Tema: PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Invierno 2018

[Derby]

https://wolfstreet.com/2018/01/15/commercial-real-estate-prices-suffer-first-down-year-since-2009/

Commercial Real Estate Suffers First Down-Year since 2009





Commercial real estate is highly leveraged, backed by $4.3 trillion in bank loans, as of November 2017. Much of this debt is held by smaller banks with less than $50 billion in assets, concentrated in CRE in their local markets. And these banks are less able to withstand shocks to collateral values.

[Derby]

http://www.eleconomista.es/empresas-finanzas/noticias/8867009/01/18/Economia-La-constructora-britanica-Carillion-entra-en-liquidacion-tras-fracasar-las-conversaciones-con-sus-acreedores.HTML

La constructora británica Carillion entra en liquidación tras la negativa de Reino Unido al rescate

El grupo británico de construcción y servicios Carillion ha anunciado este lunes su entrada en "liquidación forzosa con efectos inmediatos", después de que las negociaciones durante el fin de semana con sus acreedores hayan fracasado.

De este modo, antes de la apertura de la bolsa de Londres se han suspendido de negociación las acciones del grupo de construcción y servicios, que cuenta con una plantilla de unos 43.000 trabajadores, y se ha presentado ante los tribunales la solicitud de liquidación de la compañía.

La deuda neta de Carillion ronda los 900 millones de libras esterlinas (1.013 millones de euros) y un déficit de pensiones de unos 580 millones de libras (653 millones de euros), mientras que su valoración bursátil ha caído por debajo de 100 millones de libras (112 millones de euros), después de que sus acciones hayan bajado un 90% el último año.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/15/labour-demands-answers-on-high-risk-carillion-contracts?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Tweet

Labour demands answers on 'high-risk' Carillion contracts

Labour has called on the government to explain why it awarded contracts worth nearly £2bn to Carillion even after it became clear the company was in financial distress.

The construction and outsourcing group issued the first of three warnings about its financial health in July, in an update that sent its share price tumbling and forced its chief executive to step down.

[puede ser]

http://www.vozpopuli.com/economia-y-finanzas/empresas/Housers-estudia-financiarse-monedas-virtuales-bitcoin_0_1099091025.html
"La plataforma inmobiliaria Housers estudia financiarse con moneda virtual"
Dios los cría y ellos se juntan

[el flagelador de regres]

Este sainete ladrillero que nos ha tocado vivir, por más risa que de si se ve desde la tribuna o platea, tiene un problema, y es que dura bastante más que los minutejos que duraban las auténticas susodichas obrillas; en el mientras tanto, no solo pasa la vida, si no que los camareros pasan continuamente ofreciendo las viandas necesarias para sobrevivir a tamaña representación, que peseta a peseta agotan nuestra bolsa, amen que el dueño del teatro se empeña en cobrar entrada cada día al mediodía, por aquello de que ocupamos la butaca y tal... El problema es que entre las risas, algunos se cansan del dramilla, y les gustaría ver tragedia griega (sobre todo si fuese ladrillera, ¿verdad?  ), o revista, o a Max Aub, o a Chejov, o a un mago, o a cualquier otra cosa que pueda llenar una escena y entretener a la peña...


La urgencia vital vs el tempo del cambio social; la vida personal vs la duración del impulso generacional que perfila las sociedades; yo vs la realidad social. Solo hay una solución: paciencia.


El problema es que cuando la urgencia vital, la vida personal y el yo quedan orillados por las tremendas fuerzas desatadas que han perfilado eso que llamamos pisotofilia creditófaga, es casi inevitable caer en la indignación, la furia y finalmente en lo contrario de la paciencia, que no es la impaciencia, si no la ira.


Ira por la vida perdida sacrificada a mayor gloria de los cienes y cienes de Cayennes, gambas, hinversiones, pelotazos, vacaciones en Cancún, yates y demás exuberancia paleta y hortera en la que se han convertido buena parte de los esfuerzos de millones y millones de personas por procurarse eso tan básico y elemental como un techo con el que cobijarse del frío, la lluvia y los predadores. Vamos, por procurarse una necesidad vital...


Ira por la perspectiva de futuro, tanto personal como social, que la resolución del sainete trae aparejada; más si tenemos descendientes que tendrán que sufrir esa carga sin comerlo ni beberlo.


