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Cita de: Benzino Napaloni en Enero 16, 2025, 15:24:15 pmEspaña se arrepentirá de su impuesto a la propiedad del 100% para los extranjerosPenitenciagite!!! Cuanto más hablan estos cenutrios, más se delatan y más claro dejan qué se ha estado haciendo hasta ahora.Además dice en el artículo que muy pocos extranjeros compraron el año pasado... que sólo fueron 27.000.¿Entonces lo de las hordas de extranjeros y alienígenas de Andrómeda que nos estaban quitando los pisos de las manos, no es cierto?Hacendado me hallo.
España se arrepentirá de su impuesto a la propiedad del 100% para los extranjerosPenitenciagite!!! Cuanto más hablan estos cenutrios, más se delatan y más claro dejan qué se ha estado haciendo hasta ahora.
PayPal co-founder and billionaire investor Peter Thiel says US real estate is heading for a catastrophehttps://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/paypal-co-founder-and-billionaire-investor-peter-thiel-says-us-real-estate-is-heading-for-a-catastrophe/articleshow/117307379.cms?from=mdrCitarPeter Thiel, who is a renowned market expert and PayPal co-founder, is of the opinion that the US real estate market will be seeing some dark days ahead. Thiel is known for his expertise in the world of technology but he has been lately sounding alarm on real-estate stocks, which is a very interesting aspect.Will real-estate stocks crash in 2025?Thiel is renowned for his bang-on predictions and investments in tech-based stocks, but he has recently shifted his focus about cautionary measures around the real-estate stocks, which he reportedly believes would be witnessing a catastrophe in the days ahead.Is the real estate crisis in the US responsible for the dark days ahead in related stocks?Real-estate stocks have been relatively doing well since the end of 2024, backed by the stock market bull run, but there is no saying as to which way things will go around related stocks, as Thiel is of the opinion that they could be the reason for the weakening of the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite which are bullish on real-estate stocks. He localizado la entrevista en Youtube, hace mención al georgismo, que hace tiempo alguien citó en T.E.https://es.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgismohttps://youtu.be/wwJV_NuN43Y?si=qE6baq_BmjRVhMwEHabla sobre la preocupación en el georgismo sobre el impacto del inmobiliario en la economía y como se refleja en la situación actual en el mundo anglosajón . Es en el minuto 78, habla tres minutos que vale la pena escuchar.El minuto 80 habla de las rentas (inmobiliarias) como el mayor coste que existe actualmente y que la inflación no es el problema sino la vivienda. La transferencia de riqueza de los jóvenes a la generación langosta.La prueba del Capital hasta la coronilla de la vivienda. Este señor está en la lista Forbes 400
Peter Thiel, who is a renowned market expert and PayPal co-founder, is of the opinion that the US real estate market will be seeing some dark days ahead. Thiel is known for his expertise in the world of technology but he has been lately sounding alarm on real-estate stocks, which is a very interesting aspect.Will real-estate stocks crash in 2025?Thiel is renowned for his bang-on predictions and investments in tech-based stocks, but he has recently shifted his focus about cautionary measures around the real-estate stocks, which he reportedly believes would be witnessing a catastrophe in the days ahead.Is the real estate crisis in the US responsible for the dark days ahead in related stocks?Real-estate stocks have been relatively doing well since the end of 2024, backed by the stock market bull run, but there is no saying as to which way things will go around related stocks, as Thiel is of the opinion that they could be the reason for the weakening of the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq Composite which are bullish on real-estate stocks.
