Hablemos de Europa

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https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/06/13/whats-impact-immigration-according-europeans-and-a

What’s the impact of immigration, according to Europeans and Americans?

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-budget/italy-proposes-tax-on-savings-hidden-in-safety-deposit-boxes-idUSKCN1TD0G5

Italy proposes tax on savings hidden in safety deposit boxes

MILAN (Reuters) - Italy’s government may tax cash and other valuables locked away in safety deposit boxes held with banks, Italian newspapers said on Wednesday, quoting Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini.

The dailies quoted Salvini as telling a late-night TV program on Tuesday that he had been advised that safety deposit boxes in Italy held assets worth hundreds of billions of euros.

“Money that is substantially hidden,” he said, suggesting that deposit boxes were a way of hiding income and assets from the tax authorities.

Those who voluntarily declared their deposit-box holdings would be taxed at a low rate of about 15 percent, he added.

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https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/italy-parallel-payments-system-versus-greece-plan-by-yanis-varoufakis-2019-06

Fiscal Money Can Make or Break the Euro
Jun 17, 2019 YANIS VAROUFAKIS


The parallel payment system that Greece's government proposed in 2015 would have bolstered the eurozone. By contrast, the Italian government's planned "mini-Treasury bills" would lead to the single currency's demise.

ATHENS – It’s a curious feeling to watch your plan being deployed to do the opposite of what you intended. And that’s the feeling I’ve had since learning that Italy’s government is planning a variant of the fiscal money that I proposed for Greece in 2015.


My idea was to establish a tax-backed digital payment system to create fiscal space in eurozone countries that needed it, like Greece and Italy. The Italian plan, by contrast, would use a parallel payment system to break up the eurozone.

Under my proposal, each tax file number, belonging to individuals or firms, would be automatically provided with a Treasury Account (TA) and a PIN number with which to transfer funds from one TA to another, or back to the state.

One way TAs would be credited was by paying arrears into them. Taxpayers owed money by the state could opt for part or all of those arrears to be paid into their TA immediately, instead of waiting for months to be paid normally. That way, multiple arrears could be eliminated at once, thus liberating liquidity across the economy.

For example, suppose Company A is owed €1 million ($1.1 million) by the state, while owing €30,000 to an employee and another €500,000 to Company B. Suppose also that the employee and Company B owe, respectively, €10,000 and €200,000 in taxes to the state. If the €1 million is credited by the state to Company A’s TA, and Company A pays the employee and Company B via the system, the latter will be able to settle their tax arrears. At least €740,000 in arrears will have been eliminated in one fell swoop.

Individuals or firms could also acquire TA credits by purchasing them directly, via web-banking, from the state. The state would make it worth their while by offering buyers significant tax discounts (a €1 credit purchased today could extinguish taxes of, say, €1.10 a year from now). In essence, a new dis-intermediated (middlemen-free) public debt market would emerge, allowing the state to borrow small, medium, and large sums from the private sector in exchange for tax discounts.

When I first discussed the idea, staunch defenders of the status quo immediately challenged the legality of the proposed system, arguing that it violated the treaties establishing the euro as the sole legal tender. Expert advice that I had received, however, indicated that the system passed legal muster. A eurozone member state’s treasury has the authority to issue debt instruments at will, and to accept them in lieu of taxes. It is also perfectly legal for private entities to trade among themselves in any token they choose (say, frequent flier miles). The line of illegality would be crossed only if the government compelled vendors to accept the digital credits as payment – something I never intended.

An altogether different reaction to my proposal came from those who wanted to end the euro as a single currency, but not necessarily as a common currency. A former chief economist of a major European bank looked at my proposals and recognized in them his own scheme for a parallel currency that Italy, Greece, and other distressed eurozone members would use to pay salaries and pensions. I replied that a parallel currency was both undesirable and pointless, as it would lead to a sharp devaluation of the new national currency, in which most people would be paid, while private and public debts would remain euro-denominated. That would be a recipe for serial, accelerating insolvencies, inevitably leading to the eurozone’s demise.

Then there were those who argued that an announcement of any parallel payment system would trigger a bank run and capital flight, thus pushing the country surreptitiously out of the eurozone, regardless of its intentions. This conjecture contains an important truth: the payment system I proposed would reduce the costs of a euro exit by clearing a rocky but navigable path to a new national currency.

