Aspectos monetarios y financieros

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/rumbo-inversor/2016-08-14/banco-central-tipos-interes-inversores-inflacion-bce-draghi-colchon_1245976/

[wanderer]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/rumbo-inversor/2016-08-14/banco-central-tipos-interes-inversores-inflacion-bce-draghi-colchon_1245976/

...
La inflación es un fenómeno principalmente monetario y los tipos de interés una herramienta de política monetaria. Por ello, quienes deben buscar la fórmula para salir de la trampa de la liquidez son los bancos centrales. Las reformas estructurales, fiscales o las políticas de oferta son muy útiles para resolver muchos problemas de las economías, pero su capacidad para aumentar la inflación o los tipos de interés es muy limitada.
...

Ahí dejé de leer...

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

¿A ustedes también les han llegado cartas y mensajes de su banco con préstamos preconcedidos últimamente?

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

La historia del concepto PIB:

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-gdp-by-philipp-lepenies-2016-08

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/08/19/actualidad/1471596538_327387.html

Un delator del Deutsche Bank rechaza cobrar 8,2 millones de recompensa

Eric Ben-Artzi renuncia al premio del regulador bursátil de EE UU como protesta porque los directivos del banco no fueron castigados por un fraude

La Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), el supervisor bursátil de EE UU, multó el año pasado a Deutsche Bank con 55 millones de dólares (48,5 millones de euros) por falsear sus cuentas durante la crisis al valorar de forma incorrecta su exposición a productos derivados. La investigación que dio lugar a la multa se puso en marcha gracias a la información proporcionada por Eric Ben-Artzi, exanalista de riesgos del Deutsche en EE UU, y otras dos personas. La SEC premió al exanalista y a un compañero con 16,5 millones de dólares, pero Ben-Artzi ha renunciado a su parte de la recompensa en protesta por el hecho de que la multa fue impuesta al banco y no a los directivos implicados en el fraude, según afirma en un artículo que publica el Financial Times. Denuncia además, las puertas giratorias entre el banco alemán y la autoridad bursátil que han librado a los altos cargos.

"La SEC me acaba de decir que voy a recibir la mitad de una recompensa para informadores de 16,5 millones. Pero renuncio a tomar mi parte". Así comienza Ben-Artzi su carta en Financial Times. En 2010-11, "informé al regulador de que mis colegas del banco habían estado inflando el valor de su enorme carpeta de créditos derivados", dice. Por informaciones de ese tipo, la SEC tiene un programa de recompensas que se nutren de un fondo del Congreso estadounidense. Ben Artzi y Matt Simpson fueron recompensados con 16,5 millones de ese fondo, el mayor premio concedido hasta la fecha, por informar de las irregularidades cometidas por directivos de Deutsche.

Sin embargo, el exanalista ha rechazado su parte del premio porque la SEC no impuso la multa a los directivos implicados, sino al banco en sí, con lo que la pagan sus accionistas y los "empleados que está siendo despedidos", que en realidad, son "víctimas" de esos directivos, dice. Compara Ben Artzi el caso de Deutsche con otro similar de menor cuantía que afectó a la empresa Trinity Capital y el banco Los Alamos National Bank, cuyos directivos sí fueron sancionados. "¿Por qué la SEC no fue a por los ejecutivos de Deutsche?", se pregunta.

Y se responde a continuación: Porque altos cargos de Deutsche Bank entraron y salieron de la SEC "antes, durante y después de la actividad ilegal del banco". Es decir, por las puertas giratorias por las que esos directivos entraron a trabajar para uno u otro lado. Y pone ejemplos como el de Robert Rice, abogado jefe encargado de la investigación al Deutsche en 2011, que se convirtió en alto cargo de la SEC en 2013, o el de Robert Khuzami, abogado jefe del banco en EE UU, que dejó el puesto para encabezar un departamento del regulador. "Esto va más allá del típico caso de puertas giratorias. Abogados punteros de la SEC han tenido altos cargos en el banco, entrando y saliendo de esos puestos en el regulador incluso mientras se investigaba el fraude en Deutsche", denuncia en el FT. Ni la SEC ni el banco han comentado las acusaciones.

Ben Artzi y Simpson solicitaron la recompensa por su información, lo mismo que hizo un tercer empleado de DB, aunque la SEC decidió no premiar a este último.

