Tema: PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Invierno 2022

[insana]

Pero vamos que la cuestión aquí, creo, es analizar si a través de la política comercial hipotecaria podemos intuir por dónde andan las expectativas de tipos de la banca.
[/quote]

Aquí quería llegar yo. Y también a saber si pudiera ser que estén dispuestos a sacrificar algo sus márgenes con tal de que no se apague la música de la fiesta

[el malo]

(Reedición de la ficha:
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2573.msg203022#msg203022 )

FICHA || LA RETÓRICA DE LA «LEY DE HIERRO DE LOS SALARIOS» CONTRA LA PETULANCIA «OFERTADEMANDISTA».—

[..]

La verdad es que el suelo construido no vale intrínsecamente casi nada, como lo prueba que dos pisitos idénticos en edificios colindantes, uno de cuatro alturas y otro de ocho, 'valen' lo mismo.

Este apunte, que suena muy obvio una vez escrito, es una bofetada de realidad. La repercusión del precio del suelo son los padres. Si fuera real, el precio por metro cuadrado de vivienda bajaría por cada altura construida. Llevando esa teoría al extremo, en un rascacielos el precio del suelo por vivienda tendería a cero y el coste del piso sería el de la construcción + beneficio promotor.
Es algo que ya sabía pero al verlo así escrito me ha abierto los ojos.


Y con su permiso le corrijo un pequeño typo

rentas aproductivas = Renta Trabajo Neta + Renta Empresarial Neta

[sudden and sharp]

Mi experiencia en el tema es que a veces... no te lo dan por escrito... o NO te dejan sacarlo de la sucursal.



Por ahí, entra lo de insana... las palabras se las lleva el viento. Pero aquí hay otro factor... la venta en frío. Es más normal que te citen...

Y finalmente hay que firmar en papel, dos copias, porque si firmas en la pizarra... no sabes lo que firmas. No, no lo sabes. (No quieren dártelo en papel... que sí al correo... etc.

Táctica: experimento con gaseosa. Vale... y metes muy poco. Luego ya con el papel manufirmado por ti... ya si eso, metes más.

[Saturio]

Mi experiencia en el tema es que a veces... no te lo dan por escrito... o NO te dejan sacarlo de la sucursal.



Por ahí, entra lo de insana... las palabras se las lleva el viento. Pero aquí hay otro factor... la venta en frío. Es más normal que te citen...

Y finalmente hay que firmar en papel, dos copias, porque si firmas en la pizarra... no sabes lo que firmas. No, no lo sabes. (No quieren dártelo en papel... que sí al correo... etc.

Táctica: experimento con gaseosa. Vale... y metes muy poco. Luego ya con el papel manufirmado por ti... ya si eso, metes más.

Y la vieja táctica comercial de decirte que las condiciones son X y luego cuando ya te has interesado y se mira bien, bien, bien y con detalle tu caso, resulta que para ti, lamentablemente, las condiciones son un poquito peores porque -¡qué lástima!- no cumples tal o cual.

[asustadísimos]

[Aviso de 'adenda' al comentario:
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2583.msg210406#msg210406
El vídeo enlazado es obligatorio.]

[Derby]

Pero vamos que la cuestión aquí, creo, es analizar si a través de la política comercial hipotecaria podemos intuir por dónde andan las expectativas de tipos de la banca.

Hoy me han contado de una compraventa que no se ha llegado a firmar en la notaría, estando todo el mundo presente (notario, vendedor, comprador, banco) porque el banco hipotecante ha cambiado las condiciones en el mismo momento (tipo fijo del 4%). Lógicamente, el comprador ha dicho que se lo pensará 

Debe ser la compra de un local porque en el caso de vivienda hay un trámite (Ficha Europea de Información Normalizada, FEIN) que fija los términos y condiciones de la hipoteca con una antelación de 14/10 días.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/985e3794-3691-48d6-84c2-ff1f23855163

German inflation hits five-month low of 9.2%

Delayed data release may require revision to eurozone figure as end of energy subsidies complicates calculations

German inflation hit a five-month low of 9.2 per cent in January, according to delayed data that could require an upward revision to last week’s eurozone-wide figure.

The federal statistical agency said annual inflation fell from 9.6 per cent in December, but it gave no details on the main factors driving the change or how it accounted for government subsidies to cut consumers’ energy bills. Economists had expected an increase in German inflation to 10 per cent last month, according to a poll by Reuters.

Publication of Germany’s inflation data was delayed last week because of “an unexpected technical problem”, which the federal statistical agency said on Thursday was linked to the change of its base year for price statistics from 2015 to 2020.

