Tema: PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Invierno 2022

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.larazon.es/madrid/valdecarros-nuevo-barrio-madrid-que-tendra-51600-viviendas_202303116409ced2079ac9000165b82f.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.elmundo.es/economia/empresas/2023/03/10/640b0ad321efa0cf0e8b457e.html

https://elpais.com/economia/2023-03-10/el-silicon-valley-bank-protagoniza-la-mayor-caida-de-un-banco-en-ee-uu-desde-la-crisis-financiera.html

https://www.abc.es/economia/colapsa-banco-silicon-valley-contagia-europa-ocurrido-20230311190551-nt.html

https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20230310/8816846/cierre-estadounidense-silicon-valley-bank-sacude-mercados.html

https://www.expansion.com/mercados/2023/03/10/640b81fb468aeb661c8b45e6.html

https://cincodias.elpais.com/mercados-financieros/2023-03-10/svb-se-desploma-un-47-por-la-amenaza-de-las-empresas-de-retirar-su-efectivo.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFPI-Orders-Silicon-Valley-Bank-03102023.pdf

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-silicon-valley-bank-fails-tech-startups-race-to-meet-payroll-4ebd9c5c

Saludos.

[Rui Brennan]

https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2023/03/DFPI-Orders-Silicon-Valley-Bank-03102023.pdf

Saludos.

Creo que esta bancarrota ha sido un "black swan" en toda regla, al menos para el ecosistema de VC y startups de Silicon Valley. Llevo entre ayer y hoy leyendo varias noticias en ycombinator (https://news.ycombinator.com/), y parece que todo cristo tenía puesta su pasta ahí (*1), pasta que ahora mismo ni está ni se la espera: los depósitos de hasta 250K USD están asegurados, pero las empresas evidentemente tenía mucho más dinero allí, dinero que i) evidentemente ahora mismo no es accesible, y ii) quizás nunca se recupere completamente, y si se recupera, van a pasar meses mientras el FDIC vende los activos del banco.

(*1) EDITADO: Un ejemplo de ello: "(It seems that) 94% of SVB's deposits are uninsured by FDIC (40-50% is typical), meaning there are big sum deposits that go past $250,000."
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=35104396

[muyuu]

https://qz.com/silicon-valley-bank-is-the-second-largest-us-bank-failu-1850214350

Silicon Valley Bank is the second-largest US bank failure in history



[...]

pone en perspectiva las dimensiones del efecto contagio en 2008-2009 y la pregunta ahora es si vamos a tener un cataclismo similar

salu2

[senslev]

El esperpento que vamos a presenciar estos años va a ser épico, si es que logramos sobrevivir.

[Derby]

https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3213188/chinese-property-developer-cifi-posts-profit-warning-cash-strapped-firm-formulates-plan-repay

Chinese property developer CIFI warns of US$2 billion loss for 2022, as the cash-strapped firm formulates plan to repay defaulted offshore debt

*Shanghai-based CIFI said that it expected a loss ranging from US$1.87 billion to US$2.02 billion for 2022
*The shortfall was mainly attributed to a decline in the number of properties delivered and increased impairment provision for property projects

Cash-strapped Chinese property developer CIFI Holdings (Group) Co has warned of a US$2 billion loss for last year, saying the industry’s debt crisis and housing market slump led to a substantial decrease in its business.

Shanghai-based CIFI said that it expected a loss ranging from 13 billion yuan to 14 billion yuan (US$1.87 billion to US$2.02 billion) for 2022, according to the company’s filing with the Hong Kong stock exchange late on Friday.

It estimated core net losses attributable to equity owners to range from 5.1 billion yuan to 5.6 billion yuan during the same period, compared to a core net profit of 7.28 billion yuan in 2021.

The expected shortfall was mainly attributed to a decline in the number of properties delivered and increased impairment provision for property projects, which were both “affected by the overall unfavourable business environment of the real estate industry and the pandemic” last year, according to the company’s filing. It also chalked up the deficit to the yuan’s depreciation and fair value loss recorded from investment properties.(...)

[Derby]

https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/ceo-failed-silicon-valley-bank-no-longer-director-sf-fed-2023-03-10/

CEO of failed Silicon Valley Bank no longer a director at San Francisco Fed

March 10 (Reuters) - The chief executive officer of failed Silicon Valley Bank, Greg Becker, is no longer on the board of directors at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

Becker's departure was effective on Friday, a spokesperson for the Federal Reserve said. Earlier on Friday, Silicon Valley Bank was closed by regulators.

