PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2025

[Derby]

https://x.com/NickTimiraos/status/1912934477887594853

[CHOSEN]

Comento todo esto porque la posibilidad de quedarse sin una pieza crítica para el marcapasos es muy cierta y seria.

No lo creo.
La fabricación -de cualquier cosa- es algo que se superó en los 70.
El problema es que los costes asociados a fabricar aquí rompen la marginalidad del beneficio, beneficio que mueve a las empresas. Fuera es más barato porque no hay artefacto inmobiliario, no existe tramo usurario empotrado y por eso los marcapasos (y todo en general) ya se fabricaba en occidente en 1970.
Las cadenas de suministros no son un problema.
Fabricar aquí no es el problema.
Hay miles de ejemplos desde los drones rusos (tecnología ultramoderna) hasta los azulejos de Porcelanosa (tecnología ultraantigua).

El rendimiento es marginal, fabricar cualquier cosa ha sido superado ampliamente por los métodos de fabricación y las economías de escala. Deslocalizando podemos mejorar el tamaño de ese rendimiento marginal durante un período de tiempo que es cada vez más escaso. Me dedico a esto.
El planeta se puede inundar de marcapasos con el chasquido de un dedo.
Olvídate de China, de India y de Vietnam.
Este año AMD empezará a fabricar su ultimísima generación de procesadores en Tejas.
Y te estoy hablando de tecnología TOP entre las TOP.
Imagínate fabricar ropa, coches o electrodomésticos.

El miedo a las cadenas de suministros es propaganda de guerra, como la escasez de chips para automoción hace un par de años, como aquello de Rusia robando lavadoras, el covid mortal o el precio del aceite de girasol, que mágicamente ya no se ve bloqueado en los puertos de Ucrania.
MENTIRAS y propaganda.
La mejor mentira siempre tiene algo de verdad, y es la parte que se utiliza para engañarte. Que se utilice JUSTAMENTE a Nvida como ejemplo de nosequé de las cadenas de suministros debería hacernos saltar las alarmas. Solo tenemos que ver su evolución bursátil y el evidente tongo de la IA.

Fabricar en Europa es tan barato como fabricar en China, y si no se hace es por lo que todos sabemos. Y en esta encrucijada NO hay dos alternativas.
La única salida es la rebaja absoluta de los costes indirectos asociados a la fabricación local. Ya no existirá el "exorbitant privilege" y el intercambio comercial deberá hacerse de igual a igual, es decir, igualando los rendimientos marginales.

Por eso dije hace dos días que la administración Trump sabe que la RELOCALIZACIÓN industrial implica si o si la corrección del precio de la vivienda.
Falta ver si se hará, o si no se hará.
Si habrá Made in Usa, o si es un farol y lo que interesa es mantener la hegemonía dólar.
Asustadísimos da por hecho el nivel 1,600, de donde entiendo que la devaluación y relocalización es el camino. La cuestión como dice es que hay burbujas de ricos y de pobres.
El sector público en EEUU es del 36%.
En Europa supera ampliamente el 50%.
El problema añadido en España es que además de una burbuja de pobres, son adictos al paternalismo gubernamental socialista, sea de izquierdas o de derechas, y por eso la corrección ni está ni se la espera.

No solo eso, sino que con un euro fortísimo a los jugadores el desamparo simplemente se la sopla. Y da gracias si ésto no se convierte en una nueva época dorada.
Cosas peores hemos visto.

[Derby]

Es la lógica de los negocios de Trump.

https://www.ft.com/content/06cc7b0f-3e32-4164-b096-ff92a1532236

Yuval Noah Harari: Trump’s world of rival fortresses

In the US president’s vision of post-liberal global disorder the weak should always surrender to the strong, writes the historian, philosopher and author


© Ann Kiernan

The surprising thing about Donald Trump’s policies is that people are still surprised by them. Headlines express shock and disbelief whenever Trump assaults another pillar of the global liberal order — for example by supporting Russia’s claims for Ukrainian territory, contemplating the forced annexation of Greenland or unleashing financial chaos with his tariff announcements. Yet his policies are so consistent, and his vision of the world so clearly defined, that by this stage only wilful self-deception can account for any surprise.