Indeed, if my parallel, euro-denominated system had been operational in June 2015, when the European Central Bank closed down Greece’s banks to blackmail its people and government into accepting the third bailout loan, two outcomes would have been possible. First, transactions would have shifted massively from the banking system to our TA-based public payment system, thus reducing substantially the ECB’s leverage. Second, it would be common knowledge that, at the push of a button, the government could convert the new euro-denominated payment system into a new currency.

Would such a system have triggered a redenomination from the euro to the drachma? Or would it have given pause to the troika of Greece’s lenders (the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the ECB), causing them to think twice before they closed down Greece’s banks and issued their Grexit threats?

The answer depends on the politics of both sides. In this sense, the parallel payment system is neutral: it can be used to bolster the eurozone just as effectively as it can be deployed to break it up.

In our case, the idea was to keep Greece viably within the eurozone by using the additional bargaining power afforded by the parallel payment system to negotiate the deep debt restructuring needed to revive economic growth and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. As long as our creditors saw that our redenomination costs were lowered, while our demands for debt restructuring were sensible, they would think twice before threatening us with Grexit. Joint action by the ECB and my ministry would allow the parallel system to be portrayed as a new pillar of the euro, thus quashing any financial panic. By ending the popular association of the euro with permanent stagnation, the parallel system would be the single currency’s friend.

This brings us to Italy. There are two technical differences between the system I designed and Italy’s planned mini-Treasury bills (or mini-BOTs). First, mini-BOTs will be printed on paper, something I opposed, to avoid a grey market. Our total supply of digital credits would have been managed by a distributed ledger, to ensure full transparency and prevent the inflationary overproduction of credits. Second, the mini-BOTs will be interest-free, perpetual bonds, without future tax discounts.

But the real difference between the Italian scheme and mine remains political. The parallel payment system I proposed was designed to use the reality of lower eurozone exit costs to create new fiscal space and help civilize the monetary union in the process. Italy’s system is the first step toward a parallel currency by which to bring about the eurozone’s end.

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https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ecb-policy-sources-exclusive/exclusive-left-in-the-dark-ecb-policymakers-divided-on-stimulus-options-idUKKCN1TJ2TG

SINTRA, Portugal (Reuters) - European Central Bank policymakers were divided on Tuesday, with some feeling powerless, after President Mario Draghi hinted at new stimulus measures that had yet to be discussed by the ECB’s Governing Council.

Draghi told an ECB conference the central bank would ease policy again if inflation fails to accelerate, saying that fresh bond purchases, rate cuts or changes to the ECB’s policy guidance had all been “raised and discussed” at a meeting of the Council less than two weeks ago.

The message depressed the euro and bond yields, in the process angering U.S. President Donald Trump, who accused Draghi of seeking an unfair trade advantage by devaluing the euro.

But conversations with six sources on the sidelines of the ECB’s annual symposium in Sintra, Portugal, showed that rate-setters had not expected such a strong message and that there was no consensus on the path ahead.

The sources, who have direct knowledge of the situation, said the possibility of a rate cut or fresh asset buys had been mentioned last month only in passing and there had been no substantive discussion as the focus had been on a fresh package of loans.

Markets were unimpressed with Draghi’s message after the June rate meeting, however.

A further escalation of the global trade war since then and a string of bad economic indicators also suggested that many of the risks were already materialising, forcing Draghi to strengthen his message, one of the sources said.

CLEAR SHIFT

Indeed, speaking on Tuesday, Draghi said more stimulus would come if there were no improvement, a marked shift from the June message that the ECB would act in the event of “adverse contingencies”.

The sources said policymakers were concerned that Draghi was flagging his measures so strongly to markets as a ‘fait accompli’ that there would be no chance for them to disagree with them in at the next policy meeting on July 25.

But they added that, with a global trade war escalating and financial worries around Italy already high, there was little appetite for a fight in July.

Several added that very little new information will come to light before the next rate meeting, so it would be difficult to justify coming to a different policy conclusion than in June.

Nevertheless, they said the debate about which measures might be implemented, when and in what order was still wide open. An ECB spokesman declined to comment.

Some policymakers favour a resumption of the ECB’s 2.6 trillion euro bond purchase programme, others prefer a simple reinforcement to the ECB’s pledge not to raise rates for a long time and some lean towards rate cuts, the sources said.