Dan ganas de repartir, ¿verdad? Reventar alguna cara, así, a puñetazo limpio... derecha, pim, izquierda pam, a los huevos, patapam, patadón a traición...


Pero la ira no soluciona ningún problema; solo los empeora. La ira ciega nuestro juicio cuando más lo necesitamos. La ira es nuestro ángel de la perdición, inyectandonos odio para hacernos caer todavía más bajo; buscando convertirnos en los bufones apaleados del sainete, aún más que los pobres desplumados por los ladrillos de oro.


Paciencia. Y capacidad para sobreponerse a la situación, para analizarla, con calma, por supuesto; buscando en el análisis la mejor vía de acción. Tómense el sainete no como una mala pesadilla, de la que se espera desesperadamente despertar para continuar con la vida, si no como una situación de combate. Una batalla desgraciadamente perdida desde hace ya mucho, en la que ya solo se puede sobrevivir para pelear la siguiente batalla. Prioricen situaciones, objetivos, y ACTUEN. Desgraciadamente ya se ha corrido el "sauve qui peut", y ahora ya solo queda pensar en la unidad que te rodea, en uno mismo... salvarnos a nosotros como podamos, y el resto, sintiendolo mucho, que apechuguen. Piensen en Annual. Estamos ya de lejos pasado el momento de las cargas del Regimiento de Caballería de Alcántara que tantas vidas de compatriotas nuestros salvaron; los mas combativos de nosotros ya arremetimos en su momento "espada" en ristre contra la "morisma" ladrillera para salvar a más de un pepito, a veces a costa de nosotros mismos... los heroicos jinetes recibieron al final (2012) el reconocimiento colectivo al serle concedido al Regimiento la Cruz Laureada de San Fernando a título colectivo; a la mayoría de nosotros el mejor reconocimiento al que podemos aspirar es el salir lo mejor posible de la sarracina que se avecina.


PACIENCIA. Y ojo avizor...


Otro día hablaré más largo y tendido sobre la paciencia, una de las piezas claves de toda esta "historia"...

[chameleon]

Nota personal: Dow Jones en 26056

[kapi59ttp]

no hay más que señales por todos los lados: SP&500, bitcoin, U.K., Suecia, deuda publica estatal, hucha de las pensiones...
luego saldrán ministros y "ejspertos" diciendo que la crisis era imprevisible

[VivanlasCaenas]

Al menos el bitcoin sufre correcciones del 30% con cierta frecuencia.

EL SP500 lleva meses sin un mísero 1% de caída.

Es el chicharro mayor, con permiso del DOW.

Esto no puede durar mucho, aunque mas de un bajista morirá antes.

[Derby]

Otros monstruos de Amstetten...

https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2018-01-16/pareja-california-hijos-encadenados-tortura-detenidos_1506752/

Detienen a una pareja en California por encadenar y torturar a sus 13 hijos

los agentes contactaron a los padres, quienes "fueron incapaces de dar una razón lógica al hecho de que sus hijos estuvieran retenidos de esa manera",

[Derby]

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-01-16/china-downgrades-us-credit-rating-bbb-warns-us-insolvency-would-detonate-next

China Downgrades US Credit Rating From A- To BBB+, Warns US Insolvency Would "Detonate Next Crisis"

“Deficiencies in the current U.S. political ecology make it difficult for the efficient administration of the federal government, so the national economic development derails from the right track,” Dagong said adding that "Massive tax cuts directly reduce the federal government’s sources of debt repayment, therefore further weaken the base of government’s debt repayment."

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ratings-dagong/chinese-agency-dagong-cuts-u-s-sovereign-ratings-to-bbb-from-a-idUSKBN1F50OU

[Derby]

http://blogs.cincodias.com/el-puente/2018/01/-creo-que-podemos-ir-a-cero-de-un-golpe-sin-ningún-problema-ardo-hansson.HTML

[La política monetaria de la eurozona se podrá restrictiva cuando la norteamericana se ponga expansiva, lo que tendrá lugar con el cambio de tendencia de Bolsa e inmuebles en EEUU. Las autoridades hablan de septiembre de este año —segundosemestrismo— porque el crash bursátil e inmobiliario norteamericano es inminente. ¡Pobre 'Ejpaña'!, cuya 'reburbucuperación' depende de la continuidad de la política monetaria expansiva en la eurozona. Cuenten con que va a haber menos Renta —la presente más la traída del futuro— para distribuir y que, de los 5 grandes destinos de Renta, solo 2 pueden razonablemente absorber la mengua: rentas inmobiliarias y pensiones —versus salarios, beneficios e intereses—. Los políticos se aúnan para preservar las rentas inmobiliarias —'prioridad política', como acaba de reconocer el exministro Solbes— y apuntan el tiro hacia las pensiones. «Mi pisito, mi tesoro»: vamos a pasar hambre real. Y el EUR/USD rumbo a 1,4000 y más allá.]

