Los administradores de TransicionEstructural no se responsabilizan de las opiniones vertidas por los usuarios del foro. Cada usuario asume la responsabilidad de los comentarios publicados.
0 Usuarios y 16 Visitantes están viendo este tema.
Cita de: alpha en Julio 09, 2016, 21:52:05 pmBueno Chosen, aprovecho para saludar y despedirme, ya sin argumentar.Es que ultimamente no me meto en fregaos de los que no sale nada, y de aqui no sale (ojo, y no hablo de ganar la discusion, sino de sacar en claro, que yo entro aqui a que me tireis del caballo y y me hagais dudar)Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.Hay que tener más paciencia. Ya saldrá la respuesta. (No sé por ejemplo, por qué no aceptas la hipótesis de que varufaquis sea lo que parece, un fraude, un discurso vacío.)Tu verás.
Bueno Chosen, aprovecho para saludar y despedirme, ya sin argumentar.Es que ultimamente no me meto en fregaos de los que no sale nada, y de aqui no sale (ojo, y no hablo de ganar la discusion, sino de sacar en claro, que yo entro aqui a que me tireis del caballo y y me hagais dudar)Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.
[...]De VF solo me interesa bajar a las propuestas concretas que hizo y como las hizo. Su posterior discurso de DiEM25 me guste mas o menos es mas dificilmente baremable. En ningun momento nadie me ha dicho que su propuesta tal estaba equivocada o era demagogica por este y aquel motivos. Utilizando un simil pugilistico, estoy intentando que se pelee en un ring (las acciones de VF como ministro griego de finanzas), pero los oponentes no se deciden a entrar, pero, desde fuera, sostienen que mis argumentos no tienen media ostia, eso si, sin subir al ring y confrontarlos con los suyos. Me importa un rabano recibir una paliza, pero ha de ser en ese ring. ¿Que puede haber mas facil que decir que la propuesta de superavit primario para 2017 de la CE del 3.5% era realista y cojonuda, y que el 2% de VF era una tomadura de pelo? Se puede valorar muy facilmente algo asi. [...]
Pero estamos protagonizando un "¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo" de libro.
Encontré un articulo en Forbes y además Keen hace un buen resumen del Modest Proposal. Vale la pena releerlo.http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevekeen/2015/05/20/greek-deception-greek-tragedy-german-farce-german-myth/7/Citar 5/20/2015 @ 2:42AM 30,166 viewsTheir first proposal addressed the real cause of the crisis: the parlous state of many Greek (and Spanish and Cypriot) private banks after the crisis. The current arrangement requires the Greek government to borrow on their behalf from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); they propose instead that the ESM should take over: Citar Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.Their second recognised the Maastricht Treaty’s limit on government debt of 60% of GDP, and proposed that this could also be an obligation of the ECB (European Central Bank). Since a 60% of GDP level was allowed, this should be funded by bonds backed by the ECB which would still be serviced by the Greek government. With the ECB issuing the bonds, the interest rate on them would reflect the credit rating of the ECB—which is absolute—rather than the tenuous credit rating of Greece. Rates on these bonds would fall from over 10% now to just above zero—and what holders would lose in returns they would gain in the certainty that the bonds would be honoured.The third proposal was to use the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the almost dormant European Investment Fund (EIF) to fund infrastructure investments throughout Europe. Bonds used to finance this investment would be debt of the European Union in general, which is quite low, rather than of any member states. The fourth was to start a Emergency Social Solidarity Programme to undo some of the enormous harm that austerity progams have done to living standards in Europe. This program would:Citar guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.These proposals are both modest and separable, and only the third and fourth proposals breach Schäuble’s uncompromising assertion that “Stimulus—both in fiscal and monetary policy—is not part of the plan”. Varoufakis expected that, when he became Finance Minister for Greece, he would be able to raise these proposals with his counterparts. Surely they could agree to the first two proposals—and certainly to the second, which would involve no cost to other EU partners? But instead he has found that his fellow Finance Ministers are unwilling to discuss anything except compliance with the existing, failing, program of austerity. For his exasperation at this, he is accused of “hectoring” his fellow Finance Ministers.Hay una crítica a la postura de Keen & all de Tim Worstall aquí http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/05/20/steve-keens-interesting-view-of-the-greek-debt-crisis/CitarOr alternatively, could we please have some more of your taxpayers’ money to spend on our voters? Great politics domestically in Greece, not so hot in other eurozone countries. Y esta crítica sigue razonando sobre la UE como si no pudiera tener un presupuesto común.Fusión de acreedores y deudores (claro que para eso, hace falta un FMIxit previo).
