General > Transición Estructural
PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Otoño 2019
wanderer:
Como siempre decimos (y alguna vez acertaremos), será en Octubre... Bienvenidos al Otoño 2019. Venimos de:
--- Citar ---PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Otoño 2011
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Invierno 2012
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Primavera 2012
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Verano 2012
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Otoño 2012
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Invierno 2013
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Primavera 2013
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Verano 2013
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Otoño 2013
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - INVIERNO 2014
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - PRIMAVERA 2014
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - VERANO 2014
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - VERANO 2014
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Invierno 2014/2015
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Primavera 2015
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - verano 2015
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Otoño 2015
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Invierno 2016
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Primavera 2016
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Verano 2016
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Otoño 2016
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Invierno 2017
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Primavera 2017
PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos - Verano 2017
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Otoño 2017
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Invierno 2018
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Primavera 2018
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Verano 2018
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Otoño 2018
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Invierno 2018-2019
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Primavera 2019
PPCC - Pisitófilos Creditófagos Verano 2019
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Derby:
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/larry-berman-what-s-up-with-the-repo-market-1.1320456#_gus&_gucid=&_gup=twitter&_gsc=yDXWmnN
--- Citar ---Repo Rates And The Fed
Because of post-crisis rules such as Dodd-Frank and Basel III, banks have been forced to set aside reserves to meet the more stringent requirements, putting a strain on the available cash they can use. Capital constraints have made taking large positions in short-term money markets far less lucrative. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon summed up the conundrum last week, saying that “banks have a tremendous amount of liquidity, but also have a tremendous amount of restraints on how they use that liquidity.” At his post-policy news conference on Sept. 18, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell sidestepped questions about whether he felt bank regulations were a catalyst for the market turmoil. They are clearly a contributing factor.
A big consideration is the massive increase in the U.S. deficit in recent years. More supply of bonds sucks liquidity in the cash markets. Dealers at Treasury auctions have increasingly turned from lenders to borrowers in the repo market to absorb the additional supply. This year, net issuance will reach roughly $1.2 trillion, after $1.3 trillion last year. It was half that amount in 2016. The projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggest trillion-plus deficits for at least the next decade. This issue is not going away.
Liquidity constraints came into full view over the past week when corporate tax payments, big Treasury auctions and maneuvers by financial firms to manage their capital requirements prior to quarter-end drained cash available for repo transactions. The overnight lending rate quickly shot up to 10 per cent and the Fed temporarily lost control of its benchmark rate. In the past, the Fed has disputed the idea that its balance-sheet unwind left bank reserves in short supply. And Instead, the Fed has opted for a temporary fix. On Friday, the New York Fed announced a series of overnight and term operations over the next three weeks to boost short-term liquidity. That follows four straight days of repo transactions, something it hasn’t done in a decade. A number of investors, strategists and at least one former Fed official have come out to warn that more may need to be done.
Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren acknowledged last week that permanently expanding the Fed’s balance sheet (permanent QE) is one option on the table and the one he personally prefers. (The other two being continued ad-hoc interventions or a so-called standing repo facility, which would make cash loans available on a daily basis). Growing the balance sheet might also be the easier one, some strategists say. Pumping cheap cash into the financial system has historically come with the risk of spurring too much inflationary pressure.
Fixed-income is going to be a challenge in investment portfolios. This issue may lead to a permanent QE and expansion of liquidity. We are entering a new era of ultra-low bond yields and liquidity as the U.S. government has lost control of the fiscal purse. This will have material impacts on your portfolios in the future and bears watching.
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senslev:
--- Citar ---Central banks drive equity prices. Full stop. And they have done so again in 2019 and they continue to do so by fully intervening again and markets keep reacting to it, and the obvious chink in the bear case is that, if they succeed again, there is no bear case.
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https://northmantrader.com/2019/09/21/the-bear-case/
PastorMesetario:
Poco a poco nos vamos dando cuenta de que los bancos centrales se están convirtiendo en ese "bien superior", de poder supuestamente ilimitado, que hace que los cuentos siempre terminen mal; no felicidad; no perdices.
PastorMesetario:
Hoy el IFO (la encuesta del "clima empresarial" alemán) ofrece un dato positivo y mejor de lo esperado.
No es demasiado relevante, pero hay que contarlo todo.
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