Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-13/miners-buried-billions-debt-after-colossal-misjudgment-demand

Miners destroyed...?

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Back in May we brought you "The Real Story Behind Deutsche Bank's Latest Book Cooking Settlement," in which we detailed the circumstances that led the bank to settle claims it mismarked its crisis-era derivatives book to the tune of at least $5 billion.

Deutsche Bank settled the issue with the SEC for the laughable sum of $55 million a few months back.

The SEC inquiry was prompted, in part, by Dr. Eric Ben-Artzi who was fired from Deutsche Bank in 2011 after expressing his concerns about the bank's valuation methodology.

What follows is the real, play-by-play account of Ben-Artzi's dismissal from Deutsche Bank, told in its entirety for the first time.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-14/exclusive-inside-story-how-deutsche-bank-deals-whistleblowers

[juancoco]

Back in May we brought you "The Real Story Behind Deutsche Bank's Latest Book Cooking Settlement," in which we detailed the circumstances that led the bank to settle claims it mismarked its crisis-era derivatives book to the tune of at least $5 billion.

Deutsche Bank settled the issue with the SEC for the laughable sum of $55 million a few months back.

The SEC inquiry was prompted, in part, by Dr. Eric Ben-Artzi who was fired from Deutsche Bank in 2011 after expressing his concerns about the bank's valuation methodology.

What follows is the real, play-by-play account of Ben-Artzi's dismissal from Deutsche Bank, told in its entirety for the first time.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-14/exclusive-inside-story-how-deutsche-bank-deals-whistleblowers

Too big to jail.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/will-computer-algorithms-replace-humans-in-financial-markets-by-robert-j--shiller-2015-07

NEW HAVEN – In their new book The Incredible Shrinking Alpha, Larry E. Swedroe and Andrew L. Berkin describe an investment environment populated by increasingly sophisticated analysts who rely on big data, powerful computers, and scholarly research. With all this competition, “the hurdles to achieving alpha [returns above a risk-adjusted benchmark – and thus a measure of success in picking individual investments] are getting higher and higher.”

That conclusion raises a key question: Will alpha eventually go to zero for every imaginable investment strategy? More fundamentally, is the day approaching when, thanks to so many smart people and smarter computers, financial markets really do become perfect, and we can just sit back, relax, and assume that all assets are priced correctly?

This imagined state of affairs might be called the financial singularity, analogous to the hypothetical future technological singularity, when computers replace human intelligence. The financial singularity implies that all investment decisions would be better left to a computer program, because the experts with their algorithms have figured out what drives market outcomes and reduced it to a seamless system.

Many believe that we are almost there. Even legendary investors like Warren Buffett, it is argued, are not really outperforming the market. In a recent paper, “Buffett’s Alpha,” Andrea Frazzini and David Kabiller of AQR Capital Management and Lasse Pedersen of Copenhagen Business School, conclude that Buffett is not generating significantly positive alpha if one takes account of certain lesser-known risk factors that have weighed heavily in his portfolio. The implication is that Buffet’s genius could be replicated by a computer program that incorporates these factors.

If that were true, investors would abandon, en masse, their efforts to ferret out mispricing in the market, because there wouldn’t be any. Market participants would rationally assume that every stock price is the true expected present value of future cash flows, with the appropriate rate of discount, and that those cash flows reflect fundamentals that everyone understands the same way. Investors’ decisions would diverge only because of differences in their personal situation. For example, an automotive engineer might not buy automotive stocks – and might even short them – as a way to hedge the risk to his or her own particular type of human capital. Indeed, according to a computer crunching big data, this would be an optimal decision.

There is a long-recognized problem with such perfect markets: No one would want to expend any effort to figure out what oscillations in prices mean for the future. Thirty-five years ago, in their classic paper, “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz presented this problem as a paradox: Perfectly efficient markets require the effort of smart money to make them so; but if markets were perfect, smart money would give up trying.

The Grossman-Stiglitz conundrum seems less compelling in the financial singularity if we can imagine that computers direct all the investment decisions. Although alpha may be vanishingly small, it still represents enough profit to keep the computers running.

But the real problem with this vision of financial singularity is not the Grossman-Stiglitz conundrum; it is that real-world markets are nowhere close to it. Computer enthusiasts are excited by things like the blockchain used by Bitcoin (covered on an education website called Singularity University, in a section dramatically titled Exponential Finance). But the futurists’ financial world bears no resemblance to today’s financial world. After all, the financial singularity implies that all prices would be based on such things as optimally projected future corporate profits and the correlation of profits with expected technological innovations and long-term demographic changes. But the smart money hardly ever talks in such ethereal terms.

In this context, it is difficult not to think of China’s recent stock-market plunge. News accounts depict hordes of emotional people trading on hunch and superstition. That looks a lot more like reality than all the talk of impending financial singularity.

Markets seem to be driven by stories, as I emphasize in my book Irrational Exuberance. There are stories of great new eras and of looming depressions. There are fundamental stories about technology and declining resources. And there are stories about politics and bizarre conspiracies.

No one knows if these stories are true, but they take on a life of their own. Sometimes they go viral. When one has a heart-to-heart talk with many seemingly rational people, they turn out to have crazy theories. These people influence markets, because all other investors must reckon with them; and their craziness is not going away anytime soon.

Maybe Buffett’s past investing style can be captured in a trading algorithm today. But that does not necessarily detract from his genius. Indeed, the true source of his success may consist in his understanding of when to abandon one method and devise another.

The idea of financial singularity may seem inspiring; but it is no less illusory than the rational Utopia that inspired generations of central planners. Human judgment, good and bad, will drive investment decisions and financial-market outcomes for the rest of our lives and beyond.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

"Locos por la volatilidad" de Kike Vázquez

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/perlas-de-kike/2015-07-16/locos-por-la-volatilidad_928085/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-16/icahn-vs-fink-wall-street-legends-clash-over-dangerous-etfs

Y recordemos que Fink es el Master & Commander de Blackrock...

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/calm-storm

Even as protests spread across the Middle East in early 2011, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria appeared immune from the upheaval. Assad had ruled comfortably for over a decade, having replaced his father, Hafez, who himself had held power for the previous three decades. Many pundits argued that Syria’s sturdy police state, which exercised tight control over the country’s people and economy, would survive the Arab Spring undisturbed. Compared with its neighbor Lebanon, Syria looked positively stable. Civil war had torn through Lebanon throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 had plunged the country into yet more chaos. 


