Hablemos de Europa

[CHOSEN]

La unidad fiscal pasa porque, a largo plazo, no exista el concepto de país acreedor y país deudor dentro de la UE - especialmente en lo referente a electorados.

Por supuesto.
Pero lo que tu predicas hoy y ahora es que normas y tiempos los marque el deudor.
Es muy distinto.

La realidad es que camino de esa fusión entre acreedor y deudor, la UE ha conseguido muy sibilinamente casi expulsar al FMI de las negociaciones. Yo no se que mayor demostración de fuerza se puede poner sobre la mesa
Todo ha quedado en casa.
Grecia es Europa y lo seguirá siendo.
La puerta ya está cerrada, ya no cabe ni Putin ni nadie mas. Se ha acabado, el proceso de fusión UE/países deudores se ha formalizado en un tercer rescate. No hay puerta. Ya no cabe fragmentación.

[R.G.C.I.M.]

No le comprendo muyuu.

El acreedor jamás de los jamases está dispuesto a RE financiar a largo plazo a su deudor una vez ya lo es.
En todi caso lo hará su lo considera oportuno,  una vez vuelva a convertirse en credit worthy.

En serio que no entiendo la postura.

La unidad fiscal pasa porque, a largo plazo, no exista el concepto de país acreedor y país deudor dentro de la UE - especialmente en lo referente a electorados.

Salu2

Cierto.
Y la disolucion de las soberanias.
Y la venta o cancenlacion a traves de activos que ya no seran "griegos".
Venga esa unidad fiscal!

Sds.

[muyuu]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11767891/Four-charts-that-show-why-the-euro-isnt-working-for-Germany-or-Greece.html

1. Rebalancing is going nowhere
The IMF notes that "rebalancing has failed to take place among creditor countries with the large current surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands continuing to grow and moving farther away from levels implied by medium-term fundamentals".
Germany is running a record modern-era current account surplus, and has been in violation of the eurozone's "excessive imbalances" rules for the last few years, without punishment.




The IMF again redoubled its calls for larger economies to pull their weight and reduce global imbalances in its External Sector Report published today.
In essence, the Fund is calling on the likes of Germany and creditor bloc nations, who have "fiscal space and low public debt" to support investment and boost consumption in the bloc.

The consequences of failing to reduce these imbalances are severe. The IMF's David Lipton says: "inaction on excess imbalances would mean a lost opportunity, settling for a mediocre global outcome in terms of growth and stability."
On the flip side, weaker southern debtor states such as Greece have born the brunt of the drive to end the eurozone's dysfunction. Much of this has occurred through a process of "internal devaluation" bringing down the costs of goods and labour in order to boost their competitiveness.
The chart below shows how developments in labour costs have progressed over the last decade or so.
It's notable just how severe a devaluation Greece has been forced to undergo. But German unit labour costs have not responded in kind making the country hyper-competitive in relation to its peers.



2. Long-term unemployment is dangerously high
Joblessness has steadily been coming down and currently stands at around 11pc in the eurozone. But long-term and youth unemployment are at near historic highs. The number of people in work is also far below its pre-crisis peak.



Long-term unemployment leads to a particualrly dangerous phenomena which economists have dubbed "hysteresis". This relates to a loss of skills by those who have been out of the labour force for a year or longer. In Britain, governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney has warned policymakers should be engaged in a "race against hysteresis".
Chronic unemployment problems are most acute in southern Europe. Seven out of the ten EU regions with highest share of long-term unemployment are in Greece, while youth unemployment plagues half the population in Spain.

3. Output is still lagging behind the advanced world
Some monetary unions do work. The chart below compares nominal GDP per person in the US and the eurozone.



The IMF expects eurozone growth to reach 1.5pc in 2015, and 1.7pc next year but over the medium term, potential growth will average around 1pc. They note that in an adverse case of low investment for all euro area countries and increased risk premia for high debt countries, "output could be nearly 2pc lower by 2020".

[muyuu]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11768231/George-Osborne-Britain-should-return-to-a-trade-relationship-with-the-EU.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greece-debt-restructuring-by-yanis-varoufakis-2015-07

ATHENS – The point of restructuring debt is to reduce the volume of new loans needed to salvage an insolvent entity. Creditors offer debt relief to get more value back and to extend as little new finance to the insolvent entity as possible.