El programa de recompensas de la SEC, que se puso en marcha en 2011, en mital de la crisis, es bastante opaco. Se sabe que el regulador premia con entre un 10 y un 30% de las multas que impone a las personas que proporcionan información para las investigaciones que llevan a esas sanciones. Sin embargo, el dinero no sale de la multa en sí, sino de una partida presupuestaria del Congreso de EE UU. Según el FT, es la primera vez que un informador rechaza su recompensa. No obstante, no puede renunciar a todo: cobrarán parte su exesposa y los abogados y expertos que le ayudaron a poner el caso sobre la mesa de la SEC.

[wanderer]

Sea ha decretado la mayor suspensión de pagos de una naviera en la historia, y éso tendrá previsiblemente una influencia a lo largo de todo éste otoño para el comercio mundial (por ejemplo, los buques contenedores de la naviera tienen denegado el acceso a los puertos):

http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/09/01/actualidad/1472749096_544593.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Bitcoin, blockchain y chachingchachein...

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/perlas-de-kike/2016-09-06/el-nuevo-patron-no-es-el-dolar-es-blockchain_1255680/

[saturno]

Bitcoin, blockchain y chachingchachein...

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/perlas-de-kike/2016-09-06/el-nuevo-patron-no-es-el-dolar-es-blockchain_1255680/

Sí, el análisis es correcto. El tema es que lo que llaman el blockchain es sólo una "idea" : el demonio está en la implementación.

Y no me refiero a la implementación técnica concreta : no se vende tal o cual "programa":
No se trata de la tecnología en sí  que suele ser open source (y si no lo es, el muro del (c) se convierte en límite)

Lo que hace la diferencia, es ser o no ser el primero en conseguir que los demás la adopten.
Por hacer una analogía, el asunto es ser el Facebook, es decir el primero en "organizar" lo que todos van haciendo espontáneamente (en el caso de FB, se trata de organizar el cotilleo)

¿Entonces dónde está el negocio?
El interés de ser el promotor de la tecnología común, incluso gratuita, es convertirse en centro de la sinergias de los que van a construir sobre esa tecnología de la que eres líder.

Así, FB es una "central" de cotilleos. Y todos los que ganan dinero cotilleando en FB, se vuelven dependientes de FB. Si FB les pide algo, no pueden declinar dárselo.

[wanderer]

Ésto no sé si es reflejo de la madre de todas las burbujas, o la constatación definitiva de la Era Cero:

http://www.elconfidencial.com/mercados/2016-09-08/la-mayor-burbuja-financiera-en-mis-25-anos-como-profesional_1256652/

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/aprender-a-invertir/2016-09-09/gestion-pasiva-gestion-activa-marxismo_1257015/

[Yupi_Punto]

http://blogs.elconfidencial.com/mercados/aprender-a-invertir/2016-09-09/gestion-pasiva-gestion-activa-marxismo_1257015/

La industria de gestión pasiva está dominada por tres grandes: BlackRock, Vanguard y State Street. Entre las tres, tienen a diciembre de 2015 casi un 70% del mercado de ETFs.

Esa concentración en lo que se llama “the Big Three” o las tres grandes provoca que, a día de hoy, sean los mayores propietarios en un 40% de todas las empresas cotizadas en US y que sean igualmente lo mayores accionistas en un 88% de las empresas del S&P500.

Cuesta creerlo. ¿Será?

[wanderer]

El Gran Estancamiento de los Ingresos:

The Great Income Stagnation

BERKELEY – Nowadays, the inequality debate often focuses on the disproportionate accumulation of income and wealth by a very small share of households in the United States and other advanced economies. Less noticed – but just as corrosive – is the trend of falling or stagnating incomes for the majority of households.

For much of the post-World War II period, until the 2000s, strong GDP and employment growth in the advanced economies meant that almost all households experienced rising incomes, both before and after taxes and transfers. As a result, generation after generation grew up expecting to be better off than their parents. But, according to new research from the McKinsey Global Institute, that expectation may no longer be warranted.
Angela Merkel
German Europe or European Germany?
Hugo Drochon poses the question that Europe and the world can no longer avoid, and examines how Joschka Fischer, Otmar Issing, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others address it.

During the last decade, income growth came to an abrupt halt for most households in the developed countries, with those headed by single women or comprising young, less educated workers among the hardest hit. Real income from wages and capital for households in the same part of the income distribution was lower in 2014 than in 2005 for about two-thirds of households in 25 advanced economies – more than 500 million people. From 1993 to 2005, by contrast, less than 2% of households in these economies had flat or falling incomes.

Increases in government transfers and lower tax rates reduced the effect of stagnating or falling market incomes on disposable incomes. Nonetheless, 20-25% of households faced flat or falling disposable incomes from 2005 to 2014, compared to less than 2% in the preceding 12 years.