Peter Thiel, en esta conversación, habla sobre la vivienda y los bienes raíces desde la perspectiva del impacto de la inmigración en el mercado inmobiliario de Estados Unidos. Thiel argumenta que, si bien los inmigrantes pueden contribuir al crecimiento de la economía, también **crean una dinámica de ganadores y perdedores,** perjudicando especialmente a la clase media-baja y a los jóvenes.Thiel basa su argumento en la teoría económica de Henry George, un economista del siglo XIX que se preocupaba por el aumento descontrolado de los precios de los bienes raíces. Según George, **si no se controlan adecuadamente, los precios de las viviendas aumentarán sin control, beneficiando a los propietarios y terratenientes a expensas del resto de la sociedad**.Thiel aplica esta teoría a la situación actual en Estados Unidos, argumentando que **la inmigración, combinada con las leyes de zonificación restrictivas, ha provocado un aumento significativo de los precios de las viviendas y los alquileres**. Este aumento ha generado una enorme transferencia de riqueza de los jóvenes y la clase media-baja hacia la clase media-alta, los terratenientes y los mayores.Para ilustrar su punto, Thiel utiliza el ejemplo de Los Ángeles, donde los precios de las viviendas y los alquileres se han disparado en las últimas décadas. Argumenta que **esto ejerce presión tanto sobre los inmigrantes como sobre las personas con las que compiten directamente en el mercado inmobiliario**.Thiel cree que **la inmigración descontrolada está creando una crisis inmobiliaria similar a la que predijo Henry George**. Esta crisis está exacerbando la desigualdad económica y dificultando que los jóvenes y la clase media-baja puedan acceder a una vivienda asequible.En resumen, Thiel argumenta que la inmigración, junto con la falta de construcción de nuevas viviendas, **está inflando el mercado inmobiliario y perjudicando a un gran sector de la población**.
[Thiel, ajedrecista, alemán y homosexual, no es cualquiera. Trump, Musk y Thiel son el triunvirato al frente del Estado de EE. UU. a partir del lunes que viene. Thiel y Musk fundaron PayPal, le dieron el pase y ahí empezó la leyenda de la tecnoligarquía. De los tres, es el que sabe Derecho. Es el calvino-joker multimillonario de la ilustración oscura.]
Como inversor o fundador, Peter Thiel (Fráncfort, 54 años) está detrás de casi todos los gigantes tecnológicos, desde Facebook a SpaceX. Además, es el ideólogo de los movimientos que buscan que el trumpismo sobreviva al propio Donald Trump. Su figura concita odio, pero también admiración... y miedo. El periodista Max Chafkin, que lo conoce personalmente, lleva desde 2004 investigando las conexiones entre finanzas y tecnología. Trabaja para Bloomberg Businessweek y acaba de publicar The contrarian ('El contrario'), una biografía no autorizada.XLSemanal. Afirma que Peter Thiel es de las pocas personas capaces de moldear el futuro, para lo bueno y para lo malo. Max Chafkin. Peter Thiel va a contracorriente en los negocios y en la vida. Y le va muy bien. Apoya ideologías oscuras por ese espíritu de contradicción.XL. ¿Es su villano favorito?M.C. ¡Desde luego! [Ríe]. Es un supervillano de película. A él le encanta proyectar esa imagen. Un tipo misterioso con unas conexiones turbias que hace un montón de dinero gracias al uso de nuestros datos. Pero también es un superhéroe para sectores muy conservadores.