POLICY MESSAGE FIRST?

Several saw a change to the ECB’s policy message as the first port of call.

This could mean dropping a reference to when rates might rise, simply saying they would stay at present – or potentially lower – levels until specific economic conditions including a level of inflation were met, two of the sources said.

This would allow the ECB to maintain guidance for a longer period, not having to push back the timing of rate lift-off over and over again.

Others favoured resuming purchases of sovereign bonds on the grounds that it would lower borrowing costs for governments, indirectly creating fiscal space for them to react to the economic downturn.

This posed some issues, however. After buying 2.6 trillion euros’ (£2.3 trillion) worth of bonds between 2014 and 2018, the ECB is already close to owning a third of the public debt of countries such as Portugal and Germany – a threshold it has pledged not to breach so as not to constitute a blocking minority in any debt restructuring.

Draghi said the ECB would make full use of its flexibility, and some sources said this so called “issuer limit” could be disposed of or circumvented if necessary.

A handful of sources were supportive of a rate cut, although this would be made more complicated by the possible need to mitigate the side effect on banks of deeply negative rates through exemptions.

This so-called tiered system, where banks pay a reduced penalty rate on a portion of their excess reserves, has met with opposition from large parts of the Governing Council due to its complexity.

One source also pointed out that it risked creating arbitrage opportunities for some banks when taken in combination with ECB’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operation (TLTRO III), in which banks are paid to borrow from the ECB provided that they lend that cash on to households and firms.

A minority thought the ECB should refrain from acting altogether unless economic data deteriorated significantly and inflation expectations fell further away from the ECB’s target.

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https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-top-jobs-its-gonna-get-ugly/

EU top jobs: It’s gonna get ugly
Leaders under pressure to get down to business at summit.


As the European Council convenes Thursday to try to select a new slate of EU leaders, one thing is clear: Nobody has the upper hand.

In years past, the center-right European People’s Party was strong enough in the Council and the European Parliament to muscle in many of its candidates. This time around, the political divisions are stark. Power in the Council is split roughly into quarters — between the EPP, Socialists, Liberals and none of the above.

What makes the political math so ugly is that while no single political force can dominate the discussion, there’s no shortage of veto points. Both the EPP and the new alliance between the Liberals and French President Emmanuel Macron control enough votes in the Council to block its most important decision: the appointment of a new European Commission president.

“I’ve never before seen the political families playing such a strong role within the Council,” said Reinhard Bütikofer, the co-president of the European Greens party.

In theory, even the countries whose representatives in the Council don’t belong to any of the major political families — Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland — could wield a veto, in the unlikely case that they were willing to work together.


To send a nomination to the European Parliament for approval requires a “reinforced qualified majority” in the Council — meaning the consent of at least 21 of 28 EU countries, comprising 65 percent or more of the bloc’s population.

Things are no less unsettled in Parliament. The institution’s leaders have insisted that the Commission president be a Spitzenkandidat — or one of the “lead candidates” put forward for the European Parliament election by the major political groups. But they haven’t been able to agree on which one  — German MEP Manfred Weber for the conservatives; Commission First Vice President Frans Timmermans for the Socialists; and Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager for the Liberals.

That leaves the Council in a strong position to eliminate all three at Thursday’s summit, effectively setting the search back to square one.

The result is a deeply unsettled, potentially volatile selection process that could drag on through the summer or beyond, even as European Council President Donald Tusk said he is still hoping to get a deal by the end of this month.

Franco-German stumble
When it comes to what Tusk and other Brussels insiders are calling Plan B — choosing a Commission president from a small pool of eligible and interested prospects — nothing gets easier.

Germany and France, the EU’s big two, have traditionally spearheaded the decision-making process, and the support of Chancellor Angela Merkel and Macron is widely regarded as a prerequisite for any deal.

Merkel, however, is now serving her last term, and her influence so far has been undercut by her need to show allegiance to Weber, both as a German and member of her EPP family. Meanwhile, Macron has stumbled in his initial efforts to upend the EU establishment, with Nathalie Loiseau, his choice to lead the new centrist-liberal group in Parliament, forced to withdraw from contention after she angered the group's rank-and-fil.

Even if Germany and France remain the most influential voices, the stakes of the leadership talks are so high that the interests and views of all EU countries must be taken into consideration — including the outliers that under other circumstances might be more easily pressured into accepting a plan.