A major culprit behind this reversal is the deep recession and slow recovery following the 2008 economic crisis in the advanced economies. From 1993 to 2005, GDP growth contributed about 18 percentage points to annual median household income growth, on average, in the US and Europe; that figure plunged to just four percentage points from 2005 to 2014.

But the post-crisis drop in growth is far from the only problem. (If it were, the last decade could be just an anomaly.) Longer-term factors like weak investment, decelerating labor-force growth, and a sharp slowdown in productivity growth have reduced income growth for the median household in most advanced countries relative to the 1993-2005 period.

Demographic shifts – including changing family structure, low fertility rates, and population aging – have led to reductions both in the overall size of households and in the number of working-age earners per household. And labor-market shifts – driven by technological change, the globalization of low- and medium-skill jobs, and the growing prevalence of part-time, temporary employment – have caused the wage share of national income to decline and the distribution of that income among households to become increasingly uneven. None of these trends is going to be reversed anytime soon. On the contrary, some are likely to strengthen.

McKinsey’s research confirms the role of such long-term factors in undermining incomes for the majority of households. It shows that most households’ real market incomes remained flat or fell, even though aggregate growth remained positive in the 2005-2014 period.

In the US, in particular, the ability of labor to protect its share of national income, and of lower- and middle-income households to protect their share of the wage pool, eroded substantially. As a result, real growth in median disposable income slowed by nine percentage points from 1993 to 2005, and by another seven percentage points from 2005 to 2014.

Sweden, where median households received a larger share of the gains from output growth in the 2005-2014 period, has bucked this negative trend. In response to the growth slowdown of the last decade, Sweden’s government worked with employers and unions to reduce working hours and preserve jobs. Thanks to these interventions, market incomes fell or were flat for only 20% of households. And generous net transfers meant that disposable incomes increased for almost all households.

To be sure, the US also intervened after the crisis, implementing a fiscal stimulus package in 2009 that, along with other transfers, raised median disposable income growth by the equivalent of five percentage points. A four-point decline in median market income thus became a one-percentage-point gain in median disposable income. But that did not change the fact that, from 2005 to the end of 2013, market incomes declined for 81% of US households.

Similarly, recent research by Berkeley’s Emmanuel Saez shows that real market income for the bottom 99% in the US grew in both 2014 and 2015 at rates not seen since 1999. Nonetheless, by the end of 2015, real market incomes for that group had recovered only about two-thirds of the losses borne during the 2007-2009 recession. In other words, while disposable income did not fall in either Sweden or the US, the US approach was to compensate for a decline in market incomes, which Sweden had managed to head off.

The consequences of such failures are far-reaching. Stagnating or falling real incomes do not just act as a brake on consumption demand and GDP growth; they also fuel social and political discontent, as citizens lose confidence in existing economic structures.

MGI surveys in France, the United Kingdom, and the US have found that people whose incomes are not growing, and who do not anticipate an improvement, tend to view trade and immigration much more negatively than those who are experiencing or foresee gains. The Brexit vote in the UK and bipartisan opposition to trade agreements in the US are clear signs of this.

Recent debate about income inequality in the US and other developed countries has focused on the rapid surge in incomes for the few. But stagnating or falling incomes for the many add a different dimension to the debate – and demand different types of solutions that emphasize wage growth for the majority of the income distribution. With most households continuing to face stagnating or falling incomes – and with younger generations thus on track to be poorer than their parents – such solutions are urgently needed.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stagnating-wages-advanced-economies-by-laura-tyson-and-anu-madgavkar-2016-09

(Otro clavo en el ataúd del Iceberg Deflacionario...)

[CHOSEN]

Cuesta creerlo. ¿Será?

Sólo viendo que es una noticia del confidencial, ya te digo que hay gato encerrado.
Leyendo la noticia, confirmo:
Se puede ser el "mayor propietario" (re-lee el titular) con un 5%. De hecho esto ya es mucho hablando de grandes empresas y encima cotizadas. Por supuesto esto -obviamente- no da ningún poder de decisión ni nada de nada por estar el capital muy atomizado, precisamente por cotizar en bolsa. Por lo tanto cuanto menos, el titular induce a error.
Segundo ejemplo (88%) habla de mayores accionistas en una frase que retuerce el castellano, pero es el mismo caso que antes.

En el fondo, se trata de gestoras de fondos ajenos.
Fondos que por definición NO son suyos. Esos fondos tienen dueño.
En cualquier caso, es un claro ejemplo de clickbait.