But appearances were deceiving: today, Syria is in a shambles, with the regime fighting for its very survival, whereas Lebanon has withstood the influx of Syrian refugees and the other considerable pressures of the civil war next door. Surprising as it may seem, the per capita death rate from violence in Lebanon in 2013 was lower than that in Washington, D.C. That same year, the body count of the Syrian conflict surpassed 100,000. 


Why has seemingly stable Syria turned out to be the fragile regime, whereas always-in-turmoil Lebanon has so far proved robust? The answer is that prior to its civil war, Syria was exhibiting only pseudo-stability, its calm façade concealing deep structural vulnerabilities. Lebanon’s chaos, paradoxically, signaled strength. Fifteen years of civil war had served to decentralize the state and bring about a more balanced sectarian power-sharing structure. Along with Lebanon’s small size as an administrative unit, these factors added to its durability. So did the country’s free-market economy. In Syria, the ruling Baath Party sought to control economic variability, replacing the lively chaos of the ancestral souk with the top-down, Soviet-style structure of the office building. This rigidity made Syria (and the other Baathist state, Iraq) much more vulnerable to disruption than Lebanon.


But Syria’s biggest vulnerability was that it had no recent record of recovering from turmoil. Countries that have survived past bouts of chaos tend to be vaccinated against future ones. Thus, the best indicator of a country’s future stability is not past stability but moderate volatility in the relatively recent past. As one of us, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, wrote in the 2007 book The Black Swan, “Dictatorships that do not appear volatile, like, say, Syria or Saudi Arabia, face a larger risk of chaos than, say, Italy, as the latter has been in a state of continual political turmoil since the second [world] war.” 


The divergent tales of Syria and Lebanon demonstrate that the best early warning signs of instability are found not in historical data but in underlying structural properties. Past experience can be extremely effective when it comes to detecting risks of cancer, crime, and earthquakes. But it is a bad bellwether of complex political and economic events, particularly so-called tail risks—events, such as coups and financial crises, that are highly unlikely but enormously consequential. For those, the evidence of risk comes too late to do anything about it, and a more sophisticated approach is required.


Thus, instead of trying in vain to predict such “Black Swan” events, it’s much more fruitful to focus on how systems can handle disorder—in other words, to study how fragile they are. Although one cannot predict what events will befall a country, one can predict how events will affect a country. Some political systems can sustain an extraordinary amount of stress, while others fall apart at the onset of the slightest trouble. The good news is that it’s possible to tell which are which by relying on the theory of fragility. 


Simply put, fragility is aversion to disorder. Things that are fragile do not like variability, volatility, stress, chaos, and random events, which cause them to either gain little or suffer. A teacup, for example, will not benefit from any form of shock. It wants peace and predictability, something that is not possible in the long run, which is why time is an enemy to the fragile. What’s more, things that are fragile respond to shock in a nonlinear fashion. With humans, for example, the harm from a ten-foot fall in no way equals ten times as much harm as from a one-foot fall. In political and economic terms, a $30 drop in the price of a barrel of oil is much more than twice as harmful to Saudi Arabia as a $15 drop.


For countries, fragility has five principal sources: a centralized governing system, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, a lack of political variability, and no history of surviving past shocks. Applying these criteria, the world map looks a lot different. Disorderly regimes come out as safer bets than commonly thought—and seemingly placid states turn out to be ticking time bombs. 


THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD

The first marker of a fragile state is a concentrated decision-making system. On its face, centralization seems to make governments more efficient and thus more stable. But that stability is an illusion. Apart from in the military—the only sector that needs to be unified into a single structure—centralization contributes to fragility. Although centralization reduces deviations from the norm, making things appear to run more smoothly, it magnifies the consequences of those deviations that do occur. It concentrates turmoil in fewer but more severe episodes, which are disproportionately more harmful than cumulative small variations. In other words, centralization decreases local risks, such as provincial barons pocketing public funds, at the price of increasing systemic risks, such as disastrous national-level reforms. Accordingly, highly centralized states, such as the Soviet Union, are more fragile than decentralized ones, such as Switzerland, which is effectively composed of village-states. 


States that centralize power often do so to suppress sectarian tension. That inability to handle diversity, whether political or ethnoreligious, further adds to their fragility. Although countries that allow their sectarian splits to remain out in the open may seem to experience political turmoil, they are considerably more stable than those that artificially repress those splits, which creates a discontented minority group that brews silently. Iraq, for example, had a Sunni-minority-led regime under Saddam Hussein that repressed the Shiites and the Kurds; the country overshot in the opposite direction after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, took office in 2006 and began excluding the Sunnis. Indeed, research by the scholar Yaneer Bar-Yam has shown that states that have well-defined boundaries separating various ethnic groups experience less violence than those that attempt to integrate them. In other words, people are better next-door neighbors than roommates. Thus, in countries riven by sectarian divides, it makes more sense to give various groups their own fiefdoms than to force them to live under one roof, since the latter arrangement only serves to radicalize the repressed minority. 


Moreover, centralization increases the odds of a military coup by making the levers of power easier to seize. Greece, for example, was highly centralized when a group of colonels overthrew the government in 1967. Italy might have appeared just as vulnerable around the same time, given that it also suffered from widespread social unrest and ideological conflict, but it was saved by its political decentralization and narrow geography. The various economic and political centers were both figuratively and literally far from one another, distance that prevented any single military faction from seizing power.


Just as states composed of semiautonomous units have fared well in the modern era, further back in history, the most resilient polities were city-states that operated under empires that provided a measure of protection, from Pax Romana to Pax Ottomana. But at the tail end of their existence, many empires began to centralize, including Pharaonic Egypt and the Ming dynasty in China. In both cases, the empires tightened the reins after, not before, they thrived, ruling out centralization as a cause of their success and fingering it as an explanation for their subsequent failure. 


City-states both old and new—from Venice to Dubai to Geneva to Singapore—owe their success to their smallness. Those who compare political systems by looking at their character without taking into account their size are thus making an analytic error: city-states are remarkably diverse in terms of their political systems, from the most democratic (Venice) to the most enlightened but autocratic (Singapore). Just as an elephant is not a large mouse, China is not a bigger version of Singapore, even if the two share similar styles of government. 


