PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2020/2021

[el malo]

El PP de Madrid no tiene nada que ver con el del resto de España. Si hay elecciones mi impresion es que va a arrasar y le va a dar para gobernar con VOX. Otra cosa es que este movimiento fuera de Madrid no les valga, pero es que la derecha para gobernar en España con los escaños que se dan en Cataluña y Pais Vasco lo tiene sencillamente imposible.

Madrid está en una situación de secuestro que dejan a la altura de una broma casos como los 40 años de PSOE en Andalucía o el gilismo en Marbella. En Murcia, si damos por buena la entrevista que ha hecho El Diario (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/sospechas-corrupcion-murcia-hay-mafia-tremenda_1_7286995.html) están en una situación parecida. Todos tragan por miedo, pero al mismo tiempo se sabe que eso no podía mantenerse indefinidamente. Deben de estar todos rezando para que cuando la bola de mierda estalle no les salpique.

Madrid está directamente en otra dimensión. Si ya en su día se dio el Tamayazo, qué no harán ahora para no perder su feudo. Pero tras muchos años de gobierno la mierda ya les rebosa. Llevan ya dos presidentas dimitidas por escándalos de corrupción. Ciudadanos ha hecho posiblemente la última jugada que le quedaba para evitar la desaparición. Es una moneda al aire, pero en realidad ya no tenían nada que perder por intentarlo. No hacer nada les garantizaba ser fagocitados por el PP.

El asunto de las mociones de censura va a ir seguro a los tribunales. Si el PP es expulsado del poder puede salir una cantidad ingente de mierda, así que ellos también van a echar el resto. Es todo o nada, es una guerra sin prisioneros. Vencer o desaparecer.

Jodó Hynkel. Ya se que cada uno tenemos nuestras filias y fobias pero hablar de la corrupción del PP para sobrevivir a estas alturas tiene bemoles.
Sí, el PP tiene muchos esqueletos en el armario de Madrid, pero es que el PSOE estaba sentado encima de una fosa común en Andalucía. ¿La corrupción sólo afecta a "unos" pero no a "otros"? ¿Como podemos hablar de secuestro de Madrid cuando Andalucía ha sido la región con más corrupción de España? (posiblemente de Europa).

Lo puse hace tiempo por aquí (con links). Sólo con las mamandurrias LEGALES de Andalucía de los últimos 10 años se podría haber desarrollado un programa Eurofighter. En las ilegales no entro porque ni ellos deben saber cuanto dinero se ha perdido por el sumidero.

Eso no hace mejor al PP de Madrid, pero joder es menudas gafas tenemos en España, que sólo vemos las corrupciones dependiendo del color del que las perpetre.

[pedrito]

Que no decaíga la fiesta. Alegría, alegría....

Los estímulos del BCE para mitigar la crisis del covid ya superan el PIB español

Las cifras de los estímulos monetarios cada vez superan nuevos récords y cuestionan si hay límites para los bancos centrales. En el caso del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), las compras netas desde abril de 2020, cuando empezó a funcionar el programa especial contra la pandemia (PEPP, por sus siglas en inglés), alcanza ya los 1,12 billones (millones de millones) de euros, superando el PIB español de 2020. Si se contabilizan las adquisiciones netas de activos desde hace justo un año, la cifra alcanza ya los 1,196 billones.

[...]

En este contexto, según los últimos datos publicados por el Banco de España, que corresponden al cierre de enero, la deuda en el balance del BCE alcanza los 3,73 billones, mientras que los bancos tienen una deuda con la institución con sede en Fráncfort de 1,79 billones. En conjunto, el pasivo de la eurozona con el BCE alcanza los 4,96 billones. La dependencia que tiene el sistema económico de los estímulos monetarios también se observa en España, con un pasivo de 735.000 millones que equivale ya al 66% del PIB español en 2020, gracias a las tenencias de deuda del BCE por valor de 475.783 millones y la deuda de la banca con el BCE por 261.210 millones.

No me cuadran las cuentas, pero da igual: cuanto peor, mejor.

[Maloserá]

Un articulo laaaargo de Economia Social de Mercado y Ordoliberalismo. A veces Project Syndicate traduce artículos, pero éste no.  Si no recuerdo mal, el ordoliberalismo nos gusta a muchos aquí, incluído ppcc.

Unos comentarios aleatorios previos: Los autores ponen el sistema como el origen del milagro alemán. Pero Alemania ya había demostrado antes que podía ser una potencia con sistemas distintos. El unico que no hicieron funcionar es el comunismo (lo que da que pensar). Otra pregunta es... es extrapolable? Porque la idea de la Cooperativa Mondragón en nuestra escala suena tambien fantástica, pero dificil de extrapolar fuera de una idiosincrasia socio-cultural-temporal peculiar. Y un ultimo comentario... los autores citan la vacuna de Pfizer como ejemplo de lo que Alemania hace. Pero tambien hay que preguntarse por que no usamos moviles ni ordenadores alemanes, ni leemos prensa alemana, ni vemos TV alemana ni queremos ir a estudiar a Alemania etc etc.

Pero bueno, el articulo es una buena introducción al ordoliberalismo que me parece al final mi posición natural ante el mundo.




https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/german-social-market-economy-rules-based-policymaking-by-lars-p-feld-et-al-2021-03

Why the Social Market Economy Succeeds Mar 12, 2021
LARS P. FELD, PETER JUNGEN, LUDGER SCHUKNECHT


Since World War II, Germany has served as Europe's economic anchor and managed to weather global and regional storms better than most other countries. The reason is not that it has been lucky, but that it has remained committed to a tried-and-tested policymaking approach anchored in classical economics.

COLOGNE – The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified ongoing debates about the future of capitalism and the economic framework best suited to meet the post-pandemic world’s long-term needs. Developed economies will, of course, need strong growth to offset the economic damage wrought by the virus, and to rise to the challenges posed by climate change and societal aging. And yet, across the developed world, the pace of economic growth has been slowing for decades, casting doubt on how these challenges will be met.

German "ordoliberal" principles are embedded throughout the European Union's economic governance, making it easy to forget that they were once dismissed out of hand. But with sound policymaking essential to secure sustained growth after the pandemic, a reappraisal of the model that enabled post-war Germany's "Wirtschaftswunder" is in order.

How should the gap between actual and necessary growth be closed? Should developed economies continue to focus on Keynesian demand management, thus risking the accumulation of ever more debt? Or should we shift to a longer-term, rules-based approach that anchors expectations and builds confidence, albeit at the expense of some policy discretion?

Such questions have become urgent, and yet are not being forthrightly addressed. Throughout the pandemic, the consensus has been that governments should intervene to boost aggregate demand through fiscal- and monetary-policy stimulus. Yet while a decisive crisis response was clearly necessary to avert an economic death spiral last spring, scant attention has been paid to the pitfalls of demand management – from the implications of massive government deficits to the potential for renewed inflation, lost business confidence, and future tax policies.

At the same time, rules-based policies have increasingly fallen out of favor. A strong tide is pushing against any measure that might inhibit the freewheeling monetary and fiscal experiments we have been witnessing. Structures such as the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which capped government fiscal deficits and debt at 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively, now seem to have been discredited as manifestations of “evil austerity.” Never mind that they delivered clear successes in Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain in the 2010s.

Moreover, the singular emphasis on demand management has distracted policymakers from the fact that today’s challenges are structural, and not solely the result of the pandemic. Concerns about growing government interventionism have coincided with reduced overall investment. Despite this, many economists continue to demand even more state intervention, while glossing over questions of what expansive monetary and fiscal policies will mean for growth over the long term.

THE SOCIAL MARKET BLUEPRINT

While much of the West has been preoccupied with what the Nobel laureate novelist Saul Bellow called “sucking out the victories of the short run,” many Asian countries have adopted more of a strategic, long-term approach to their economic decision-making.

