PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2025

[Benzino Napaloni]

Ese "conflicto" entre deudores y acreedores ya se produjo en 2012 y lo ganaron los deudores. Y ademas por goleada. Y lo consiguieron victimizandose frente a los acreedores y amenazando a la sociedad con liarla parda si los demás no les pagabamos sus deudas.

En España, el gobierno perdió el culo en montar sarebs, bamcos malos, rescatar cajas de ahorros para que no tuvieran que ejecutar las hipotecas de los endeudados y dar paquetes de ayidas a diestro y siniestro para que ningun endeudado quiebre y les monten un pollo en la calles.

Ese conflicto entre deudores o acreedores lo ganará el que más enseñe los dientes a los demas, y los gobiernos actuaran en consecuencia. Tal y como pasó en el 2012.

Porque en 2012 había con qué pagar a los deudores, aunque fuese a lo cabrón y quemando una generación entera. También porque el sistema entero estaba secuestrado por la deuda.

Que van a intentar repetir la jugada, ni lo dudo. La pregunta pertinente es si van a poder. El dinero se puede imprimir, pero esta vez hay problemas que no se arreglan con dinero, como trabajadores cada vez más escasos, y algo que apuntaba Tomasjos hace poco. Con uno de cada tres estadounidenses que no sabe hacer las tablas de multiplicar, y con un porcentaje significativo de población que no entiende un texto elemental, cómo piensan competir con la industria china.

Esta vez hay algo mucho más importante en juego que seguir pagando el tocho.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/6482ed5e-8d9a-4a76-b62e-d9fa908458dc

Gavin Newsom says California to sue over Trump tariffs

State governor argues duties will lead to job losses and higher prices


Gavin Newsom: ‘President Trump’s unlawful tariffs are wreaking chaos on California families, businesses and our economy’ © AP

California governor Gavin Newsom said that the state will sue to halt Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs in a move that challenges the US president’s unprecedented use of emergency powers to upend the global trading order.

The lawsuit, which will be filed on Wednesday by Newsom and state attorney-general Rob Bonta, is the second to challenge Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs and could lead to a judge curtailing the president’s trade powers.

Trump earlier this month hit the US’s major trading partners with steep “reciprocal” tariffs of up to 50 per cent, before temporarily pausing the higher rates and leaving in place a levy of 10 per cent on most countries.

“President Trump’s unlawful tariffs are wreaking chaos on California families, businesses and our economy, driving up prices and threatening jobs,” Newsom said.

The lawsuit, which will be filed in the District Court for the Northern District of California, asks the court to declare the tariffs imposed by Trump void and block their implementation.

Trump aides proposed several legal mechanisms for applying tariffs, but most other avenues would require the government to produce studies first, which would have led to a slower application of the duties.

Instead, Trump opted to invoke the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), which allows the US president to immediately hit trading partners with levies in times of national emergency.

To use the law, the Trump administration declared a national emergency “due to national security and economic security concerns arising from the conditions reflected in large and persistent annual US goods trade deficits”. 

The California action follows a lawsuit filed in the US Court of International Trade earlier this week by the Liberty Justice Center on behalf of five small US businesses.

Lawyers in that case have argued that the IEEPA can only be triggered in the case of an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, and say that the US trade deficit “is neither an emergency nor an unusual or extraordinary threat”.

“Trade deficits have existed for decades, and do not constitute a national emergency or threat to security,” the Liberty Justice Center said.

“Moreover, the administration imposed tariffs even on countries with which the US does not have a trade deficit, further undermining the administration’s justification.”

Meanwhile, the California lawsuit argues that IEEPA does not allow the president to apply tariffs, and says that Trump should seek congressional approval to take such “economically significant actions”.

The success of either lawsuit in blocking the US’s “reciprocal” tariffs would represent a major blow to Trump’s trade agenda, although it would not affect sector-specific tariffs on steel, aluminium and autos that the administration has applied by invoking alternative US laws.

Newsom, who was elected governor of California in 2018 and is regarded as a potential future Democratic presidential candidate, said California’s lawsuit was an effort to represent “American families who can’t afford to let the chaos continue”.

According to Newsom’s office, the state is the fifth-largest economy in the world. It is also home to the Port of Los Angeles, which is the busiest in the US and is particularly exposed to a slowdown in trade with China.