Again, consider Lebanon. For much of history, the Mediterranean was ringed by multilingual, religiously tolerant, and obsessively mercantile city-states, which accommodated a variety of empires. But most were eventually swallowed up by the modern nation-states. Alexandria was consumed by Egypt, Smyrna by Turkey, Thessaloniki by Greece, and Aleppo by Syria. Luckily for Lebanon, however, it was swallowed up by Beirut, not vice versa. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the state of Lebanon was small and weak enough to get colonized by the city-state of Beirut. The result: over the past half century, living standards in Lebanon have risen in comparison to its peers. The country avoided the wave of statism that swept over the region with Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria, a trend that concentrated decision-making power and created dysfunctional bureaucracies, leading to many of the region’s problems today.


UNSTEADY-STATE ECONOMY


The second soft spot is the absence of economic diversity. Economic concentration can be even more harmful than political centralization. Economists since David Ricardo have touted the gains in efficiency to be had if countries specialize in the sectors in which they hold a comparative advantage. But specialization makes a state more vulnerable in the face of random events.


For a state to be safe, the loss of a single source of income should not dramatically damage its overall economic condition. Places that depend on tourism, for example, are particularly susceptible to perceived instability (as Greece discovered after its economic crisis and Egypt discovered after its revolution), as well as unrelated events (as Hawaii found out immediately after 9/11) and even just the vagaries of fashion, as new hot spots replace older ones (as Tangier, Morocco, has come to recognize). Another common source of fragility is an economy built around a single commodity, such as Botswana, with its reliance on diamonds, or a single industry that accounts for the lion’s share of exports, such as Japan’s automobile sector. Even worse is when large state-sponsored or state-friendly enterprises dominate the economy; these tend to not only reduce competitiveness but also compound the downside risks of drops in demand for a particular commodity or product by responding only slowly and awkwardly to market signals.


The third source of fragility is also economic in nature: being highly indebted and highly leveraged. Debt is perhaps the single most critical source of fragility. It makes an entity more sensitive to shortfalls in revenue, and all the more so as those shortfalls accelerate. As Lehman Brothers experienced when it collapsed in 2008, as the confidence of investors wanes and requests for repayment grow, losses mount at an increasing rate. Debt issued by a state itself is perhaps the most vicious type of debt, because it doesn’t turn into equity; instead, it becomes a permanent burden. Countries cannot easily go bankrupt—which, ironically, is the main reason people lend to them, believing that their investments are safe.


Leverage raises risks in much the same way. Dubai, for example, has plowed money into aggressive real estate projects, increasing its operating leverage and thus making any drops in revenue extremely threatening. Profit margins there are so thin that shortfalls could easily accelerate, which would rapidly push the emirate’s companies into the red and drain state coffers. This means that Dubai, in spite of its admirable structure and governance, can rapidly go insolvent—as the world witnessed after the 2008 financial crisis, when Abu Dhabi had to bail it out.


THE VIRTUE OF VOLATILITY


The fourth source of fragility is a lack of political variability. Contrary to conventional wisdom, genuinely stable countries experience moderate political changes, continually switching governments and reversing their political orientations. By responding to pressures in the body politic, these changes promote stability, provided their magnitude is not too large—more like the gap between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the contemporary United Kingdom than that between the Jacobins and the royalists in revolutionary France. Moderate political variability also removes particular leaders from power, thus reducing cronyism in politics. When a state is decentralized, the variations are smoother still, since municipalities distribute decision-making power and allow for a plurality of political views.


It is political variability that makes democracies less fragile than autocracies. Italy is resilient precisely because it has been able to accommodate virtually constant political turmoil, training citizens for change and incubating institutions able to correct for mild instability. So far, perhaps predictably, none of the former dictatorships touched by the Arab Spring has demonstrated any such capacity. Egypt has reverted to military rule, and the others have fallen into varying degrees of chaos. Some states that emerged from autocratic rule without devolving into turmoil were able to develop means of accommodating change. Spain under Francisco Franco, for instance, over time became more and more an autocratic façade behind which the institutions of civil society could develop.


The fifth marker of fragility takes the proposition that there is no stability without volatility a step further: it is the lack of a record of surviving big shocks. States that have experienced a worst-case scenario in the recent past (say, around the previous two decades) and recovered from it are likely to be more stable than those that haven’t. In part, this marker is simply providing information: countries that sustain chaos without falling apart reveal something about their strength that could not be discovered otherwise. But this marker also involves the idea of “antifragility,” the property of gaining from disorder. Shocks to a state are educational, causing them to experience posttraumatic growth. 


Look at Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The fact that these countries weathered the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis suggests that they were robust enough to survive—and their impressive subsequent performance suggests that they might even have been antifragile, adjusting their institutions and practices based on the lessons of the crisis. Likewise, the fact that the former Soviet states have recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that they are also relatively stable. The idea is analogous to child rearing: parents want to protect their children from truly serious shocks that they might not survive but should not want to shelter them from the challenges in life that make them tougher.


THE BEAUTIFUL AND DAMNED

These five markers function best as warning signals. They cannot indicate with high confidence whether a given country is stable—no methodology can—but they certainly can reveal if a given country should cause worry. Those countries that score poorly on multiple criteria are particularly concerning, since these markers are compounding: qualifying as fragile on two counts is more than twice as dangerous as doing so on one. When it comes to overall fragility, countries can vary from exhibiting no signs of fragility to being very fragile.


Saudi Arabia is an easy call: it is extremely dependent on oil, has no political variability, and is highly centralized. Its oil wealth and powerful government have papered over the splits between its ethnoreligious units, with the Shiite minority living where the oil is. For the same reason, Bahrain should be considered extremely fragile, mainly on account of its repressed Shiite majority.


Egypt should also be considered fragile, given its only slight and cosmetic recovery from the chaos of the revolution and its highly centralized (and bureaucratic) government. So should Venezuela, which has a highly centralized political system, little political variability, an oil-based economy, and no record of surviving a massive shock. Some of the same problems apply to Russia. It remains highly dependent on oil and gas production and has a highly centralized political system. Its one redeeming factor is that it surmounted the difficult transition from the Soviet era. For that reason, it probably lies somewhere between moderately fragile and fragile.