This is certainly true of China, which has systematically sought to learn from others’ experiences as it confronts its own development challenges. Specifically, Chinese leaders have been keen to understand how Germany managed to outperform most of its Western peers in the face of challenges ranging from the post-World War II reconstruction and the great inflation to reunification and the 2008 global financial crisis.

To that end, two of us (Feld and Jungen), together with Zhou Hong, former Director-General of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Zhu Min, former Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, conducted a wide-ranging study to identify the essential elements of German post-war economic policymaking. This work culminated in The Social Market Economy: Compatibility among Individuals, Markets, Society, and the State, a book outlining the main features of the German model, the historic context that led to its creation, and the lessons it holds for our own time.

The book makes clear that Germany’s social market economy is not chained to circumstance. Rather, it is essentially a set of universal principles and rules for running an open economy. Although it advocates a strong state, it shares Adam Smith’s view that government’s proper role is to provide essential public goods and services, set the rules of the game, and then serve as a referee.

The “social” element of the social market economy, then, is not about state ownership or state direction, as under socialism. Instead, it refers to a rules-based economy in which social interests are properly accounted for.

A MODEL FOR OPEN SOCIETIES AND FREE CITIZENS

Although the social market economy was implemented under unique conditions – namely, out of the ruins of the most devastating and destructive period in human history – it is well suited for any country that is committed to pursuing patient, secure economic development. In the German context, the idea for a liberalizing reform package originated with the Freiburg School – so named for the picturesque town at the foot of the Black Forest, home to the University of Freiburg.

The social market economy’s main protagonists were the economists Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, and it was strongly influenced by the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek (then in exile in London). Henry Simons and Frank Knight of the University of Chicago also inspired the “ordoliberal” thinking underlying the approach.

The true “birth” of the Freiburg School of economics came in 1936, over a decade before Germany’s currency reform, and at one of the darkest moments in the country’s history. This was when Böhm, Eucken, and Hans Grossmann-Doerth published the “Ordo Manifesto,” pushing back against the collectivist ideas that had come to seem triumphant with Stalin’s disastrous five-year plans and the Nazis’ increasingly interventionist and clientelist economic policies.

In the face of this, Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth saw the need for a systemic, principle-based view of the economy. Taking the perspective of lawyers as well as economists, their manifesto advanced the Hayekian notion of an “economic constitution” comprising special laws on bankruptcy, labor, real estate, and other relevant domains, all with the aim of providing for a well-functioning, competitive market-based system. At a time when the country was fully in Adolf Hitler’s grip, the publication of such a manifesto was nothing if not courageous.

Once peace came and Germans began to govern themselves again, Ludwig Erhard, the minister for economic affairs, sought to put the “Ordo Manifesto” into practice. Erhard considered himself a liberal and was strongly influenced by ordoliberal ideas. But labels are important, so Alfred Müller-Armack, another “founding” ordoliberal and senior official under Erhard, coined the term “social market economy” in 1947 to serve as the public expression of “ordoliberalism.”

A WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER IS BORN

The rudiments of the ordoliberal model were first put into practice three years after WWII, a time when Germany remained destitute, desperate, and nearly paralyzed. The country’s economy was riddled with black marketeering and widespread economic controls that had been imposed by a massive bureaucracy comprising not only the remnants of the old German state but also the military administration of the occupying powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). There were shortages of everything, and various forms of interventionism, state planning, and control prevailed. But Germany’s nascent post-war leaders were preparing to embark on a different path.

A crucial moment came on June 20, 1948, when the Deutsche Mark was introduced as a new currency. This coincided with Erhard’s decision to abolish the wartime and post-war systems of price administration. With these two seemingly simple steps, the foundation of a market economy was laid. Henceforth, the prices of most goods and services would be set by the free operation of markets. Soon enough, German shop windows were restocked with goods as the black market was absorbed into the official economy.

In liberalizing markets and strengthening competition, Erhard and his Freiburg School collaborators in Konrad Adenauer’s government broke with Germany’s long tradition of monopolies, cartels, and ad hoc government intervention. Consumption and production quickly aligned, as entrepreneurs reallocated labor and scarce capital to more productive uses. Investment and innovation took off. The postwar German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) was born. By unleashing the market to revitalize a moribund economy, German policymakers pursued a course that may seem obvious today but certainly didn’t at the time.

Ironically, those who were most skeptical of the ordoliberal reforms included representatives of the US, the world’s leading market economy. Though what is apocryphal and real are now impossible to reconstruct, there is an anecdote that General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor of the US-controlled zone, summoned Erhard and told him that he must not alter the rules of price administration:

“Mr. General, I have not altered the rules, I have lifted them,” Erhard replied.
“Professor Erhard, all my advisers tell me that a market economy in Germany will never work.”
“Don’t worry,” Erhard assured him, “all my advisers are telling me the same.”

In the event, it took the German people some time to warm to the new approach. Such hesitancy was understandable after the years of National Socialist dictatorship and virtual serfdom. Nonetheless, in 1949, Germans chose the Christian Democrat Adenauer, a longtime mayor of Cologne who had never supported Nazi rule, to serve as West Germany’s first chancellor, and Adenauer put Erhard in charge of economic policy. The social market economy was the platform on which they would build a democratic Germany.

“At a turning point of German history,” explains Alfred Mierzejewski, Erhard’s biographer, Germany was “offered a real and moderate alternative to all the other political ideological extremes” then under discussion. Over time, as the economy delivered persistently strong growth, the social market economy became ever more popular. In the words of Jürgen Jeske, former editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, it was “the visible hand of economic prosperity.” In the following decades, West Germany became one of Europe’s most successful economies. The social market economy and ordoliberalism have continued to serve as the country’s guiding economic philosophy.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

Conceptually, the social market economy has the virtue of being straightforward and intuitive to ordinary citizens. Recognizing that modern economies are far too complex to be planned or engineered, ordoliberalism limits itself to governing the rules of the game, which in turn allows people to set their own expectations and act accordingly. To be effective, however, all of the rules and policies must “fit together”; good rules make for good games, in the economy as in sports.

The roots of ordoliberal thinking lay in classical economics, which placed great faith in free, responsible individuals interacting in markets. Ordoliberals shared Smith’s view that, as the economist John Kay put it, a “successful market economy requires the legal, social, and economic infrastructure that only a strong state can provide.” But “a strong state is tolerable only in an environment of pluralism, democracy, and mutual trust.” Ordoliberals were similarly aware of how markets can go wrong or go too far. Like Smith, they knew that “markets function well only when embedded in strong and supportive social institutions.” Again, in Kay’s words, “there is no contradiction between Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations.”

Böhm argued along the same lines. Writing in 1966, he pointed out that the social market economy required the rule of law so as to abolish “all class prerogatives and privileges.” In particular, “the administration of justice should be totally free from all powers of domination and representation.” The result, in today’s parlance, is a level playing field on which free citizens can pursue their own interests and thrive.

To that end, markets are crucial for aligning production with consumer preferences, by generating information about what is scarce and what is not. The price mechanism, as Eucken put it, is a “scarcity gauge.” To function properly, however, markets need to be competitive, which has the added benefit of enhancing efficiency and innovation.

A competitive order provides opportunities for everyone, rather than just for the powerful, and the principle of individual responsibility ensures that people can reap the rewards of their successes without avoiding liability for their failures. Uncompetitive, power-driven behavior is therefore a threat to any market order. Because firms tend to collude, form cartels, and exploit their local labor-market powers, well-designed competition and labor laws are essential.

While pre-war Germany had a long history of labor law, it was more resistant to the idea of a competition policy. But with the Freiburg School’s support, Erhard introduced the German Competition Act in the late 1950s.

DIGNITY OVER DEPENDENCE

Erhard stressed that the social market economy was designed to support “the basic human instinct to better one’s life.” It was aligned with the “nature and dignity of human beings” that the Nazi regime had so grievously denied. The state, he and his contemporaries believed, should act as an impartial referee and not as a player, let alone a team manager.