This meant Eurostat, the EU’s statistics agency, had to estimate price growth in Europe’s largest economy in order to calculate inflation for the overall euro area. Germany makes up more than a quarter of all price data used to calculate eurozone inflation.

Any change in eurozone inflation for January may alter the perception of how rapidly price pressures are receding in the region and shift market expectations of when the European Central Bank will stop raising interest rates.

As part of its flash estimate that eurozone inflation fell from 9.2 per cent in December to 8.5 per cent last month, analysts calculated that Eurostat used an estimate of 8.7 per cent for Germany.



Based on the higher inflation figure reported by Germany on Thursday, ING economist Carsten Brzeski estimated the eurozone figure for January was likely to be revised up by about 0.1 percentage points to 8.6 per cent.

“We’re still left wondering exactly what happened to German prices at the start of the year,” said Claus Vistesen, an economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics, adding that the German inflation figure was “a slight upside surprise, but a minor one, in the end”.

Germany’s central bank boss Joachim Nagel, who is a member of the ECB rate-setting governing council, warned this week there was “a great danger” that inflation could remain too high if it stopped raising rates too soon.

The Bundesbank president told Börsen-Zeitung on Tuesday that “further, significant rate hikes” were still needed because even after it raised its deposit rate to 2.5 per cent last week, this did not yet seem “restrictive” to him.

Calculating German inflation has been made harder by the role of government subsidies designed to cushion the impact of higher energy prices on households.

In December, Berlin paid the gas bills of most German households. This was a one-off, meaning that when the scheme ended at the start of January consumer energy bills bounced back up.

An extra complication is that the German government has announced plans to introduce a price brake in March to offset most of the increase in gas and electricity costs for households that will apply retrospectively to their bills since the start of the year.

The Bundesbank has estimated that energy price caps and cheap public transport tickets will lower average German inflation by 1.5 percentage points this year.

[Derby]

BRI=Belt and Road Initiative o OBOR=One Belt One Road



https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-hasnt-given-belt-and-road

China Hasn’t Given Up on the Belt and Road,  Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole

Beijing’s Development Aid Plan Is Less Flashy—but No Less Ambitious
(...)
CHINA’S TIGHTENING BELT

Rather than marking the end of the BRI, however, Beijing’s reorientation away from unbridled lending may push the program toward a more sustainable model. As it moves away from infrastructure megaprojects, Beijing appears to be embracing less capital-intensive, more organic forms of economic collaboration with developing economies. As research by IRI and others has shown, the “Belt and Road” label now extends far beyond infrastructure to encompass less flashy and less expensive initiatives in fields such as academia, telecommunications, green energy, and even tuna fishing.

Beijing is transforming the BRI, and it is doing so discreetly and intentionally; neither China’s overall reduction in lending nor the diffusion of the BRI beyond infrastructure is entirely accidental. Even as BRI lending peaked in 2016 and 2017, policymakers and researchers in China had already begun to call for a BRI that was better tailored to host country needs, more environmentally friendly, and less concentrated in high-profile infrastructure projects.

Beijing has shifted the BRI accordingly. It has increased China’s involvement in the think-tank and academic worlds, working to get first dibs on structuring the field of China studies in countries with emerging Sinology programs—such as South Africa—through academic exchanges, grant programs, and Confucius Institutes. Under the BRI’s auspices, China has also expanded its footprint in the media sector throughout the developing world—most notably in Africa, where the China-based satellite broadcaster StarTimes has won market share from national state broadcasting companies and private competitors alike. China’s efforts to bring its technology to the developing world are likewise growing: although Huawei, for instance, has now been largely shut out of industrialized countries’ telecommunications networks, its 4G and 5G business continues to perform strongly in many countries in Africa and South Asia. Investment by China’s state-owned and private companies in green energy and power grids continues to perform well, and Chinese companies and state institutions are stepping up their cooperation with other countries such as Tanzania, Myanmar, and the Solomon Islands in security, surveillance, and “governance” training.

Beijing has not abandoned its quest for global influence through economic development. It has adjusted its strategy—in some cases out of necessity—in more flexible, targeted, and organic directions. China’s party-state continues to try to win the political and economic allegiance of low-income countries around the world—and it has found a cheaper way to do so. Although Beijing’s decision to move away from large infrastructure projects that tend to foster antidemocratic behavior might seem like a blessing to Washington and its partners, it is at best a mixed bag for everyone involved.