Some countries are best categorized as fragile but possibly doing something about it. Greece holds enormous quantities of debt and has an inflexible political system, but it has begun to undertake an economic restructuring. (Time will tell whether this is the beginning of a new era of responsibility or a false start.) Iran has an effectively centralized government that exhibits little variability and an economy tied to oil and gas production, yet the regime has been tolerating (although only implicitly) a measure of political dissent. And although Iran is nominally a theocracy, unlike Saudi Arabia, it appears to have an extremely adaptive form of Islam that may accommodate modernization. Greece and Iran could transform into more robust states or lapse into fragility.


Moderately fragile states include Japan, given its highest-in-the-world debt-to-gdp ratio, long-term dominance by a single party, dependence on exports, and failure to fully recover from its “lost decade”; Brazil, which is growing increasingly centralized and bureaucratized; Nigeria, which is highly centralized and dependent on oil yet has rebounded from the economic and political turmoil of the 1980s and proved somewhat adaptable in the face of new threats, such as the Islamist insurgent group Boko Haram; and Turkey, which is highly centralized and has no track record of recovery. (In addition, Turkey’s dependence on foreign investment is incompatible with its aggressive pro-Islamist foreign policy, which turns off Western investors.) India is perhaps best considered slightly fragile. Its political system is relatively decentralized and has adapted to rapid population growth and uneven economic progress, and its economy is somewhat reliant on exports. 


Italy, paradoxically, shows no signs of fragility. It is effectively decentralized and has bounced back from perennial political crises. It also experiences a great deal of harmless political variability, cycling through 14 prime ministerial terms in the past 25 years. France, by contrast, is more fragile—centralized (in spite of the lip service it pays to decentralization), indebted, and without a demonstrated comeback. The country is at risk of economic trauma, which would raise the danger of erratic political reactions. Those, in turn, would likely enhance the appeal of right-wing factions and radicalize the country’s significant Muslim minority. 


Then there is the China puzzle. China’s stunning economic growth makes its future hard to assess. The country has recuperated remarkably well from the major shocks of the Maoist period. That era, however, ended nearly four decades ago, and so the recovery is hardly a recent comeback and thus less certain to protect against future shocks. What’s more, China’s political system is highly centralized, its economy is dependent on exports to the West, and its government has been on a borrowing binge as of late, making the country more vulnerable to slowdowns in both domestic and foreign growth. Are the gains from past turmoil big enough to offset the weakness from debt and centralization? The most likely answer is no—that what gains China has accrued by learning from trauma are dwarfed by its burdens. With each passing year, those lessons recede further into the past, and the prospects of a Black Swan of Beijing loom larger. But the sooner that event happens, the better China will emerge in the long run.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-17/china-increases-gold-holdings-57-one-month-first-official-update-2009

Back in April we wrote that "The Mystery Of China's Gold Holdings Is Coming To An End" as a result of China willingness to add the Yuan to the IMF's SDR currency basket which would require the disclosure of China's gold holding ahead of an IMF meeting on SDR composition which may be held in October.

By way of background, the reason why everyone has been so focused on Chinese official gold holdings is that there has been no official update to the gold inventory of the world's biggest nation, which have been fixed at 33.89 million oz since April 2009, a little over 1000 tons. In other words, the PBOC's gold inventory has been "unchanged" for over 6 years which is in stark contrast to the ravenous buying of physical gold China has been engaging in for the past 5 years.

As we further noted in April, "with China disclosing so little about its hoard, finding out how much the central bank has in its vaults is of increasing interest to traders. Confirmation of bigger holdings would signal the importance of the metal as a reserve asset and boost market sentiment, TD Securities’ Melek said. At a time when prices are languishing, the buying could give support, said Suki Cooper, director of commodities at Barclays Plc in New York."

In a rare comment on gold, Yi Gang, the central bank’s deputy governor, said in March 2013 that the country could only invest as much as 2 percent of its foreign-exchange holdings in gold because the market was too small. The press office of the People’s Bank of China in Beijing didn’t respond to a fax seeking comment sent on April 14.

Well, the long awaited moment has finally arrived and this morning, after a 6 year delay when, China finally admitted that it had been misrepresenting its gold holdings for a very long time, when it announced that its gold holdings had increased from 38.89 million to 53.31 million troy ounces, a 57% increase "in one month."

The amounts to a new grand total of 1658 metric tons, an increase of 604 tons from the 1054 reported last in 2009 and which according to the PBOC was also the May 2015 total.

What is surprising about this release are three things:

First, while we welcome some long overdue "transparency", the number is well below official expectations. This is what Bloomberg said previously: "The People’s Bank of China may have tripled holdings of bullion since it last updated them in April 2009, to 3,510 metric tons, says Bloomberg Intelligence, based on trade data, domestic output and China Gold Association figures. A stockpile that big would be second only to the 8,133.5 tons in the U.S."

Second, China has finally admitted that its official gold numbers were fabricated (alongside all other official data released from the communist country) as it is impossible the PBOC could have bought 600 tons of gold in the open market in June when the price of the yellow metal actually dropped by 2%.

Third, and perhaps most important, is the reasoning behind the increase. While in April it was expected that China will be focused on SDR acceptance of the Yuan, that was subsequently refuted when it became clear that the IMF has no intention of making such a decision any time soon.  So why make the disclosure?

PBOC SAYS GOLD RESERVE INCREASE AIMS TO ENSURE SECURITY
And from the PBOC:

Gold as a special asset, with multiple attributes financial and commodities, together with other assets to help regulate and optimize the overall risk-return characteristics of international reserves portfolio. From the perspective of long-term and strategic perspective, if necessary, dynamically adjusted international reserves portfolio allocation, safety, liquidity and increasing the value of international reserve assets.
In other words, China had to wait until its stock market was crashing to present the "systemic stability" bazooka: gold.

Because in revealing a surge in its gold holdings, the PBOC is hoping to finally provide that final missing link that will boost investor sentiment, and get people buying stocks all over again.

And now that the seal has been finally broken after so many years, and since today's update indicates that Chinese gold numbers are clearly goal-seeked with a specific policy purpose - to boost confidence - we await for the PBOC to start leaking incremental gold holding data every month (and especially in months when the market crashes) which will bring us ever closer to what China's true gold holdings are.

