PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - OTOÑO 2014

[Saturio]

Perdonen el resto de foreros por hablar de nuestras cosillas...

Efectivamente. El único problema urbanístico serio que tenía Zaragoza en los 90 era cierta congestión en lo que los idiotas llaman "ciudad consolidada".
¡Y anda que no había sitios por donde descongestionarla!

Lo que hicimos fueron los sucesivos desarrollos planificados, aislados del resto del mundo por vías de comunicación que parecen fronteras. Bloques exentos...Además del desarrollo de los "barrios rurales" y municipios cercanos. Todo ello para albergar a la misma gente.

Esto no es una ciudad:

[Маркс]

Esa es la salida a Valencia, no? Valdespartera y la madre que lo parió...

Dices lo de "Ciudad Consolidada..." Pues anda que esto...

Belloch anuncia el programa "Zaragoza Esencial" que apuesta por la ciudad consolidada y el comercio

http://www.aragondigital.es/noticiaMovil.asp?notid=114800

[burbunova]

Nada, no hay nada tan burbujil como Ciudad Zaragoza Golf a unos 20 kms más o menos del centro de la ciudad.



[...]

Más información: http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/burbuja-inmobiliaria/335794-zaragoza-ciudad-golf-fotografias-5.html

"Vivo en Zaragoza Golf, o sea"... Y luego nada de casoplones construidos en grandes parcelas de césped verde y perfecto, sino bloques de pisitos de 90 metros cuadrados, todos ellos con sólidas paredes de pladur que permiten oír los pedos del vecino y el televisor de la vecina escupiendo el Sálvame a todo volumen.

[visillófilas pepitófagas]

Would you like to play some Spanish Burbuja Golf?

[BLICHON]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pGiMBTkqn0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT6O7dcs3v0

videos dejados por avatar en  el blog

Saludos

[visillófilas pepitófagas]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pGiMBTkqn0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT6O7dcs3v0

videos dejados por avatar en  el blog

Saludos

Gracias BLICHON.

Vean esos vídeos.

[sudden and sharp]

(Una inversión pública estatal en infraestructuras por un importe cercano al 3% del PIB, especialmente en Alemania, que lo que está de moda decir ahora, sólo sirve para administrar la "recesioncilla" del modelo en crisis. Piensen que, por ejemplo, entre alquileres y pensiones se pierde para la productividad un tercio del PIB. La crisis estructural empeoraría porque dicha inversión tiene hoy que financiarse con deuda adicional a la inmensa montaña que ya hay, al no haber holgura en materia de bases imponibles precisamente porque la crisis no es coyuntural. La obligatoria financiación a crédito, además, hace que los efectos a corto plazo sobre el PIB sean ambiguos. Por eso se invocan los manidos beneficios a largo plazo. En España, sabemos mucho de palabrería de políticos de segunda división sobre un futuro espléndido a cuenta de infraestructuras faraónicas... que construye "mi cuñao". ¿Sorprende que los think tanks privados se apunten a estos cantos de sirena? No. Esa modalidad del obrerismo facha que es la ideología Chief Executive Officer es mucho peor que el politiqueo electoralista. Para los trabajadores-directivos no hay día de mañana; todo se reduce al próximo bonus o, si no, "que me echen y, así cobro el blindaje alucinante que me merezco por el inmenso talento que tengo yo y tú no".)


NUNCA ANTES EL SISTEMA HABÍA ESTADO TAN INFESTADO DE RESENTIDOS ANTISISTEMA FALSOLIBERALES Y FALSOSOCIALISTAS.-

Hoy estamos de cumpleaños. Les propongo que, mientras leen, se pongan estas músicas de fondo:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Amwq43-lrM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S75gYhODS0M

Se cumplen 8 años del Turning Point estructural español (02/10/2006) y son muchas las cosas buenas que han pasado, aunque estemos todo el día quejándonos de lo lenta que va la Transición Estructural:

- el nuncabajismo ha muerto para siempre; los precios inmobiliarios han roto a bajar, aunque no los alquileres -que lo harán-; pero, lo que es más importante, el cambio ideológico ha llegado a los profesionales del sector, lo que equivale a decir que la resistencia nuncabajista/pocobajista resentida se empieza a circunscribir a esos 2-4 millones de hogares inmomutilados, cada vez más acorralados:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pGiMBTkqn0 ;