Remarkably, Greece’s creditors seem unable to appreciate this sound financial principle. Where Greek debt is concerned, a clear pattern has emerged over the past five years. It remains unbroken to this day.
In 2010, Europe and the International Monetary Fund extended loans to the insolvent Greek state equal to 44% of the country’s GDP. The very mention of debt restructuring was considered inadmissible and a cause for ridiculing those of us who dared suggest its inevitability.

In 2012, as the debt-to-GDP ratio skyrocketed, Greece’s private creditors were given a significant 34% haircut. At the same time, however, new loans worth 63% of GDP were added to Greece’s national debt. A few months later, in November, the Eurogroup (comprising eurozone members’ finance ministers) indicated that debt relief would be finalized by December 2014, once the 2012 program was “successfully” completed and the Greek government’s budget had attained a primary surplus (which excludes interest payments).

In 2015, however, with the primary surplus achieved, Greece’s creditors refused even to discuss debt relief. For five months, negotiations remained at an impasse, culminating in the July 5 referendum in Greece, in which voters overwhelmingly rejected further austerity, and the Greek government’s subsequent surrender, formalized in the July 12 Euro Summit agreement. That agreement, which is now the blueprint for Greece’s relationship with the eurozone, perpetuates the five-year-long pattern of placing debt restructuring at the end of a sorry sequence of fiscal tightening, economic contraction, and program failure.

Indeed, the sequence of the new “bailout” envisaged in the July 12 agreement predictably begins with the adoption – before the end of the month – of harsh tax measures and medium-term fiscal targets equivalent to another bout of stringent austerity. Then comes a mid-summer negotiation of another large loan, equivalent to 48% of GDP (the debt-to-GDP ratio is already above 180%). Finally, in November, at the earliest, and after the first review of the new program is completed, “the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures… aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level.”

During the negotiations to which I was a party, from January 25 to July 5, I repeatedly suggested to our creditors a series of smart debt swaps. The aim was to minimize the amount of new funding required from the European Stability Mechanism and the IMF to refinance Greek debt, and to ensure that Greece would become eligible within 2015 for the European Central Bank’s asset-purchase program (quantitative easing), effectively restoring Greece’s access to capital markets. We estimated that no more than €30 billion ($33 billion, or 17% of GDP) of new, ESM-sourced financing would be required, none of which would be needed for the Greek state’s primary budget.

Our proposals were not rejected. Although we had it on good authority that they were technically rigorous and legally sound, they simply were never discussed. The political will of the Eurogroup was to ignore our proposals, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and force the Greek government to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is almost triple the size we had proposed. Once again, Greece’s creditors put the cart before the horse, by insisting that the new loan be agreed before any discussion of debt relief. As a result, the new loan deemed necessary grew inexorably, as in 2010 and 2012.

Unsustainable debt is, sooner or later, written down. But the precise timing and nature of that write-down makes an enormous difference for a country’s economic prospects. And Greece is in the throes of a humanitarian crisis today because the inevitable restructuring of its debt has been used as an excuse for postponing that restructuring ad infinitum. As a high-ranking European Commission official once asked me: “Your debt will be cut come hell or high water, so why are you expending precious political capital to insist that we deliver the restructuring now?”

The answer ought to have been obvious. An ex ante debt restructuring that reduces the size of any new loans and renders the debt sustainable before any reforms are implemented stands a good chance of crowding in investment, stabilizing incomes, and setting the stage for recovery. In sharp contrast, a debt write-down like Greece’s in 2012, which resulted from a program’s failure, only contributes to maintaining the downward spiral.
Why do Greece’s creditors refuse to move on debt restructuring before any new loans are negotiated? And why do they prefer a much larger new loan package than necessary?

The answers to these questions cannot be found by discussing sound finance, public or private, for they reside firmly in the realm of power politics. Debt is creditor power; and, as Greece has learned the hard way, unsustainable debt turns the creditor into Leviathan. Life under it is becoming nasty, brutish and, for many of my compatriots, short.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/varoufakis-agenda-defended-by-mohamed-a--el-erian-2015-07

LONDON – From blaming him for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy to accusing him of illegally plotting Greece’s exit from the eurozone, it has become fashionable to disparage Yanis Varoufakis, the country’s former finance minister. While I have never met or spoken to him, I believe that he is getting a bad rap (and increasingly so). In the process, attention is being diverted away from the issues that are central to Greece’s ability to recover and prosper – whether it stays in the eurozone or decides to leave.