* * *

The SAFE's full accompanying Q&A statement with reporters on its latest reserves is below (google translated):

http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/!ut/p/c5/hY2xDoIwAES_xS_oVWpbxlJjW4uAaVRkIR0MIRFwMH6_EGf1bnx5d6Qhc8f46rv47Kcx3klNGt4yIMiMKpQh3cGllEklqgSgM7_yVhtlmcgByQzgWFYWVh8pXPLHvix_vLV6qw_eUEh_lnBuE_T-5Nc6Fx_-a3_h-BIFUthpuJHHUKOvutUbGRxr1w!!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfSENEQ01LRzEwODRJQzBJSUpRRUpKSDEySTI!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/safe_web_store/safe_web/whxw/sjjd/node_news_sjjd_store/fa6d5d80492308f2b580f781806a8331

People's Bank of China, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the official answered reporters' questions on China's total foreign debts, foreign exchange reserves, gold reserves, etc.

 To further enhance the quality and transparency of foreign data, fully reflects the outcome of the internationalization of RMB recently, People's Bank of China, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange SDDS according to IMF data (SDDS) announced the country's foreign exchange reserves, gold reserves, and other data, corresponding adjustment of the caliber of external debt data, published a full-bore renminbi debt, including the debt included. People's Bank of China, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange person in charge of related issues answered reporters' questions.

First, what SDDS is?

A: SDDS namely IMF (IMF) Special Data Dissemination Standard of, is an international standard on countries' economic and financial statistics published by IMF enacted in 1996, the English name Special Data Dissemination Standard, referred to as the SDDS.

In order to improve the transparency of the Member States of macroeconomic statistics, IMF has developed GDDS (GDDS) and Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) two sets of data dissemination standards. Both the overall framework basically the same, but in actuality, SDDS for data coverage, publication frequency, timeliness released, data quality, and other aspects of the public can get more demanding. SDDS the countries need to adopt in accordance with the requirements of the standard, published data of the real economy, fiscal, monetary, foreign and socio-demographic and other five sectors.

Currently, there are 73 economies adopted SDDS, including all developed economies, as well as Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa and other major emerging market countries. GDDS country had been announced by macroeconomic data.

Second, why should the adoption of SDDS?

A: With the deepening of economic globalization, improve data quality, make up the data gaps and enhance data comparability and enhance data transparency become a consensus. China's proactive response and internationally accepted data standards initiative, in November 2014, the Chairman Xi Jinping at the G20 summit in Brisbane officially announced that China will adopt the IMF Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS). After a series of technical preparations, the current standard conditions according to SDDS data published ripe.

Adopted SDDS, in line with our needs further reform and expand opening-up, help to improve the transparency of macroeconomic statistics, reliability and international comparability, promote the improvement of statistical methods; to further find out the macroeconomic real situation, as the country's macroeconomic provide the basis for decision-making to prevent and defuse financial risks; conducive to China's active participation in global economic cooperation, enhance the international community and public confidence in the domestic economy.

Three , according to the SDDS reserves data released specifically what?

A: The foreign exchange reserves, according to data released SDDS carried out, including the "official reserve assets" and "International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Data Template" in two parts. "Official Reserve Assets" includes the foreign exchange reserves, IMF reserve positions and special drawing rights (SDR), gold, other reserve assets of five projects, including "reserves" This project corresponds to the size of our country's foreign exchange reserves in the past announced ; "International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Data Template" includes four tables of official reserve assets and other foreign currency assets, the predetermined short-term net outflow of foreign currency assets and foreign currency assets or net outflow of short-term, memos.

On the publishing frequency, two pieces of data are released monthly, including "official reserve assets" not later than the seventh day of general release of the data at the beginning of each month on month, "International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity Data Template" general release in the end of each month data. Since this is the first release, we have also released two pieces of data, to facilitate your control, according to the corresponding time in the future will be published separately requirements.

On statistical methods, in full accordance with IMF to carry out uniform standards relevant statistics.

Fourth, the comparative size of foreign exchange reserves in the past released the recently released data which points?

A: There are three main aspects:

(1) This announcement is fully consistent with the country's reserves of foreign exchange reserves in the past announced the size of caliber. The size of our country's foreign exchange reserves in the past has been published in accordance with the relevant methods and standards of statistics in SDDS. As of the end of June 2015, China's foreign exchange reserves of $ 3.69 trillion.
(2) new released other foreign currency assets. As of the end of June 2015, the Bank of other foreign currency assets of $ 232.9 billion.
(3) adjusted by the size of its gold reserves. As of the end of June 2015, the scale of China's gold reserves to 53.32 million ounces (equivalent to 1,658 tons).
Five , gold reserves according to data released this time, compared with the scale of China's gold reserves since the end of April 2009 increased by 604 tons. Why should our holdings of gold reserves?

A: The gold reserve has been an important element of international reserve diversification countries constituted the majority of the central bank's international reserves have gold, country as well. Gold as a special asset, with multiple attributes financial and commodities, together with other assets to help regulate and optimize the overall risk-return characteristics of international reserves portfolio. From the perspective of long-term and strategic perspective, if necessary, dynamically adjusted international reserves portfolio allocation, safety, liquidity and increasing the value of international reserve assets.

Six , in recent years, international gold prices volatile, the current round of holdings of gold reserves is at what time what channel from holdings? Whether the future will continue to overweight?

A: With the prices of other commodities and financial assets, the international gold prices also ebb. Over the past few years, gold prices continued to rise to a record high, the gradual decline. Our asset-based valuation and price changes for gold analysis, under the premise of impact and influence in the right markets, at home and abroad through a variety of channels, this part of the gradual accumulation of gold reserves. Overweight channels including domestic miscellaneous gold purification, production Shouzhu, domestic and foreign market transactions and other means.

Gold has a special risk-return characteristics, at a particular time is a good investment products. But the capacity of the gold market is small compared with the scale of China's foreign exchange reserves, if a large number of short-term foreign exchange reserves to buy gold, easily affect the market. At present, China has become the world's largest gold producer, is also a big consumer of gold, "hidden gold to the people," the situation has been happening. The need to continue and consider the future of private investment demand and international reserve asset allocation, flexible operation.