The ‘grossly overvalued’ American dollarTheir currency, our problemIf you spend enough time on certain corners of certain social media sites, chances are that you’ll see someone point out that Mississippi, the poorest US state, is now richer per capita than the UK or Japan.Some say it is a killer example of America’s exceptionalism, while others will counter that a stunning chunk of the US economy is healthcare spending, or point out that nominal GDP per capita is a flawed measure of how comfortable the median citizen actually is.However, in his latest note, Stephen Jen of Eurizon SLJ has articulated what FT Alphaville has been quietly wondering for some time: perhaps it’s just mostly indicative of an egregiously overvalued US dollar. Here’s Jen:CitarThe poorest state in the US — Mississippi — has a per capita dollar income that is higher than those of the UK, France, Italy, and Japan, and is only slightly lower than that of Germany. Does this make sense to you? To us, this is another proof that the dollar is grossly over-valued, inflated in part due to the super-sized fiscal program.Some FX analysts might sneer at such a facile take, pointing to more complex econometric models that show dollar strength is entirely justified and will probably continue to strengthen. And for now, it seems the markets agree.But Alphaville can’t shake the feeling that many of the weird phenomena — such as US gas station managers seemingly commanding bigger salaries than many European doctors, or Jane Street interns making more than the UK prime minister — are simply evidence that the US dollar is wildly overvalued.Here’s Jen’s more specific arguments on why fiscal largesse is at the heart of the phenomenon, and why he estimates that the dollar is about 22 per cent overvalued against other G10 currencies — the most since 2002:Citar● American Exceptionalism not all benign. Without downplaying the unique and familiar strengths of the US, a good part of the US’ superior real GDP growth, high inflation, high interest rates, and strong dollar are a result of its aggressive fiscal posture. We have posed the rhetorical question: if the US embarked on a fiscal consolidation program to bring its fiscal deficit down from the current 6-7 percent of GDP to the Maastricht limit of 3 percent of GDP, which is what many non-European countries consider the threshold of tolerance in the absence of major recessions, what would its GDP growth rate be, and where would the FFR need to be? Where would the dollar trade? ● The US’ fiscal posture is unsustainable. Few would contest this point, yet most of the members of Congress resisted spending cuts last December. Currently, the US’ federal expenditures are around 23 percent of GDP, while its revenues are around 17-18 percent of GDP. The latter has been stable at these levels for more than three decades. The former, however, rose sharply and steadily since the early 2000s, from around 19 percent of GDP then, to 23 percent in the period between the GFC and Covid, and 26 percent average between 2021-2024. Countries operate at very different sizes of government, reflecting cultural and other differences. For example, Norway’s government expenditure has ranged between 45-50 percent of GDP, and Singapore’s government spending ratio is only around 10 percent of GDP. Those who believe in big government point out that the US’s spending is not that large compared to the European countries, but those who believe in small government point to counter-examples, like Singapore, where government services don’t seem to be compromised despite a small government presence in the economy. In any case, spending should be fully funded on average over a business cycle, whatever the level of government presence. It is not in the US. The US is not in a recession or coping with any material shock. Proponents of MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) long promoted aggressive fiscal spending financed by money printing, assuming casually that fiscal spending would easily be cut when appropriate. We are reminded that fiscal policies are not symmetrical: it is easier to spend and difficult to save. We are also reminded of a quote from President Reagan: ‘Nothing lasts longer than a temporary government program.’ ● Inflation and future currency depreciation. The US has experienced cumulative inflation from end-2019 of some 24 percent, compared to 10 percent in Japan and 3 percent in China during the same period. We have previously pointed out that the differentials in price and wage inflation between countries have led to wide disparities in manufacturing costs, which are around USD53 an hour in the US, USD21 in Japan, and USD10 in China. This has put the US in a highly uncompetitive position in the goods market. No wonder the US needs high import tariffs for protection. EM investors are familiar with the linkage between inflation and currencies: poor inflation control in an EM economy usually leads to an erosion in competitiveness, which in turn compels currency depreciation to restore the real exchange rate value prior to the inflation spurt. This is precisely why inflation control has been the Achilles heel of EM for decades. The same logic, we argue, applies to the USD, especially USDAsia: the very wide gap in inflation since the Pandemic should eventually lead to currency adjustments to help restore relative competitiveness between the West and the East. Tariffs could provide temporary protection for a country that is no longer competitive. They should not lead to a further dollar appreciation but might help prevent a large depreciation in the dollar, in our view. Further, Japan’s per capita income, being only one-third that of California, is largely a result of the 45 percent rise in USDJPY during this period. Is Japan really as poor as these numbers show? The answer is obviously no. ● Our valuation model tells the same story. [ . . . ] The dollar index is about 22 percent over-valued against G10 currencies. The size of the dollar over-valuation is quite significant compared to history and its duration. It is the highest overvaluation against G10 since 2002. It is also remarkable that, in bilateral terms, the dollar looks overvalued against a very wide range of currencies. On our measures, the dollar is 15 percent overvalued against the EUR, 24 against GBP, 9 percent against CNY and 53 percent against the JPY.If this is true, what might trigger a reversal? Who knows. Fiscal retrenchment looks unlikely, with DOGE now apparently reduced to a glorified Signal messaging group. In the meantime, let us know if you need someone to tend the pumps at a gas station near Jackson, Mississippi.