The spokesperson declined to say how Becker exited the San Francisco Fed board. Becker served as a Class A director at the San Francisco Fed, one of three finance executives representing member banks in the San Francisco Fed district.

Each regional bank is overseen by boards comprised of private citizens. In addition to having three directors to represent banks, there are six other directors who present a mix of local businesses and community interests. Three of those directors are selected by the Fed's Board of Governors in Washington, while the remainder are selected in a local process.

The 12 regional Federal Reserve banks are quasi-private institutions overseen by the Fed in Washington. Their respective boards watch over the banks directly and provide advice on governance as well as local economic intelligence.

Most importantly, these boards also lead the process to select new presidents when there are vacancies, although directors from firms regulated by the Fed are not allowed to participate in that process.

The directors of the Fed banks have been in the spotlight in recent years as the central bank has faced criticism that bank directors lacked racial and gender diversity and were too weighted towards the business and banking community. The Fed has been working on expanding who serves in these roles.

The boards have also created issues for the Fed in years past. The New York Fed’s board was heavily dominated by bankers at the onset of the global financial crisis and even included the leader of Lehman Brothers, a firm whose failure in the fall of 2008 is widely seen as kicking off the most acute phase of the financial crisis.

In 2019, the Chicago Fed’s then board chair resigned her term early as her employer faced legal trouble.

[Cadavre Exquis]

Why Small Banks Are In Big Trouble: As Hedge Funds Pile Into The New "Big Short", The Next 'Credit Event' Emerges

BY TYLER DURDEN Friday, Mar 10, 2023 - 10:11 PM

For those who have been trading long enough, every couple of years a new "big short" opportunity presents itself which makes a handful of investors extremely rich right before the Fed floods the system with liquidity and drowns all the bears for the next several years. And while all the trades are unique, they all share a common feature: they all have something to do with US real estate, whether residential or commercial.

The first "big short", as popularized by John Paulson, Michael Burry, Christian Bale and Brad Pitt was, of course, the RMBS short trade of 2007/2008 - immortalized in the movie by the same name - when buying ABX CDS (either RMBX or its cousing the CMBX) on various subprime residential and commercial mortgage backed securities generated huge profits for what was at the time an extremely convex trade. After all, none other than Ben Bernanke had just recently said that US real estate was not in a housing bubble and it had never before dropped in history. We all know what happened next.

The next big short, i.e., the "Big Short 2.0" which we first profiled six years ago in March of 2017, was a bet against securities backed by malls in weaker locations where stores could close in quick succession, triggering debt defaults. The trade, which many including Carl Icahn, had put on buy shorting the CMBX Series 6 (due to its substantial exposure to malls which were hurting long before the arrival of the pandemic) failed to move for years and then suddenly collapsed in the aftermath of the covid crash which shuttered the economy overnight and led to widespread defaults among malls (we discussed this in "The "Big Short 2" Hits An All Time Low As Commercial Real Estate Implodes"). End result: Carl Icahn made $1.3 billion, while other commercial real estate bears such as Daniel Mcnamara - then at MP Securitized Credit Partners - gained more than 110% (more on that below).

Then, around the time shorts were busy gathering their profits on the "Big Short 2.0", a new "Big Short 3.0" trade was emerging: we profiled it in August 2020 when we said that with "CMBX 6 now done, keep a close eye on CMBX 9. With its outlier exposure to hotels which have quickly emerged as the most impacted sector from the pandemic, this may well be the next big short." That's right: the third iteration of the big short was all about hotels: "there is a new "Big Short" lurking among the various tranches, especially in the aftermath of the coronavirus shutdowns which will cripple not just retail outlets but everything from restaurants, to multi-family housing (as city renters flee for the suburbs), to offices and hotels." Well... technically we said "offices and hotels", which would prove to be prophetic, because while the "hotel" short also generated substantial profits after initially ramping higher before sliding to 2 year lows via the CMBX 9 BBB- tranche...



... attention has now turned to yet another short - the "Big Short 3.0" - one which in our view could have far more devastating consequences for the broader financial system, and be the trade that eventually results in the infamous credit event that many - including Michael Hartnett - have predicted is inevitable, and is necessary to finally end the bear market as it forced the Fed to panic.

Yes: the Big Short 3.0 is all about shorting offices.... and with good reason: office property values have plunged 25% in the past 12 months, according to Green Street, and higher interest rates will only add to the pain. Ultimately, the decline in office prices is likely to outpace the drop for commercial real estate prices broadly, according to Matt Rocco, chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association.