That is why it is important to take note of the ideas that Varoufakis continues to espouse. Greeks and others may fault him for pursuing his agenda with too little politesse while in office. But the essence of that agenda was – and remains – largely correct.

Following an impressive election victory by his Syriza party in January, Greece’s prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, appointed Varoufakis to lead the delicate negotiations with the country’s creditors. His mandate was to recast the relationship in two important ways: render its terms more amenable to economic growth and job creation; and restore balance and dignity to the treatment of Greece by its European partners and the International Monetary Fund.

These objectives reflected Greece’s frustrating and disappointing experience under two previous bailout packages administered by “the institutions” (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF). In pursuing them, Varoufakis felt empowered by the scale of Syriza’s electoral win and compelled by economic logic to press three issues that many economists believe must be addressed if sustained growth is to be restored: less and more intelligent austerity; structural reforms that better meet social objectives; and debt reduction.

These issues remain as relevant today, with Varoufakis out of government, as they were when he was tirelessly advocating for them during visits to European capitals and in tense late-night negotiations in Brussels. Indeed, many observers view the agreement on a third bailout program that Greece reached with its creditors – barely a week after Varoufakis resigned – as simply more of the same. At best, the deal will bring a respite – one that is likely to prove both short and shallow.

In part, the criticism of Varoufakis reflects less the substance of his proposals than the manner in which he approached his interlocutors. Eschewing the traditional duality of frank private discussions and restrained public commentary, he aggressively advocated his case openly and bluntly, and did so in an increasingly personal manner.

Whether deemed naive or belligerent, this approach undeniably upset and angered European politicians. Rather than modifying a policy framework that had failed for five years to deliver on its stated objectives, they dug in their heels, eventually resorting to the economic equivalent of gunboat diplomacy. And they evidently also made it clear to Varoufakis’s boss, Tsipras, that the future of negotiations depended on him casting aside his unconventional minister – which he did, first by assigning someone else to lead the negotiations and then by appointing a new finance minister altogether.

Now that he is out of office, Varoufakis is being blamed for much more than failing to adapt his approach to political reality. Some hold him responsible for the renewed collapse of the Greek economy, the unprecedented shuttering of the banking system, and the imposition of stifling capital controls. Others are calling for criminal investigations, characterizing the work he led on a Plan B (whereby Greece would introduce a new payments system either in parallel or instead of the euro) as tantamount to treason.

But, love him or hate him (and, it seems, very few people who have encountered him feel indifferent), Varoufakis was never the arbiter of Greece’s fate. Yes, he should have adopted a more conciliatory style and shown greater appreciation for the norms of European negotiations; and, yes, he overestimated Greece’s bargaining power, wrongly assuming that pressing the threat of Grexit would compel his European partners to reconsider their long-entrenched positions. But, relative to the macro situation, these are minor issues.

Varoufakis had no control over the economic mess that Syriza inherited when it came to power, including an unemployment rate hovering around 25% and youth joblessness that had been running at more than 50% for a considerable period. He could not influence in any meaningful manner the national narratives that had sunk deep roots in other European countries and thus undermined those countries’ ability to adapt. He could not counter the view among some of the region’s politicians that success for Syriza would embolden and strengthen other non-traditional parties around Europe.
It also would have been irresponsible for Varoufakis not to work behind closed doors on a Plan B. After all, Greece’s eurozone destiny largely was – and remains – in the hands of others (particularly Germany, the ECB, and the IMF). And it is yet to be established whether Varoufakis broke any laws in the way he and his colleagues worked on their contingency plan.

When push came to shove, Varoufakis faced the difficult choice of going along with more of the same, despite knowing that it would fail, or trying to pivot to a new approach. He bravely opted for the latter. While his brash style undermined outcomes, it would be a real tragedy to lose sight of his arguments (which have been made by many others as well).

If Greece is to have any realistic chance of long-term economic recovery and meeting its citizens’ legitimate aspirations, policymakers must recast the country’s austerity program, couple pro-growth reforms with greater social justice, and secure additional debt relief. And if Greece is to remain in the eurozone (still a big if, even after the latest agreement), it must not only earn its peers’ respect; it must be treated with greater respect by them as well.

El Erian no es un cualquiera, precisamente...