Supporters of the liberal order see the world as a potentially win-win network of co-operation. They believe that conflict is not inevitable, because co-operation can be mutually beneficial. This belief has deep philosophical roots. Liberals argue that all humans share some common experiences and interests, which can form the basis for universal values, global institutions and international laws. For example, all humans abhor illness and have a common interest in preventing the spread of contagious diseases. So all countries would benefit from the sharing of medical knowledge, global efforts to eradicate epidemics and the establishment of institutions like the World Health Organization that co-ordinate such efforts. Similarly, when liberals look at the flow of ideas, goods and people between countries, they tend to understand it in terms of potential mutual benefits rather than inevitable competition and exploitation. 

In the Trumpian vision, by contrast, the world is seen as a zero-sum game in which every transaction involves winners and losers. The movement of ideas, goods and people is therefore inherently suspect. In Trump’s world, international agreements, organisations and laws cannot be anything but a plot to weaken some countries and strengthen others — or perhaps a plot to weaken all countries and benefit a sinister cosmopolitan elite.

What, then, is Trump’s preferred alternative? If he could reshape the world according to his wishes, what would it look like? 

Trump’s ideal world is a mosaic of fortresses, where countries are separated by high financial, military, cultural and physical walls. It forgoes the potential of mutually beneficial co-operation, but Trump and like-minded populists argue that it will offer countries more stability and peace.

There is, of course, a key component missing from this vision. Thousands of years of history teach us that each fortress would probably want a bit more security, prosperity and territory for itself, at the expense of its neighbours. In the absence of universal values, global institutions and international laws, how would rival fortresses resolve their disputes?

Trump’s solution is simple: the way to prevent conflicts is for the weak to do whatever the strong demand. According to this view, conflict occurs only when the weak refuse to accept reality. War is therefore always the fault of the weak.

When Trump blamed Ukraine for the Russian invasion, many people couldn’t understand how he could hold such a preposterous view. Some assumed he’d been hoodwinked by Russian propaganda. But there is a simpler explanation. According to the Trumpian worldview, considerations of justice, morality and international law are irrelevant, and the only thing that matters in international relations is power. Since Ukraine is weaker than Russia, it should have surrendered. In the Trumpian vision, peace means surrender, and since Ukraine refused to surrender, the war is its fault. 

The same logic underlies Trump’s plan for annexing Greenland. According to Trumpian logic, if weak Denmark refuses to cede Greenland to the much stronger US and the US then invades and conquers Greenland by force, Denmark would bear sole responsibility for any violence and bloodshed.

There are three obvious problems with the idea that rival fortresses can avoid conflict by accepting reality and cutting deals.

First, it exposes the lie behind the promise that in a world of fortresses everyone will feel less threatened, and every country could focus on peacefully developing its own traditions and economy. In fact, the weaker fortresses would soon find themselves swallowed by their stronger neighbours, which would turn from national fortresses into sprawling multinational empires.

Trump himself is very clear about his own imperial plans. While he builds walls to protect US territory and resources, he turns a predatory eye to the territory and resources of other countries, including erstwhile allies. Denmark is again a tell-tale example. For decades, it has been one of America’s most reliable allies. After the 9/11 attacks, Denmark fulfilled its Nato treaty obligations enthusiastically. Forty-four Danish soldiers died in Afghanistan — a higher per capita death rate than that suffered by the US itself. Trump didn’t bother saying “thank you”. Instead, he expects Denmark to capitulate to his imperial ambitions. He clearly wants vassals rather than allies. 

A second problem is that since no fortress can afford to be weak, all of them would be under enormous pressure to strengthen themselves militarily. Resources would be diverted from economic development and welfare programmes to defence. The resulting arms races would decrease everyone’s prosperity without making anyone feel more secure. 

Third, the Trumpian vision expects the weak to surrender to the strong, but it offers no clear method for determining relative strength. What happens if countries miscalculate, as often happens in history? In 1965 the US was convinced that it was much stronger than North Vietnam, and that by applying enough pressure it could force the government in Hanoi to cut a deal. The North Vietnamese refused to acknowledge American superiority, persevered against immense odds — and won the war. How could the US have known in advance that it actually had the weaker hand?