While the U.K., which is consumed by Brexit, has pledged to play a constructive role, and essentially go along with whatever majority decision is reached within the Council, it is unclear a consensus will be reached. It is also unclear if the new British prime minister, who could take office before the EU deliberations are complete, will take the same approach as Theresa May.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose Fidesz party has been suspended from the EPP, has voiced loud opposition to Weber, his one-time ally. Meanwhile, Poland has signaled it would never accept the selection of Timmermans, who has led the EU’s efforts to punish Warsaw over alleged rule-of-law violations. The Central European Visegrad Four group, which also includes the Czech Republic and Slovakia, has indicated it could support the EU's Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, as a compromise candidate for Commission president.

For some countries, like Italy, the leadership negotiations are also an opportunity to simultaneously press other interests. Italy is set to lose the three top EU jobs that it currently holds — the high representative for foreign affairs, Parliament president and president of the European Central Bank.


The current populist, Euroskeptic government in Rome makes it unlikely Italy will come away with a big prize. Still, Italian officials are working on two fronts — in the hopes of securing at least one prominent job, but also avoiding a Commission-imposed disciplinary procedure for running an excessive budget deficit.

Diplomats said it is unclear whom Italy would support for the EU’s top jobs, but that it is clear who could never win Rome’s backing: notably the Belgian MEP and former Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who is aiming to become Parliament president.

Verhofstadt drew Italy’s ire by calling Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte a “puppet” of the country’s populist deputy prime ministers, Matteo Salvini of the League and Luigi Di Maio of the 5Star Movement.

In any case, the deficit issue seems to be Rome’s higher priority. Italian media reported that Conte used a summit of Southern European countries, the so-called Club Med, in Malta on Friday to try to strike a deal with France: offering to back a French candidate for president of the European Central Bank in exchange for help from Paris in preventing the deficit procedure.

Diplomats from both countries told POLITICO they have no indication of such a request.

Time pressure
The Council is also facing extraordinary pressure to come to an agreement on the top jobs before the new Parliament sits for its first plenary session in Strasbourg on July 2 — a fact that many EU leaders, including Merkel, only seemed to fully digest in recent days.

The Parliament is obligated to select its president, and if the Council has not settled on its broader package by then, the legislature’s decision will severely restrict EU leaders’ options, particularly in terms of whom it chooses to succeed Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker.

The EU treaties require the Council to take into account the Parliament election result, but also to seek balance among political parties, geography and demography. The leaders have also said they want to improve gender parity in the EU’s upper ranks, meaning their ideal scenario would place women in two of the top four posts.

Adding even more complexity to the process is a simultaneous effort in Parliament by the three big party alliances, along with the Greens, to negotiate a joint policy agenda.


The Greens, despite a surge in numbers, don’t have any leader on the European Council and are still smaller than the others, so they are unlikely to end up with a top job even as their priorities, particularly in relation to climate change, are increasingly resonant with voters. As a result, the Greens have dug in their heels in the negotiations, demanding more ambitious environmental policies, including more aggressive efforts to cut emissions.

In his formal invitation letter to Thursday’s summit, Tusk could only restate his hope for quick agreement, while noting that his own consultations, which included phone calls on Tuesday with 14 of the 28 leaders, highlighted continuing divisions.

“These consultations have shown that there are different views, different interests, but also a common will to finalize this process before the first session of the European Parliament,” Tusk wrote to national leaders. “To this end, I will continue to consult you one by one up until the summit starts. I remain cautiously optimistic, as those I have spoken to have expressed determination to decide swiftly.”

“I hope we can make it on Thursday,” he added.

Prime ministers’ club

Many EU officials and diplomats think a deal Thursday is unlikely, and discussions will have to continue, including at the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan next week, where Tusk, Juncker, Merkel, Macron, May, and Conte will be in attendance, along with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Rutte is one of the negotiating coordinators for the Liberals, while Sánchez is a coordinator for the Socialists.

Tusk’s main challenge in the process so far has been to identify qualified candidates willing to take on the EU jobs — and to get them to admit their interest openly. Council officials have long complained that one of the main flaws in the Spitzenkandidat process is that sitting prime ministers and presidents are unwilling to publicly declare their interest for fear of criticism at home, even though they are the most qualified and obvious candidates for EU posts.