That shouldn't come as much of a surprise: after all, we now live in a time when some of the highest profile, and most solvent landlords - names like Pimco and Blackstone - are actively pushing their underperforming office portfolios in bankruptcy and rushing to give the keys to the creditors without a fight.

Recall two weeks ago we reported that "Facing "Unprecedented Challenges" And Soaring Rates, PIMCO-Owned Landlord Defaults On $1.7 Billion In Office Mortgages", which was followed one week ago by "Blackstone Defaulting On $562MM CMBS As It Keeps Blocking Investor Withdrawals From $71BN REIT" and while countless smaller landlords also quietly handed over the keys to their creditors in recent months, realizing that with workers refusing to come back to work in an office setting in a post-covid world the office property equity tranche is effectively worthless, it was the capitulation by the two CRE giants that sent shockwaves through a troubled part of the real estate market.

But wait, a little bit higher we said that as far back as 2020 we ourselves said that both "offices and hotels" would be the next big short: why did this issue only gain urgency now? Simple: in 2020 rates were zero but now they are about to hit 5%, and while the carrying cost of huge CRE debt loads as recently as 2 years ago was manageable, with rates where they are it is no longer feasible for hope to be a strategy.

Bloomberg agrees and writes that for years, property owners have been grappling with the rise of remote work - a problem so large that one brokerage estimates roughly 330 million square feet (31 million square meters) of office space will become vacant by the end of the decade as a result. But low interest rates allowed the investors to muddle along more easily without worrying about the debt.

Now, many office landlords are seeing borrowing costs skyrocket, leading owners such as Pimco’s Columbia Property Trust and Brookfield Corp. to default on mortgages. While remote work hurt the office market, rising rates could push landlords, which often use floating-rate debt, closer to a tricky edge.

“It’s just a group psychology, like, ‘Now that one of my peers has done it, everyone’s going to do it,’ so I wouldn’t be surprised over the next six months, if you just saw a wave of defaults and keys getting handed back, because the offices are not getting filled up,” said Nitin Chexal, chief executive officer of real estate investment firm Palladius Capital Management. “A lot of these assets will never recover.”

Meanwhile, the clock is ticking for more office owners with the Federal Reserve on the path to raising its benchmark rate even higher, more than 17% of the entire US office supply vacant and an additional 4.3% available for sublease. The numbers are staggering: nearly $92 billion in debt for those properties from nonbank lenders comes due this year, and $58 billion will mature in 2024, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.

“If you have a loan coming due this year, you’re in trouble,” GFP Real Estate Chairman Jeffrey Gural said. “If you have a loan coming due in three years and you don’t have a lot of vacancy, you’re going to just wait it out.”

Gural’s GFP recently defaulted on a Manhattan office building on Madison Avenue and is in talks with lenders to extend the loan. But the recent defaults by other landlords could help negotiations because lenders may not want to take back the assets, he said. “It’s helpful for me, that we’ve seen some big players basically give the keys because it makes it easier to negotiate with the banks,” Gural said.

Digging more into the challenges facing the industry, we find that a core problem is the proliferation of floating-rate loans, where interest rates reset more frequently. About 48% of debt on office properties that matures this year has a variable rate, according to Newmark Group.

Thanks to the Fed's rate hikes, landlords have been forced to purchase interest rate caps, which limit payment increases when rates rise and have also become more expensive (think of it as hawk insurance). The price for one-year protection on a $25 million loan with a 2% rate cap soared to $819,000 in February from $33,000 in early March 2022, according to Chatham Financial.

Even for owners who haven’t defaulted, the math has become a lot more complicated. Blackstone’s Willis Tower in Chicago has roughly $1.33 billion of commercial mortgage-backed securities and has seen monthly payments on that debt jump nearly 300% in February from a year earlier, according to Bloomberg data. A Blackstone spokeswoman said the building is highly occupied with long lease terms.

“We are extremely selective in the types of office we want to own, which is why US traditional office represents only approximately 2% of our portfolio today,” Jillian Kary, a Blackstone spokeswoman, said in a statement.

Defaults don’t necessarily mean owners are giving up on offices entirely. In many cases, such as GFP’s Madison Avenue tower, the investors are looking to negotiate better terms with lenders, or explore other options such as converting the buildings to apartments.