Y:

https://www.bullionstar.com/blogs/koos-jansen/analyzing-pboc-official-gold-reserves-update/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/g20-infrastructure-investment-by-nancy-alexander-2015-07/spanish

WASHINGTON, DC – Parece que estamos entrando en una nueva era de megaproyectos: los países –en especial los del G20– movilizan al sector privado para que invierta fuertemente en iniciativas de infraestructura de millones, miles de millones, o billones de dólares, como ductos, represas, sistemas eléctricos e hídricos, y redes de caminos.

El gasto en megaproyectos ya representa aproximadamente entre 6 y 9 billones de dólares al año, aproximadamente el 8 % del PBI mundial, y constituye «la mayor bonanza de inversiones en la historia humana». Y la geopolítica, junto con la búsqueda del crecimiento económico, de nuevos mercados y de recursos naturales, canalizan aún más financiamiento hacia los proyectos de infraestructura de gran escala. En la cúspide de una posible explosión sin precedentes de este tipo de proyectos, tanto los líderes mundiales como los prestamistas parecen relativamente ajenos a las costosas lecciones que nos ha dejado el pasado.

Ciertamente, las inversiones en infraestructura pueden atender a necesidades reales y ayudar a cubrir el esperado aumento en la demanda de alimentos, agua y energía. Pero, a menos que la explosión de los megaproyectos se redirija y gestione cuidadosamente, es probable que el esfuerzo resulte contraproducente e insostenible. Sin controles democráticos, los inversores pueden privatizar las ganancias y socializar las pérdidas, consolidando enfoques con elevadas emisiones de carbono y que generan otros perjuicios ambientales y sociales.

Para comenzar, tenemos la cuestión de la rentabilidad. En vez de adoptar filosofías del tipo «lo pequeño es hermoso» o «cuanto más grande, mejor», los países deben construir infraestructura «a escala adecuada», según sus propósitos.

Bent Flyvbjerg, un profesor de la Universidad de Oxford especializado en la administración y planificación de programas, estudió 70 años de datos para concluir que existe una «ley de hierro de los megaproyectos»: casi invariablemente, «exceden sus presupuestos y cronogramas, una y otra vez». Son también, agrega, ejemplos de la «supervivencia del menos apto»: los peores proyectos son los que finalmente se construyen.

Este riesgo se ve incrementado porque estos megaproyectos son impulsados en gran medida por la geopolítica en vez de por una cuidadosa evaluación económica. El PBI mundial de 2014 es más del doble que en el año 2000 (llegó a los 75 billones de USD), mientras que la participación de los países del G7 en la economía mundial cayó del 65 % al 45 %. Mientras el entorno internacional se ajusta a este reequilibrio, Estados Unidos ha comenzado a preocuparse por el desafío a su hegemonía que implican estos nuevos jugadores e instituciones, como el Banco Asiático de Inversión para Infraestructura, liderado por China. Las instituciones lideradas por Occidente, como el Banco Mundial y el Banco Asiático de Desarrollo, reaccionaron ampliando agresivamente sus operaciones de inversiones en infraestructura y abiertamente llaman a un cambio de paradigma.
El G20 también está acelerando el lanzamiento de megaproyectos con la esperanza de aumentar las tasas de crecimiento mundial al menos un 2 % para 2018. La OCDE estima que serán necesarios unos 70 billones de USD adicionales en infraestructura para 2030: un gasto promedio de poco más de 4,5 billones de USD al año. En comparación, se estima que serían necesarios unos 2 a 3 billones de USD al año, para cumplir con las Metas de Desarrollo Sostenible. Claramente, en los megaproyectos el potencial de derroche, corrupción y aumento de la deuda pública insostenible es elevado.

La segunda cuestión que se debe considerar son los límites del planeta. En una carta al G20 de marzo de 2015, un grupo de científicos, ambientalistas y líderes de opinión advirtió que aumentar la inversión en megaproyectos conlleva el riesgo de daños irreversibles y catastróficos al medio ambiente. «Cada año ya consumimos aproximadamente un planeta y medio de recursos», explicaron los autores. «Las decisiones sobre infraestructura deben aliviar, en vez de exacerbar, esta situación».

De manera similar, el Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático previene que «los avances en infraestructura y productos de gran perdurabilidad que obligan a las sociedades a mantener intensas emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero pueden llevar a comportamientos muy difíciles o costosos de cambiar». Y, de hecho, el G20 ha implementado pocos criterios sociales, ambientales o climáticos en la «lista de deseos» para los megaproyectos, que cada país miembro debe presentar en noviembre en la cumbre que se llevará a cabo en Turquía.

El tercer posible problema de los megaproyectos es su dependencia de las asociaciones público-privadas. Como parte del renovado foco en las inversiones a gran escala, el Banco Mundial, el Fondo Monetario Internacional y otros prestamistas multilaterales han lanzado una iniciativa para rediseñar las finanzas para el desarrollo mediante, entre otras cosas, la creación de nuevas clases de activos de infraestructura social y económica para atraer la inversión privada. «Debemos aprovechar los billones de dólares en manos de inversores institucionales... y dirigirlos hacia proyectos», dijo el presidente del Banco Mundial, Jim Yong Kim.
Usando el dinero público para contrarrestar el riesgo, las instituciones esperan atraer inversores institucionales a largo plazo –incluidos fondos de inversión, empresas aseguradoras, fondos de pensiones y fondos soberanos de inversión patrimonial– que controlan conjuntamente unos 93 billones de USD en activos. Esperan que aprovechar esta enorme reserva de capital les permitirá aumentar la escala de la infraestructura y transformar las finanzas para el desarrollo de maneras que antes eran inimaginables.

El problema es que las asociaciones público-privadas deben proporcionar una rentabilidad competitiva sobre las inversiones. Por ello, según investigadores de la London School of Economics, «no se las considera como un instrumento adecuado para proyectos [de tecnologías de la información], o en casos en que posibles problemas sociales limiten los cobros a los usuarios, que pueden hacer que un proyecto resulte interesante para el sector privado». Los inversores privados buscan mantener la tasa rentabilidad para sus inversiones con flujos de ingresos garantizados y asegurándose de que las leyes y la normativa (incluidos los requisitos ambientales y sociales) no limiten sus beneficios. El riesgo es que la búsqueda de beneficios socave el bien público.