“At the Council, they are scratching their heads, searching everywhere for candidates,” said an EU minister based outside of Brussels, who is closely following the process and spoke on condition of anonymity.


This minister said Council members are clearly putting a priority on finding candidates who have served within their own ranks, and this has led to some unusual suggestions, including former Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, who led the government that lost power to the populists, former Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt, and outgoing Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė.

“They are searching for names among the ex-prime ministers’ club,” the minister said. “They are focused on prime ministers and they’re stuck in the spirit of an exclusive club.”

“It reminds me of the dead poets’ society or royal marriages,” the minister added. “It is a pity because the best Commission presidents have not come from the old PMs’ club. Look at Jacques Delors.”

Delors, the veteran French statesman appointed in 1985, is the last Commission president named to the post without previously serving as a head of government.


Other names batted around Brussels include Barnier and former Commission Vice President Kristalina Georgieva, a veteran Bulgarian official now serving as chief executive officer of the World Bank in Washington. Georgieva made a brief bid to become United Nations secretary-general in 2016 and some of the advisers who helped her in that effort are now in Brussels testing her chances as a potential successor to Juncker.

The rejection of all three lead candidates from the European election could prompt an outcry in Parliament, but Macron and other critics of the Spitzenkandidat system have said that it was always intended to work in tandem with a new system of transnational candidate lists for Parliament, which the EU has not yet adopted. Should the transnational lists be adopted for the 2024 cycle, it could easily resurrect the Spitzenkandidat process.

With Brussels consumed by gossip and guessing about the leadership talks, this week’s summit seems to be shaping up more as an exercise in elimination than in selection.

“We can easily find ourselves with a tabula rasa at this council,” the EU minister said.

Lili Bayer contributed reporting.

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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-21/europe-s-biggest-economy-is-looking-at-world-without-bond-yields

Europe's Biggest Economy Is Looking at World Without Bond Yields

The last glimmer of positive yields on German bonds is in danger of being snuffed out.

Thirty-year yields turning negative would be a first among major bond markets, with a global rally already having sent all of Germany’s out to 20 years below zero. It may only take a further deterioration in trade relations between the U.S. and China, a flare-up of Italian political risk or more hints of stimulus from the European Central Bank to turn the whole curve negative.





The impact could be far reaching. It may mean that insurers and pension funds are forced into buying negative-yielding debt, due to the need to maintain portfolios with high credit ratings. It will also push traders into more risky securities such as Italian, corporate or emerging-market debt to chase yields. And it’s another signal for Europe’s so-called “Japanification” where growth, inflation and bond yields stay depressed long-term.

“If you had asked me just two weeks ago about the prospect of 30-year German yields going below zero, I would have taken a couple of days to get over the laughing fit,” said Luke Hickmore, a money manager at Aberdeen Standard Investments. “Now, we seem to have transitioned to a completely different market environment with yields set to test more eye-watering lows and negative levels around the world. The significance is massive.”

The amount of bonds globally with negative yields surged to a record $12.5 trillion this week after ECB President Mario Draghi gave the clearest signal yet that the institution is weighing up interest-rate cuts and quantitative easing. He has joined the U.S. Federal Reserve and others in mooting renewed stimulus on the growing threats to global economic growth.

Germany only has six conventional securities out of 57 left that offer a positive yield, all maturing in more than 20 years. This will make it harder for Europe’s economic powerhouse to resist boosting fiscal expenditure, since it effectively gets paid to do so, at a time when the European Commission is battling with Italy to reign in its spending.

“If that would not encourage them to borrow more and spend, I’m not sure what will,” said Kacper Brzezniak, a money manager at Allianz Global Investors. “Frankly, right now, if I was the German finance ministry, I would issue bunds and buy Italian bonds.”

Giffen Good

Peter Chatwell, head of European rates strategy at Mizuho International Plc, described German 30-year bonds as a “giffen good,” defined as a product that people consume more of as the price rises. Investors who follow a benchmark index are likely to buy German bonds, while others may only be permitted to buy securities with a positive yield.

“For those investors who are mandated to hold a certain proportion of German paper, and particularly those who cannot buy negative-yielding paper, they have an ever narrowing window in which to buy,” Chatwell said. “Some real-money investors may well be forced to buy this scarce commodity of positive-yielding German paper.”