“Every situation is unique,” said Dustin Stolly, a vice chairman at Newmark. “If you’ve got a building that’s well-leased, well-located and has an institutional owner, you’ll be fine. There’s high likelihood the lender you have in place will play ball on an extension. If it’s private ownership, the building is overleveraged, and sponsorship doesn’t have access to liquid capital, that’s where we are seeing situational loan sales or forced asset sales.”

* * *

Of course, higher rates are only the latest of the office market’s woes. A structural post-covid issue is that many buildings have been struggling to lure workers back after the pandemic, a problem that’s worsened as companies lay off employees and cut back on real estate. Cushman & Wakefield calculated that falling demand will leave the US with an excess supply of 330 million square feet of office space by 2030!

Some cities have fared better than others. The average occupancy rate in Austin, Texas, was 66% of pre-pandemic levels for the week through Feb. 22; others, meanwhile, are far lower: New York is currently at just 47% while San Francisco has dropped to just 44%, according to security firm Kastle Systems.

Worse, the financing fallout has spread across the US. As noted previously, the default by Columbia Property Trust, which was bought in 2021 by funds managed by Pimco, involves seven properties, ranging from a Manhattan tower that used to house the New York Times, to a San Francisco building that’s battling Elon Musk’s Twitter over some missed rent payments. One building in the group of properties, 245-249 W. 17th St., is also seeing Twitter, a key tenant, look to sublease its space at the building. Another one of the properties entangled in the default, 201 California St. in San Francisco, had roughly 42% of its office space available for lease, either directly or via sublease, as of Feb. 28, according to Savills. For 315 Park Ave. South in Manhattan, that figure stood at nearly 39%.

A Brookfield business defaulted on loans tied to two Los Angeles office towers earlier this year. Brookfield Property Partners, which owns a range of real estate including office and retail spots, said in a Feb. 24 filing that it had stopped payment on only about 2% of all of its properties while trying to negotiate a modification or restructuring of its debt.

“We are generally seeking relief given the circumstances resulting from the current economic slowdown, and may or may not be successful with these negotiations” the filing said. “If we are unsuccessful, it is possible that certain properties securing these loans could be transferred to the lenders.”

The office market’s pain has also ratcheted up as lenders pull back, with major banks weighing sales of office loans. For owners wanting out of this market, there have been few sales of the properties: Transactions in January fell to their slowest pace for the month since 2010, according to MSCI Real Assets.

“It’s going to be a very tough two years until the market finds an equilibrium,” said Ran Eliasaf, founder of investment firm Northwind Group. “In the meantime, there’s going to be a lot of hurt and unfortunately, a lot of money lost.”

* * *

So yes, we have shifted from residential, to malls, to hotels and now offices, and none other than one of the veterans of the Big Short 2.0 trade agrees.

Recall, we introduced Dan McNamara above, a name familiar to regular Zero Hedge readers. As noted several years ago, he was the hedge fund manager who made a 119% return shorting debt linked to shopping malls is betting on fresh pain in the US commercial property market, and this time he is targeting the office sector.

According to Daniel McNamara, founder of Polpo Capital Management, a large number of older offices will fail to lure back workers in the post-Covid era, making them less attractive to occupiers and spurring a wave of defaults. Meanwhile, the rest will bleed cash for as long as the Fed keeps rates high.

"No one is going to want to be in the worst-looking office in suburban New Jersey or downtown Manhattan," McNamara told Bloomberg in an interview. “We think there’s a lot of room for this thing to fall in the short term. And in the longer term, at maturity, they’re going to be worth a lot less.”

McNamara joins the likes of Bruce Richards, CEO at Marathon Asset Management, in speculating that the fall in demand for less-desirable workplaces - older buildings or those in unpopular locations — will render big swathes of the office-property market obsolete and loans linked to them at risk of delinquency according to Bloomberg.

And just like in 2017 and 2020, both investors are making bets using derivative indexes that track the performance of commercial mortgage-backed securities. But if CMBX 6 was the index to short in 2017 for the "mall short", and CMBX 9 was the preferred index for those seeking to short the highest hotel exposure, which is the best CMBX to focus on when shorting offices? Well, according to a recent note from Goldman (available to pro subs), the series to focus on is S 15, which has 33% of all loans exposed to the office sector (the BBB- tranche has traditionally been the most convex to underlying price changes, so that is probably the best security to short).



Also similar to previous "big short" moments, the volume of distressed debt remains small for now, but the problems are expected to spread. Lenders have become increasingly wary of financing older offices, analysts at DBRS Morningstar wrote last month. Sales of new commercial-mortgage backed securities in the US have dropped, as rising interest rates cut into lending volumes.