5/20/2015 @ 2:42AM 30,166 viewsTheir first proposal addressed the real cause of the crisis: the parlous state of many Greek (and Spanish and Cypriot) private banks after the crisis. The current arrangement requires the Greek government to borrow on their behalf from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); they propose instead that the ESM should take over: Citar Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.Their second recognised the Maastricht Treaty’s limit on government debt of 60% of GDP, and proposed that this could also be an obligation of the ECB (European Central Bank). Since a 60% of GDP level was allowed, this should be funded by bonds backed by the ECB which would still be serviced by the Greek government. With the ECB issuing the bonds, the interest rate on them would reflect the credit rating of the ECB—which is absolute—rather than the tenuous credit rating of Greece. Rates on these bonds would fall from over 10% now to just above zero—and what holders would lose in returns they would gain in the certainty that the bonds would be honoured.The third proposal was to use the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the almost dormant European Investment Fund (EIF) to fund infrastructure investments throughout Europe. Bonds used to finance this investment would be debt of the European Union in general, which is quite low, rather than of any member states. The fourth was to start a Emergency Social Solidarity Programme to undo some of the enormous harm that austerity progams have done to living standards in Europe. This program would:Citar guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.These proposals are both modest and separable, and only the third and fourth proposals breach Schäuble’s uncompromising assertion that “Stimulus—both in fiscal and monetary policy—is not part of the plan”. Varoufakis expected that, when he became Finance Minister for Greece, he would be able to raise these proposals with his counterparts. Surely they could agree to the first two proposals—and certainly to the second, which would involve no cost to other EU partners? But instead he has found that his fellow Finance Ministers are unwilling to discuss anything except compliance with the existing, failing, program of austerity. For his exasperation at this, he is accused of “hectoring” his fellow Finance Ministers.
Our proposal is that a national government should have the option of waiving its right to supervise and resolve a failing bank. Shares equivalent to the needed capital injection will then pass to the ESM… Reform may entail a merger, downsizing, even a full resolution of the bank, with the understanding that steps will be taken to avoid, above all, a haircut of deposits. Once the bank has been restructured and recapitalised, the ESM will sell its shares and recoup its costs.
guarantee access to nutrition and to basic energy needs for all Europeans, by means of a European Food Stamp Programme modelled on its US equivalent and a European Minimum Energy Programme.
Or alternatively, could we please have some more of your taxpayers’ money to spend on our voters? Great politics domestically in Greece, not so hot in other eurozone countries.
Las fantasías revolucionarias antinaturales de Varoufakis sólo valen para vender sus libros (de papel, que lo aguanta todo). Su moto la tuvo que pagar. Y su casa. Y su corte de pelo. ¿A que vienen sus propuestas heterodoxas para el resto del universo?
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/yanis-varoufakis-why-we-must-save-the-eu"From the day I assumed office I strove to put together sensible, moderate proposals that would create common ground between my government, the troika of Greece’s lenders and Schäuble’s people. The idea was to go to Brussels, put to them our own blueprint for Greece’s recovery and then discuss with them their own ideas and objections to ours.My own Athens-based team worked hard on this, together with experts from abroad, including Jeff Sachs of Columbia University, Thomas Meyer, a former chief economist at Deutsche Bank, Daniel Cohen and Matthieu Pigasse, leading lights of the French investment bank Lazard, the former US treasury secretary Larry Summers, and my personal friend Lord Lamont – not exactly a group of leftist recalcitrants.Soon we had a fully-fledged plan, whose final version I co-authored with Jeff Sachs. It consisted of three chapters. One proposed smart debt operations that would make Greece’s public debt manageable again, while guaranteeing maximum returns to our creditors. The second chapter put forward a medium-term fiscal consolidation policy that would ensure the Greek government would never get into deficit again, while limiting our budget surplus targets to levels low enough to be credible and consistent with recovery. Finally, the third chapter outlined deep reforms to public and tax administration, product markets, and the restructure of a broken banking system as well as the creation a development bank to manage public assets at an arm’s length from politicians.I am often asked: Why were these proposals of your ministry rejected? They were not. The Eurogroup and the troika did not have to reject them because they never allowed me to put them on the table. When I began speaking about them, they would look at me as if I were singing the Swedish national anthem. And behind the scenes they were exerting pressure on the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, to repress these proposals, insinuating that there would be no agreement unless we stuck to the troika’s failed programme.What was really going on, of course, was that the troika could simply ignore our proposals, tell the world that I had nothing credible to offer them, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and then force the prime minister to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is at least double the size Greece would have required under our proposals."