[muyuu]

Ejjpaña va bien + gracias a la "mano dura" de Alemania. 2 en 1.

[muyuu]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11768134/European-alliance-of-national-liberation-fronts-emerges-to-avenge-Greek-defeat.html

European 'alliance of national liberation fronts' emerges to avenge Greek defeat
For the pony-tailed leader of Spain's Podemos movement, the Leninist lesson of Greece is that revolutionary forces must show an iron fist

[...]

[saturno]

Fiscalidad UE.

Francia acaba de dar un puñetazo en la mesa:
http://www.boursorama.com/actualites/un-retraite-qui-vit-a-l-etranger-de-sa-pension-percue-en-france-a-son-domicile-fiscal-en-france-ec34315c987731ef1f1678b1db88c494

Conseil d’Etat (arrêt du 17 juin 2015, n° 371412)

Los jubilados en el extranjero cuyos principales ingresos (=sus intereses economicos principales) provienen de la pension francesa (del pais de origen) tienen su domicilio fiscal en Francia, aunque residan civilmente en el extranjero.

Es correcto con los convenios fiscales y tratados UE (los relativos a SSocial, por ejemplo)
La novedad es que el p'rincipio se aplica a todos los sujetos pasivos del IRPF, no sólo a los que tienen una actividad economica declarada

En referencia a la importación de pensionistas jubiletas, se acaba de cargar el negocio nicho ofrecido por  paises como Portugal (o norte de Africa) y otros que eximen de IRPF por "himbertir" la pension en pisitos,y domiciliarse en Portugal o España.

Apuesto que en breve se apuntarán Alemania, UK y todos los paises norteños a tan excelente principio. O que lo codificarán de una vez en una Directiiva fiscal europea. La primera.

Je, je.

En realidad, les da igual a los paises de acogida, aunque  no podrán aplicar IRPF a los jubiletas en el futuro. Lo que hacian era aprovechar un nicho fiscal, otorgando exencion de IRPF a los "importados", cuando esa exencion se la tenian que comer  Francia (o UK, o Alemania, etc)..

Lo que ha hecho Francia es rellenar "el hueco" y decir que se acabo lo de la exencion fiscal.
 
Además, la fiscalidad ligada a bienes inmuebles depende del lugar del inmueble. Así que a los paises de acogida como Portugal les sale redondo: siguen cobrando IBI, mutacion y sucesion, y todas las tasas ligadas al inmueble, como antes.

Me sé de  jubiletas importados (o exportados, según se mire) que  se van a comer sus  ladrillos al sol.

Vamos, Union fiscal por la vía ejecutiva




 

[Republik]

Cómo está el patio que cada cual echa el lazo para cazar  fiscalmente a sus nacionales. Recuerdo que en tiempos de Aznar a Rato se le ocurrió (sería a un técnico, que a ese solamente se le ocurre lo que ya sabemos), que un español no dejaba de ser residente fiscal por pasar 183 días al año en otro lugar si ese lugar era calificable de "paraíso fiscal". Ojo que de aquí al chip implantado va poco.  Claro que el que paga, manda.

[saturno]

En los comentarios  se leen a algunas "victimas" del Estado que huian de los impuestos.

Curiosamente, su argumento es que son los jóvenes de su pais los que deben cargar con sus pensiones exentas de IRPF. Que ya se aprovecharán cuando hayan trabajado 42 años. 
Sus razones son de puro odio, en medio de otros comentarios que ven normal la sentencia (Corte Máxima del Estado, tras esto, sólo queda el TJUE)
 
Cuando echa pestes del Estado, para ese comentarista, es evidente que es por maniobra de los jóvenes que han votado a ese gobierno, y que "deben" pagarle su pensión (en el extranjero, exenta hasta ahora).

El odio al Estado es odio a los jovenes que "deben" pargarle su pension.
Interesante, por cómo se ve que el odio generacional no nace de los jóvenes : lo inculcaron los Triunfadores.
Es el mismo razonamiento que los lectores de  Bild, los Alemanes con los Griegos.

Se ve claro que para los jóvenes activos y los que entran ahora, no hay ni habrá ninguna culpa en pagarles con la misma moneda.
Lo dice el jubileta,  "42 años trabajando", es decir, lleva 42 años  sembrando odio generacional.

(Siempre supieron de qué iba lo que hicieron.)