['Cinco Días' acaba de publicar un artículo en contradicción extraordinariamente obscena con los datos oficiales:

https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2018/01/12/midinero/1515779665_946602.html
- «El precio de los alquileres cierra 2017 con la mayor subida en 11 años. Las rentas se revalorizan un 8,9% de media, si bien en algunas ciudades ya tocan techo».

http://www.ine.es/varipc/verVariaciones.do;jsessionid=D40910657DC7A0380F69E408EA77200A.varipc03?idmesini=12&anyoini=2016&idmesfin=12&anyofin=2017&ntipo=5&enviar=Calcular
- «Variación del Índice Nacional de Rúbricas según el sistema IPC base 2016 desde Diciembre de 2016 hasta Diciembre de 2017... Vivienda en alquiler: 0,9%».

¡La diferencia es entre 8,9% —Cinco Días— y 0,9% —Instituto Nacional de Estadística—! Necesitamos una explicación.]

Publicado por: pisitófilos creditófagos | 01/17/2018 en 07:29 a.m.

[pedrito]

La explicación:

El último informe elaborado por Fotocasa sobre La vivienda en alquiler en España en 2017 revela que los precios del arrendamiento se revalorizaron el pasado ejercicio una media del 8,9%, lo que constituye la subida más elevada de la serie histórica que elabora el portal, que arranca en 2007.

Pues eso. Los perezosos de Cinco Dias, en vez de ir a las fuentes del ine, se han limitado a publicar un panfleto de Fotocasa, haciendolo suyo. Esta es la basura periodistica que tenemos en este pais.

Y termina diciendo:

Y es que los expertos coinciden en que el precio del alquiler es muy sensible a subidas esproporcionadas, sobre todo en un entorno como el actual en el que se está produciendo en paralelo un aumento de la oferta. De hecho, los portales inmobiliarios saben que en un momento dado una simple diferencia de 50 euros puede suponer que el piso no se alquile. Por ello, Toribio pronostica que aunque los alquileres se seguirán encareciendo este 2018, “lo harán a un menor ritmo”.


Toma ya!!! los ejpertos dicen...

[Miguefuen]

Si llevas cinco años jubilado sé solidario

http://www.lasexta.com/embed/espanol-si-llevas-mas-de-cinco-anos-jubilando-se-solidario-y-muerete-el-nuevo-anuncio-del-gobierno-a-la-villalobos-sobre-las-pensiones/video/7/2018/01/16/5a5e70787ed1a8aea8c1a0b2#

[pyn]

¿En serio estamos en 2018 y un periódico medio serio como la vanguardia publica esto?

http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20180117/4455167331/por-que-ha-llegado-la-hora-de-comprarte-un-piso-brl.html

no sé si siento más asco o vergüenza

[VivanlasCaenas]

En zerohedge somos noticia:


https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-01-18/creation-spanish-real-estate-bubble

The Creation Of The Spanish Real Estate Bubble

https://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/20180117_spain.png

The story of the Spanish real estate bubble that popped following the Great Recession started off around the turn of the new millennium when Spain officially joined the Eurozone. At the time, millions of Spaniards celebrated this accomplishment as it was believed that this would be the first step in a new age of prosperity for the country which had suffered a deep recession in the mid-1990s, causing the unemployment rate to rise to a record 24%. Few people at the time could have imagined that this prosperity would end less than a decade later with a far worse recession and an unemployment rate that would break the previous record to reach 27%.

When Spain entered the Eurozone, borrowing rates were higher than those of other Western European countries such as France and Germany; however, those rates quickly aligned themselves as investors believed that Spain would now benefit from the same stability and economic prosperity as that of its Eurozone compatriots. With interest rates falling, banks saw an opportunity to expand their business by targeting non-traditional clients whom could now afford mortgages due to the lower rates. Previously, banks had been limited to going after clients with college degrees whom typically made more money than the average Spaniard, independent business owners with long track records of success, and public sector employees whom benefited from a high level of job stability. The new class of clients however would include construction workers, restaurant employees, factory workers, and practically anyone with a job whose salary was high enough to afford the new lower rate mortgages that banks were now pedaling. Essentially, this meant practically anyone who was employed.