[Derby]

[Derby]

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/us-plans-to-use-tariff-negotiations-to-isolate-china/

U.S. Plans to Use Tariff Negotiations to Isolate China


Shipping containers at a port in southern China © jade gao/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The Trump administration plans to use ongoing tariff negotiations to pressure U.S. trading partners to limit their dealings with China, according to people with knowledge of the conversations.

The idea is to extract commitments from U.S. trading partners to isolate China’s economy in exchange for reductions in trade and tariff barriers imposed by the White House. U.S. officials plan to use negotiations with more than 70 nations to ask them to disallow China to ship goods through their countries, prevent Chinese firms from locating in their territories to avoid U.S. tariffs, and not absorb China’s cheap industrial goods into their economies.

Those measures are meant to put a dent in China’s already rickety economy and force Beijing to the negotiating table with less leverage ahead of potential talks between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The exact demands could vary widely by nation, given their degree of involvement with the Chinese economy.

The White House and Treasury didn’t respond to requests for comment.

U.S. officials have broached the idea in early talks with some countries, people familiar with the discussions said. Trump himself hinted at the strategy on Tuesday, telling Fox Noticias he would consider making countries choose between the U.S. and China in response to a question about Panama deciding not to renew its role in the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s global infrastructure program for developing nations.

One brain behind the strategy is Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who has taken a leading role in the trade negotiations since Trump announced a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs for most nations—but not China—on April 9.

Bessent pitched the idea to Trump during an April 6 meeting in Mar-a-Lago, said people familiar with the discussion, saying that extracting concessions from U.S. trading partners could prevent Beijing and its firms from avoiding U.S. tariffs, export controls and other economic measures, the people said.

The tactic is part of a larger strategy being pushed by Bessent to isolate the Chinese economy, which has gained traction among Trump officials recently. Debates over the scope and severity of U.S. tariffs are ongoing, but officials largely appear to agree with Bessent’s China plan.

It involves cutting China off from the U.S. economy with tariffs and potentially even cutting Chinese stocks out of U.S. exchanges. Bessent didn’t rule out the administration trying to delist Chinese stocks in a recent interview with Fox Business.

Still, the ultimate goal of the administration’s China policy isn’t yet clear.


Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent © Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

Bessent has also said there is still room for talks on a potential trade deal between the U.S. and China. Such talks would have to involve Trump and Xi. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt read a new statement from Trump during Tuesday’s press briefing suggesting a deal with China isn’t imminent.

“The ball is in China’s court. China needs to make a deal with us. We don’t have to make a deal with them. China wants what we have…the American consumer,” Leavitt said when reading Trump’s statement.

It is also not clear that the anti-China line has entered into negotiations with all nations. Some countries haven’t heard demands from U.S. negotiators related to China, say people familiar with the talks, though they acknowledge that negotiations remain in early stages. Many expect the Trump administration to raise China-related demands sooner or later.

Bessent has shown his desire for anti-China pledges from U.S. trading partners before. In late February, he said that Mexico had offered to match U.S. tariffs on China as part of negotiations over Trump’s tariffs on Mexico imposed because of the fentanyl trade. Bessent called Mexico’s offer a “nice gesture,” but the idea didn’t find much traction with the administration.

Since then, Bessent has taken a more central role in trade negotiations, assuming a lead in talks over reciprocal tariffs after Trump announced his 90-day pause on April 9. The Treasury secretary is slated to meet with Japan’s economic revitalization minister as soon as Wednesday and has laid out a list of nations he believes could soon reach deals with the U.S., including Japan, the U.K., Australia, South Korea and India.

China is conducting its own trade diplomacy. This week, Xi traveled to Vietnam—a major U.S. trading partner hard-hit by Trump’s tariffs—and signed dozens of economic pledges with the Hanoi government.

China views Trump’s reciprocal trade gambit as an opportunity, Peter Harrell, the former senior director for international economics on Joe Biden’s National Security Council, said on a panel discussion at Georgetown Law on Tuesday.

But China’s ability to counteract U.S. trade policies is limited, Harrell said. While the U.S. remains a “massive net importer,” China is reducing its imports from the rest of the world and focusing on self-sufficiency.

China “isn’t going to replace the U.S. as a source of demand for the products that a bunch of these developing countries…make,” Harrell said. “So the economics of this are going to prove challenging for China, but I think we see them playing the politics of this reasonably savvily.”