[saturno]

Cómo está el patio que cada cual echa el lazo para cazar  fiscalmente a sus nacionales. Recuerdo que en tiempos de Aznar a Rato se le ocurrió (sería a un técnico, que a ese solamente se le ocurre lo que ya sabemos), que un español no dejaba de ser residente fiscal por pasar 183 días al año en otro lugar si ese lugar era calificable de "paraíso fiscal". Ojo que de aquí al chip implantado va poco.  Claro que el que paga, manda.

Bueno, pero no es cazar a "sus nacionales". Se aplica a todo destinatario de renta, no a los "nacionales". Cuidado.

Es el principio de pagar impuestos en el Estado donde uno tiene su interés principal economico.
En la UE, el principio de nacionalidad o de residencia civil está caduco.

Lo que se determina es qué Estado debe calcular el Impuesto sobre todas las rentas de un sujeto, cualquiera que sea su residencia civil

El IRPF lo pagas una vez, sobre las rentas "mundiales".
El principio aquí resuelto es determinar el Estado que deba calcular el IRPF.
La respuesta es: calcula el IRPF mundial el Estado donde generas tus intereses economicos principales

Hasta ahora, se aplicaba a profesionales. El principio lo acaba de generalizar a todos, incluidos particulares o pensionistas. Ese principio ya existe para cobertura sanitaria Pero en términos de IRPF, seguía estando regido por convenios bilaterales.

El puñetazo de Francia significa que acepta generalizar el principio social europeo a lo que hasta ahora correspondia a soberania fiscal. Francia acaba de reconocer que no hay por qué mantener una dualidad de principio entre fiscalidad (convenio  bilateral entre soberanias) y social (directiva UE de implementación obligatoria)

No creo que ningun Estado le vea pegas, por la cuenta que les trae !!!.


Es una gran noticia de cara a la unión fiscal, para todos los Europeos.

[sudden and sharp]

Lo decíamos un poco de cachondeo, pero igual si tenemos FMIxit... 

El FMI no participará en el rescate de Grecia sin un "alivio de su deuda"
http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/6907628/07/15/El-FMI-podria-no-participar-en-el-rescate-de-Grecia-tiene-demasiada-deuda.html#.Kku8kxhf8RkaJhc

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greek-crisis-socializing-sovereign-debt-by-hans-werner-sinn-2015-07/spanish

MÚNICH – Tras meses de juegos y actitudes políticas temerarias y sólo una semana después de que los votantes griegos rechazaran las condiciones para un plan de rescate de 7.500 millones de euros (8.200 millones de dólares), el final llegó rápidamente. Los dirigentes políticos de la zona del euro acordaron iniciar negociaciones con un plan mucho mayor, que asciende a 86.000 millones de euros, casi la mitad del PIB de Grecia. Lamentablemente, el acuerdo revela la evidente determinación de Europa de volver a representar la misma tragedia en el futuro.

A lo largo de los cinco últimos años, nada menos que 344.000 millones de euros han pasado de los acreedores oficiales, como el Banco Central Europeo y el Fondo Monetario Internacional a las arcas del Estado griego y a los bancos comerciales de este país, pero, seis meses después de negociaciones casi fútiles, se había llegado al agotamiento y las vacaciones estaban al caer, por lo que se prestó poca atención a las condiciones reales para un nuevo rescate de Grecia. Aunque el Fondo Europeo de Estabilidad Financiera había declarado oficialmente en quiebra a Grecia el 3 de julio, los dirigentes de la zona del euro volvieron a aplazar el asunto de la insolvencia.

El último acuerdo sí que detuvo –o al menos interrumpió– la mayor  crisis de la zona del euro hasta la fecha, lo que puso fin a un período sin precedentes de antipatía, oprobio, humillación, incordios y chantaje dentro de Europa. De hecho, Grecia se libró por los pelos de salir de la zona del euro.
El ex ministro de Hacienda de Grecia Yanis Varoufakis reveló que, después de tomar posesión de su cargo, montó un grupo, con el consentimiento del Primer Ministro, Alexis Tsipras, que se reunió en secreto para preparar la introducción de una moneda paralela y la toma del control del Banco Central de Grecia: la salida, en realidad, de la zona del euro. El Gobierno de Alemania estaba dispuesto también a aceptar lo que parecía inevitable. Si el Presidente de Francia, François Hollande, no hubiera asesorado a Grecia, a espaldas de la Canciller de Alemania, Angela Merkel, sobre cómo negociar, los acontecimientos habrían seguido un rumbo totalmente distinto.