(...) The sooner policymakers can acknowledge China’s shifting international strategy and reconfigure their own approach, the better. China’s party-state is quickly learning what the United States discovered after its own emergence as a superpower: that changing other societies is a complicated, messy business, and that trying to do it through large infusions of cash can backfire in damaging ways. How Beijing applies these lessons, and whether it is successful in its pursuit of power, remains one of the most pressing questions for democracy globally. It is up to the United States and its democratic partners to develop answers of their own—and to make them as effective as possible.

Vamos a tener que ser más eficientes y eso siempre requiere de esfuerzo a varios niveles (para racionalizar, por ejemplo).

[Derby]

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/business/economy/economists-see-chances-of-a-growth-rebound.html

What Recession? Some Economists See Chances of a Growth Rebound.

The Federal Reserve has raised rates rapidly. But instead of cracking, some data point to an economy that’s thriving.

(...) One major service cost — rent — does look poised to decelerate this year. But both the extent and the timing is enormously uncertain: Some economists think that rent increases will slow in official inflation data within the coming months, while others are expecting the change to come much later.

Lael Brainard, the Fed vice chair, suggested in a recent speech that rent inflation might not decline until the third quarter of 2023, which stretches from July through September.

[Derby]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-tensions-are-high-so-is-commerce-between-the-nations-11675920444

U.S.-China Trade Grows as Spy Balloon Raises Tensions

Expansion in commerce comes despite Washington’s efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese goods

U.S. commerce with China is on the rise, despite escalating national-security tensions over matters such as last week’s downing of a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon.

U.S. imports of goods from China totaled $536.8 billion in 2022, a 6.3% increase from the prior year and close to the record $538.5 billion reached in 2018, the Commerce Department said earlier this week. U.S. exports to China grew 1.6% to $153.8 billion last year, pushing the total commerce between the two countries to a record $690.6 billion. The figures aren’t adjusted for inflation.(...)

[Derby]

https://www.eleconomista.es/flash/#flash_34469

El gráfico del inmobiliario del Reino Unido que revela lo que se viene en la vivienda



La actividad del mercado inmobiliario del Reino Unido se ha seguido hundiendo a principios de año, según la encuesta RICS. El balance general de precios (encuesta sobre el futuro de los precios de los inmuebles a expertos del sector) revela una caída del -47% en enero frente al -42,2% en diciembre. Este es el saldo mensual más bajo desde abril de 2009, cuando el Reino Unido estaba en las garras de la crisis financiera mundial, y el tercer cambio anual más grande en la serie que se remonta a 1978. El saldo general solo ha sido más bajo durante las correcciones del mercado inmobiliario de principios de la década de 1990 y 2008-09, cuando los precios nacionales de la vivienda disminuyeron en 12% y 18%, respectivamente.

"Como describimos en nuestra nota reciente Recesión de la vivienda en el Reino Unido: lecciones del pasado, la economía orientada al consumidor del Reino Unido es sensible a los grandes cambios en los precios de la vivienda, que afectan la riqueza neta de los hogares y, a menudo, amplifican las oscilaciones en el ciclo económico. Aunque los datos económicos se mantuvieron decididamente mejor de lo esperado a finales de 2022, la caída de la actividad del mercado inmobiliario indica que los riesgos a corto plazo se inclinan a la baja", advierten desde Berenberg.

De este modo, las expectativas de precios para los próximos tres meses cayeron hasta el -66,2% en enero desde el -64,8% en diciembre. Por otro lado, las expectativas de ventas para los próximos tres meses disminuyeron hasta el -49,4% en enero desde -54% en diciembre.

[Derby]

En lo que estoy de acuerdo con El-Erian es destacar la reticencia generalizada a abordar la complejidad.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/why-the-resurgent-transitory-inflation-narrative-is-dangerous-by-mohamed-a-el-erian-2023-02

There Is More Inflation Complexity Ahead MOHAMED A. EL-ERIAN

As US inflation gradually eases, the claim that today’s inflationary pressures are the result of a temporary supply shock has re-emerged. While this thesis may be comforting, it could also encourage dangerous complacency, making an already serious problem much harder to solve

(...) Looking ahead to the rest of the year and early 2024, three possibilities stand out for me. The first is orderly disinflation, also known by critics as “immaculate disinflation.” In this scenario, inflation continues to come down steadily toward the Fed’s 2% target without damaging US economic growth and jobs. The dynamics involve primarily a labor market that avoids excessive wage increases while continuing to anchor strong economic activity. Given what else is going on in the economy, I would put the probability of this scenario at 25%.