Finalmente, las normas que rigen las inversiones a largo plazo no incorporan eficazmente los riesgos ambientales y sociales de largo plazo relacionados, como lo destacan los sindicatos y el Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente. Consolidar en carteras las inversiones de infraestructura o convertir a los sectores de desarrollo en clases de activos podría llevar a la privatización de las ganancias y la socialización de las pérdidas a escala masiva. Esta dinámica puede aumentar los niveles de desigualdad y socavar la democracia debido a la falta de influencia que los gobiernos –y mucho más, los ciudadanos– pueden tener sobre los inversores institucionales. Por lo general, las normas y los acuerdos comerciales multiplican estos problemas al priorizar los intereses de los inversores frente a los de los ciudadanos comunes.

Si no se los evalúa, la presión por avanzar con los megaproyectos genera el riesgo –según los autores de la carta al G20– de «duplicar la apuesta por una visión peligrosa». Es fundamental que garanticemos que cualquier transformación de las finanzas para el desarrollo se diseñe de manera tal que respete los derechos humanos y proteja al planeta.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

El PER ruso, por los suelos... ETFs para valientes y ambiciosos

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article51524.html

In May, the US unemployment rate stood at 5.5 percent against the rate of 5.3 percent for the “natural unemployment,” also known as the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU).

According to the popular view, once the actual unemployment rate falls to below the NAIRU, or the natural unemployment rate, the rate of inflation tends to accelerate and economic activity becomes overheated. (This acceleration in the rate of inflation takes place through increases in the demand for goods and services. It also lifts the demand for workers and puts pressure on wages, reinforcing the growth in inflation).


By this way of thinking, the central bank must step in and lift interest rates to prevent the rate of inflation from getting out of control.

Recently however, some experts have raised the possibility that the natural unemployment rate is likely to be much lower than the government official estimate of 5.3 percent. In fact, earlier this year, economists at the Chicago Fed argued that the natural unemployment rate since October last year has fallen to 4.3 percent.

The reasons for this decline are demographic changes and an increase in the level of education. (The natural unemployment rate tends to fall, so it is held, with the rising age of the labor force and with its education.)

Experts are of the view that these factors should continue to lower the natural unemployment rate for at least the remainder of the decade.

It is held that a lower natural rate may help explain why wage inflation and price inflation remain low, despite the actual unemployment rate recently reaching 5.5 percent.

Advocates for a lower natural rate also claim a lower rate would mean the Fed can keep interest rates lower for longer without worrying about lifting the rate of inflation.

Why NAIRU Is an Arbitrary Measure

The NAIRU however, is an arbitrary measure; it is derived from a statistical correlation between changes in the consumer price index and the unemployment rate. What matters here for Fed economists and others is whether the theory “works” (i.e., whether it can predict the future rate of increases in the consumer price index).

This way of thinking doesn’t consider whether a theory corresponds to reality. Here we have a framework, which implies that “anything goes” as long as one can make accurate predictions.

The purpose of a theory however is to present the facts of reality in a simplified form. A theory has to originate from reality and not from some arbitrary idea that is based on a statistical correlation.

If “anything goes,” then we could find by means of statistical methods all sorts of formulas that could serve as forecasting devices.

For example, let us assume that high correlation has been established between the income of Mr. Jones and the rate of growth in the consumer price index — the higher the rate of increase of Mr. Jones’s income, the higher the rate of increase in the consumer price index.

Therefore we could easily conclude that in order to exercise control over the rate of inflation the central bank must carefully watch and control the rate of increases in Mr. Jones’s income. The absurdity of this example matches that of the NAIRU framework.

Inflation Is Not Caused by Increased Economic Activity

Contrary to mainstream thinking, strong economic activity as such doesn’t cause a general rise in the prices of goods and services and economic overheating labeled as inflation.

Regardless of the rate of unemployment, as long as every increase in expenditure is supported by production, no overheating can occur.

The overheating emerges once expenditure is rising without the backup of production — for instance, when the money stock is increasing. Once money increases, it generates an exchange of nothing for something, or consumption without preceding production, which leads to the erosion of real wealth.

As a rule, rises in the money stock are followed by rises in the prices of goods and services.

Prices are another name for the amount of money that people spend on goods they buy.

If the amount of money in an economy increases while the number of goods remains unchanged more money will be spent on the given number of goods i.e., prices will increase.

Conversely, if the stock of money remains unchanged it is not possible to spend more on all the goods and services; hence no general rise in prices is possible. By the same logic, in a growing economy with a growing number of goods and an unchanged money stock, prices will fall.

[JENOFONTE10]

El PER ruso, por los suelos... ETFs para valientes y ambiciosos

Es evidente que se trata de un artículo foráneo, quizá (regular) traducido. Los ETFs de renta variable rusa que cita no cotizan en mercado español, por lo que tienen mayores costes asociados de compraventa, e incluso por cambio de divisa.

El artículo que nos enlaza LH84 no cita que en Bolsa de Madrid, dos de las tres gestoras tienen ETFs de acciones rusas, en € y con gastos iguales a cualquier acción del mercado continuo.

El de Deutsche (capped):
http://www.bmerv.es/esp/aspx/ETFs/Mercados/FichaValor.aspx?isin=LU0322252502
Y el de Lyxor (SG):
http://www.bmerv.es/esp/aspx/ETFs/Mercados/FichaValor.aspx?isin=FR0010326140

Los interesados tengan en cuenta que un ETF está pensado como instrumento para capturar beta (gestión pasiva) y no alfa, por tanto minimizar las comisiones y gastos asociados es una de las claves para optimizar su rentabilidad.

Saludos.

[saturno]

Rifkin ! (en v/F)

http://www.challenges.fr/economie/conjoncture/20150629.CHA7377/jeremy-rifkin-le-capitalisme-va-devoir-vivre-avec-l-economie-collaborative.html

Hay 2 preguntas sobre las 3 revoluciones industriales y la lógica de la tercera: Pongo las 2 preguntas para el contexto

Est-ce que vous pouvez nous expliquer en quoi consiste exactement la 3e révolution industrielle?