La enconada disputa dentro del Eurogrupo (compuesto por los ministros de Hacienda de la zona del euro) no sólo creó tensiones en las relaciones entre los miembros de la unión monetaria, sino que, además, avivó las existentes dentro de los gobiernos nacionales. Muchos dirigentes europeos siguen sintiendo el escozor y lamiéndose las heridas, pero éste debería ser también el momento de que reflexionaran sobre lo sucedido y sus causas.

El rifirrafe fue la consecuencia de un intento de colocar la política por encima de las leyes de la economía. El dogma de la infalibilidad de las autoridades europeas y la irrevocabilidad de todos los avances hacia la integración chocaron con la realidad.

Si Europa sigue aplicando el mismo planteamiento a sus problemas de deuda que ha utilizado en el caso de Grecia, afrontará muchos conflictos en el futuro. El error fundamental se produjo en abril y mayo de 2010, cuando los prestadores oficiales –en forma de los demás Estados miembros de la zona del euro– substituyeron a los acreedores privados de Grecia.

Propuso ese plan el entonces Presidente del BCE Jean-Claude Trichet, con una clara violación de la regla del Tratado de Maastricht que prohibía los rescates de países y que había sido la condición fundamental de Alemania para abandonar el marco alemán, pero el Presidente francés Nicolas Sarkozy amenazó con abandonar el euro (como más adelante reveló el ex Primer Ministro de España, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, al periódico El País), a no ser que Alemania firmara el acuerdo sobre el rescate. Christine Lagarde, la ministra de Hacienda de Francia en aquel momento, dijo: “Violamos todas las reglas porque queríamos cerrar filas y rescatar de verdad a la zona del euro”.

Se violaron las reglas, en efecto, pero está por ver si la decisión sobre el rescate rescató el euro. Desde luego, rescató a muchos bancos comerciales, que en el primer trimestre de 2010 corrían grandes riesgos en relación con el Estado griego. Los bancos griegos habían sido los que habían prestado más al Estado griego (29.000 millones de euros), seguidos por los bancos franceses (20.000 millones de euros), los bancos alemanes (17.000 millones de euros) y los bancos de los EE.UU. (4.000 millones de euros).

Con el rescate se rescató también al BCE, en la medida en que el crédito fiscal substituyó parte de su crédito Target, acumulado desde el comienzo de 2008. En aquel momento, la economía griega afrontó una interrupción repentina de las entradas de capitales privados y el Banco Central de Grecia financió todo el déficit por cuenta corriente del país con un crédito suplementario de refinanciación procedente de su imprenta electrónica local.

Pero rescatar a bancos no es lo mismo que rescatar el euro. Además, rescatar el euro no es lo mismo que rescatar el proyecto europeo.

La decisión sobre el rescate de 2010 transformó una controversia comercial normal entre acreedores y deudores –que siempre surge cuando los deudores dejan de saldar su deuda– en una disputa entre Estados soberanos. Con ello se creó animosidad entre los pueblos de Europa y se proporcionaron armas a partidos radicales de toda clase, lo que dañó gravemente el proceso de integración europea.

Sin la socialización de la deuda brindada por los planes de rescate, Varoufakis o quienquiera que hubiese dirigido el Ministerio de Hacienda de Grecia habría tenido que declararse insolvente y después afrontar a los acreedores privados de una diversidad de países. Después los gobiernos de éstos se habrían visto obligados a rescatar a bancos  tambaleantes con el dinero de sus contribuyentes.

Desde luego, el rescate de bancos locales no habría sido un paseo por el parque, pero habría ahorrado a Europa el espectáculo de los gobiernos de sus Estados miembros enseñándose los dientes unos a otros. En 2008, Alemania rescató a Hypo Real Estate y en 2011 Bélgica, Francia y Luxemburgo rescataron a Dexia Bank. Como indican estos casos, se podría haber hecho la limpieza de la casa propia sin gran alborto o al menos sin provocar tensiones internacionales.