It is this principled impartiality that puts the “social” in the social market economy. Because everyone has a natural drive to improve their situation, the provision of an efficient, innovative, equal-opportunity system is a paramount social good.

The social market economy is also social because it creates the wealth needed to provide welfare benefits, housing support, pensions, and other programs. Of course, as Müller-Armack stressed early on, such social policies should be designed to promote self-reliance and dignity rather than dependence.

More fundamentally, Eucken, Böhm, and other ordoliberals saw ad hoc government interventions in the economy as the greatest threat to a functioning economic order. Not only do government actions affect short-term outcomes, but they also introduce uncertainty, distortions, and disincentives that will frustrate the workings of the system over the long run.

Hence, Erhard warned of the “insolence” of “megalomaniacal bureaucrats.” To be sure, he was no less scathing about well-organized private interests and “crony capitalists” who pursue every opportunity to secure privileges for themselves at the expense of everyone else. But because interventionism tended to benefit the well-connected rather than the innovative or the poor, the ordoliberal’s default view was that it was, if anything, anti-social.

THE BIG TENT

As a direct intellectual descendant of the classical economists, ordoliberalism is not simply some peculiar German or Austrian invention. The social market economy and Ordnungspolitik have kindred spirits around the world. For example, with its emphasis on rules and the general interest (rather than special interests), the “constitutional economics” pioneered by the American Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan had much in common with ordoliberal thinking. Similarly, public choice theory, the economic analysis of politics and the role of government in the economy, relies on an approach very similar to that of the Freiburg School.

And, of course, ordoliberals have always sided with the rules-oriented-economics camp in the great “rules vs. discretion” debate in macroeconomics. Whereas rules foster intertemporal consistency and long-term optimality, discretionary policies ignore and even undermine these objectives. By the same token, there is strong cross-fertilization between ordoliberal views and the American debates over fiscal and monetary rulemaking, which touch on everything from most US states’ balanced budget requirements to the famous Taylor rule in central banking.

Moreover, the social market economy and ordoliberal thinking remain dominant in many other parts of Europe. For example, ordoliberals have had a strong influence on the development of the EU’s competition policy, which itself has followed a rules-based approach. Indeed, ordoliberalism’s greatest international achievement is perhaps the EU’s “four freedoms” framework, which provides for free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the single market. When combined with clear and predictable competition rules, these freedoms keep countries economically fit, by encouraging them to develop an attractive, well-functioning market system at home, lest they lose out on trade, investment, and other commercial opportunities.

Ordoliberal thinking has also strongly influenced what one might call Europe’s “financial constitution.” It was the German Bundesbank that provided the model for the European Central Bank and other independent central banks across the Union. Likewise, the Maastricht deficit and debt rules that laid the foundation for the euro were a clear reflection of ordoliberal thinking. And the same can be said of the German deficit rule – the “debt brake” that allowed Germany to reduce its public debt after the global financial crisis and thus be well prepared to handle the fiscal challenges of the pandemic.

Ordoliberalism’s central tenets also underpin the European Stability Mechanism – which adheres to the IMF’s principle of conditional financial support to ensure solidarity within the EU – and the EU Treaty’s requirement of “subsidiarity,” or decentralized decision-making.

Finally, rules-based economic policymaking is strongly supported at the level of multilateral and global-governance institutions. This is not surprising: one country’s trade protectionism, for example, damages the interests of not only its own consumers but also of many others abroad. Before a rules-based system was established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organization, protectionism had long been a source of international tension and conflict.

GOOD RULES MAKE FOR INNOVATIVE IDEAS

Building on Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas, ordoliberals have long stressed the importance of openness, innovation, and economic dynamism. According to Herbert Giersch, one of the most prominent ordoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s, human capital and favorable institutions were the keys to Germany’s escape from post-war misery. These factors helped Germany avoid the middle-income trap as it recovered from post-war impoverishment and achieve general prosperity, before ably tackling the challenge of reunification and then weathering the 2008 global financial crisis.

With its focus on predictable rules and open, reliable institutions, ordoliberalism has provided a powerful framework for driving innovation. Here, the state’s role is limited to funding basic research and the appropriate infrastructure, so that entrepreneurs and inventors have a stable environment in which to turn knowledge into capital and bring new and innovative products to market.

Still, policymaking in Germany is not a perfect incarnation of ordoliberalism. Political compromises have had to be made in the face of diverging interests. The state’s continued ownership stake in Volkswagen and a few other companies comes to mind. But these examples are exceptions to an otherwise private-sector-driven growth and innovation model.

Germany thus stands in stark contrast to countries that have engaged in “industrial policy,” aiming to identify the most promising industries to promote. This reflects the conviction that successful innovation policy does not pretend to know what the future will bring. Instead, it maintains institutional openness to ideas that no one today could even imagine. Indeed, no government could have foreseen that mRNA technology developed by a German startup (BioNTech) to fight cancer would be used to create a vaccine against the coronavirus in record-breaking time.

Finally, in fostering more green innovation, Europe has deployed rules- and market-based emissions trading schemes as the foundation of its decarbonization strategy. This, too, represents another win for ordoliberal thinking. It shows that the social market economy remains the framework for tackling our most pressing challenges today.

The social market economy model endures because it supports consumer interests before those of producers, just as it positions citizens, rather than the state, as the true sovereigns. At its heart is a commitment to constitutional and system-level thinking, not piecemeal, discretionary policymaking. This approach has proven to offer the most reliable foundation for a successful economy. Germany’s record after 1945 speaks for itself.

This matters today because too many economists continue to view rules and boundaries as guidelines, not guardrails. Yet now more than ever, we need a reliable compass for navigating the challenges ahead. Consistency and predictability invariably build confidence, which is one of the main reasons why Germany became the economic anchor of the EU. The world’s drifting advanced economies could do worse than to attach themselves to the same mooring.

[Hynkel]

El PP de Madrid no tiene nada que ver con el del resto de España. Si hay elecciones mi impresion es que va a arrasar y le va a dar para gobernar con VOX. Otra cosa es que este movimiento fuera de Madrid no les valga, pero es que la derecha para gobernar en España con los escaños que se dan en Cataluña y Pais Vasco lo tiene sencillamente imposible.

Madrid está en una situación de secuestro que dejan a la altura de una broma casos como los 40 años de PSOE en Andalucía o el gilismo en Marbella. En Murcia, si damos por buena la entrevista que ha hecho El Diario (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/sospechas-corrupcion-murcia-hay-mafia-tremenda_1_7286995.html) están en una situación parecida. Todos tragan por miedo, pero al mismo tiempo se sabe que eso no podía mantenerse indefinidamente. Deben de estar todos rezando para que cuando la bola de mierda estalle no les salpique.

Madrid está directamente en otra dimensión. Si ya en su día se dio el Tamayazo, qué no harán ahora para no perder su feudo. Pero tras muchos años de gobierno la mierda ya les rebosa. Llevan ya dos presidentas dimitidas por escándalos de corrupción. Ciudadanos ha hecho posiblemente la última jugada que le quedaba para evitar la desaparición. Es una moneda al aire, pero en realidad ya no tenían nada que perder por intentarlo. No hacer nada les garantizaba ser fagocitados por el PP.

El asunto de las mociones de censura va a ir seguro a los tribunales. Si el PP es expulsado del poder puede salir una cantidad ingente de mierda, así que ellos también van a echar el resto. Es todo o nada, es una guerra sin prisioneros. Vencer o desaparecer.