Jeremy Rifkin: Nous sommes actuellement à l'aube d'un nouveau paradigme économique. Pour le comprendre, il faut s'intéresser aux précédents changements de paradigme économique qui ont eu lieu au cours de l'histoire. Ce qui est intéressant c'est que, quand vous les analysez, ils partagent tous un dénominateur commun. A chaque fois, ils ont eu lieu grâce à l'émergence et la convergence de trois innovations technologiques qui créent au final une nouvelle manière d'organiser l'activité économique. La première innovation c'est celle des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication qui permettent de gérer plus efficacement l'activité économique. La deuxième concerne les nouvelles sources d'énergie qui permettent de mettre en oeuvre l'activité économique. Et enfin, la troisième ce sont les nouveaux moyens de transports qui améliorent la circulation de l'activité économique. Quand ces trois nouvelles technologies convergent, elles changent fondamentalement la manière dont s'articule l'activité économique.

Par exemple, la 1ère révolution industrielle a pu naître au 18e siècle en Grande-Bretagne grâce au développement de la machine à vapeur, avec le charbon, et du télégraphe qui ont pu révolutionner les transports et alphabétiser en masse la population. La productivité a beaucoup augmenté et les marchés se sont élargis. La 2e révolution industrielle aux Etats-Unis au 20e siècle est aussi le résultat de la convergence d'innovations dans l'énergie, le transport et la communication avec la création du téléphone, de la radio et de la télévision, de centrales électriques et du moteur à explosion utilisant le pétrole. Ont pu alors se développer des voitures, des bus, des camions... Cette 2nde révolution industrielle a traversé tout le 20e siècle mais a atteint son apogée en juillet 2008. Ce mois a constitué le grand tremblement de terre économique qui a engendré ensuite une grande récession. Depuis cette date, on assiste au crépuscule de cette 2e révolution industrielle basée sur les énergies fossiles et des télécommunications centralisées.


Et quelles sont les nouvelles convergences aujourd'hui ?

Aujourd'hui , nous commençons donc à voir émerger une 3e révolution industrielle où convergent des innovations dans les secteurs de l'énergie, de la communication et de transport. Internet, en tant que moyen de communication, converge ainsi avec les énergies renouvelables, produites de manière décentralisées, et de nouveaux modes de transports, sans conducteur et guidés uniquement par des GPS. Les trois réunis forment ce que l'on appelle l'Internet des Objets. Encore méconnu, ce concept repose sur la numérisation des transports, de l'énergie et de la communication avec la multiplication de capteurs qui gèrent des données et communiquent entre eux. D'ici 2030, je pense que tout sera connecté et que l'on pourra ainsi tout gérer depuis un réseau externe. Chacun pourra alors s'y connecter et participer à l'activité économique sans avoir recours aux grandes organisations verticales que constituent les entreprises comme ce fut le cas lors de la 1ère et 2e révolution industrielle. Tout un chacun aura une vision transparente de ce qui se passe dans le monde.

Ceci étant dit, l'Internet des objets tel que je le conçois, où tout est relié, soulève des questions très importantes. Comment s'assurer de la neutralité du réseau? Comment pouvons-nous être certains que les gouvernements et les entreprises ne vont pas essayer de monopoliser ce domaine à des fins politiques ou commerciales? Comment pouvons-nous protéger notre vie privée et la sécurité de nos données? Comment pouvons-nous lutter contre la cybercriminalité et le cyber-terrorisme? En supposant que nous pouvons répondre à ces questions, cette plateforme sera formidable car chacun d'entre nous pourra avoir un impact sur l'activité économique en faisant partie intégrante de la chaîne de valeur. Un individu pourra stocker de l'énergie, produire des biens et services, les consommer et jusqu'à les recycler. Il pourra par exemple créer facilement sa propre application. La productivité va grandement s'améliorer tout en réduisant de manière importante le coût marginal. Un nombre important de biens et de services vont même s'approcher d'un coût marginal zéro. Ils deviendront gratuits et sortiront donc du circuit économique classique. C'est ce qu'on appelle l'économie collaborative. Il s'agit du premier nouveau système économique à émerger depuis l'avènement du capitalisme et du socialisme dans les années 1970. Même si cette économie collaborative peut paraître encore balbutiante, elle n'en demeure pas moins importante car elle oblige le système capitaliste à changer. En effet, ce que nous observons c'est l'émergence d'un système hybride avec d'un côté l'économie de marché, dit capitalistique, et de l'autre l'économie de partage, fondée sur les biens et services quasi-gratuits. Je considère que d'ici 35 ans, ce système dual sera arrivé complètement à maturité.

(Google da un resultado más o menos legible
https://translate.google.fr/?hl=fr#fr/es/

[saturno]

Ya que estoy:
Proyecto legislativo para La RBU en Finlandia (centro derecha)

http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2015/07/25/20002-20150725ARTFIG00001-en-finlande-travailler-pourrait-devenir-un-choix.php
 

Le gouvernement de centre droit entend tester dans les prochains mois l'idée d'une allocation de base pour tous les citoyens du pays, sans distinction d'âge, de situation sociale ou de santé. L'expérimentation devrait être réalisée dans un premier temps dans une région du pays fortement impactée par le chômage servant de laboratoire. Ce revenu universel, versé sans contrepartie, a pour objectif de permettre à chaque citoyen finlandais de vivre modestement. Pour le gouvernement, il s'agit de lutter contre la pauvreté. Un salaire minimum commun remplacerait alors toutes aides sociales en vigueur. Un Finlandais verrait donc s'évaporer ses aides au logement, aux études, au chômage mais aussi sa pension de retraite. Les citoyens qui souhaitent avoir un niveau de vie plus élevé pourront bien sûr compléter ce revenu de base en étant salarié, artisan ou entrepreneur. La Finlande a un PIB par habitant ( environ 46.450 dollars) bien supérieur à celui de l'Allemagne (43.910 euros) et à la France (37.741 euros).

Resumiendo, se eliminan todos los subsidios INCLUIDA LA PENSION DE JUBILACION
 por una RBU (universal, sin contrapartida por derechos adquiridos) de subsistencia

Los que quieran superar la RBU, tendran que trabajar, es decir, crear una "plusvalía" con su trabajo, je, je.

Pero es un proyecto, a ver cómo queda después de pasar los trámites
Aunque lo de la jubilación sería la forma más directa de resolver el peso de 1/3 de PIB como dice PPCC