- la política económica española ha sido intervenida formalmente por la UE, que obligó al Gobierno a pedir la ayuda por escrito e, inmediatamente después, impuso un Memorando de Entendimiento, que, por cierto, ha sido reinterpretado torticeramente en muchas cosas, como por ejemplo, el banco malo, La Caixa, etc.;

- las Cajas de Ahorro (en España no había actividad crediticia subprime, había sector subprime todo él) han caído en la más absoluta desgracia, sólo que la enormidad del trabajo con CajaMadrid impide todavía empezar con las "kutxas" y, sobre todo, con La Caixa, que anómalamente conserva en sus manos el petróleo y el gas en España; recuerden que hace ocho años nosotros decíamos literalmente que, "con un poco de suerte, en esta embestida histórica, nos libramos de las CCdAA"; nuestros deseos se están haciendo felizmente realidad, aunque queda mucho trabajo, especialmente en Cataluña, el paraíso cajadeahorrístico español, lo que, junto con el diseño de la AEAT, late en el fondo de la impresentable deriva antiespañola catalanista; y

- está ya encima de la mesa que el abaratamiento de costes inmobiliarios es "la" solución, por encima del recorte de pensiones, todavía inédito, lo que equivale a aceptar que LA VIVIENDA BÁSICA DEBE SER DE PROVISIÓN PÚBLICA COMO LA SANIDAD Y LA EDUCACIÓN:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT6O7dcs3v0

Pero falta mucho camino por recorrer, como lo prueba lo fuerte que está el ANTIAUSTERIDADISMO.

Tanto el falsoliberalismo como el falsosocialismo incurren en él. El primero no se adorna tanto como el segundo, pero dice lo mismo, incluso con más radicalidad (cfr. el antibancocentralismo sedicioso; el separtaismo étnico-cultural-territorial, fascistoide por tanto; la negativa infantil a adaptarse a la Era Cero; la nostalgia por la orgía ye-yé, que llaman "normalización"; el keynesianismo bélico contra el terrorismo internacional; el nuevo infraestructurismo recetado para "los alemanes", a los que se tilda de cabezas cuadradas anti-inflacionistas; el estajanovismo y la productividad por la vía del numerador; etc.). Mucho lilí pero poco lalá. Todo el día con el Gasto en la boca pero con la Renta suprimida aposta del discurso: lo que llamamos el anantapódoton-Renta.

Recordemos que el austeridadismo sólo es la continua llamada a la prudencia en el Gasto Público dirigida a la constelación de administraciones públicas (en la UE: 28 estatales, 262 regionales y 200.000 locales), en medio de un "Deficit Spending" financiado con deuda pública como nunca antes había vivido la humanidad.

Los antiausteridadistas incurren en tres errores, según mi leal saber y entender:

1) como decimos, dan por hecho que se está combinando una política monetaria expansiva con una fiscal restrictiva, cuando la verdad es que nunca antes la política fiscal había sido tan persistentemente expansiva, entendiendo por tal lo que la Teoría Económica dice que es: que el Gasto Público sea superior a la Recaudación Tributaria y que la diferencia se financie con endeudamiento masivo de las administraciones públicas; aparte de que éste tiene límites objetivos (cfr. "Fiscal Limit");

2) hablan de cómo la actividad y el empleo (Producción) están correlacionados con la demanda de consumo e inversión (Gasto), e invocan el concepto de Demanda Efectiva y la prevalencia del Efecto Renta sobre el Efecto Sustitución; pero olvidan aposta que, entre la Producción y el Gasto, está el cedazo de la distribución de la Renta y que ésta es irracional desde mediados de los 1980s, cuando comenzó la fantasía popularcapitalista de El Pisito & La Paguita; y

3) para ellos, la crisis no es estructural (sólo es una recesión grande) ni tiene etiología inmobiliaria-generacional; es más, la burbuja inmobiliaria y otras hipotéticas burbujas en ciernes, que nunca identifican, serían consecuencia de la laxitud financiera; todo ello les lleva a contradicción de ambicionar la combinación una política fiscal alocada, más expansiva aún que la actual, con un ambiente de dinero escaso y caro; y fantasean con el alza del nivel general de precios, para aligerar el peso de la losa que tienen encima los 2-4 millones de hipotecados en "negative equity", importándoles un bledo la estabilidad del sistema financiero y la pérdida de poder de compra del resto de 14-15 millones de hogares.