German 30-year yields currently provide a yield of 0.25%, the lowest level on record. By comparison U.S. 30-year yields are at 2.51% and Italy’s still offer above 3%. Market pricing using options implies a roughly one-in-three chance that German 30-year yields will drop into negative territory over the next year, according to Bloomberg calculations.

Negative Europe

That would be one step further than Japan, where yields on 30-year bonds have never turned negative, touching a low of 0.02% in 2016 and offering 0.31% now. Only Switzerland has seen an entire yield curve in negative territory, but the size of its debt market is less than a tenth of Germany. The whole yield curve in Denmark is also close to going negative.

The Netherlands may follow, with its 10-year yields already negative. The equivalent French, Finnish and Austrian bond yields all dipped below zero this week. The growing stock of debt below zero may mean that insurers have to be stress tested for the impact of negative rates under the European Union’s Solvency II regulations in the future.

“There are many liability-driven investors in the world who are trying to buy long duration assets, and are finding that they still do not have enough,” said Aberdeen’s Hickmore.

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Relativo al brexit, o al puesto vacante de primer ministro en UK, que viene a ser lo mismo, esta la cosa interesante en el sentido chino de la palabra.

Tras la dimisión de May, el nuevo PM se elegirá en dos pasos

1º por rondas eliminatorias hasta que solo queden 2 candidatos, y son los MP del partido conservador los que votan
2º por votación entre los dos ganadores de la ronda anterior, y son la militancia del partido conservador los que votan

Es decir, no tienen ni que pasar por el parlamento para colocar al que les salga del orto. Si eso no fuese suficiente drama, del orto va a salir con toda probabilidad....Boris Johnson, embaucador, incompetente, payaso y brexiteer convencido.

Por lo menos hay cagadas que no cometemos en este país, si esto sirve de consuelo.



https://www.theguardian.com/politics/conservative-leadership

[muyuu]

Relativo al brexit, o al puesto vacante de primer ministro en UK, que viene a ser lo mismo, esta la cosa interesante en el sentido chino de la palabra.

Tras la dimisión de May, el nuevo PM se elegirá en dos pasos

1º por rondas eliminatorias hasta que solo queden 2 candidatos, y son los MP del partido conservador los que votan
2º por votación entre los dos ganadores de la ronda anterior, y son la militancia del partido conservador los que votan

Es decir, no tienen ni que pasar por el parlamento para colocar al que les salga del orto. Si eso no fuese suficiente drama, del orto va a salir con toda probabilidad....Boris Johnson, embaucador, incompetente, payaso y brexiteer convencido.

Por lo menos hay cagadas que no cometemos en este país, si esto sirve de consuelo.



https://www.theguardian.com/politics/conservative-leadership

Ya estamos en la segunda fase desde anoche. La votación será entre Boris Johnson y Jeremy Hunt, con Johnson favorito abrumador.

[mpt]

se montan solitos las roboluciones de colorines; es lo que tiene el dolor de ir a menos, los cardumenes que no lo aceptan y los vendidos que los pastorean

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Next Conservative leader after Theresa May:

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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-merkel/germanys-merkel-seen-shaking-for-second-time-this-month-idUSKCN1TS0RE

¿Algo serio?

BERLIN (Reuters) - German Chancellor Angela Merkel was seen shaking as she met President Frank-Walter Steinmeier on Thursday, her second such bout within two weeks, but her spokesman said she was fine.

Merkel, 64, was attending a farewell ceremony for Justice Minister Katarina Barley, who is leaving to become a lawmaker in the European Parliament. The spokesman said Merkel would take part later in the swearing-in of the new justice minister.

On June 18, Merkel was also seen shaking when she met visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy but later said she felt better after drinking some water. Berlin is in the throes of a heatwave.

Asked if the chancellor would take part in this weekend’s G20 meeting in Japan, the spokesman said: “Everything is taking place as planned. The chancellor is well.”

Merkel appeared her usual self when she fielded questions from lawmakers during an hour-long session in parliament on Wednesday, shortly after which she gave a speech at the Humboldt University of Berlin.

The chancellor faces a grueling schedule in the coming days.

Later on Thursday, she flies to Japan for the G20 meeting before heading to Brussels for an EU summit on Sunday at which she will play a key role in trying to seal a deal on the distribution of the bloc’s top jobs for the next five years.