https://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/18/greeces-proposals-to-end-the-crisis-my-intervention-at-todays-eurogroup/In our proposals to the institutions we have offered:- An extensive (but optimised) privatisation agenda spanning the period 2015-2025- The creation of a fully independent Tax and Customs Authority (under the aegis and supervision of Parliament)- A Fiscal Council that oversees the state budget- A short-term program for limiting foreclosures and managing non-performing loans- Judicial and civil procedure code reforms- Liberalising several product markets and services (with protections for middle class values and professions that are part and parcel of society’s fabric)- Elimination of many nuisance charges- Public administration reforms (introducing proper staff evaluation systems, reducing non-wage costs, modernising and unifying public sector payrolls).In addition to these reforms the Greek Authorities have engaged the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help Athens design, implement and monitor a second series of reforms. Yesterday I met with the OECD’s Secretary General Mr Angel Gurria and his team to announce this joint reform agenda, complete with a specific roadmap:- A major Anti-corruption Drive and relevant institutions to support it – especially in the area of procurement- Liberalising the construction sector, including the market and standards of construction materials- Wholesale trade liberalisation- Media – electronic and press code of practice- One-Stop Business Centres that eradicate the bureaucratic impediments to doing business in Greece- Pension System Reform – where the emphasis is on a proper, long-term, actuarial study, the phasing out of early retirements, the reduction in the operating costs of the pensions funds, pension fund consolidation – rather than mere pension cuts.Yes, colleagues, Greeks need to adjust further. We desperately need deep reforms. But, I urge you to take seriously under consideration this important difference between:- reforms that attack parasitic, rent-seeking behaviour or inefficiencies, and- parametric changes that jack up tax rates and reduce benefits to the weakest.We need a lot more of the real reforms and a lot less of the parametric type.
http://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/proyecto-europeo/propuestas-Varoufakis-eurozona_0_352415401.html"El documento está firmado en Julio de 2013, y muchas cosas han ocurrido desde entonces. Los posteriores desarrollos de la UE en la gestión de la crisis no sólo están en consonancia con las propuestas de Varoufakis, Holland y Galbraith, sino que en algunos casos incluso las han superado.En el ámbito bancario, la Unión Europea ha culminado su proceso de puesta en marcha de la Unión Bancaria, adelantándose de esta manera los presagios de los autores. La gestión del MEDE y del Banco Central Europeo en el Mecanismo Único de supervisión y de resolución bancaria, así como la utilización del MEDE como instrumento de recapitalización bancaria, suponen un paso en una dirección similar a la propuesta por el documento. ...En el plano del plan de inversiones, la propuesta de Juncker para la elaboración de un plan de inversiones en la Unión Europea va de hecho más allá del planteado por los autores, usando no sólo el Banco Europeo de Inversiones (BEI), sino también la garantía del presupuesto comunitario y la de aquellos países que, de manera voluntaria, quieran contribuir al mismo sin que estas contribuciones sean consideradas déficit público por la comisión. Adicionalmente, la compra, por parte del Banco Central Europeo, de bonos del BEI en el marco del QE rebajarán sus costes de financiación y le permitirán ampliar su propio balance."
[...]Me pasa lo mismo que a alpha. No entiendo nada.
Es como si leyésemos dos Varoufakis distintos. Por eso me pregunto si realmente lo conoces bien o simplemente lo estás caracterizando como el tipo de gente que lo suele apoyar políticamente. Es que acabo de enlazar un artículo de Yanis titulado "¿Por qué debemos salvar la UE?", todo el mundo sabe que es pro-Europa, ha estado haciendo campaña por el "Remain" en UK, ha arrancado el primer partido-movimiento panaeuropeo, y aquí tú nos estás diciendo que no, que Yanis es todo lo contrario, y que quería sacar a Grecia de Europa. Igual es cosa mía y me estoy perdiendo algo que tú sí ves, pero tu discurso sería más sencillo de compartir sino se acompañase de referencias sorprendentes sobre Varoufakis que, para mí, a falta de mejor explicación, no se ajustan a la realidad en absoluto.