Sin embargo, hay un ortograma, es decir, hay una ortodoxia bien arraigada en la mente de todos, ya vayan de Savile Row ya sean sans-culottes. Y quienes estamos en nuestro sitio, actuamos en consecuencia, aunque la lucha contra los resabiados, especialmente los más cínicos, nos cueste tanto sudor y lágrimas.

Nosotros, los PPCC, creíamos el día del Turning Point acabaría nuestra parresia en Internet... ¡entonces ha sido cuando ha empezado de verdad!

Gracias por leernos.

Publicado por: PISITÓFILOS CREDITÓFAGOS | 10/02/2014 en 12:12 p.m.

http://blogs.cincodias.com/vision-mercados/2014/10/invertir-en-infraestructuras.html#comments

[polov]

Dejo este artículo de Jesse Colombo:

http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/09/30/7-reasons-why-warning-about-economic-crises-is-insanely-frustrating/

7 Reasons Why It Is So Frustrating To Warn About Economic Crises

I have a hard time believing that six whole years have passed since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. My memories of this time are so vivid that it feels like it was only yesterday. I attribute this feeling to the fact that the Crash of 2008 was a very traumatic time for me as a recent college graduate who was looking to start a career in finance at the very worst time imaginable. That experience was what drove me to warn about the unsustainable nature of our debt-driven global economy even years after the financial crisis.

Since then, global central banks have managed to inflate new asset bubbles that are alarmingly similar to the ones that caused the financial crisis in the first place. While most people are aware that the global economy is struggling with anemic growth and burdensome debt, few understand that we are currently experiencing another bubble phase rather than a sustainable recovery. This is just one of the many challenges that people who warn about economic bubbles and resultant financial crises are forced to deal with as we attempt to educate the public in hope of preventing the next disaster.

Here are seven reasons why it is extremely frustrating to warn about bubbles and economic crises, even though I believe it has to be done anyway:

 1) People don’t believe you until the crisis happens

Many people are guilty of a cognitive error called normalcy bias in which they underestimate the probability of a crisis even after they are shown ample evidence of its likelihood. Those who have this mentality typically comfort themselves with thoughts such as “the government wouldn’t let such a disaster happen” or “2008 was a ‘hundred year storm’; it won’t happen again for a very long time” or “this time is different.” This “believe it when I see it” type of thinking makes it extremely difficult to rally a critical mass of people for the purpose of taking preventive action before it is too late.

2) Even many sympathizers don’t understand the full extent of the risks


There is another group of people who concede that we are on an unsustainable path, but do not understand how severe the coming crisis will be. People who think this way often believe that we may experience a recession, a bear market, or further economic stagnation, but stop short of believing that another calamity like 2008 or worse is possible.

3) People think that you’re too “negative”

When a bearish analyst shows facts to support their conclusions, many people simply write them and their evidence off as being “too negative” (as if a positive attitude will erase global debts and deflate asset bubbles).

4) People are apathetic

In my experience, there are people who may not have a hard time believing that another global financial crisis is coming, but they feel that the situation is so much larger than them that they simply take an apathetic stance instead of a proactive one. This type of apathy makes it very difficult to rally enough people to take necessary action.

5) Dealing with short-term thinkers

Many people, especially in the finance community, tend to care more about the short-term profit opportunities that bubbles create while turning a blind eye to the risks that these bubbles pose to society. I’ve been told many times, “stop worrying so much about bubbles, and start making money on them!”

6) Feeling alone


When warning about bubbles and economic crises, it’s very easy to feel like a “lone voice in the wilderness.” It’s difficult to watch the rest of society get caught up in frivolous bubble manias while feeling like a curmudgeon for warning about the inevitable hangover that will result.
7) Career risk

Economic bears who work in finance or the business world face career risk if they are too cautious as a result of their awareness of a coming crisis. At the same time, their risk-embracing colleagues receive praises while the bubble continues to inflate.