Write to Gavin Bade at gavin.bade@wsj.com and Brian Schwartz at brian.schwartz@wsj.com

[AbiertoPorDemolicion]

Ese "conflicto" entre deudores y acreedores ya se produjo en 2012 y lo ganaron los deudores. Y ademas por goleada. Y lo consiguieron victimizandose frente a los acreedores y amenazando a la sociedad con liarla parda si los demás no les pagabamos sus deudas.

En España, el gobierno perdió el culo en montar sarebs, bamcos malos, rescatar cajas de ahorros para que no tuvieran que ejecutar las hipotecas de los endeudados y dar paquetes de ayidas a diestro y siniestro para que ningun endeudado quiebre y les monten un pollo en la calles.

Ese conflicto entre deudores o acreedores lo ganará el que más enseñe los dientes a los demas, y los gobiernos actuaran en consecuencia. Tal y como pasó en el 2012.

Porque en 2012 había con qué pagar a los deudores, aunque fuese a lo cabrón y quemando una generación entera. También porque el sistema entero estaba secuestrado por la deuda.

Y si el sistema entero estaba secuestrado por la deuda...Entonces, ¿Quién pagó la fiesta?

[Derby]

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/16/powell-indicates-tariffs-could-pose-a-two-pronged-policy-challenge-for-the-fed-.html

Powell indicates tariffs could pose a challenge for the Fed between controlling inflation and boosting growth

Key Points
*Fed Chair Jerome Powell said Wednesday that the central bank could find itself in a dilemma between controlling inflation and supporting economic growth.

*“If that were to occur, we would consider how far the economy is from each goal, and the potentially different time horizons over which those respective gaps would be anticipated to close,” he said for a speech in Chicago.

*Powell gave no indication on where he sees interest rates headed, but noted that, “For the time being, we are well positioned to wait for greater clarity before considering any adjustments to our policy stance.”

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell expressed concern in a speech Wednesday that the central bank could find itself in a dilemma between controlling inflation and supporting economic growth.

With uncertainty elevated over what impact President Donald Trump’s tariffs will have, the central bank leader said that while he expects higher inflation and lower growth, it’s unclear where the Fed will need to devote greater focus.

“We may find ourselves in the challenging scenario in which our dual-mandate goals are in tension,” Powell said in prepared remarks before the Economic Club of Chicago. “If that were to occur, we would consider how far the economy is from each goal, and the potentially different time horizons over which those respective gaps would be anticipated to close.”

The Fed is tasked with ensuring stable prices and full employment, and economists including those at the Fed see threats to both from the levies. Tariffs essentially act as a tax on imports, though their direct link to inflation historically has been spotty.

Powell gave no indication on where he sees interest rates headed, but noted that, “For the time being, we are well positioned to wait for greater clarity before considering any adjustments to our policy stance.”

Stocks hit session lows as Powell spoke while Treasury yields turned lower.

In the case of higher inflation, the Fed would keep interest rates steady or even increase them to dampen demand. In the case of slower growth, the Fed might be persuaded to lower interest rates. Powell emphasized the importance to keeping inflation expectations in check.

Markets expect the Fed to start reducing rates again in June and to enact three or four quarter-percentage-point cuts by the end of 2025, according to the CME Group’s FedWatch gauge.

Fed officials generally consider tariffs to be a one-time hit to prices, but the expansive nature of the Trump duties could alter that trend.

Powell noted that survey- and market-based measures of near-term inflation are on the rise, though the longer-term outlook remains close to the Fed’s 2% goal. The Fed’s key inflation measure is expected to show a rate of 2.6% for March, he said.

“Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation,” said Powell. “The inflationary effects could also be more persistent. Avoiding that outcome will depend on the size of the effects, on how long it takes for them to pass through fully to prices, and, ultimately, on keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored.”

The speech was largely similar to one he delivered earlier this month in Virginia, and in some passages verbatim.

Powell noted the threats to growth as well as inflation.

Gross domestic product for the first quarter, which will be reported later this month, is expected to show little growth in the U.S. economy for the January-through-March period.

