Tema: PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Invierno 2022

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2023/02/03/economia/1675452245_816964.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://lectura.kioskoymas.com/cinco-dias/20230206/page/21/textview

La construcción de casas supera las 100.000 en 11 meses

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2023/02/03/economia/1675445864_616300.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://lectura.kioskoymas.com/cinco-dias/20230206/page/24/textview

Los problemas (no resueltos) de China que ensombrece­rán 2023

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://lectura.kioskoymas.com/cinco-dias/20230206/page/25/textview

Alemania despierta: la carrera por los recursos energéticos globales

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://lectura.kioskoymas.com/cinco-dias/20230206/page/26/textview

¿Hacia el fin de la barra libre en las devoluciones gratuitas?

Saludos.

[asustadísimos]

[INFLACIÓN RARA (Cont.).— La llamada nueva normalidad es mentira. Y no es inocente 'whisful thinking'. Es una estafa.

Los 'nuevanormalidaditas' predican un escenario que saben que imposible económicamente y, además, contrario a la 'National Security Strategy'. El escenario se resume en:
a) inflación local persistente; y
b) comercio exterior intervenido y reprimido, lo que llaman 'desglobalización'.

Es imposible económicamente porque el imperialismo actual consiste en poder endeudarte en tu moneda con tus proveedores periféricos. Y que tú tengas inflación destruye este 'statu quo'. Por eso la inflación propia forma parte de la lista de vulnerabilidades de la 'National Security Strategy'.

Y el comercio exterior es imparable, pero no solo porque China va a seguir desarrollándose —y en el próximo futuro ya no solo será China—. Sobre todo está que hay 193+1 Estados (el +1 es la UE) y los 'nuevanormalidaditas' no es que no puedan enfriar todas las fronteras, es que no pueden ni con una sola, como se comprobó durante la 'yihad' arancelaria de Trump y, ahora, con el comercio exterior ruso.

Los nuevanormalidaditas son los tontos de los pisitos engolando la voz (alguno trabajador-directivo 'bienpagao', con predicamento entre horteras y comemierdas). Son los mismacestahuevones los que quieren que la inflación disimule su fealdad y que nada ni nadie perturbe su tesoro —mi pisito un capital, mi terruñito una nación, mis ideítas una religión—. «When they sends its people, they're not sending their best... They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.» Es la mentalidad del colono en la conquista del Oeste: soberanismo individual, en un mano el rifle, en la otra la biblia... y el 'libre examen', claro está.

Nosotros, a lo nuestro. A darle vueltas al horizonte realmente existente: OBOR 2049.]

[sudden and sharp]

[...] Nosotros, a lo nuestro. A darle vueltas al horizonte realmente existente: OBOR 2049.]

Vale.

Yo voy a investigar sobre todo esto:

Por si aún quedaran dudas de que la referencia a la CSE es capciosa, cabe recordar que no tiene sentido que la misma fijara proporción alguna ya que hay seis países de la UE que carecen de SMI (Austria, Italia, Finlandia, Dinamarca, Suecia y Chipre). Queda aún una prueba más contundente: en ningún país de la UE, salvo España, el salario mínimo se acerca al 60% del salario medio. Según datos del informe de CEPYME sobre el SMI, el ránking ya era liderado por España con un SMI de 1.000 euros, que equivalía al 54,8% del salario medio. Por detrás se colocaban, por ejemplo, Grecia (51,3%), Portugal (49,2%), Francia y Reino Unido (48,1% en ambos casos), Alemania (41,8%) y Hungría (35,4%).

https://www.libremercado.com/2023-02-03/diego-barcelo-larran-subida-del-smi-argumentos-falsos-y-verdades-duras-6981884/


... y con vistas al 2050.



----------
[ Interesante lo que se dice en el artículo sobre el 60% del salario medi[ano|o] ]

[Benzino Napaloni]

Seguimos para bingo.

Golpe del Supremo al 'catastrazo': exige a Hacienda que justifique sus tasaciones

Esto junto a las plusvalías municipales era una de las guarradas que nos han traído hasta aquí y que nunca deberían haberse consentido.

Qué razón tenía Ivà cuando parodiaba la avaricia de Hacienda. Si ej que ya roban diret-tamente de los bancos, son insasiables.

https://youtu.be/DPMWAmwh6ZU

[Derby]

Ya en Bloomberg...para los inversores extranjeros 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/barcelona-madrid-propel-spanish-rental-rates-to-record-high

Barcelona, Madrid Propel Spanish Rental Rates to Record High

Higher interest rates have made home purchases more expensive
Rents have increased for 11 straight months with supply tight

(...) Buying a home will become increasingly expensive in Spain this year. Selling prices are also at record highs even as mortgage rates rise. The combination is likely to further increase demand for rental properties in the coming months.

[Derby]

https://www.businessinsider.com/china-property-sector-crisis-imf-economy-debt-2023-2

China keeps insisting its real estate market is not in a crisis — even as just about every sign points to the opposite

(...)"The real problem is that many developers simply do not generate positive cash flow and that the funding model of unfettered pre-sale receipts is broken," Andrew Lawrence, TS Lombard's Asia property analyst, wrote in a January 12 note seen by Insider.

[Benzino Napaloni]

Ya en Bloomberg...para los inversores extranjeros 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-02-06/barcelona-madrid-propel-spanish-rental-rates-to-record-high

Barcelona, Madrid Propel Spanish Rental Rates to Record High

Higher interest rates have made home purchases more expensive
Rents have increased for 11 straight months with supply tight

(...) Buying a home will become increasingly expensive in Spain this year. Selling prices are also at record highs even as mortgage rates rise. The combination is likely to further increase demand for rental properties in the coming months.