Video: https://twitter.com/Reuters/status/1144155529209450496

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https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-who-will-be-the-next-ecb-president/?terminal=true

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Estados Unidos usa la ley como arma de destrucción contra Europa (informe)

V/F-- https://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/les-etats-unis-se-servent-du-doit-comme-d-une-arme-de-destruction-contre-l-europe-rapport-822024.html?fbclid=IwAR0Ikwk8_7SAQgd8Nw5rfYNYv6D9QJDIW98MZVFrUoxusQQd9trSpV31Vq4

Google v/ES-- https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=es&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.latribune.fr%2Fentreprises-finance%2Fles-etats-unis-se-servent-du-doit-comme-d-une-arme-de-destruction-contre-l-europe-rapport-822024.html%3Ffbclid%3DIwAR0Ikwk8_7SAQgd8Nw5rfYNYv6D9QJDIW98MZVFrUoxusQQd9trSpV31Vq4

Los Estados Unidos de América han arrastrado al mundo a la era del proteccionismo judicial, mientras que el estado de derecho siempre ha servido como un instrumento regulador y se ha convertido en un arma de destrucción en la actualidad. la guerra económica que libra Estados Unidos contra el resto del mundo, incluso contra sus aliados tradicionales en Europa " . Una declaración impactante en el preámbulo del informe "Restaurando la soberanía de Francia y Europa y protegiendo a nuestras compañías de las leyes y medidas con alcance extraterritorial" del diputado de LREM, Raphaël Gawain, entregó el 26 de junio al Primer Ministro Edouard Philippe. Un informe vitriolo que también critica la pasividad de las autoridades francesas.

    Al igual que el del diputado del PS Jean-Jacques Urvoas publicado en diciembre de 2014 , el informe de Rafael Gawain tiene el mérito de la claridad: "los procesamientos parecen estar motivados económicamente y los objetivos elegidos por diseño. (...) Sólo grandes Las empresas europeas y asiáticas, en competencia directa con las empresas estadounidenses, son el objetivo " .

Los tribunales estadounidenses han exigido multas de miles de millones de dólares a compañías francesas, europeas, sudamericanas y asiáticas, debido a que sus prácticas comerciales, sus clientes o algunos de sus pagos no cumplían con la ley de los EE. UU. Sin embargo, ninguna de estas prácticas tenía un vínculo directo con el territorio de los EE. UU. Y / o estas empresas cumplían con la ley de su país. Muchas compañías fueron condenadas e hicieron los títulos de la prensa internacional: BNP Paribas, HSBC, Commerzbank, Credit Agricole, Standard Chartered, ING, Bank of Tokyo, Royal Bank of Scotland, Siemens, Alstom, Telia, BAE Systems. , Total, Credit Suisse ... Y pronto por qué no Areva y Airbus. Demasiado es demasiado ... especialmente porque "las grandes empresas estadounidenses se salvan de cualquier procesamiento" o son condenadas a multas mucho más bajas, según el informe. Multas que no han comprometido su sostenibilidad. A diferencia de las empresas europeas muy fuertemente sancionadas.
Muy alta vulnerabilidad de las empresas francesas.

Los seis meses de investigaciones y audiencias llevadas a cabo por la misión de Raphaël Gawain permitieron elaborar una "observación ampliamente compartida" por los interlocutores entrevistados: las empresas francesas no tienen hoy en día las herramientas legales efectivas para defenderse. Procedimientos legales extraterritoriales contra ellos, ya sea por competidores o por autoridades extranjeras. "Están en una situación de gran vulnerabilidad, las autoridades francesas han dado durante muchos años la sensación de pasividad y la impresión de haberse rendido", señala el informe.

[...]

Finalmente, el informe indica que recientemente se dio un paso más en esta confrontación multidimensional con la entrada en vigor de la Ley de la Nube en marzo de 2018: "esta ley brinda a las autoridades judiciales de los EE. UU. La oportunidad de obtener proveedores de almacenamiento" de datos digitales (que son todos estadounidenses), sobre la base de una simple "orden judicial" de un juez de EE. UU., todos los datos no personales de personas jurídicas de cualquier nacionalidad, independientemente de dónde se encuentren los datos " . La Ley de la Nube proporciona acceso sin restricciones por parte de las autoridades judiciales de los EE. UU. A datos corporativos, lo que hace que los Tratados de Asistencia Legal Mutua sean obsoletos e innecesarios.


Que hacer ?