The poorest state in the US — Mississippi — has a per capita dollar income that is higher than those of the UK, France, Italy, and Japan, and is only slightly lower than that of Germany. Does this make sense to you? To us, this is another proof that the dollar is grossly over-valued, inflated in part due to the super-sized fiscal program.
● American Exceptionalism not all benign. Without downplaying the unique and familiar strengths of the US, a good part of the US’ superior real GDP growth, high inflation, high interest rates, and strong dollar are a result of its aggressive fiscal posture. We have posed the rhetorical question: if the US embarked on a fiscal consolidation program to bring its fiscal deficit down from the current 6-7 percent of GDP to the Maastricht limit of 3 percent of GDP, which is what many non-European countries consider the threshold of tolerance in the absence of major recessions, what would its GDP growth rate be, and where would the FFR need to be? Where would the dollar trade? ● The US’ fiscal posture is unsustainable. Few would contest this point, yet most of the members of Congress resisted spending cuts last December. Currently, the US’ federal expenditures are around 23 percent of GDP, while its revenues are around 17-18 percent of GDP. The latter has been stable at these levels for more than three decades. The former, however, rose sharply and steadily since the early 2000s, from around 19 percent of GDP then, to 23 percent in the period between the GFC and Covid, and 26 percent average between 2021-2024. Countries operate at very different sizes of government, reflecting cultural and other differences. For example, Norway’s government expenditure has ranged between 45-50 percent of GDP, and Singapore’s government spending ratio is only around 10 percent of GDP. Those who believe in big government point out that the US’s spending is not that large compared to the European countries, but those who believe in small government point to counter-examples, like Singapore, where government services don’t seem to be compromised despite a small government presence in the economy. In any case, spending should be fully funded on average over a business cycle, whatever the level of government presence. It is not in the US. The US is not in a recession or coping with any material shock. Proponents of MMT (Modern Monetary Theory) long promoted aggressive fiscal spending financed by money printing, assuming casually that fiscal spending would easily be cut when appropriate. We are reminded that fiscal policies are not symmetrical: it is easier to spend and difficult to save. We are also reminded of a quote from President Reagan: ‘Nothing lasts longer than a temporary government program.’ ● Inflation and future currency depreciation. The US has experienced cumulative inflation from end-2019 of some 24 percent, compared to 10 percent in Japan and 3 percent in China during the same period. We have previously pointed out that the differentials in price and wage inflation between countries have led to wide disparities in manufacturing costs, which are around USD53 an hour in the US, USD21 in Japan, and USD10 in China. This has put the US in a highly uncompetitive position in the goods market. No wonder the US needs high import tariffs for protection. EM investors are familiar with the linkage between inflation and currencies: poor inflation control in an EM economy usually leads to an erosion in competitiveness, which in turn compels currency depreciation to restore the real exchange rate value prior to the inflation spurt. This is precisely why inflation control has been the Achilles heel of EM for decades. The same logic, we argue, applies to the USD, especially USDAsia: the very wide gap in inflation since the Pandemic should eventually lead to currency adjustments to help restore relative competitiveness between the West and the East. Tariffs could provide temporary protection for a country that is no longer competitive. They should not lead to a further dollar appreciation but might help prevent a large depreciation in the dollar, in our view. Further, Japan’s per capita income, being only one-third that of California, is largely a result of the 45 percent rise in USDJPY during this period. Is Japan really as poor as these numbers show? The answer is obviously no. ● Our valuation model tells the same story. [ . . . ] The dollar index is about 22 percent over-valued against G10 currencies. The size of the dollar over-valuation is quite significant compared to history and its duration. It is the highest overvaluation against G10 since 2002. It is also remarkable that, in bilateral terms, the dollar looks overvalued against a very wide range of currencies. On our measures, the dollar is 15 percent overvalued against the EUR, 24 against GBP, 9 percent against CNY and 53 percent against the JPY.