Despite these frustrations, I still believe it is well worth the sacrifice to warn about economic bubbles and trying to prevent another devastating crisis.

gracias por sus posts

[R.G.C.I.M.]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pGiMBTkqn0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT6O7dcs3v0

videos dejados por avatar en  el blog

Saludos

Gracias BLICHON.

Vean esos vídeos.

Por cuestiones informaticas que no vienen al caso, no puedo ver videos.
Dado que parecen muy interesantes tanto por los recomendantes como por las gracias; le agradecere una muy sucinta recension de sus tesis.
GRacias.

Sds.

[Oslodije2]

A ver si PPCC (si es verdad que trabaja en el entorno bancario) se entera de quién ha autorizado (desde fuera de España evidentemente) que sigan las investigaciones sobre Bankia

Yo creo que está ordenado desde fuera (la UE) pero lo van a llevar de forma electoralista, van a coger a algunos cabezas de turco y a colgarlos para dar la imagen de que han hecho algo en el caso que ha afectado a más T (las preferentes)

[sudden and sharp]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pGiMBTkqn0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT6O7dcs3v0

videos dejados por avatar en  el blog

Saludos

Gracias BLICHON.

Vean esos vídeos.

Por cuestiones informaticas que no vienen al caso, no puedo ver videos.
Dado que parecen muy interesantes tanto por los recomendantes como por las gracias; le agradecere una muy sucinta recension de sus tesis.
GRacias.

Sds.

No dicen nada qie no sepas. Sin embargo el primer video es inenarrable. Tienes que verlo. Ve a un ciber o bliblioteca, o ruega al vecino pero tienes que verlo.

A modo de resumen: Victoria !!!

[R.G.C.I.M.]

Maldita victoria .


En otro orden , no deja de joderme que este cobre la pasta que cobre y tenga las responsabilidades que tiene cuando nosotros estamos ahí 7 años antes y lo hacemos gratis ...
El cuento de los hermanos medicos chinos .

Sds

[visillófilas pepitófagas]

En otro orden , no deja de joderme que este cobre la pasta que cobre y tenga las responsabilidades que tiene cuando nosotros estamos ahí 7 años antes y lo hacemos gratis ...

Es lo que tiene la parresía...

[visillófilas pepitófagas]

Introductory statement to the press conference
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Naples, 2 October 2014

Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. I would like to thank Governor Visco for his kind hospitality and express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of today’s meeting of the Governing Council. We will now report on the outcome of our meeting.

Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, and in line with our forward guidance, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Following up on the decisions of 4 September 2014, we also decided on the key operational details of both the asset-backed securities purchase programme and the new covered bond purchase programme.

This will allow us to start purchasing covered bonds and asset-backed securities (ABSs) in the fourth quarter of 2014, starting with covered bonds in the second half of October. The programmes will last for at least two years. Together with the series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations to be conducted until June 2016, these purchases will have a sizeable impact on our balance sheet.

The new measures will support specific market segments that play a key role in the financing of the economy. They will thereby further enhance the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, facilitate credit provision to the broad economy and generate positive spillovers to other markets. Taking into account the overall subdued outlook for inflation, the weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum over the recent past and the continued subdued monetary and credit dynamics, our asset purchases should ease the monetary policy stance more broadly. They should also strengthen our forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates and reinforce the fact that there are significant and increasing differences in the monetary policy cycle between major advanced economies.

Together with the monetary accommodation already in place, the determined implementation of the new measures will underpin the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations, in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. As all our measures work their way through to the economy they will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to our aim. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council is unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate.

A separate press release will provide further information on the modalities of our new purchase programmes for ABSs and covered bonds. It will be released at 3.30 p.m.

Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Following four quarters of moderate expansion, euro area real GDP remained unchanged between the first and second quarter of this year. Survey data available up to September confirm the weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum, while remaining consistent with a modest economic expansion in the second half of the year. Looking ahead to 2015, the outlook for a moderate recovery in the euro area remains in place, but the main factors and assumptions shaping this assessment need to be monitored closely. Domestic demand should be supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing improvements in financial conditions, the progress made in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, and lower energy prices supporting real disposable income. Furthermore, demand for exports should benefit from the global recovery. At the same time, the recovery is likely to continue to be dampened by high unemployment, sizeable unutilised capacity, continued negative bank loan growth to the private sector, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and private sectors.