Jodó Hynkel. Ya se que cada uno tenemos nuestras filias y fobias pero hablar de la corrupción del PP para sobrevivir a estas alturas tiene bemoles.
Sí, el PP tiene muchos esqueletos en el armario de Madrid, pero es que el PSOE estaba sentado encima de una fosa común en Andalucía. ¿La corrupción sólo afecta a "unos" pero no a "otros"? ¿Como podemos hablar de secuestro de Madrid cuando Andalucía ha sido la región con más corrupción de España? (posiblemente de Europa).

Lo puse hace tiempo por aquí (con links). Sólo con las mamandurrias LEGALES de Andalucía de los últimos 10 años se podría haber desarrollado un programa Eurofighter. En las ilegales no entro porque ni ellos deben saber cuanto dinero se ha perdido por el sumidero.

Eso no hace mejor al PP de Madrid, pero joder es menudas gafas tenemos en España, que sólo vemos las corrupciones dependiendo del color del que las perpetre.

Ni filias ni fobias. Es algo completamente diferente, y que para bien o para mal, sucede.

El PP es el heredero de quienes en el franquismo hacían y deshacían sin que nadie les molestase. Trataban al país como lo que era, su cortijo. Esa mentalidad la mantienen completamente.

El PSOE antes de Suresnes prácticamente no existía. Eran Llopis y cuatro gatos más. El único partido de oposición a la dictadura realmente organizado era el comunista. Obviamente Felipe no organizó el PSOE actual ni llegó al poder por inspiración divina, sino porque tenía detrás apoyos poderosos. Que una vez en el poder le pusieron a Felipe la agenda a escala internacional que el franquismo se resistía a aplicar.


Y esto está volviendo a suceder ahora mismo, delante de nuestros ojos. Mantengo que lo de Rajoy no fue casualidad, la sentencia de la Gürtel fue la excusa.

El PP no está conectado con las altas esferas internacionales y tiene que hacer como la antigua CiU, vivir de sus corruptelas. El PSOE sí tiene apoyos internacionales que le permiten funcionar sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía, por supuesto.

Esto no es un problema de filias o fobias. Es un problema de que desde el 78 tenemos dos partidos, el "institucional" con apoyo de fuera (y para que nos tutelen), y un subalterno al que se le deja gobernar de vez en cuando cuando hay que airear al "institucional".


Es decir, tenemos para elegir un partido que hace de "delegado de la clase" para que nos tutelen sin que nos enteremos, y otro que no sabe ir más allá del traje, la corbata, el ladrillo, y demás negocios fáciles.

[Hynkel]

Y no hace ni dos horas aparece algo que va en línea de lo que acabo de comentar.

Ni 48 horas han tardado en Murcia en sacar tres tránsfugas de Ciudadanos, que habían firmado la moción, para cambiarse de bando de un día para otro.

A saber lo que tendrán bajo las alfombras para querer ocultarlo así.

[sudden and sharp]

[...] A saber lo que tendrán bajo las alfombras para querer ocultarlo así.

Sí, pero a saber qué tienen *todos* debajo de la alfombra.

[el malo]

El PP de Madrid no tiene nada que ver con el del resto de España. Si hay elecciones mi impresion es que va a arrasar y le va a dar para gobernar con VOX. Otra cosa es que este movimiento fuera de Madrid no les valga, pero es que la derecha para gobernar en España con los escaños que se dan en Cataluña y Pais Vasco lo tiene sencillamente imposible.

Madrid está en una situación de secuestro que dejan a la altura de una broma casos como los 40 años de PSOE en Andalucía o el gilismo en Marbella. En Murcia, si damos por buena la entrevista que ha hecho El Diario (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/sospechas-corrupcion-murcia-hay-mafia-tremenda_1_7286995.html) están en una situación parecida. Todos tragan por miedo, pero al mismo tiempo se sabe que eso no podía mantenerse indefinidamente. Deben de estar todos rezando para que cuando la bola de mierda estalle no les salpique.

Madrid está directamente en otra dimensión. Si ya en su día se dio el Tamayazo, qué no harán ahora para no perder su feudo. Pero tras muchos años de gobierno la mierda ya les rebosa. Llevan ya dos presidentas dimitidas por escándalos de corrupción. Ciudadanos ha hecho posiblemente la última jugada que le quedaba para evitar la desaparición. Es una moneda al aire, pero en realidad ya no tenían nada que perder por intentarlo. No hacer nada les garantizaba ser fagocitados por el PP.

El asunto de las mociones de censura va a ir seguro a los tribunales. Si el PP es expulsado del poder puede salir una cantidad ingente de mierda, así que ellos también van a echar el resto. Es todo o nada, es una guerra sin prisioneros. Vencer o desaparecer.

Jodó Hynkel. Ya se que cada uno tenemos nuestras filias y fobias pero hablar de la corrupción del PP para sobrevivir a estas alturas tiene bemoles.
Sí, el PP tiene muchos esqueletos en el armario de Madrid, pero es que el PSOE estaba sentado encima de una fosa común en Andalucía. ¿La corrupción sólo afecta a "unos" pero no a "otros"? ¿Como podemos hablar de secuestro de Madrid cuando Andalucía ha sido la región con más corrupción de España? (posiblemente de Europa).

Lo puse hace tiempo por aquí (con links). Sólo con las mamandurrias LEGALES de Andalucía de los últimos 10 años se podría haber desarrollado un programa Eurofighter. En las ilegales no entro porque ni ellos deben saber cuanto dinero se ha perdido por el sumidero.

Eso no hace mejor al PP de Madrid, pero joder es menudas gafas tenemos en España, que sólo vemos las corrupciones dependiendo del color del que las perpetre.

Ni filias ni fobias. Es algo completamente diferente, y que para bien o para mal, sucede.

El PP es el heredero de quienes en el franquismo hacían y deshacían sin que nadie les molestase. Trataban al país como lo que era, su cortijo. Esa mentalidad la mantienen completamente.

El PSOE antes de Suresnes prácticamente no existía. Eran Llopis y cuatro gatos más. El único partido de oposición a la dictadura realmente organizado era el comunista. Obviamente Felipe no organizó el PSOE actual ni llegó al poder por inspiración divina, sino porque tenía detrás apoyos poderosos. Que una vez en el poder le pusieron a Felipe la agenda a escala internacional que el franquismo se resistía a aplicar.


Y esto está volviendo a suceder ahora mismo, delante de nuestros ojos. Mantengo que lo de Rajoy no fue casualidad, la sentencia de la Gürtel fue la excusa.

El PP no está conectado con las altas esferas internacionales y tiene que hacer como la antigua CiU, vivir de sus corruptelas. El PSOE sí tiene apoyos internacionales que le permiten funcionar sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía, por supuesto.

Esto no es un problema de filias o fobias. Es un problema de que desde el 78 tenemos dos partidos, el "institucional" con apoyo de fuera (y para que nos tutelen), y un subalterno al que se le deja gobernar de vez en cuando cuando hay que airear al "institucional".


Es decir, tenemos para elegir un partido que hace de "delegado de la clase" para que nos tutelen sin que nos enteremos, y otro que no sabe ir más allá del traje, la corbata, el ladrillo, y demás negocios fáciles.

 

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

[senslev]

Son todos la misma bazofia de lo contrario no estaríamos como estamos, añadiendo que los políticos y la política de hoy en día son la representación de la bazofia de sociedad que tenemos.

[dmar]

Vomitivo todo lo que ha pasado en las últimas horas.  Hemos descendido otro escalón.

[Hynkel]

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

Por si no se me ha entendido, esto no es un tema de mera política. Es un tema del Big Picture.

Ninguno de los dos grandes es un santo. Si Sánchez llegó a presidente del gobierno (en mi modesta opinión) es porque Rajoy se negaba a dejar el dichoso ladrillo, y eso chocaba con los planes a gran escala. La orden del descabello vino de muy arriba. La sentencia de la Gürtel era lo de menos.