Los bancos y quienes los apoyan en los medios de comunicación siempre predicen desastres cuando se ciernen deudas incobrables. Entonces los políticos suelen acceder, temblorosos, a sus peticiones y meten en un apuro a sus contribuyentes, pero las más de 180 suspensiones de pagos soberanas que ha habido desde 1945 no hicieron caer a los incumplidores por un precipicio. Al contrario: por lo general, tuvieron una nueva oportunidad. En realidad, los peligros que ahora afronta Europa a consecuencia de la socialización de las deudas son mucho mayores que los planteados por una posible y simple crisis financiera.

La enseñanza que se desprende del desastre griego es la de que la zona del euro debe formular procedimientos para abordar las insolvencias soberanas lo antes posible para impedir que otros soberanos pasen a ser acreedores mediante la mutualización de la deuda. Si los gobiernos nacionales de la Unión Europea quieren ayudarse unos a otros en una crisis, deben prestar ayuda humanitaria unilateralmente, sin condiciones y sin rescate. Si prestas a un amigo, dejará de ser tu amigo. Si no se tiene en cuenta ese principio de sensatez, será imposible mantener unida a Europa.

[muyuu]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/07/30/italy-is-the-most-likely-country-to-leave-the-euro/

Italy is the most likely country to leave the euro

What do you call a country that has grown 4.6 percent—in total—since it joined the euro 16 years ago? Well, probably the one most likely to leave the common currency. Or Italy, for short.

It's hard to say what went wrong with Italy, because nothing ever went right. It grew 4 percent its first year or so in the euro, but almost not at all in the 15 years since. Now, that's not to say that it's been flat the whole time. It hasn't. It got as much as 14 percent bigger as it was when it joined the euro, before the 2008 recession and 2011 double-dip erased most of that progress. But unlike, say, Greece, there was never much of a boom. There has only been a bust. The result, though, has been the same. As you can see below, Greece and Italy have both grown a meager 4.6 percent the past 16 years, although they took drastically different paths to get there.

Part of it is that Italy, as the IMF points out, has real structural problems. It's hard to start a business, hard to expand one, and hard to fire people, which makes employers wary about hiring them in the first place. That's led to a small business dystopia, where nobody can achieve the kind of economies of scale that would make them more productive. But, at the same time, Italy had these problems even before it had the euro, and it still managed to grow back then. So part of the problem is the euro itself. It's too expensive for Italian exporters, and too restrictive for the government that's had to cut its budget even more than it otherwise would have.

This doesn't make Italy unique—the euro has hurt even the best-run countries—but what does is that Italy's populists have noticed. Why is that? Well, more than anything else, the common currency has given Europe a severe case of cognitive dissonance. People hate austerity, but they love the euro even more—they have an emotional attachment to everything it stands for. The problem, though, is that the euro is the reason they have to slash their budgets so much in the first place (at least as long as the European Central Bank will force their banks shut if they don't). So anti-austerity parties have felt like they have to promise the impossible if they want any hope of gaining power: that they can end the budget cuts without ending the country's euro membership. But as Greece's Syriza party found out, that strategy, if you want to call it one, only gives your people unrealistic expectations and Europe no reason to help you out. The other countries, after all, don't want to reward what, in their view, is bad budgetary behavior, if not blackmail. And so Greece was all but given an ultimatum: either leave the euro or do even more austerity than it was originally told to do. It chose austerity.

The lesson was clear. Don't elect anti-austerity parties, or things will get even worse for you. But, in Italy at least, the anti-austerity parties have learned the opposite lesson. Don't rule out leaving the euro, or things will never get better for you. Beppe Grillo, the comedian-turned-politician at the head of Italy's second-most popular party, the Five Star Movement, has gone from being a vague euroskeptic to an outspoken one. He wrote that Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsispras' "refusal to exit the euro was his death sentence" and that Italy should use its debt "as an advantage that allows us to be on the offensive in any future negotiations." It's the old saying: if you owe the bank 100 euros, that's your problem, but if you owe the bank 2 trillion euros, that's their problem.

As far as problems go, that's a pretty big one. It wouldn't be quite so large, though, if Italy would actually start growing again. More income would mean less of a debt burden, and, in turn, less need for austerity. But it's just hard to see how that would happen. Italy's government still has to cut its budget, and its companies still have to cut their costs to become more competitive, both of which will hurt growth in the short-term. And, in the meantime, Italy's anti-austerity party is the only one in Europe willing to point out that the emperor has no growth.

People might notice that it's true.