Hablas de sus propuestas heterodoxas, pero no dices cuáles son, porque la más heterodoxa debía ser la reestructuración de la deuda pública griega y eso es algo que apoya el FMI y que funciona desde Babilonia al menos. Las propuestas griegas fueron diseñadas por conocidos representantes de la ortodoxia económica, como expica Varu en el mismo artículo de que enlacé el otro día: Citarhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/yanis-varoufakis-why-we-must-save-the-eu"From the day I assumed office I strove to put together sensible, moderate proposals that would create common ground between my government, the troika of Greece’s lenders and Schäuble’s people. The idea was to go to Brussels, put to them our own blueprint for Greece’s recovery and then discuss with them their own ideas and objections to ours.My own Athens-based team worked hard on this, together with experts from abroad, including Jeff Sachs of Columbia University, Thomas Meyer, a former chief economist at Deutsche Bank, Daniel Cohen and Matthieu Pigasse, leading lights of the French investment bank Lazard, the former US treasury secretary Larry Summers, and my personal friend Lord Lamont – not exactly a group of leftist recalcitrants.Soon we had a fully-fledged plan, whose final version I co-authored with Jeff Sachs. It consisted of three chapters. One proposed smart debt operations that would make Greece’s public debt manageable again, while guaranteeing maximum returns to our creditors. [Esto es un deseo, no una serie de propuestas.] The second chapter put forward a medium-term fiscal consolidation policy that would ensure the Greek government would never get into deficit again, [Otro deseo.] while limiting our budget surplus targets to levels low enough to be credible and consistent with recovery. Finally, the third chapter outlined deep reforms to public and tax administration, product markets, and the restructure of a broken banking system as well as the creation a development bank to manage public assets at an arm’s length from politicians. [Esto es lo que tendríais que traer, si acaso.]I am often asked: Why were these proposals of your ministry rejected? They were not. The Eurogroup and the troika did not have to reject them because they never allowed me to put them on the table. When I began speaking about them, they would look at me as if I were singing the Swedish national anthem. And behind the scenes they were exerting pressure on the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, to repress these proposals, insinuating that there would be no agreement unless we stuck to the troika’s failed programme.What was really going on, of course, was that the troika could simply ignore our proposals, tell the world that I had nothing credible to offer them, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and then force the prime minister to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is at least double the size Greece would have required under our proposals."
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/yanis-varoufakis-why-we-must-save-the-eu"From the day I assumed office I strove to put together sensible, moderate proposals that would create common ground between my government, the troika of Greece’s lenders and Schäuble’s people. The idea was to go to Brussels, put to them our own blueprint for Greece’s recovery and then discuss with them their own ideas and objections to ours.My own Athens-based team worked hard on this, together with experts from abroad, including Jeff Sachs of Columbia University, Thomas Meyer, a former chief economist at Deutsche Bank, Daniel Cohen and Matthieu Pigasse, leading lights of the French investment bank Lazard, the former US treasury secretary Larry Summers, and my personal friend Lord Lamont – not exactly a group of leftist recalcitrants.Soon we had a fully-fledged plan, whose final version I co-authored with Jeff Sachs. It consisted of three chapters. One proposed smart debt operations that would make Greece’s public debt manageable again, while guaranteeing maximum returns to our creditors. [Esto es un deseo, no una serie de propuestas.] The second chapter put forward a medium-term fiscal consolidation policy that would ensure the Greek government would never get into deficit again, [Otro deseo.] while limiting our budget surplus targets to levels low enough to be credible and consistent with recovery. Finally, the third chapter outlined deep reforms to public and tax administration, product markets, and the restructure of a broken banking system as well as the creation a development bank to manage public assets at an arm’s length from politicians. [Esto es lo que tendríais que traer, si acaso.]I am often asked: Why were these proposals of your ministry rejected? They were not. The Eurogroup and the troika did not have to reject them because they never allowed me to put them on the table. When I began speaking about them, they would look at me as if I were singing the Swedish national anthem. And behind the scenes they were exerting pressure on the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, to repress these proposals, insinuating that there would be no agreement unless we stuck to the troika’s failed programme.What was really going on, of course, was that the troika could simply ignore our proposals, tell the world that I had nothing credible to offer them, let the negotiations fail, impose an indefinite bank holiday, and then force the prime minister to acquiesce on everything – including a massive new loan that is at least double the size Greece would have required under our proposals."