The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area remain on the downside. In particular, the recent weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum, alongside heightened geopolitical risks, could dampen confidence and, in particular, private investment. In addition, insufficient progress in structural reforms in euro area countries constitutes a key downward risk to the economic outlook.

According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation was 0.3% in September 2014, after 0.4% in August. Compared with the previous month, this reflects a stronger decline in energy prices and somewhat lower price increases in most other components of the HICP. On the basis of current information, annual HICP inflation is expected to remain at low levels over the coming months, before increasing gradually during 2015 and 2016.

The Governing Council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term. In this context, we will focus in particular on the possible repercussions of dampened growth dynamics, geopolitical developments, exchange rate developments and the pass-through of our monetary policy measures.

Turning to the monetary analysis, data for August 2014 continue to point to subdued underlying growth in broad money (M3), with the annual growth rate increasing moderately to 2.0% in August, after 1.8% in July. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 5.8% in August.

The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained negative at -2.0% in August, after -2.2% in the previous month. On average over recent months, net redemptions have moderated from the historically high levels recorded a year ago. Lending to non-financial corporations continues to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was 0.5% in August, broadly unchanged since the beginning of 2013.

Against the background of weak credit growth, the ECB is now close to finalising the comprehensive assessment of banks’ balance sheets, which is of key importance to overcome credit supply constraints.

To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirms the recent decisions taken by the Governing Council to provide further monetary policy accommodation and to support lending to the real economy.

Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodative stance contributes to supporting economic activity. However, in order to strengthen investment activity, job creation and potential growth, other policy areas need to contribute decisively. In particular, the legislation and implementation of structural reforms clearly need to gain momentum in several countries. This applies to product and labour markets as well as to actions to improve the business environment for firms. As regards fiscal policies, euro area countries should not unravel the progress already made and should proceed in line with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. This should be reflected in the draft budgetary plans for 2015 that governments will now deliver, in which they will address the relevant country-specific recommendations. The Pact should remain the anchor for confidence in sustainable public finances, and the existing flexibility within the rules should allow governments to address the budgetary costs of major structural reforms, to support demand and to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. A full and consistent implementation of the euro area’s existing fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance framework is key to bringing down high public debt ratios, to raising potential growth and to increasing the euro area’s resilience to shocks.

We are now at your disposal for questions.

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is141002.en.html

[visillófilas pepitófagas]

2 October 2014 - ECB announces operational details of asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase programmes

- Programmes will last at least two years

- Will enhance transmission of monetary policy, support provision of credit to the euro area economy and, as a result, provide further monetary policy accommodation

- Eurosystem collateral framework is guiding principle for eligibility of assets for purchase

- Asset purchases to start in fourth quarter 2014, starting with covered bonds in second half of October

The Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) today agreed key details regarding the operation of its new programmes to buy simple and transparent asset-backed securities (ABSs) and a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds. Together with the targeted longer-term refinancing operations, the purchase programmes will further enhance the transmission of monetary policy. They will facilitate credit provision to the euro area economy, generate positive spill-overs to other markets and, as a result, ease the ECB’s monetary policy stance. These measures will have a sizeable impact on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and will contribute to a return of inflation rates to levels closer to 2%.

The Eurosystem’s collateral framework – the rules that lay out which assets are acceptable as collateral for monetary policy credit operations – will be the guiding principle for deciding the eligibility of assets to be bought under the ABS purchase programme (ABSPP) and covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3). There will be some adjustments to take into account the difference between accepting assets as collateral and buying assets outright. To ensure that the programmes can include the whole euro area, ABSs and covered bonds from Greece and Cyprus that are currently not eligible as collateral for monetary policy operations will be subject to specific rules with risk-mitigating measures.

The two programmes will last for at least two years and are likely to have a stimulating effect on issuance. Asset purchases will commence in the fourth quarter of 2014, starting with covered bonds in the second half of October. The ABSPP will start after external service providers have been selected, following an ongoing procurement process.

Further technical details on the ABSPP are provided in Annex 1 of this press release and on CBPP3 in Annex 2.

Annex 1: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141002_1_Annex_1.pdf?c4144e9908c29df066a053246f81d1ff

Annex 2: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141002_1_Annex_2.pdf?0ba2a520b8a2b7ad8ff6bfb99333ba25

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr141002_1.en.html