Bloomberg ens roba.

La verdad, en la Ciudad Condal echamos muchas cosas (y empresas) de menos, pero los buitres del ladrillo no es una de ellas. Que Florentino les acoja.

[Derby]

Seguimos para bingo.

Golpe del Supremo al 'catastrazo': exige a Hacienda que justifique sus tasaciones

Y lo que sucede en las reclamaciones contra la propia autoliquidación del Impuesto de transmisiones patrimoniales, aportando el informe de tasación para acreditar el valor del piso (inferior al valor de referencia catastral), es que la administración tributaria (en mi caso Agència Tributària de Catalunya) resuelve "parcialmente" a favor de la reclamación pero sin justificar los criterios con los que se obtiene el valor del piso que da lugar a esa resolución favorable "parcial". La vía del recurso queda de facto cerrada. 

Y sí, estoy viendo "operaciones" que se tiran para atrás porque el valor de referencia del inmueble puede llegar a doblar el precio de venta pactado. Luego se puede reclamar, pero antes hay que liquidar para evitar una complementaria. Afecta especialmente a los pisos de fondos o de bancos porque suelen estar en muy malas condiciones y el valor de referencia catastral se elabora anualmente (en enero se ha publicado el valor de referencia para este año 2023) a partir de las medias de los registros y notarios de cada zona.

[asustadísimos]

[Siempre se puede instar la revisión de oficio y, en su caso, contra el acuerdo denegatorio, cabe reclamar y recurrir.]

[Derby]

https://economiccollapsenews.com/2023/02/05/collapse-in-money-supply-growth-supports-u-s-recession-case/

Collapse in money-supply growth supports U.S. recession case

Money supply growth fell again in December, falling even further into negative territory after turning negative in November for the first time in twenty-eight years. December’s drop continues a steep downward trend from the unprecedented highs experienced during much of the past two years. During the thirteen months between April 2020 and April 2021, money supply growth in the United States often climbed above 35 percent year over year, well above even the “high” levels experienced from 2009 to 2013.

Since then, the money supply growth has slowed quickly, and since November, we’ve been seeing the money supply contract for the first time since the 1990s. The last time the year-over-year (YOY) change in the money supply slipped into negative territory was in November 1994. At that time, negative growth continued for fifteen months, finally turning positive again in January 1996.

During December 2022, YOY growth in the money supply was at –2.4 percent. That’s down from November’s rate of –0.55 percent and down from December 2021’s rate of 6.44 percent.



The money supply metric used here—the “true,” or Rothbard-Salerno, money supply measure (TMS)—is the metric developed by Murray Rothbard and Joseph Salerno, and is designed to provide a better measure of money supply fluctuations than M2.1

The Mises Institute now offers regular updates on this metric and its growth. This measure of the money supply differs from M2 in that it includes Treasury deposits at the Fed (and excludes short-time deposits and retail money funds).

In recent months, M2 growth rates have followed a similar course to TMS growth rates. In December 2022, the M2 growth rate was –1.3 percent. That’s down from November’s growth rate of –0.01 percent. December’s rate was also well down from December 2021’s rate of 12.5 percent.

Money supply growth can often be a helpful measure of economic activity and an indicator of coming recessions. During periods of economic boom, money supply tends to grow quickly as commercial banks make more loans. Recessions, on the other hand, tend to be preceded by slowing rates of money supply growth. However, money supply growth tends to begin growing again before the onset of recession.

Negative money supply growth is not in itself an especially meaningful metric. But the drop into negative territory we’ve seen in recent months does help illustrate just how far and how rapidly money supply growth has fallen in recent months. That is generally a red flag for economic growth and employment.

Money supply growth also appears to be connected to yield-curve inversion—itself a recession indicator. For example, the 3s/10s yield spread often heads toward zero as money supply growth moves in the same direction. This was especially clear from 1999 through 2000, from 2004 to 2006, and during 2018 and 2019, and beginning in 2022. This is not surprising because trends in money supply growth have long appeared to be connected to the shape of the yield curve. As Bob Murphy notes in his book Understanding Money Mechanics, a sustained decline in TMS growth often reflects spikes in short-term yields, which can fuel a flattening or inverting yield curve.



It’s not especially a mystery why short-term interest rates are headed up fast, and why the money supply is decelerating. Since January 2022, the Fed has raised the target federal funds rate from 0.25 percent up to 4.75 percent



This means fewer injections of Fed money into the market through open market operations. Moreover, although it has done very little to sizably reduce the size of its portfolio, the Fed has nonetheless stopped adding to its portfolio through quantitative easing and allowed a small amount (about 5 percent of $8.9 trillion) to roll off.

It should be emphasized that it is not necessary for money supply growth to turn negative in order to trigger recession, defaults, and other economic disruptions. With recent decades marked by the Greenspan put, financial repression, and other forms of easy money, the Federal Reserve has inflated a number of bubbles and zombie enterprises that now rely on nearly constant infusions of new money to stay afloat. For many of these bubble industries, all that is necessary for a crisis is a slowing in money supply growth, brought on by rising interest rates or a confidence crisis.

Numerous indicators now point toward recession along with the falling money supply and the inverted yield curve. The Leading Economic Index is in recession territory. Real wages have fallen for twenty-one months. Home builder confidence fell every month of 2022. The Philadelphia Fed’s manufacturing index has been negative since September. Home price growth has been cut in half. The fact that the money supply is actually shrinking serves as just one more indicator that the so-called soft landing promised by the Federal Reserve is unlikely to ever be a reality.