Y este es el resumen que hacía Yanis en junio pasado de sus propuestas: Citarhttps://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/18/greeces-proposals-to-end-the-crisis-my-intervention-at-todays-eurogroup/In our proposals to the institutions we have offered:- An extensive (but optimised) privatisation agenda spanning the period 2015-2025- The creation of a fully independent Tax and Customs Authority (under the aegis and supervision of Parliament)- A Fiscal Council that oversees the state budget- A short-term program for limiting foreclosures and managing non-performing loans- Judicial and civil procedure code reforms- Liberalising several product markets and services (with protections for middle class values and professions that are part and parcel of society’s fabric)- Elimination of many nuisance charges- Public administration reforms (introducing proper staff evaluation systems, reducing non-wage costs, modernising and unifying public sector payrolls).Tiene toda la razón Chosen. Se reunen para hablar de la deuda griega (y de sus bancos) y el idiota este se pone a hablar de como debería ser, en su opinión, la eurozona. Le callaron la boca, claro.CitarIn addition to these reforms the Greek Authorities have engaged the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help Athens design, implement and monitor a second series of reforms. Yesterday I met with the OECD’s Secretary General Mr Angel Gurria and his team to announce this joint reform agenda, complete with a specific roadmap:- A major Anti-corruption Drive and relevant institutions to support it – especially in the area of procurement- Liberalising the construction sector, including the market and standards of construction materials- Wholesale trade liberalisation- Media – electronic and press code of practice- One-Stop Business Centres that eradicate the bureaucratic impediments to doing business in Greece- Pension System Reform – where the emphasis is on a proper, long-term, actuarial study, the phasing out of early retirements, the reduction in the operating costs of the pensions funds, pension fund consolidation – rather than mere pension cuts.Todo deseos; de cómo hacerlo, ni palabra.CitarYes, colleagues, Greeks need to adjust further. We desperately need deep reforms. But, I urge you to take seriously under consideration this important difference between:- reforms that attack parasitic, rent-seeking behaviour or inefficiencies, and- parametric changes that jack up tax rates and reduce benefits to the weakest.We need a lot more of the real reforms and a lot less of the parametric type.
https://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/06/18/greeces-proposals-to-end-the-crisis-my-intervention-at-todays-eurogroup/In our proposals to the institutions we have offered:- An extensive (but optimised) privatisation agenda spanning the period 2015-2025- The creation of a fully independent Tax and Customs Authority (under the aegis and supervision of Parliament)- A Fiscal Council that oversees the state budget- A short-term program for limiting foreclosures and managing non-performing loans- Judicial and civil procedure code reforms- Liberalising several product markets and services (with protections for middle class values and professions that are part and parcel of society’s fabric)- Elimination of many nuisance charges- Public administration reforms (introducing proper staff evaluation systems, reducing non-wage costs, modernising and unifying public sector payrolls).
In addition to these reforms the Greek Authorities have engaged the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help Athens design, implement and monitor a second series of reforms. Yesterday I met with the OECD’s Secretary General Mr Angel Gurria and his team to announce this joint reform agenda, complete with a specific roadmap:- A major Anti-corruption Drive and relevant institutions to support it – especially in the area of procurement- Liberalising the construction sector, including the market and standards of construction materials- Wholesale trade liberalisation- Media – electronic and press code of practice- One-Stop Business Centres that eradicate the bureaucratic impediments to doing business in Greece- Pension System Reform – where the emphasis is on a proper, long-term, actuarial study, the phasing out of early retirements, the reduction in the operating costs of the pensions funds, pension fund consolidation – rather than mere pension cuts.