[pobrecitohablador]

Caixabank: "Cobrar por los servicios es algo que las entidades se tienen que plantear"

[wanderer]

En los años recientes, la productividad global aparentemente ha decaído, a pesar de la implementación global de las nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación, entre otras:

Probing the Productivity Paradox

WASHINGTON, DC – Over the last decade or so, productivity growth has slowed considerably in most major developed economies, even as impressive advances have been made in areas like computing, mobile telephony, and robotics. All of these advances ostensibly should have boosted productivity; and yet, in the United States, a world leader in technological innovation, business-sector labor productivity growth in 2004-2014 averaged less than half the rate of the previous decade. What is going on?

One theory that has gained a lot of traction lately is that the so-called productivity paradox does not actually exist. Productivity growth only seems to be dropping, the logic goes, because the statistics we use to measure it fail to capture fully recent gains, especially those from new and higher-quality information and communication technology (ICT). If prices do not reflect quality improvements in the new products, price deflators are overestimated, and real output is underestimated.
Angela Merkel
German Europe or European Germany?
Hugo Drochon poses the question that Europe and the world can no longer avoid, and examines how Joschka Fischer, Otmar Issing, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others address it.

Moreover, the skeptics point out, standard measures of productivity are based on GDP, which, by definition, includes only output produced. Consumer surplus – which is growing fast, as Internet-based services like Google search and Facebook generate substantial utility to consumers, at a market price of close to zero – is ignored.

There is some logic to this argument. Indeed, a recent review of research on productivity by the Brookings Institution and the Chumir Foundation confirmed that gains from new technologies are underestimated, owing to measurement issues relating to both product quality and consumer surplus.

But these two types of mismeasurement, the report continues, explain only a relatively small share of the slowdown in economic gains. Furthermore, these lapses have existed for a long time, and they do not seem to have increased substantially in recent years. The conclusion is clear: the productivity-growth slowdown is real.

Perhaps, then, we must look at the other component of the paradox: technological innovation. Many have argued that the real issue is that recent technological innovations have been less consequential than their predecessors. New ICT technologies, the “techno-pessimists” claim, simply do not bring the kind of economy-wide benefits that were brought by, say, the internal combustion engine and electrification. “Techno-optimists,” for their part, believe that ICT advances do have the potential to drive rapid productivity growth; their benefits are merely subject to lags and come in waves.

What do the numbers say? Firm-level data show that productivity growth has held up relatively well for firms that are at the technological frontier. It is the less technologically advanced firms, which are often smaller, that have experienced the major growth slowdowns. This suggests that the problem may not be the technology itself, but rather its slow diffusion.

There is also a macroeconomic element to the decline in productivity growth, rooted in deficient aggregate demand. According to former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, when the desired level of investment is below the desired level of savings despite a nominal interest rate of zero, chronically deficient demand constrains GDP and productivity growth, producing so-called “secular stagnation.”

But, of course, demand- and supply-side arguments are inextricably linked. And, indeed, techno-pessimist expectations, which can lower expected profits, may be discouraging investment. Meanwhile, excessive income concentration at the top – a situation that inadequate technological diffusion may exacerbate – contributes to excess savings.

Any strategy to address the problems underpinning low productivity growth – from inadequate technological diffusion to income inequality – must address skill constraints and mismatches affecting the labor market’s ability to adjust. As it stands, workers, particularly from lower income groups, are slow to respond to demand for new higher-level skills, owing to lags in education and training, labor-market rigidities, and perhaps also geographical factors. These factors, together with rent capture and winner-take-all markets, can entrench inequality and blunt markets’ competitiveness.

Spurring investment is also important. In most advanced economies and many emerging economies, investment rates fell sharply in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, and have still not returned to pre-crisis levels. But innovation is often embedded in capital and needs new investment to spread across economies.

Fortunately, world leaders seem to recognize some of the imperatives they face. At the recent G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, world leaders emphasized the need to boost investment and accelerate structural reforms to enhance productivity and lift potential growth. One hopes that this is the first step toward an integrated approach that addresses the forces impeding technology diffusion, undermining competitiveness, and exacerbating inequality.

We cannot know how new technologies will affect the world economy in the long term. But we know one thing: the productivity paradox is real, and it is contributing to rising inequality in many societies. It is time to address it.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/productivity-growth-and-technological-innovation-by-kemal-dervis-and-zia-qureshi-2016-09

¿Y nuestro buen amigo SNB "El Clusterizado" qué tiene que decir a todo ésto??

En todo caso, no parece sino otra manifestación del Iceberg Deflacionario, y sospecho que los "bullshit jobs" de Graeber, también tienen mucho que ver...