Ésta y no otra es la única trifulca real entre los dos grandes. Uno es el sirviente de la agenda internacional, y el otro quiere ir por libre. Por si no nos hemos dado cuenta, hay un pastel de 140.000 millones de euros. Y ahí, una vez más, la única diferencia entre los dos grandes es que uno está dispuesto a obedecer lo que les manden a cambio de recibirlos, y los otros no. Las corruptelas las dan por descontadas.


Los ciudadanos en estas trifulcas ni pinchamos ni cortamos.

[el malo]

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

Por si no se me ha entendido, esto no es un tema de mera política. Es un tema del Big Picture.

Ninguno de los dos grandes es un santo. Si Sánchez llegó a presidente del gobierno (en mi modesta opinión) es porque Rajoy se negaba a dejar el dichoso ladrillo, y eso chocaba con los planes a gran escala. La orden del descabello vino de muy arriba. La sentencia de la Gürtel era lo de menos.

Ésta y no otra es la única trifulca real entre los dos grandes. Uno es el sirviente de la agenda internacional, y el otro quiere ir por libre. Por si no nos hemos dado cuenta, hay un pastel de 140.000 millones de euros. Y ahí, una vez más, la única diferencia entre los dos grandes es que uno está dispuesto a obedecer lo que les manden a cambio de recibirlos, y los otros no. Las corruptelas las dan por descontadas.


Los ciudadanos en estas trifulcas ni pinchamos ni cortamos.

Ahí te doy la razón. Y hay veces que siento que llevo un gorro de papel albal en la cabeza, pero es que estas noticias no ayudan.

https://www.elmundo.es/economia/2021/03/04/6041649521efa0f9208b4649.html

George Soros advierte sobre la inestabilidad de España: "Su situación política es demasiado incierta"

 

[Vipamo]

Un articulo laaaargo de Economia Social de Mercado y Ordoliberalismo. A veces Project Syndicate traduce artículos, pero éste no.  Si no recuerdo mal, el ordoliberalismo nos gusta a muchos aquí, incluído ppcc.

Unos comentarios aleatorios previos: Los autores ponen el sistema como el origen del milagro alemán. Pero Alemania ya había demostrado antes que podía ser una potencia con sistemas distintos. El unico que no hicieron funcionar es el comunismo (lo que da que pensar). Otra pregunta es... es extrapolable? Porque la idea de la Cooperativa Mondragón en nuestra escala suena tambien fantástica, pero dificil de extrapolar fuera de una idiosincrasia socio-cultural-temporal peculiar. Y un ultimo comentario... los autores citan la vacuna de Pfizer como ejemplo de lo que Alemania hace. Pero tambien hay que preguntarse por que no usamos moviles ni ordenadores alemanes, ni leemos prensa alemana, ni vemos TV alemana ni queremos ir a estudiar a Alemania etc etc.

Pero bueno, el articulo es una buena introducción al ordoliberalismo que me parece al final mi posición natural ante el mundo.




https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/german-social-market-economy-rules-based-policymaking-by-lars-p-feld-et-al-2021-03

Why the Social Market Economy Succeeds Mar 12, 2021
LARS P. FELD, PETER JUNGEN, LUDGER SCHUKNECHT


Since World War II, Germany has served as Europe's economic anchor and managed to weather global and regional storms better than most other countries. The reason is not that it has been lucky, but that it has remained committed to a tried-and-tested policymaking approach anchored in classical economics.

COLOGNE – The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified ongoing debates about the future of capitalism and the economic framework best suited to meet the post-pandemic world’s long-term needs. Developed economies will, of course, need strong growth to offset the economic damage wrought by the virus, and to rise to the challenges posed by climate change and societal aging. And yet, across the developed world, the pace of economic growth has been slowing for decades, casting doubt on how these challenges will be met.

German "ordoliberal" principles are embedded throughout the European Union's economic governance, making it easy to forget that they were once dismissed out of hand. But with sound policymaking essential to secure sustained growth after the pandemic, a reappraisal of the model that enabled post-war Germany's "Wirtschaftswunder" is in order.

How should the gap between actual and necessary growth be closed? Should developed economies continue to focus on Keynesian demand management, thus risking the accumulation of ever more debt? Or should we shift to a longer-term, rules-based approach that anchors expectations and builds confidence, albeit at the expense of some policy discretion?

Such questions have become urgent, and yet are not being forthrightly addressed. Throughout the pandemic, the consensus has been that governments should intervene to boost aggregate demand through fiscal- and monetary-policy stimulus. Yet while a decisive crisis response was clearly necessary to avert an economic death spiral last spring, scant attention has been paid to the pitfalls of demand management – from the implications of massive government deficits to the potential for renewed inflation, lost business confidence, and future tax policies.

At the same time, rules-based policies have increasingly fallen out of favor. A strong tide is pushing against any measure that might inhibit the freewheeling monetary and fiscal experiments we have been witnessing. Structures such as the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which capped government fiscal deficits and debt at 3% and 60% of GDP, respectively, now seem to have been discredited as manifestations of “evil austerity.” Never mind that they delivered clear successes in Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain in the 2010s.

Moreover, the singular emphasis on demand management has distracted policymakers from the fact that today’s challenges are structural, and not solely the result of the pandemic. Concerns about growing government interventionism have coincided with reduced overall investment. Despite this, many economists continue to demand even more state intervention, while glossing over questions of what expansive monetary and fiscal policies will mean for growth over the long term.

THE SOCIAL MARKET BLUEPRINT

While much of the West has been preoccupied with what the Nobel laureate novelist Saul Bellow called “sucking out the victories of the short run,” many Asian countries have adopted more of a strategic, long-term approach to their economic decision-making.

This is certainly true of China, which has systematically sought to learn from others’ experiences as it confronts its own development challenges. Specifically, Chinese leaders have been keen to understand how Germany managed to outperform most of its Western peers in the face of challenges ranging from the post-World War II reconstruction and the great inflation to reunification and the 2008 global financial crisis.

To that end, two of us (Feld and Jungen), together with Zhou Hong, former Director-General of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Zhu Min, former Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, conducted a wide-ranging study to identify the essential elements of German post-war economic policymaking. This work culminated in The Social Market Economy: Compatibility among Individuals, Markets, Society, and the State, a book outlining the main features of the German model, the historic context that led to its creation, and the lessons it holds for our own time.

The book makes clear that Germany’s social market economy is not chained to circumstance. Rather, it is essentially a set of universal principles and rules for running an open economy. Although it advocates a strong state, it shares Adam Smith’s view that government’s proper role is to provide essential public goods and services, set the rules of the game, and then serve as a referee.

The “social” element of the social market economy, then, is not about state ownership or state direction, as under socialism. Instead, it refers to a rules-based economy in which social interests are properly accounted for.

A MODEL FOR OPEN SOCIETIES AND FREE CITIZENS

Although the social market economy was implemented under unique conditions – namely, out of the ruins of the most devastating and destructive period in human history – it is well suited for any country that is committed to pursuing patient, secure economic development. In the German context, the idea for a liberalizing reform package originated with the Freiburg School – so named for the picturesque town at the foot of the Black Forest, home to the University of Freiburg.

The social market economy’s main protagonists were the economists Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, and it was strongly influenced by the Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek (then in exile in London). Henry Simons and Frank Knight of the University of Chicago also inspired the “ordoliberal” thinking underlying the approach.

The true “birth” of the Freiburg School of economics came in 1936, over a decade before Germany’s currency reform, and at one of the darkest moments in the country’s history. This was when Böhm, Eucken, and Hans Grossmann-Doerth published the “Ordo Manifesto,” pushing back against the collectivist ideas that had come to seem triumphant with Stalin’s disastrous five-year plans and the Nazis’ increasingly interventionist and clientelist economic policies.