Similarly, in 1914 both Germany and Russia were convinced they would win the war by Christmas. They miscalculated. The war took much longer than anyone expected and involved many unforeseen twists and turns. By 1917 the defeated Tsarist Empire was engulfed by revolution, but Germany was denied victory due to the unanticipated intervention of the US. So should Germany have cut a deal in 1914? Or perhaps it was the Russian tsar who should have acknowledged reality and surrendered to German demands?

In the current trade war between China and the US, who should do the sensible thing and surrender in advance? You might respond that instead of seeing the world in such zero-sum terms, it is better for all countries to work together to ensure mutual prosperity. But if you think like that, you are rejecting the basic premises of the Trumpian vision. 

The Trumpian vision is not a novelty. It has been the predominant vision for thousands of years prior to the rise of the liberal world order. The Trumpian formula has been tried and tested so many times before that we know where it usually leads — to a never-ending cycle of empire-building and war. Even worse, in the 21st century the rival fortresses would have to deal not just with the old threat of war, but with the new challenges of climate change and the rise of superintelligent AI. Without robust international co-operation, there is no way to deal with these global problems. Since Trump has no viable solution for either climate change or an out-of-control AI, his strategy is to simply deny their existence.  

Concerns about the stability of the liberal world order mounted after Trump was first elected US president in 2016. Following a decade of confusion and uncertainty, we now have a clear picture of the post-liberal world disorder. The liberal vision of the world as a co-operative network is replaced by the vision of the world as a mosaic of fortresses. This is being realised all around us — walls are going up and drawbridges are raised. If this continues to be implemented, the short-term results will be trade wars, arms races and imperial expansion. The ultimate results will be global war, ecological collapse and out-of-control AI.

We can be saddened and outraged by these developments and do our best to reverse them, but there is no longer any excuse for being surprised. As for those wishing to defend Trump’s vision, they should answer one question: how can rival national fortresses peacefully resolve their economic and territorial disputes if there are no universal values or binding international laws?

[Derby]

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-markets-64e91d20-1ba8-11f0-b34e-d37214fc002c.html

1 big thing: The end of the American world

Pro-globalist, free trade institutions have an awkward admission: President Trump is right.

Why it matters:The era of America as the world's biggest customer looks like it might be over.

The leaders of major international organizations now warn the world has relied too much on the U.S. for economic growth, echoing White House calls for the rest of the globe to pick up the slack.

What they're saying: "Countries should renew their focus on internal and external macroeconomic imbalances," Kristalina Georgieva, the head of the International Monetary Fund, said yesterday.

"External surpluses and deficits can create fertile ground for trade tensions," she said in a speech entitled "Toward a Better Balanced and More Resilient World Economy."

The World Trade Organization had a similar message this week.

"Over-concentration, whether it's where we buy from or where we sell to, leads to over-dependence, making economies more vulnerable to shocks and fostering a sense of unfair burden sharing," Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the group's director, told reporters on Wednesday.

"The U.S. has a point when it says too many countries are dependent on its market or the production of some critical inputs are too concentrated in certain sectors and geographies," she added.

The big picture: That is a nod to countries that sell far more goods and services abroad than they buy from others.

In the current protectionist era, that creates a huge new risk. Never before has the U.S. — the world's biggest consumer — threatened such a sudden withdrawal from the global stage.

Between the lines: Trump and some top economic advisors believe that America has footed the global bill for too long.

But the U.S. imports only what there is demand for. Domestic consumers get low-cost goods, while manufacturers can source cheap inputs as they focus on producing more complex products. Tariffs threaten those benefits.

"Horrendous imbalances have devastated our industrial base and put our national security at risk," Trump said before announcing the reciprocal tariffs that were paused exactly one week later.

Stephen Miran, the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, called for "improved burden-sharing at the global level" in a recent speech.

Threat level: The rapid unraveling of the global trading system will be painful, with no time for the most vulnerable nations to adjust.

The WTO forecast this week that global trade will plummet this year and weigh on economic growth as a result of Trump's tariffs.

The IMF will release its latest economic forecasts next week, which Georgieva said will include "notable markdowns."

The bottom line: "Smaller advanced economies and most emerging markets rely more on trade for their growth, and are thus more exposed," Georgieva said.