Esta multiplicación de riesgos aumenta la urgencia de una acción ambiciosa por parte de las autoridades públicas francesas. "Es imperativo que Francia desarrolle una estrategia para contener los ataques de extraterritorialidad judicial que le permita reafirmar su soberanía y proteger sus negocios y los millones de empleos que dependen de ella" , dice el informe. Con este fin, la misión propone nueve recomendaciones para proporcionar a Francia los instrumentos legales que necesita, garantizar el correcto funcionamiento de las herramientas existentes y promover la adopción de medidas efectivas a nivel europeo. El informe Gawain recomienda la protección de la confidencialidad de las opiniones legales en los negocios mediante la creación de un estatus de abogado en la empresa dotada de la ética del abogado. Esta medida, "la más eficaz técnicamente porque utiliza la ley de los Estados Unidos para protegerse a sí misma" , llenará uno de los vacíos más evidentes de la ley francesa. "Le dará a las compañías francesas el mismo nivel de protección del que disfrutan sus principales competidores", señala el informe.

El informe también aboga por la modernización de la ley de 1968, conocida como "ley de bloqueo", que la hará más efectiva mediante una serie de medidas en torno al tríptico: declaración (creación de un mecanismo de alerta obligatorio en upstream), soporte (implementación de soporte para empresas por parte de una administración dedicada, SISSE) y sanción (aumento de la sanción prevista en caso de violación de la ley). También recomienda la adopción de una ley que proteja a las empresas francesas contra la transmisión por parte del anfitrión de sus datos digitales no personales a las autoridades judiciales extranjeras: una extensión de la RGPD a los datos de entidades legales, que sancionarán a las empresas de alojamiento de datos digitales. que transmitiría a las autoridades extranjeras datos no personales relativos a personas jurídicas francesas fuera de los canales de asistencia judicial o administrativa mutua.
Herramientas para limitar el impacto de las leyes extraterritoriales.

Además, el informe solicita el desarrollo de una doctrina nacional compartida sobre los secretos a proteger, y para todas las administraciones que contribuyan a la cooperación internacional, ya sea judicial o administrativa, para evitar En el futuro, la información confidencial relacionada con intereses económicos esenciales puede ser transmitida a las autoridades extranjeras y utilizada en contra de nuestros negocios. Se recomienda hacer que la política criminal francesa sea más legible para fortalecer el uso de la convención judicial de interés público (CJIP), a fin de poder procesar delitos económicos y financieros de manera más efectiva en Francia. Esta iniciativa implicaría la remisión a la Fiscalía Nacional Financiera (PNF), que podría iniciar investigaciones contra grupos extranjeros. Pero ninguna acción de este tipo había sido lanzada hasta ahora por el PNF.

Al mismo tiempo, el informe Gawain quiere lanzar otras tres iniciativas para limitar el impacto de estas leyes. Recomienda que se consulte a la Corte Internacional de Justicia para determinar el estado del derecho internacional sobre extraterritorialidad y lanzar una iniciativa francesa en la OCDE para establecer normas comunes sobre leyes y medidas con efecto extraterritorial, permitiendo Regular mejor su uso y evitar el proteccionismo judicial. Finalmente, recomienda desarrollar una propuesta francesa a nuestros socios en la Unión Europea para fortalecer las herramientas europeas para la protección de las empresas europeas en respuesta a las solicitudes de autoridades administrativas y judiciales extranjeras. Sin duda, esto tendría un impacto mucho más poderoso a escala europea debido a un mercado económico estratégico para todas las compañías globales, a diferencia de las leyes nacionales que no tienen mucho que ver con las grandes compañías estadounidenses. Pueden pasar toda la noche desde Francia. ¿Pero de Europa? Ya sea un balance de terror mucho más efectivo a nivel europeo para contrarrestar a los Estados Unidos, este país aliado que no nos quiere tan bien ...
Michel Cabirol
Michel Cabirol

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Buen artículo, traducido de TAZ para ver cómo se fueron organizando.

-- Asociaciones de vecinos desde 2011
-- Integracion del art, 15 de la constitución
-- El SPD (izquierda) que se dedicó a vender los pisos sociales en los 2000

La diferencia con ES, viene a ser la proporción de inquilinos (85%) y la presencia de 2-3 socimis nationales que suman 1/2 millón de viviendas.

Hay muchas lecciones que sacar.