In the face of this, Böhm, Eucken, and Grossmann-Doerth saw the need for a systemic, principle-based view of the economy. Taking the perspective of lawyers as well as economists, their manifesto advanced the Hayekian notion of an “economic constitution” comprising special laws on bankruptcy, labor, real estate, and other relevant domains, all with the aim of providing for a well-functioning, competitive market-based system. At a time when the country was fully in Adolf Hitler’s grip, the publication of such a manifesto was nothing if not courageous.

Once peace came and Germans began to govern themselves again, Ludwig Erhard, the minister for economic affairs, sought to put the “Ordo Manifesto” into practice. Erhard considered himself a liberal and was strongly influenced by ordoliberal ideas. But labels are important, so Alfred Müller-Armack, another “founding” ordoliberal and senior official under Erhard, coined the term “social market economy” in 1947 to serve as the public expression of “ordoliberalism.”

A WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER IS BORN

The rudiments of the ordoliberal model were first put into practice three years after WWII, a time when Germany remained destitute, desperate, and nearly paralyzed. The country’s economy was riddled with black marketeering and widespread economic controls that had been imposed by a massive bureaucracy comprising not only the remnants of the old German state but also the military administration of the occupying powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). There were shortages of everything, and various forms of interventionism, state planning, and control prevailed. But Germany’s nascent post-war leaders were preparing to embark on a different path.

A crucial moment came on June 20, 1948, when the Deutsche Mark was introduced as a new currency. This coincided with Erhard’s decision to abolish the wartime and post-war systems of price administration. With these two seemingly simple steps, the foundation of a market economy was laid. Henceforth, the prices of most goods and services would be set by the free operation of markets. Soon enough, German shop windows were restocked with goods as the black market was absorbed into the official economy.

In liberalizing markets and strengthening competition, Erhard and his Freiburg School collaborators in Konrad Adenauer’s government broke with Germany’s long tradition of monopolies, cartels, and ad hoc government intervention. Consumption and production quickly aligned, as entrepreneurs reallocated labor and scarce capital to more productive uses. Investment and innovation took off. The postwar German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) was born. By unleashing the market to revitalize a moribund economy, German policymakers pursued a course that may seem obvious today but certainly didn’t at the time.

Ironically, those who were most skeptical of the ordoliberal reforms included representatives of the US, the world’s leading market economy. Though what is apocryphal and real are now impossible to reconstruct, there is an anecdote that General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor of the US-controlled zone, summoned Erhard and told him that he must not alter the rules of price administration:

“Mr. General, I have not altered the rules, I have lifted them,” Erhard replied.
“Professor Erhard, all my advisers tell me that a market economy in Germany will never work.”
“Don’t worry,” Erhard assured him, “all my advisers are telling me the same.”

In the event, it took the German people some time to warm to the new approach. Such hesitancy was understandable after the years of National Socialist dictatorship and virtual serfdom. Nonetheless, in 1949, Germans chose the Christian Democrat Adenauer, a longtime mayor of Cologne who had never supported Nazi rule, to serve as West Germany’s first chancellor, and Adenauer put Erhard in charge of economic policy. The social market economy was the platform on which they would build a democratic Germany.

“At a turning point of German history,” explains Alfred Mierzejewski, Erhard’s biographer, Germany was “offered a real and moderate alternative to all the other political ideological extremes” then under discussion. Over time, as the economy delivered persistently strong growth, the social market economy became ever more popular. In the words of Jürgen Jeske, former editor of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, it was “the visible hand of economic prosperity.” In the following decades, West Germany became one of Europe’s most successful economies. The social market economy and ordoliberalism have continued to serve as the country’s guiding economic philosophy.

THE RULES OF THE GAME

Conceptually, the social market economy has the virtue of being straightforward and intuitive to ordinary citizens. Recognizing that modern economies are far too complex to be planned or engineered, ordoliberalism limits itself to governing the rules of the game, which in turn allows people to set their own expectations and act accordingly. To be effective, however, all of the rules and policies must “fit together”; good rules make for good games, in the economy as in sports.

The roots of ordoliberal thinking lay in classical economics, which placed great faith in free, responsible individuals interacting in markets. Ordoliberals shared Smith’s view that, as the economist John Kay put it, a “successful market economy requires the legal, social, and economic infrastructure that only a strong state can provide.” But “a strong state is tolerable only in an environment of pluralism, democracy, and mutual trust.” Ordoliberals were similarly aware of how markets can go wrong or go too far. Like Smith, they knew that “markets function well only when embedded in strong and supportive social institutions.” Again, in Kay’s words, “there is no contradiction between Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations.”

Böhm argued along the same lines. Writing in 1966, he pointed out that the social market economy required the rule of law so as to abolish “all class prerogatives and privileges.” In particular, “the administration of justice should be totally free from all powers of domination and representation.” The result, in today’s parlance, is a level playing field on which free citizens can pursue their own interests and thrive.

To that end, markets are crucial for aligning production with consumer preferences, by generating information about what is scarce and what is not. The price mechanism, as Eucken put it, is a “scarcity gauge.” To function properly, however, markets need to be competitive, which has the added benefit of enhancing efficiency and innovation.

A competitive order provides opportunities for everyone, rather than just for the powerful, and the principle of individual responsibility ensures that people can reap the rewards of their successes without avoiding liability for their failures. Uncompetitive, power-driven behavior is therefore a threat to any market order. Because firms tend to collude, form cartels, and exploit their local labor-market powers, well-designed competition and labor laws are essential.

While pre-war Germany had a long history of labor law, it was more resistant to the idea of a competition policy. But with the Freiburg School’s support, Erhard introduced the German Competition Act in the late 1950s.

DIGNITY OVER DEPENDENCE

Erhard stressed that the social market economy was designed to support “the basic human instinct to better one’s life.” It was aligned with the “nature and dignity of human beings” that the Nazi regime had so grievously denied. The state, he and his contemporaries believed, should act as an impartial referee and not as a player, let alone a team manager.

It is this principled impartiality that puts the “social” in the social market economy. Because everyone has a natural drive to improve their situation, the provision of an efficient, innovative, equal-opportunity system is a paramount social good.

The social market economy is also social because it creates the wealth needed to provide welfare benefits, housing support, pensions, and other programs. Of course, as Müller-Armack stressed early on, such social policies should be designed to promote self-reliance and dignity rather than dependence.

More fundamentally, Eucken, Böhm, and other ordoliberals saw ad hoc government interventions in the economy as the greatest threat to a functioning economic order. Not only do government actions affect short-term outcomes, but they also introduce uncertainty, distortions, and disincentives that will frustrate the workings of the system over the long run.

Hence, Erhard warned of the “insolence” of “megalomaniacal bureaucrats.” To be sure, he was no less scathing about well-organized private interests and “crony capitalists” who pursue every opportunity to secure privileges for themselves at the expense of everyone else. But because interventionism tended to benefit the well-connected rather than the innovative or the poor, the ordoliberal’s default view was that it was, if anything, anti-social.

THE BIG TENT

As a direct intellectual descendant of the classical economists, ordoliberalism is not simply some peculiar German or Austrian invention. The social market economy and Ordnungspolitik have kindred spirits around the world. For example, with its emphasis on rules and the general interest (rather than special interests), the “constitutional economics” pioneered by the American Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan had much in common with ordoliberal thinking. Similarly, public choice theory, the economic analysis of politics and the role of government in the economy, relies on an approach very similar to that of the Freiburg School.

And, of course, ordoliberals have always sided with the rules-oriented-economics camp in the great “rules vs. discretion” debate in macroeconomics. Whereas rules foster intertemporal consistency and long-term optimality, discretionary policies ignore and even undermine these objectives. By the same token, there is strong cross-fertilization between ordoliberal views and the American debates over fiscal and monetary rulemaking, which touch on everything from most US states’ balanced budget requirements to the famous Taylor rule in central banking.