Yes, colleagues, Greeks need to adjust further. We desperately need deep reforms. But, I urge you to take seriously under consideration this important difference between:- reforms that attack parasitic, rent-seeking behaviour or inefficiencies, and- parametric changes that jack up tax rates and reduce benefits to the weakest.We need a lot more of the real reforms and a lot less of the parametric type.
Tampoco tengo muy claro si te refieres a estas propuestas para Grecia cuando hablas de las propuestas "heterodoxas" de Varoufakis o de las que hace para Europa en su "Modest Proposal", y que ya han sido parcialmente adoptadas en Europa: Citarhttp://www.eldiario.es/agendapublica/proyecto-europeo/propuestas-Varoufakis-eurozona_0_352415401.html"El documento está firmado en Julio de 2013, y muchas cosas han ocurrido desde entonces. Los posteriores desarrollos de la UE en la gestión de la crisis no sólo están en consonancia con las propuestas de Varoufakis, Holland y Galbraith, sino que en algunos casos incluso las han superado.En el ámbito bancario, la Unión Europea ha culminado su proceso de puesta en marcha de la Unión Bancaria, adelantándose de esta manera los presagios de los autores. La gestión del MEDE y del Banco Central Europeo en el Mecanismo Único de supervisión y de resolución bancaria, así como la utilización del MEDE como instrumento de recapitalización bancaria, suponen un paso en una dirección similar a la propuesta por el documento. ...En el plano del plan de inversiones, la propuesta de Juncker para la elaboración de un plan de inversiones en la Unión Europea va de hecho más allá del planteado por los autores, usando no sólo el Banco Europeo de Inversiones (BEI), sino también la garantía del presupuesto comunitario y la de aquellos países que, de manera voluntaria, quieran contribuir al mismo sin que estas contribuciones sean consideradas déficit público por la comisión. Adicionalmente, la compra, por parte del Banco Central Europeo, de bonos del BEI en el marco del QE rebajarán sus costes de financiación y le permitirán ampliar su propio balance."
Europe is fragmenting. While in the past year the European Central Bank hasmanaged to stabilise the bond markets, the economies of the European core andits periphery are drifting apart. As this happens, human costs mount anddisintegration becomes an increasing threat.It is not just a matter for the Eurozone. The fallout from a Eurozone breakupwould destroy the European Union, except perhaps in name. And Europe’sfragmentation poses a global danger.Following a sequence of errors and avoidable delays Europe’s leadershipremains in denial about the nature of the crisis, and continues to pose the falsechoice between draconian austerity and a federal Europe.
Todo deseos; de cómo hacerlo, ni palabra. Bla, bla, bla; más deseos.¿Dónde están las propuestas? [Que las traiga alpha, preferentemente.]
Antieuro, para ser exactos.
2) Varoufakis es nacionalista
[...]Otras dos afirmaciones que me hacen explotar el cerebro. Yo sigo a Varoufakis en twitter desde hace mucho tiempo y jamás lo describiría de esa manera. En el artículo "Why we must save the EU" que acabo de enlazar Yanis explica su estrecha relación con Alemania desde la infancia (su tío había convencido a su madre de estudiar en Alemania, sus padres sintonizaban el canal DW alemán clandestinamente), y en "Europe needs a hegemonic Germany" Yanis deja claras sus preferencias ya desde el título: https://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/02/22/europe-needs-a-hegemonic-germany/[...]
El resto del discurso me parece razonable y lo compro sin problemas, pero no entiendo de dónde salen ciertas opiniones sobre Varoufakis, no encajan en absoluto con lo que le he venido leyendo durante años.
Entonces, cuando se dice que las propuestas son heterodoxas sería interesante para el debate señalar cuáles en concreto lo son.
Francamente, me asaltan sentimientos encontrados con estas cosas. Por una parte, parte de ese desvio en el cumplimiento es pura basura electoralista de Mariano. Por otro, despues del trato dispensado a Grecia, empiezo a estar harto de la ley del embudo alemana, basada, principalmente, en que ellos no cometen errores, y que cualquier disidencia debe verse castigada. Todo esto, acompañado de la logica politica de barrer para casa.Todo lo que digo es muy general, y no me gusta apuntar a enemigos exteriores. Pero seguramente si lo documentase, se verian los lados oscuros de la politica liderada por Alemania (lo que no se es si tenemos un sustituto que la mejore, probablemente habria que contrapesarla para equilibrar el resultado)