The second scenario is one in which inflation becomes sticky. The inflation rate continues to decrease but then gets stuck at 3-4% over the second half of this year as goods prices stop declining and services inflation persists. This would force the Fed to choose between crushing the economy to get inflation down to its 2% target, adjusting the target rate to make it more consistent with changing supply conditions, or waiting to see whether the US can live with stable 3-4% inflation. I do not know what the Fed would choose in such a case, but I would put the probability of such sticky inflation at 50%, so I hope it has given this scenario some thought.

Lastly, there is the possibility of what we can label “U inflation”: prices head back up late this year and into 2024, as a fully-recovered Chinese economy and the strong US labor market simultaneously drive persistent services inflation and higher goods prices. I would put the probability of this outcome at 25%.

This is not just about multiple scenarios with no single one dominating. It is also about probabilities that must be viewed with caution. Former US Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers captured well the prevailing mood among many economists: “It’s as difficult an economy to read as I can remember,” he recently said.

This sense of uncertainty is evident in the short-term outlook for economic activity, prices, and monetary policy, as well as long-term structural shifts like the clean-energy transition, the rewiring of global supply chains, and the changing nature of globalization. Heightened geopolitical tensions also play a role.

Whatever happens, the worst thing we can do is fall back into complacency. Powell, after championing “transitory inflation” for too long, is now warning against it. “There has been an expectation that [inflation] will go away quickly and painlessly and I don’t think that’s at all guaranteed,” he said recently. “The base case, for me, is that it will take some time. And we will have to do more rate increases…”

Simplistic economic narratives, especially comforting ones that entice those looking for shortcuts, often mislead much more than enlighten. This was the case with the transitory inflation narrative that, while discredited in 2021-22, is now reemerging. It is also the case with those who are predicting with a high degree of confidence a US recession (I am not in that camp), only to dismiss it as “short and shallow” in order to regain their economic comfort zone.

[Cadavre Exquis]

GitHub is Laying Off 10% of Staff and Cutting Down Office Space
Posted by msmash on Thursday February 09, 2023 @02:15PM from the tough-luck dept.

Microsoft-owned GitHub is laying off 10% of its staff. From a report:

In a message to staff on Thursday, GitHub's CEO Thomas Dohmke said that due to "new budgetary realignments" the company must reduce the workforce "by up to 10% through the end of FY23." The company is also going fully remote, Dohmke wrote, telling staff they're "seeing very low utilization rates" in their offices. "We are not vacating offices immediately, but will move to close all of our offices as their leases end or as we are operationally able to do so," Dohmke wrote.

"We announced a number of difficult but necessary decisions and budgetary realignments to both protect the health of our business in the short term and grant us the capacity to invest in our long-term strategy moving forward," a GitHub spokesperson told Fortune in a written statement. The company declined to comment on whether these cuts are a part of Microsoft's layoffs that impacted 10,000 employees last month.

GitLab To Cut 7% of Workforce
Posted by msmash on Thursday February 09, 2023 @03:40PM from the navigating-market-downturn dept.

GitLab CEO Sid Sijbrandij said in a message to employees Thursday that the company is reducing headcount by 7%, or about 130 positions. From a report:

"The current macroeconomic environment is tough, and as a result, companies are still spending but they are taking a more conservative approach to software investments and are taking more time to make purchasing decisions," Sijbrandij said in his message to employees. GitLab had 1,860 employees according to PitchBook data.

Saludos.

[Mad Men]

(Reedición de la ficha:
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2573.msg203022#msg203022 )

FICHA || LA RETÓRICA DE LA «LEY DE HIERRO DE LOS SALARIOS» CONTRA LA PETULANCIA «OFERTADEMANDISTA».—

[..]

La verdad es que el suelo construido no vale intrínsecamente casi nada, como lo prueba que dos pisitos idénticos en edificios colindantes, uno de cuatro alturas y otro de ocho, 'valen' lo mismo.

Este apunte, que suena muy obvio una vez escrito, es una bofetada de realidad. La repercusión del precio del suelo son los padres. Si fuera real, el precio por metro cuadrado de vivienda bajaría por cada altura construida. Llevando esa teoría al extremo, en un rascacielos el precio del suelo por vivienda tendería a cero y el coste del piso sería el de la construcción + beneficio promotor.
Es algo que ya sabía pero al verlo así escrito me ha abierto los ojos.


Y con su permiso le corrijo un pequeño typo

rentas aproductivas = Renta Trabajo Neta + Renta Empresarial Neta

Pero es que son muy cachondos los tíos. Te cobran según la edificabilidad del solar.

Saludos

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/vivienda-inmobiliario/noticias/12141729/02/23/Altamira-Anticipa-Aliseda-Solvia-Hipoges-y-Servihabitat-pujan-por-el-ladrillo-de-CaixaBank.html

Saludos.