Moreover, the social market economy and ordoliberal thinking remain dominant in many other parts of Europe. For example, ordoliberals have had a strong influence on the development of the EU’s competition policy, which itself has followed a rules-based approach. Indeed, ordoliberalism’s greatest international achievement is perhaps the EU’s “four freedoms” framework, which provides for free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the single market. When combined with clear and predictable competition rules, these freedoms keep countries economically fit, by encouraging them to develop an attractive, well-functioning market system at home, lest they lose out on trade, investment, and other commercial opportunities.

Ordoliberal thinking has also strongly influenced what one might call Europe’s “financial constitution.” It was the German Bundesbank that provided the model for the European Central Bank and other independent central banks across the Union. Likewise, the Maastricht deficit and debt rules that laid the foundation for the euro were a clear reflection of ordoliberal thinking. And the same can be said of the German deficit rule – the “debt brake” that allowed Germany to reduce its public debt after the global financial crisis and thus be well prepared to handle the fiscal challenges of the pandemic.

Ordoliberalism’s central tenets also underpin the European Stability Mechanism – which adheres to the IMF’s principle of conditional financial support to ensure solidarity within the EU – and the EU Treaty’s requirement of “subsidiarity,” or decentralized decision-making.

Finally, rules-based economic policymaking is strongly supported at the level of multilateral and global-governance institutions. This is not surprising: one country’s trade protectionism, for example, damages the interests of not only its own consumers but also of many others abroad. Before a rules-based system was established under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and later the World Trade Organization, protectionism had long been a source of international tension and conflict.

GOOD RULES MAKE FOR INNOVATIVE IDEAS

Building on Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas, ordoliberals have long stressed the importance of openness, innovation, and economic dynamism. According to Herbert Giersch, one of the most prominent ordoliberals in the 1970s and 1980s, human capital and favorable institutions were the keys to Germany’s escape from post-war misery. These factors helped Germany avoid the middle-income trap as it recovered from post-war impoverishment and achieve general prosperity, before ably tackling the challenge of reunification and then weathering the 2008 global financial crisis.

With its focus on predictable rules and open, reliable institutions, ordoliberalism has provided a powerful framework for driving innovation. Here, the state’s role is limited to funding basic research and the appropriate infrastructure, so that entrepreneurs and inventors have a stable environment in which to turn knowledge into capital and bring new and innovative products to market.

Still, policymaking in Germany is not a perfect incarnation of ordoliberalism. Political compromises have had to be made in the face of diverging interests. The state’s continued ownership stake in Volkswagen and a few other companies comes to mind. But these examples are exceptions to an otherwise private-sector-driven growth and innovation model.

Germany thus stands in stark contrast to countries that have engaged in “industrial policy,” aiming to identify the most promising industries to promote. This reflects the conviction that successful innovation policy does not pretend to know what the future will bring. Instead, it maintains institutional openness to ideas that no one today could even imagine. Indeed, no government could have foreseen that mRNA technology developed by a German startup (BioNTech) to fight cancer would be used to create a vaccine against the coronavirus in record-breaking time.

Finally, in fostering more green innovation, Europe has deployed rules- and market-based emissions trading schemes as the foundation of its decarbonization strategy. This, too, represents another win for ordoliberal thinking. It shows that the social market economy remains the framework for tackling our most pressing challenges today.

The social market economy model endures because it supports consumer interests before those of producers, just as it positions citizens, rather than the state, as the true sovereigns. At its heart is a commitment to constitutional and system-level thinking, not piecemeal, discretionary policymaking. This approach has proven to offer the most reliable foundation for a successful economy. Germany’s record after 1945 speaks for itself.

This matters today because too many economists continue to view rules and boundaries as guidelines, not guardrails. Yet now more than ever, we need a reliable compass for navigating the challenges ahead. Consistency and predictability invariably build confidence, which is one of the main reasons why Germany became the economic anchor of the EU. The world’s drifting advanced economies could do worse than to attach themselves to the same mooring.

Perdona, pero yo sí leo prensa alemana, sí veo la tele alemana y enviaría a mis hijos a estudiar a Alemania.
Otra cosa es que aquí haya mucho anglófilo (no es mi caso), especialmente en la derecha. Parece que las hostias de Trafalgar y después Cuba/Filipinas han dejado un poso de “sí señor, gracias” en la piel de toro. Me gusta más la actitud: “me has tirado, pero me levanto y te la devolveré porque eres mi rival” que está mentalidad de perdedores.

[Reiter]

El PP de Madrid no tiene nada que ver con el del resto de España. Si hay elecciones mi impresion es que va a arrasar y le va a dar para gobernar con VOX. Otra cosa es que este movimiento fuera de Madrid no les valga, pero es que la derecha para gobernar en España con los escaños que se dan en Cataluña y Pais Vasco lo tiene sencillamente imposible.

Madrid está en una situación de secuestro que dejan a la altura de una broma casos como los 40 años de PSOE en Andalucía o el gilismo en Marbella. En Murcia, si damos por buena la entrevista que ha hecho El Diario (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/sospechas-corrupcion-murcia-hay-mafia-tremenda_1_7286995.html) están en una situación parecida. Todos tragan por miedo, pero al mismo tiempo se sabe que eso no podía mantenerse indefinidamente. Deben de estar todos rezando para que cuando la bola de mierda estalle no les salpique.

Madrid está directamente en otra dimensión. Si ya en su día se dio el Tamayazo, qué no harán ahora para no perder su feudo. Pero tras muchos años de gobierno la mierda ya les rebosa. Llevan ya dos presidentas dimitidas por escándalos de corrupción. Ciudadanos ha hecho posiblemente la última jugada que le quedaba para evitar la desaparición. Es una moneda al aire, pero en realidad ya no tenían nada que perder por intentarlo. No hacer nada les garantizaba ser fagocitados por el PP.

El asunto de las mociones de censura va a ir seguro a los tribunales. Si el PP es expulsado del poder puede salir una cantidad ingente de mierda, así que ellos también van a echar el resto. Es todo o nada, es una guerra sin prisioneros. Vencer o desaparecer.

Jodó Hynkel. Ya se que cada uno tenemos nuestras filias y fobias pero hablar de la corrupción del PP para sobrevivir a estas alturas tiene bemoles.
Sí, el PP tiene muchos esqueletos en el armario de Madrid, pero es que el PSOE estaba sentado encima de una fosa común en Andalucía. ¿La corrupción sólo afecta a "unos" pero no a "otros"? ¿Como podemos hablar de secuestro de Madrid cuando Andalucía ha sido la región con más corrupción de España? (posiblemente de Europa).

Lo puse hace tiempo por aquí (con links). Sólo con las mamandurrias LEGALES de Andalucía de los últimos 10 años se podría haber desarrollado un programa Eurofighter. En las ilegales no entro porque ni ellos deben saber cuanto dinero se ha perdido por el sumidero.

Eso no hace mejor al PP de Madrid, pero joder es menudas gafas tenemos en España, que sólo vemos las corrupciones dependiendo del color del que las perpetre.

Ni filias ni fobias. Es algo completamente diferente, y que para bien o para mal, sucede.

El PP es el heredero de quienes en el franquismo hacían y deshacían sin que nadie les molestase. Trataban al país como lo que era, su cortijo. Esa mentalidad la mantienen completamente.

El PSOE antes de Suresnes prácticamente no existía. Eran Llopis y cuatro gatos más. El único partido de oposición a la dictadura realmente organizado era el comunista. Obviamente Felipe no organizó el PSOE actual ni llegó al poder por inspiración divina, sino porque tenía detrás apoyos poderosos. Que una vez en el poder le pusieron a Felipe la agenda a escala internacional que el franquismo se resistía a aplicar.


Y esto está volviendo a suceder ahora mismo, delante de nuestros ojos. Mantengo que lo de Rajoy no fue casualidad, la sentencia de la Gürtel fue la excusa.

El PP no está conectado con las altas esferas internacionales y tiene que hacer como la antigua CiU, vivir de sus corruptelas. El PSOE sí tiene apoyos internacionales que le permiten funcionar sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía, por supuesto.

