?One senior official says: “To tell you the truth, we don’t know — and frankly, I don’t think the PM knows either.”Talks are bogged down on questions of access to British fishing grounds, rules to maintain fair competition between the two sides and an enforcement mechanism for the deal. All impact on Mr Johnson’s quest to regain unfettered national sovereignty. With the transition period ending on December 31, British ministers are confident Mr Johnson will opt for a deal. But EU negotiators have come away from talks over the past few days doubting whether that decision has really yet been taken.“It’s obvious there should be an agreement,” says one senior EU diplomat, before noting quickly that Mr Johnson does not always do what is obvious.Johnson’s calculation Regardless of the eventual outcome, one thing is clear: the prime minister has already opted for what amounts to a hard Brexit. In his determination to break free of Brussels’ rules, he set out from the beginning to negotiate a standard free trade agreement, accepting that this would mean new frictions for trade in goods, and lost opportunities for providers of services.Some Brexiters initially claimed the UK could remain in the EU single market, but they abandoned that idea when it became clear it would require the government to abide by Brussels rules. Theresa May split the difference in her July 2018 Chequers plan, an attempt to maintain access to the single market with minimal border friction under a “common rule book”; it was rejected by Eurosceptics as a capitulation and by EU leaders who saw it as “cherry picking”. When Mr Johnson became prime minister in July 2019 he opted for a much cleaner break.Business is already facing a mass of red tape on January 1 by virtue of Mr Johnson’s decision to leave the single market and customs union; that will still happen regardless of whether there is a trade deal.A deal would provide for tariff-free trade on goods that qualify as EU or UK made, helping cushion the blow for sensitive sectors including automotive and agriculture. It would also include other measures to help trade flow — recognition of truckers’ permits for example. Most trade experts agree it would be better than nothing.Ivan Rogers, Britain’s former ambassador to the EU, has long argued that “the delta” between leaving with a thin goods-only deal and leaving without a deal was so modest that Mr Johnson might find it politically easier to make a clean break with the EU, blaming intransigent Europeans for the chaos that looms in any event on January 1.The most recent UK government estimates reckoned the UK would miss out on 4.9 per cent of future income over 15 years if it left the bloc with the kind of basic trade deal under discussion. Under a no-deal scenario, that hit would increase to 7.7 per cent over the same period, compared with staying in the EU. That difference is significant but perhaps not a clinching argument for Mr Johnson.But other factors will weigh heavily on the prime minister. If he does not secure a deal — and Britain leaves on what he euphemistically calls “Australian” or World Trade Organization terms — it will not be the end of the story. Even Australia on the other side of the globe is negotiating a trade deal with Brussels; Britain at some point will want one too. Rather than turning a page on Brexit, the issue would dog his premiership.Failure to secure a trade deal would create new tensions in Northern Ireland — which will remain covered by EU customs rules as part of the divorce deal Mr Johnson struck with the EU last year. Mr Johnson has threatened to renege on those commitments over fears about the impact of a trade border in the Irish Sea. But US president-elect Joe Biden twice warned Mr Johnson in a phone call this month not to let Brexit imperil the peace process in the region.Gordon Brown, former prime minister, wondered this month if Mr Johnson really wanted to be “at war” with the EU and the US at the start of 2021, just when “Global Britain” takes over as head of the G7 and hosts the COP26 UN climate change conference. Trampling over international treaties and antagonising allies would be sharply at odds with the new Biden-led era.Then there is the future unity of the UK. Successive opinion polls show that Scotland — which voted 62-38 to remain in the EU — now favours independence, with Brexit fuelling the grievance towards Mr Johnson and the government in Westminster. Michael Gove, Mr Johnson’s cabinet colleague, has been urging him to agree a deal if possible.Finally there is the issue of competence. Mr Johnson has at times been overwhelmed during the Covid-19 crisis; failing to agree a trade deal, which Eurosceptics have claimed would be “the easiest in the world”, in the midst of a global pandemic would be a further blow to his chaotic premiership. The prime minister himself said in February that it was “very unlikely” that the talks with Brussels would not succeed.“He needs a victory,” admits one Brexiter close to the prime minister.On the groundWith less than six weeks to go until Britain’s transition period ends, some business leaders and hauliers have given up waiting for Mr Johnson to make up his mind and are preparing for major disruption. In Whitehall, preparations have included reconstituting the food industry resilience forum, which includes logisticians, port operators, hauliers and supermarket chains, with twice weekly calls to ensure food supplies are maintained if the ports become clogged. Fears that perishable food could run short have resurfaced.Richard Burnett, head of the Road Haulage Association, says hauliers are now “resigned” to the fact that there would be disruptions on January 1 and would just have to manage as best they can.Marc Payne, managing director of Plymouth-based Armoric Freight International, says that in the event of a ‘no deal’, where the EU and UK failed to recognise each other’s trucking permits, it is unclear whether he would get sufficient permits to drive into the EU.The imposition of customs and veterinary checks on goods crossing the Channel will soon become a fact of life, complete with the need for documentation, new arrangements for paying VAT, export authorisation numbers and, inevitably, truck queues. As new barriers appear, old freedoms will be lost. UK architects, doctors and other experts from regulated professions will no longer have automatic recognition of their qualifications across Europe — instead they will have to seek permission to work from authorities in individual EU countries. UK nationals will no longer have the same freedom of movement rights within the EU — relying instead on a visa-waiver programme that will allow them to spend up to 90 days in any 180-day period in the union’s border-free Schengen zone. Household animals will also lose the pet passport — their equivalent of EU citizenship.Luisa Santos, chair of the EU-UK task force at employers’ organisation BusinessEurope, says disruption was inevitable but that no company could fully prepare for a no-deal outcome, with the potential jump in tariffs from zero to as much as 40 per cent for trade in goods.In addition to mitigating the blow of Brexit, a deal would be a platform that would allow for the relationship to deepen over time. “It will allow for us to continue to talk,” she says. “We are not going to be able to do everything in this deal.”Given the economic and political self-harm that a “no deal” would inflict on Britain, it is perhaps a tribute to Lord Frost’s negotiating skills — and a reflection of Mr Johnson’s unpredictable style — that the EU27 has been left guessing until the last minute about the prime minister’s real intentions.There is genuine nervousness on both sides of the negotiating table about what happens next, although both sides still hope to reach an agreement next week.Manfred Weber, head of the European Parliament’s large centre-right grouping, warned on Thursday that the talks were running “out of time” given the need for any agreement to be ratified by the end of the year. Businesses around the continent are holding their breath.
[...] He visto el post siguiente mientras escribía éste, Sudden. Te refieres a comprobar si la traducción es correcta? Puedo hacer un muestreo aquí y allá. Pero una hora y pico de Giuliani entera solo me lo trago como penitencia en Enero, si no tengo razón con que Biden será presidente. En mi pueblo los perdedores tenían que pasar por debajo del futbolín...
Hemos creado, creo que la más extensa e inclusiva organización de fraude electoral en la historia de la política americana.
En declaraciones a CNN durante una conferencia sobre la crisis climática a principios de este año, Harris dijo que, aunque disfruta de la hamburguesa con queso ocasionalmente, el gobierno de Estados Unidos necesita crear incentivos para que sus ciudadanos tomen decisiones de consumo más respetuosas con el medio ambiente. “Me encanta una hamburguesas con queso de vez en cuando” , dijo. “Pero debemos crear incentivos para que comamos de manera saludable, moderada y que seamos informados sobre los efectos de nuestros hábitos alimenticios en el medio ambiente".