[Derby]

https://entrylevel.topdowncharts.com/p/chart-of-the-week-the-worst-chart

[Currobena]

GME aparte, puede que Ken Griffith sepa algo de las nuevas tendencias del mercado inmobiliario.

https://therealdeal.com/chicago/2025/04/16/ken-griffin-takes-loss-with-16m-chicago-condos-sale/

Aproximadamente un cuarenta por ciento de descuento le parece un buen negocio en una zona top de Chicago.

[tomasjos]

Lean este artículo. Un grupo de vecinos de Tapia presionan para que se abra una explotación de oro en la zona. Se hacen llamar Plataforma por la reindustrialización. ¿Pretenden industrializar la zona? No, quieren que la empresa les compre las tierras que tienen para dar el pelotazo y les da igual que la contaminación de las aguas se cargue la industria que si hay en la zona, que es la agroalimentaria y forestal. Dar el pelotazo y vivir de las rentas a costa de la ruina de los demás.  Está mierda está en el ADN patrio.

https://www.lne.es/occidente/2025/04/18/defensores-mina-tapia-manifestacion-sabado-116498527.html

[Derby]

https://x.com/NewsLambert/status/1912894546205200728

[sudden and sharp]

---

[cujo]

https://x.com/NewsLambert/status/1912894546205200728

1,7% anual . Subo su apuesta x10   17% , para 2030 , 30 años después de empezar a leer a S.P.Q.R. , podremos cantar victoria en el karaoke del asilo.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/bc778c8b-932d-409f-b505-49bcd4136d3d

Few US CEOs bought the dip as tariffs rattled markets

Some insiders unloaded stock before Trump’s ‘liberation day’ announcement but many more were restricted from doing so


Person inside a GameStop store. The retailer’s chief executive, Ryan Cohen, bought 500,000 shares at $21.55 on April 3. The stock hit $26.78 on April 17 © Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

Only a handful of US chief executives made well-timed stock buys during the tariff-induced market panic this month, as trading restrictions forced them on to the sidelines.

Two chief executives at companies worth more than $5bn ‘bought the dip’ when the market fell, according to data provider VerityData. But a larger group of executives had sold shares before President Donald Trump’s so-called “liberation day” announcements, including the bosses of PepsiCo and Jazz Pharmaceuticals.

Insiders often buy their own shares when markets are down. However, many executives were unable to jump on cheap shares because “liberation day” came as much of corporate America was barred from dealing ahead of first-quarter earnings.

“Simply put, the timing of the market disruption could not have come at a worse time for insiders because quarterly trading windows are closed at most US companies,” said Ben Silverman, vice-president of research at VerityData, which tracks company executives and directors’ share dealings based on regulatory filings.

Some CEOs who were able to buy saw it pay off. Ryan Cohen, chief executive of GameStop — a popular meme stock — bought 500,000 shares at $21.55 on April 3. In the days after the sell-off as the market calmed, GameStop’s shares closed at $26.78 on April 17. Cohen, who is GameStop’s second-largest shareholder, previously bought company stock in June 2023.

Gary Dickerson, the chief executive of Applied Materials, bought 50,000 shares on April 3 at $137 — the same as Thursday’s closing price. Board directors at Dollar Tree and Salesforce bought about $500,000 and $1mn respectively during the sell-off.

“We know from academic research corporate insiders are contrarians,” said Daniel Taylor, an accounting professor at the Wharton School. “When there is a big drop we have seen insiders start buying at the bottom.”

At some companies insiders started snapping up shares quickly after their earnings announcements. Goldman Sachs board director John Hess bought $2mn shares on April 15, the day after the bank reported earnings. Buying is extremely rare for Goldman insiders, and Hess’s purchase marks only the second at the bank since January 2009, disclosures show.

Company insiders have to disclose their transactions, and often have trading plans in place to automatically sell stock at certain times and share prices to avoid falling foul of insider trading rules.

Trump’s election win in November triggered a flurry of corporate executives selling. As a result, insiders were generally hesitant to sell in the first months of 2025 because “they’d generated a nice chunk of liquidity” already, Silverman said.

At Microsoft, no insider has sold stock this year, the longest pause in selling since 2022. The technology giant’s shares are down nearly 12 per cent this year.

Still, some corporate insiders sold stock between Trump’s inauguration in January and his tariffs announcement in April.