With real estate prices still low and mortgage rates also reaching historic lows, demand quickly began to ramp up. Sales skyrocketed and available properties became scarce within the early years of boom. Obviously, the laws of supply and demand were not absent for too long, and prices began to rise as scarcity took hold of the real estate market.

This had two major effects among those looking to make a quick buck.

The first was that buyers became worried that they would miss out. Some people had bought homes, only to realize a year later that values were up by double digits and then they would either turn around and sell them or hold out for higher profits. Stories of overnight millionaires were soon the nightly talk across bars and living rooms in Spain. TV shows interviewed normal people whom had made small fortunes buying and selling real estate in only one or two years. This helped to create the bonanza effect that usually signals the beginning of a bubble when it seems that everyone “investing” in the bubble asset becomes rich by doing so. Herd mentality would drive demand even higher.

The second group of people looking to make a quick buck were those that saw an opportunity in increasing supply to meet the new explosion in demand. Existing construction companies could not possibly afford to build enough to meet demand and so banks kindly stepped in to offer them the same low interest loans that their real estate buyers were getting. These construction companies then embarked on a massive building boom financed by the same banks that would then offer mortgages to buyers once the projects were completed. It didn’t really matter who you were, if you wanted in on the bonanza, you had to visit your local banker to get the loans to invest in the boom.

As construction picked up, however, building materials such as doors, windows, and floor tiles became scarce. Prices for these began to increase as well since builders needed them to finish their new homes before selling them. There are many stories of towns where a single factory would spawn a dozen or so competitors throughout the boom years. A perfect example of this was the town of Villacañas where around 60% of all doors in Spain were produced. Essentially, it would go like this: One factory would be producing a product and demand would increase significantly and so the factory would see record profits. Before long, the owners would begin to flaunt their wealth by buying luxury cars and homes, thus causing workers to take notice. A group of workers would then decide to pool their money together to open up a new factory producing the same product in the same town. They would then train new people to make the exact same thing, and then a group would splinter from the second company to create a third. The cycle would repeat itself until you had several companies in the same town making exactly the same thing. Construction companies would then know that town “A” supplied doors, town “B” made windows, town “C” made toilets, etc.

With construction now booming, the unemployment rate decreased to levels that were practically unheard of in Spain. This prompted salaries to rise and a new and strange phenomenon began to occur. Up until then, college graduates had higher salaries than construction workers, but with the boom, salaries in construction caught up, and as a result, a high school dropout working in construction could now obtain a starting salary that was on par with the starting salary of someone with a Bachelor’s degree. This of course led many high school students to drop out and start working instead of finishing their studies.

It seemed, however, that no matter how many new workers were recruited, there was never enough to feed the boom. With so many new construction projects being built, wealthy foreigners and retirees began moving to Spain in droves from other parts of Europe in order to enjoy the sun, sea, and sand that the Mediterranean coast promised. With more people now buying properties than ever, a new source of labor would be needed to keep up with demand. This was the start of the mass migration initiative undertaken by the Spanish government. In 2000, there were just under 1 million immigrants in Spain, accounting for about 2.2% of the population; a decade later, in 2010, that number had grown to 5.7 million immigrants, accounting for 12.2% of the population.

In the early years of the boom, the demand had been so strong that new apartments and homes could be sold with ease to Spaniards, and foreigners looking for vacation homes or retirees. But as the boom moved into its later stages, it became apparent that just about everyone in Spain that wanted a home and was employed already had one. The only logical thing to do at this point was to sell the new homes coming onto the market to the newly arrived immigrants in the hope that they could keep the demand going. By this point, the construction industry had surpassed tourism to become the largest industry in the country and there was now no turning back. If the largest industry in Spain were to collapse, the country would suffer an economic crisis of epic proportions. Government officials decided that their only option to keep the party going was by bringing in more immigrants to buy new properties hitting the market.

In a strategy that would remind some of a Ponzi scheme, the plan was to employee the new immigrants in the construction sector and then sell them the new homes that they themselves built, and whenever it seemed like things might crash, they would simply bring in more immigrants to fuel more demand for homes and put them to work in the construction sector so they could afford these homes.