That presents an opportunity for investors like McNamara, who started his long-short hedge fund in 2021 to focus on distressed opportunities in the CMBS market after making a fortune at MP Securitized Credit Partners with the mall short.
Polpo Capital gained 1.55% in February, bringing its return since inception in November 2021 to 13.49%, according to an investor presentation seen by Bloomberg. The firm manages about $100 million, said a person with knowledge of the matter. And while we don't know which specific CMBX Series McNamara is short - Bloomberg says that "McNamara is using more recent series of the derivatives to bet against bonds tied to lower quality and poorly located offices" - it is a fair guess that S15 is his security of focus. Not surprisingly it is now trading at the lowest level since its inception, just above 75 cents on the dollar...



... and according to Marathon's Richards, spreads on more recent versions of the gauges (for example S14 and S15) could widen from 770 basis points to more than 1,200 basis points in a “real recession."

That said, not everyone is convinced that using the derivatives is the best way to bet against offices. Morgan Stanley’s CMBS desk sees the wager on the riskiest tranches as a momentum trade after it reached a “fever pitch of panic and pandemonium in the back half of last week,” trader Kamil Sadik wrote in a March 6 note (also available to pro subs).

As shown above, the CMBX 15 has been falling recently with a BBB- gauge hitting an all-time low. “It may continue to be profitable to set fresh shorts here, but it requires a continuation of momentum, and there being someone else selling at the lows to take you out of your position,” Sadik wrote.

While timing one's entry point in a CMBX short may be tricky, one thing is certain: for bears, there are no shortage of signs that trouble is mounting. "There are early indications that delinquencies on office property in CMBS are starting to tick up," Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Martin Gruenberg said in a speech on Monday.

“I don’t think this is The Big Short,” McNamara says. “But there’s going to be a lot of distress in office.”

* * *

He is right, which brings us to the next, even more critical point: what happens as the troubles in the office sector - which had been isolated to the RE realm so far - start spreading to the broader banking sector? After all, both previous Big Shorts, versions 2.0 and 3.0, were mostly isolated phenomena thanks to the low rates that prevailed in 2020 and much of 2021.

That has now changed, and suddenly investors are starting to look at who among the US banks has the most exposure to crashing commercial real estate (and offices in particular). For now, investors are taking a shot gun approach, dumping the regional and small banks en masse, with the KRE ETF plunging to the lowest level in two years...



... the broader BKW bank index suffering its worst day since June 2020...



... while arguably the most popular office REIT, Vornado, just hit the lowest since 1997!



The problem, and this is where the discussion of the coming 'credit event' kicks in, is that while large banks still are very well capitalized, small banks - the core constituents of the KRE index - are in big trouble because as the following chart from TS Lombard shows, their reserves (as a % of total assets) have collapsed as a source of funding for loans and are back to levels when the Fed needed to do QE to reload their reserves!



Below we excerpt from TS Lombard's Steven Blitz (full note available to pro subs) explaining why we may be this close to another banking crisis:

Banks – and especially small banks – are now sitting with reserves pretty much at their lowest comfort level, There is not much of a cash-to-asset cushion left for small banks as a whole, so a funding crisis can easily get rolling if large depositors decide too many loans in commercial real estate and other areas are about to go bad. The Fed will make funds available to keep these banks afloat, but that alone will get some push-back from Congress because of the increased concentration of bank deposits in an increasingly smaller number of banks.

He continues:

Small banks could have slipped below the promised macro-supervision radar owing to the political direction to lighten the regulatory burden on small, community banks. The belief is that they should not be subject to the same reporting requirements as G-SIBs.

Ahead of any banking problem rooted in bad loans turning into a funding problem, banks are going to pull back on lending at an even faster pace.

Translation: not only are banks once again reserve constrained, but small banks are especially desperate for reserves.

In conclusion, even without the office real estate crisis, small banks were already headed for an unsettling mix of reduced funding and more underperforming loans. Throw in a cascade of bad debt in exposure to office real estate and you could see a repeat of the 2009 banking crisis for the small banks... if only in the beginning, because once the small banks go down, the big banks won't be far behind.

One parting thought: the last time big banks found themselves "reserve constrained" was in Sept 2019, when the US financial system was shaken by the repo crisis sparked by JPMorgan, and which forced the Fed to launch "NOT QE" (it was QE). The question this time is whether the risk of a cascade of small bank failures will be enough to force the Fed to reverse its tightening path, or whether it is the desire of the JPMorgans of the world (and thus Fed chairs) to get to a point where there is a cascading collapse among the smaller banks which will only make the bigger banks even bigger and more powerful after the Fed eventually caves and floods the system with liquidity.