Indeed, Powell noted “The data in hand so far suggest that growth has slowed in the first quarter from last year’s solid pace. Despite strong motor vehicle sales, overall consumer spending appears to have grown modestly. In addition, strong imports during the first quarter, reflecting attempts by businesses to get ahead of potential tariffs, are expected to weigh on GDP growth.”

Earlier in the day, the Commerce Department reported that retail sales increased a better-than-expected 1.4% in March. The report showed that a large portion of the growth came from car buyers looking to make purchases ahead of the tariffs, though multiple other sectors showed solid gains as well.

Following the report, the Atlanta Fed said it sees GDP growing at a -0.1% pace in Q1 when adjusting for an unusual rise in gold imports and exports. Powell described the economy as being in a “solid position” even with the expected slowdown in growth.

[asustadísimos]

EL DÓLAR ES UNA CARGA, SÍ, PERO PARA ARGENTINA.—

Porque para EE. UU. es un privilegio exorbitante.

Gran aportación de Nuss:
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2625.msg241503#msg241503

Fíjense cómo coincidimos todos en tres consecuencias letales de la nueva política fiscal norteamericana:

• Depreciación/Devaluación del dólar en contra de su estatus tradicional de moneda de reserva y refugio.

• Enfrentamiento impotente con China.

• Contradicción con la Fed, es decir, con la quintaesencia del poder económico verdaderamente capitalista estadounidense,  lo que supone automática pérdida de confianza por los mercados (a los fondistas les recomendamos que analicen cuánta exposición tienen a productos en dólares y tomen decisiones en consecuencia).

Nosotros insistimos en nuestra idea de que la retórica que se está empleando por el Gobierno de EE. UU. es música celestial porque, en realidad, solo se busca que valgan menos los dólares nominales con que los endeudados han de honrar su deuda.

Lo endeudados en dólares son felices si hay:
• inflación_IPC 
• depreciación/devaluación cambiaria.

Es decir, son felices con el colesterol malo. Son felices con la aterosclerosis del Capital.

La inflación ya ha sido usada después de la pandemia sin resultado. Antes al contrario, han aumentado los desequilibrios porque también ha habido inflación_de_activos en paralelo, ¡y mucha!, con la consiguiente destrucción de Capital (la erección de la trompa del serpencamelirafante).

Solo queda la segunda vía. Pero la pérdida de sexi internacional del dólar se va a pagar cara. Debe tener tal envergadura, en cantidad y tiempo, que conlleva la renuncia a la Hegemonía Dólar, al menos tal y como la hemos conocido hasta la fecha.

Al momento coyuntural y estructural histórico, por la suelta del nuevo modelo de sustitución del popularcapitalista, y sin venir a cuento —no hacía falta—, los tontos de los pisitos han añadido sorprendentemente una vertiente sistémica: el cambio de naturaleza del sistema capitalista o, cuando menos, de su arquitectura financiera internacional y del papel del anglo en ella.

¡Gracias, 'himbersores'!

'Pro memoria': La diferencia entre depreciación y devaluación es que la primera la hacen los mercados y la segunda los Estados. Pero, contablemente, es que la primera da lugar a una pérdida reversible, pero la segunda, permanente. Fíjense que están hablando de que conviene un ajuste o corrección valorativa del dólar, no de que esté una temporadita abaratado. El EUR/USD va hoy por 1.1400. Nosotros llevamos años diciendo que el tipo de cambio de equilibrio eraceroísta es 1.6000. Vamos a ver este nivel el año que viene. Pero el sentido común dice que esto solo es posible si antes tienen lugar las correcciones valorativas inmobiliaria y bursátil.]

[Derby]

https://asiatimes.com/2025/04/the-coming-us-china-financial-divorce/#

The coming US-China financial divorce

Forget tariffs and trade wars – the full-blown decoupling of global finance will touch every aspect of capitalism as we know it


The US and China are headed for a financial divorce. Image: X Screengrab

The financial decoupling between the United States and China is no longer a distant threat. It is here, formalized, accelerating, and profoundly disruptive. For investors, understanding this new era is not optional; it’s imperative.

The sweeping tariffs on Chinese imports, now codified into law, mark more than a trade skirmish. They signal a historic reordering of global capital flows, supply chains, and technological ecosystems.

This is not merely about economics. It is about economic power—and control. Investors must now adapt to a world in which the foundational rules of global commerce are being redrawn at speed and under pressure.