Some might ask why they would employee so many immigrants in construction, and the answer is quite simple. Spain was unable to bring in large numbers of skilled immigrants, so the mostly unskilled immigrant workforce was limited to a few industries which hired mostly unskilled workers. By this point, it was only a matter of time before the crash occurred since it was impossible to ramp up demand using this strategy for very long…

Apart from the easy credit, the allure of instant wealth, and the open doors immigration policy, there was also the role of government in all of this. At several points, there were opportunities to take a step back from the brink, but for the most part, these were all ignored for various reasons. Laws in Spain allowed for banks to loan up to 100% of the cost of purchasing a property which meant no down payment. This essentially allowed buyers with no savings, and often times an unstable job to purchase homes with 30-year mortgages. Some banks even offered 50-year mortgages in case payments were deemed too high. There was also no law that prevented banks from collecting outstanding loans on foreclosed homes, so if the bank seized your home because you couldn’t pay, you would still owe them the mortgage. This led to further reckless behavior from banks because they assumed that even if a client was likely to default, they could still make money off of them by taking the property back and then using legal means to collect on the defaulted loan.

Apart from the laws on the books that helped contribute to the bubble, the government played another very important role in helping to create the crisis. They acted in ways that benefited them to the detriment of their communities and the country. In some cases this was through direct bribery, but in many other cases, politicians in power would take out large loans from banks to build prestige projects for their constituents. By the end of the boom in 2008, Spain had more kilometers of high speed rail built and under constructionthan any other country in the world, with the exception of China which is much larger. Proportionate to its size, however, Spain topped China.

There were also numerous airports built in cities such as Ciudad Real and Castellon by private investors utilizing government subsidies which are now abandoned. Apart from these, there were countless buildings, roads, and bridges built by either local governments or private investors backed by government subsidies which have not been used to the extent which they were supposed to be. All of this public sector waste helped contribute to the construction bubble and these projects suffered the same fate as other building projects when that bubble finally popped. The main reason for building so much; politicians used these projects to promote themselves as visionaries and to show that they could “get things done”. This helped them win votes by keeping attention focused on the new facilities and infrastructure while keeping silent about costs.

Lastly, government revenues also skyrocketed from the boom. More employment meant more people paying taxes. Higher salaries meant individuals paid more in taxes. Construction companies and banks paid more taxes because they made more money, and real estate buyers paid taxes for every property they bought. All of this extra money coming in helped drive Spain’s debt to GDP ratio from 60% in 1997 to around 30% a decade later despite the high levels of government spending. What this meant for the national government was that there was no point in trying to prevent or deflate the bubble. It was always better to just look the other way and collect the increased tax revenue while hoping for the best.

As most of us already know, by 2008, the bubble could no longer be sustained and it popped, creating an economic crisis, which was larger than any that Spain had seen since it joined the European Union in 1986.

[BENDITALIQUIDEZ]

https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-01-16/china-downgrades-us-credit-rating-bbb-warns-us-insolvency-would-detonate-next

China Downgrades US Credit Rating From A- To BBB+, Warns US Insolvency Would "Detonate Next Crisis"

“Deficiencies in the current U.S. political ecology make it difficult for the efficient administration of the federal government, so the national economic development derails from the right track,” Dagong said adding that "Massive tax cuts directly reduce the federal government’s sources of debt repayment, therefore further weaken the base of government’s debt repayment."

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ratings-dagong/chinese-agency-dagong-cuts-u-s-sovereign-ratings-to-bbb-from-a-idUSKBN1F50OU

Esa frase de "Massive tax cuts directly reduce the federal government’s sources of debt repayment, therefore further weaken the base of government’s debt repayment." es gloriosa.

Yo creo que ya lo he explicado y nadie le prestó mucha atención.

La forma en que el gobierno va a repagar la deuda (renovar los vencimientos) ahora que la FED ya no lo hace es usando al sistema financiero al que la FED le ha dado liquidez excedente para ello.

ÉSE ES EL ESCUDO del que habla la FED y que permitirá que mientras todo se viene abajo el estado se pueda seguir financiando y el sector financiero esté a salvo.

El recorte de Trump es una forma de atacar ese escudo haciendo que el escudo dure menos tiempo.

Es decir, debilita al enfermo para que no pueda soportar la medicina y el virus inmobiliario no sea erradicado.