Saludos.

[Derby]

https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/silicon-valley-bank-collapse-marks-worst-bank-failure-great-recession

Silicon Valley Bank collapse marks worst bank failure since Great Recession

Silicon Valley Bank's fall echos Washington Mutual's closure in 2008

The closure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was announced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on Friday, marking the worst U.S. financial institution failure in nearly 15 years.

SVB was the 16th largest bank in the United States until Friday afternoon. It failed after anxious depositors rushed to withdraw money over concern for the bank's health.

SVB was connected to a number of Silicon Valley industries and startups. Y Combinator, an incubator startup that launched Airbnb, DoorDash and DropBox, regularly referred entrepreneurs to them.

"This is an extinction-level event for startups," Y Combinator CEO Garry Tan said. "I literally have been hearing from hundreds of our founders asking for help on how they can get through this. They are asking, ‘Do I have to furlough my workers?’"

The California bank also suffered from the decline in the value of technology stocks, as well as industry layoffs. SVB was so prominent that it was considered an ideal starting point to early-stage startups.

SVB's collapse was so quick that, hours before its closure, some industry analysts were hopeful that the bank was still a good investment.

The bank's shares had fallen 60% on Friday morning, after already falling 60% on Thursday. SVB had sold off $1.75 billion in shares to compensate for declining customer deposits.

SVB is the second-largest U.S. bank to close since the Great Recession. Its downfall echos the closure of Washington Mutual in 2008.


People line up outside of the shuttered Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) headquarters on March 10, 2023 in Santa Clara, California. Silicon Valley Bank was shut down on Friday morning by California regulators and was put in control of the U.S. Federal Depos (Photo by Justin Sullivan/Getty Images / Getty Images)

Washington Mutual had over $300 billion in assets when it collapsed. It was sold to Chase by the FDIC, with any remaining WaMu branches becoming Chase branches.

By the end of 2022, SVB touted $209 billion in total assets. Its total deposits numbered $175.4 billion.

The FDIC will make deposits below the $250,000 limit available on Monday, though it is unknown how many deposits were above the limit.

According to the White House, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen is watching SVB "closely." But the White House asserts that post-2008 reforms will prevent further economic meltdown.

"Our banking system is in a fundamentally different place than it was, you know, a decade ago," said Cecilia Rouse, chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. "The reforms that were put in place back then really provide the kind of resilience that we’d like to see."

[sudden and sharp]

Evisceration: No digáis que no aprendemos vocabulario...   

[sudden and sharp]

 

[CHOSEN]

Si señor.

[AbiertoPorDemolicion]

El colapso de los financiadores de las startup de silicon valley (si ese colapso es tan colapso como dice la prensa, que ya no hay que creerse nada) estaría muy en línea con el colapso de la innovación tecnológica del occidente colectivo frente a lo que antes se llamaba el tercer mundo, con El Banano como principal catalizador de ese colapso, principalmente en los polos de talento.

La industria del talento, como la llaman, ya no es capaz de generar sueldos para que los trabajadores que no vienen con el pan debajo del brazo o no tengan otras fuentes de ingresos, puedan tener una vida "normal" de clase media, con el acceso a la vivienda como principal.

Debe ser tan evidente que ya los financiadores están retirando los fondos porque ya se han dado cuenta que el sur global ese que llaman ahora, va a hacer los mismos productos a mitad de precio.

Lo de mandar a los trabajadores a Mostoles, ya no cuela (te jodes, échate una novia con trabajo, o haber nacido en una familia con posibles para que te paguen la mitad del piso).

El que trabaje o emprenda su puta madre, ya está calando en la sociedad. (De que me sirve ser el project officer executive, Si tengo que compartir piso con treinta y cinco añazos que tengo)

Hasta que al occidente colectivo no se le meta en la p. cabeza que el desarrollo tecnológico es muy intensivo en mano de obra (hacen falta miles y miles de trabajadores cualificados, algo de lo que el sur global ya dispone) y que precisamente en los polos-de-talento es donde la vivienda tiene que ser más asequible para quitar cargas financieras a las empresas que emplean a esos trabajadores y que tienen que competir con el sur global, pues los colapsos en la tecnológicas irán poco a poco, hasta que llegue el colapso final.