On April 2, President Trump declared Liberation Day, signing into law a sweeping universal 10% tariff on all imports, escalating to an extraordinary 60% on Chinese goods. These new levies come atop an already formidable 85% existing tariff wall, resulting in cumulative charges of 145% on Chinese exports to the US.

The market reaction was immediate: supply chains began to unspool, cost pressures reignited across industries, and Beijing launched the first salvos of retaliation, notably banning the export of critical minerals essential for American tech and aerospace sectors.

What is unfolding is not a tactical dispute, but a structural decoupling of the world’s two largest economies. While the term “Cold War” is frequently overused, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the parallels. The long-standing belief that economic integration would serve as a bulwark against geopolitical conflict is being abandoned in real time.

What would a full-blown financial divorce look like?

First, capital flows will become increasingly politicized. Transactions between American and Chinese entities—once considered routine—will be subject to growing scrutiny and restriction. Dollar-denominated activities could be curtailed. US pension funds, university endowments, and index-linked ETFs may face outright bans or mounting political pressure to divest from Chinese assets.

This could trigger a wave of delistings from US exchanges, tighter reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and outbound investment controls targeting key sectors. Already, Trump’s advisors are sending clear signals: American capital should not be “funding China’s rise.”

Second, the technological split will widen and deepen. In previous years, companies like Huawei, ZTE, and DJI were placed under significant pressure. Now, attention is shifting toward AI, semiconductor manufacturing, green energy platforms, and next-generation industries. Washington is not merely aiming to restrict exports; it is moving to wall off entire innovation ecosystems.

Expect tighter licensing regimes, broader investment bans, and more aggressive sanctions targeting both Chinese companies and those of allied nations that maintain deep ties with Beijing. This is about asserting technological dominance and denying China access to foundational capabilities.

Third, the very plumbing of global finance is being contested. For decades, the dollar-based system has served as the neutral arbiter of international commerce. That neutrality is eroding.

China, anticipating restrictions on its dollar access, is pushing aggressively to internationalize the yuan. Its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is being positioned as an alternative to SWIFT, aiming to create a rival monetary ecosystem less vulnerable to Western sanctions.

The emergence of parallel financial systems will reshape the flow of capital, reconfigure trade settlements, and inject new layers of complexity into currency markets.

For investors, this period of transition will bring volatility—but also opportunity.

On one side, countries aligned with the United States will become magnets for strategic capital. India, Vietnam, Mexico, and parts of Eastern Europe are already seeing significant inflows as companies diversify manufacturing footprints away from China.

Reshoring and friendshoring—once corporate buzzwords—have become explicit government policy, backed by substantial financial incentives and political will. On the other, China is not retreating; it is repositioning.

President Xi Jinping’s active courtship of the Global South underscores Beijing’s strategy to deepen ties with developing nations that find themselves squeezed by Western protectionism.

Xi’s recent visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia—countries directly impacted by Trump’s tariffs—highlight Beijing’s bid to integrate these economies into its sphere of influence through partnerships in 5G, AI, green energy, and advanced manufacturing.

Investors must recognize that this is no longer about tactical tariff battles or headline-driven skirmishes.

It’s about a bifurcation of the global financial order—a structural realignment that will touch every dimension of capital allocation, foreign exchange strategy, ESG frameworks, and index composition. The old assumption that globalization was an irreversible force is being dismantled before our eyes.

While the financial divorce is not yet final, the momentum behind it suggests it is becoming irreversible. And as with any messy separation, fortunes will be made not by those who react emotionally but by those who anticipate where assets, influence and opportunities will migrate once the old household is split.

For the discerning investor, the coming decades will not be defined by a return to the familiar but by a mastery of the new.

[Derby]

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-open-talks-us-shows-085205469.html

China Open to Talks If US Shows Respect, Names Point Person

(Bloomberg) -- China wants to see a number of steps from President Donald Trump’s administration before it will agree to trade talks, including showing more respect by reining in disparaging remarks by members of his cabinet, according to a person familiar with the Chinese government’s thinking.