Esto no es un problema de filias o fobias. Es un problema de que desde el 78 tenemos dos partidos, el "institucional" con apoyo de fuera (y para que nos tutelen), y un subalterno al que se le deja gobernar de vez en cuando cuando hay que airear al "institucional".


Es decir, tenemos para elegir un partido que hace de "delegado de la clase" para que nos tutelen sin que nos enteremos, y otro que no sabe ir más allá del traje, la corbata, el ladrillo, y demás negocios fáciles.

 

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

Ja ja! Iba a usar el mismo con lo de "sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía"

El único factor de gobierno desde el 78 es la corrupción, mientras haya dinero se cederá lo que haya que ceder a los nacionalistas y todos robarán en su cortijo tapándose unos a otros, cuando el dinero se acabe se sacarán los ojos. Ya lo advertía hace muchos años un desaparecido jurista.

[Mad Men]

El PP de Madrid no tiene nada que ver con el del resto de España. Si hay elecciones mi impresion es que va a arrasar y le va a dar para gobernar con VOX. Otra cosa es que este movimiento fuera de Madrid no les valga, pero es que la derecha para gobernar en España con los escaños que se dan en Cataluña y Pais Vasco lo tiene sencillamente imposible.

Madrid está en una situación de secuestro que dejan a la altura de una broma casos como los 40 años de PSOE en Andalucía o el gilismo en Marbella. En Murcia, si damos por buena la entrevista que ha hecho El Diario (https://www.eldiario.es/politica/sospechas-corrupcion-murcia-hay-mafia-tremenda_1_7286995.html) están en una situación parecida. Todos tragan por miedo, pero al mismo tiempo se sabe que eso no podía mantenerse indefinidamente. Deben de estar todos rezando para que cuando la bola de mierda estalle no les salpique.

Madrid está directamente en otra dimensión. Si ya en su día se dio el Tamayazo, qué no harán ahora para no perder su feudo. Pero tras muchos años de gobierno la mierda ya les rebosa. Llevan ya dos presidentas dimitidas por escándalos de corrupción. Ciudadanos ha hecho posiblemente la última jugada que le quedaba para evitar la desaparición. Es una moneda al aire, pero en realidad ya no tenían nada que perder por intentarlo. No hacer nada les garantizaba ser fagocitados por el PP.

El asunto de las mociones de censura va a ir seguro a los tribunales. Si el PP es expulsado del poder puede salir una cantidad ingente de mierda, así que ellos también van a echar el resto. Es todo o nada, es una guerra sin prisioneros. Vencer o desaparecer.

Jodó Hynkel. Ya se que cada uno tenemos nuestras filias y fobias pero hablar de la corrupción del PP para sobrevivir a estas alturas tiene bemoles.
Sí, el PP tiene muchos esqueletos en el armario de Madrid, pero es que el PSOE estaba sentado encima de una fosa común en Andalucía. ¿La corrupción sólo afecta a "unos" pero no a "otros"? ¿Como podemos hablar de secuestro de Madrid cuando Andalucía ha sido la región con más corrupción de España? (posiblemente de Europa).

Lo puse hace tiempo por aquí (con links). Sólo con las mamandurrias LEGALES de Andalucía de los últimos 10 años se podría haber desarrollado un programa Eurofighter. En las ilegales no entro porque ni ellos deben saber cuanto dinero se ha perdido por el sumidero.

Eso no hace mejor al PP de Madrid, pero joder es menudas gafas tenemos en España, que sólo vemos las corrupciones dependiendo del color del que las perpetre.

Ni filias ni fobias. Es algo completamente diferente, y que para bien o para mal, sucede.

El PP es el heredero de quienes en el franquismo hacían y deshacían sin que nadie les molestase. Trataban al país como lo que era, su cortijo. Esa mentalidad la mantienen completamente.

El PSOE antes de Suresnes prácticamente no existía. Eran Llopis y cuatro gatos más. El único partido de oposición a la dictadura realmente organizado era el comunista. Obviamente Felipe no organizó el PSOE actual ni llegó al poder por inspiración divina, sino porque tenía detrás apoyos poderosos. Que una vez en el poder le pusieron a Felipe la agenda a escala internacional que el franquismo se resistía a aplicar.


Y esto está volviendo a suceder ahora mismo, delante de nuestros ojos. Mantengo que lo de Rajoy no fue casualidad, la sentencia de la Gürtel fue la excusa.

El PP no está conectado con las altas esferas internacionales y tiene que hacer como la antigua CiU, vivir de sus corruptelas. El PSOE sí tiene apoyos internacionales que le permiten funcionar sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía, por supuesto.

Esto no es un problema de filias o fobias. Es un problema de que desde el 78 tenemos dos partidos, el "institucional" con apoyo de fuera (y para que nos tutelen), y un subalterno al que se le deja gobernar de vez en cuando cuando hay que airear al "institucional".


Es decir, tenemos para elegir un partido que hace de "delegado de la clase" para que nos tutelen sin que nos enteremos, y otro que no sabe ir más allá del traje, la corbata, el ladrillo, y demás negocios fáciles.

 

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

Ja ja! Iba a usar el mismo con lo de "sin tanto trinque. Aunque se den casos como el de Andalucía"

El único factor de gobierno desde el 78 es la corrupción, mientras haya dinero se cederá lo que haya que ceder a los nacionalistas y todos robarán en su cortijo tapándose unos a otros, cuando el dinero se acabe se sacarán los ojos. Ya lo advertía hace muchos años un desaparecido jurista.

El PSOE fue potenciado o auspiciado por EEUU y por Alemania.

El régimen Español actual es una consecuencia de la guerra fría para evitar una pinza comunista en Europa.

Saludos

[Hynkel]

¿Entonces por qué lo hacían? ¿Por deporte?

Dejo el tema por no ensuciar el hilo con política, pero que alguien me diga que el PSOE gana o tiene que ganar porque al PP le pasa la factura la corrupción es como el chiste del que le duele la cabeza y para dejar de sentir el dolor se machaca el pie con un martillo.

Por si no se me ha entendido, esto no es un tema de mera política. Es un tema del Big Picture.

Ninguno de los dos grandes es un santo. Si Sánchez llegó a presidente del gobierno (en mi modesta opinión) es porque Rajoy se negaba a dejar el dichoso ladrillo, y eso chocaba con los planes a gran escala. La orden del descabello vino de muy arriba. La sentencia de la Gürtel era lo de menos.

Ésta y no otra es la única trifulca real entre los dos grandes. Uno es el sirviente de la agenda internacional, y el otro quiere ir por libre. Por si no nos hemos dado cuenta, hay un pastel de 140.000 millones de euros. Y ahí, una vez más, la única diferencia entre los dos grandes es que uno está dispuesto a obedecer lo que les manden a cambio de recibirlos, y los otros no. Las corruptelas las dan por descontadas.


Los ciudadanos en estas trifulcas ni pinchamos ni cortamos.

Ahí te doy la razón. Y hay veces que siento que llevo un gorro de papel albal en la cabeza, pero es que estas noticias no ayudan.

https://www.elmundo.es/economia/2021/03/04/6041649521efa0f9208b4649.html

George Soros advierte sobre la inestabilidad de España: "Su situación política es demasiado incierta"

 

Hombre... es que para esto no hace falta un gorro de papel albal . Si España rompe sus cuentas, el golpe en Europa es muy gordo.

Europa no tiene ningún interés en ser nuestra institutriz, por ella como si queremos seguir rebozándonos en ladrillo. Pero con la pasta que debemos, quieren tener la garantía de que no nos vamos a endeudar más, o al menos con la situación del Covid la nueva deuda va a estar controlada. Por eso quieren estar seguros de quién hay aquí al mando y de si va a estar dispuesto a hacer los deberes.