[Derby]

https://www.statista.com/chart/20858/top-10-countries-by-share-of-global-manufacturing-output/

[sudden and sharp]

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[Saturio]

Importante.
Podemos esperarnos lo peor. Hay que prepararse.

https://european-alternatives.eu/alternative-to/aws-amazon-web-services

[CHOSEN]

Claro que puede ser peor.
Lo va a ser.
Estoy convencido de que Israel atacará Irán con apoyo total del ZOG en norteamérica. Es una guerra que no se puede ganar, lo se, pero tampoco se podía ganar en Ucrania y les dió igual. Hace tiempo que el anglo perdió la cordura.
Es fácil ver que Europa sería de nuevo la gran perjudicada por una guerra en OM, con el problema añadido que todos sabemos.

[el malo]

[El Gobierno de EE. UU. (soberanía fiscal) es un gobierno de endeudados en dólares. El objetivo es abaratar la honra de las deudas personal, corporativa y estatal. Lo demás es música celestial.

Solo hay dos vías contradictorias:
• inflación (soplar)
• depreciación/devaluación del dólar (sorber)

La política fiscal de EE. UU. es anti-Capital, de deudores contra acreedores.

Sin embargo, la política monetaria es pro-Capital, de acreedores defendiéndose de deudores malpagadores.
 
El Gobierno de EE. UU. está, pues, en contradicción con el Capitalismo-como-ortograma.

Pero la autoridad monetaria, no.

La reunión de la Fed de primeros de mayo (actas-Fomc, apróx. el martes 20) dará el campanazo porque quien manda en el sistema capitalista es el Capital, es decir, los Recursos Propios, no los Recursos Ajenos, la Deuda. Y, en el fondo, porque es estúpida la ideíta de que, en una situación de estrangulamiento financiero total final (crisis coyuntural, estructural y sistémica), el déficit público o el déficit exterior son causa-de-causas. Solo hay lucha feroz por la Renta por parte de una legión de anarquistas yonquis del dinero refractarios al Trabajo & Empresa, que llevan tres lustros en el corredor de la muerte.

Trump está ya fracasado. Los oídos sordos de Putin y, sobre todo, de Xi Jinping han sido la sentencia.]

¿Podría explicar esto para niños de dos años?

Yo siempre lo visto como una consecuencia, no como una contradicción: devaluación de la moneda -> moneda más débil -> necesitas más unidades de esa moneda para comprar el mismo bien -> suben los precios -> sube la inflación

Usted lo ve como dos medidas contradictorias (y entiendo que por contradictorias, ¿incompatibles?)

Le agradecería mucho que nos lo explicara con marionetas.

[Currobena]

Claro que puede ser peor.
Lo va a ser.
Estoy convencido de que Israel atacará Irán con apoyo total del ZOG en norteamérica. Es una guerra que no se puede ganar, lo se, pero tampoco se podía ganar en Ucrania y les dió igual. Hace tiempo que el anglo perdió la cordura.
Es fácil ver que Europa sería de nuevo la gran perjudicada por una guerra en OM, con el problema añadido que todos sabemos.

La guerra Israel Irán será otra guerra fría entre Estados Unidos y China.


Quitando a las almas nucleares que nadie quiere usar porque son el fin y nadie es tan gilipollas, tenemos una guerra fría económica entre los dos imperios, el chino y el estadounidense.


China empezó el conflicto del 2015 con el embargo selectivo de exportaciones y ahora es el país más poderoso del mundo económicamente con diferencia. Los que estamos en el bando occidental solo tenemos números en el ordenador pero no productos reales que fabricar. En Estados Unidos se han dado cuenta varios años después y ahora están empezando a aplicar contramedidas para ver quién entra en decadencia económica más rápidamente. El motivo de la guerra de Irán es cortar los suministros de petróleo a China, igual que la guerra de Ucrania se mantiene porque Estados Unidos suministra Ucrania y China a Rusia. Por sí mismos ninguno de los dos puede mantener un conflicto de años, qué es lo que tiene pinta de durar.


Me imagino que el resultado final serán dos cadenas de suministros y fabricación independientes dentro de cada esfera imperial.


A nivel local español, eso exige necesariamente la destrucción del pisito como activo de inversión y su vuelta a lo que es, un bien de consumo básico. No se pueden montar fábricas que sean rentables si el salario de los obreros va en su mayoría a los caseros zampalangostinos. Por mucho que voten a los partidos actuales estos son elegidos desde la sede imperial y tienen que obedecer sus órdenes en todos los asuntos importantes.