In early March, six Pepsi executives sold $18.4mn of stock when the company’s shares were above $150. Chief executive Ramon Laguarta sold 50,000 shares for $7.7mn, his largest sale at the company. These sales were not part of a preset trading schedule, regulatory disclosures show.

In its annual report on February 4, Pepsi added language to its risk disclosures saying new US tariffs on China, Mexico, Canada, and other countries could disrupt operations.

Pepsi’s stock closed at $143 on Thursday, trading down 6 per cent for the year. Pepsi declined to comment.

At other companies, executives accelerated their share sales as part of their stock trading plans.

Bruce Cozadd, the chief executive at Jazz Pharmaceuticals, sold 6,500 shares in March, his largest transaction since 2021. He sold at $144 on March 3, and the company’s shares are now trading at $103.

Jeff Green, the chief executive of Trade Desk, sold more than 900,000 shares on January 22, his largest transaction since 2021. He sold at $123 and the company’s shares are now trading at $50.

Dublin-based Jazz Pharmaceuticals said: “It is commonplace to have these plans in place to facilitate routine trading of company shares based on a pre-specified schedule.”

At Trade Desk, Green’s stock sales are part of a 10b5-1 plan, the company said.

Goldman Sachs, GameStop and Applied Materials did not respond to requests for comment.

[Derby]

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fda-food-safety-inspections-plans/

FDA making plans to end its routine food safety inspections, sources say

The Food and Drug Administration is drawing up plans that would end most of its routine food safety inspections work, multiple federal health officials tell CBS News, and effectively outsource this oversight to state and local authorities.

The plans have not been finalized and might need congressional action to fully fund, said the officials, who were not authorized to speak publicly.

[muyuu]

Comento todo esto porque la posibilidad de quedarse sin una pieza crítica para el marcapasos es muy cierta y seria.

No lo creo.
La fabricación -de cualquier cosa- es algo que se superó en los 70.
El problema es que los costes asociados a fabricar aquí rompen la marginalidad del beneficio, beneficio que mueve a las empresas. Fuera es más barato porque no hay artefacto inmobiliario, no existe tramo usurario empotrado y por eso los marcapasos (y todo en general) ya se fabricaba en occidente en 1970.
Las cadenas de suministros no son un problema.
Fabricar aquí no es el problema.

[...]

La capacidad de fabricar y hacerlo medianamente bien se pierde. La fabricación moderna está muy integrada y no se activa de un día para otro. De hecho muchas cosas que hacíamos en los 80 ahora no se podrían hacer, las cadenas de suministro no existen.

Tengo un colega que trabajaba en el Santander hace unos años, en Midlands (no le sigo mucho la pista, no sé si sigue) y tiene el trabajo asegurado porque pilota Cobol como nadie, y la gente se niega a ponerse a estudiar algo que supuestamente lleva 30 años muerto y enterrado. Una cosa que es medianamente estanca, como es un sistema de bases de datos, resulta que por integraciones del sistema es enormemente costoso cambiarlo y no se hace. Técnicamente, sería muy fácil. Prácticamente, ha resultado inviable décadas. Pues imagina si ahora tuvieras que revivir procesos, maquinarias y cadenas de suministro que llevan décadas difuntas y la gente con experiencia está toda muerta o retirada hace mucho.

Te digo lo que pasa si no hay piezas de marcapasos de un día para otro: búscate la vida para importarlo y si no te lo puedes permitir, DEP.

[asustadísimos]

[He mejorado el comentario anterior...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2625.msg241594#msg241594
... Estaba redactado deprisa y corriendo.

Aprovecho para decir tres cosas aparentemente inconexas:

• en España, a los turistas se les estafa;

• que no baje la cotización de la mierda —y el sistema se requetenmierde— no es tan malo para los que no se contentan con 'himbertir' barato, sino que quieren que el sistema se vaya a... la mierda:

• estamos de acuerdo con que burbuja, lo que se dice burbuja, no hay. Hay otra cosa muchísimo peor. Este mismo año, los que hasta ahora vienen diciendo que no hay burbuja acabarán pidiendo por favor que se diga que sí la hay.]

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-18/china-premier-calls-for-more-efforts-to-help-stocks-property

China Premier Calls for More Efforts to Help Stocks, Property


Li Qiang Photographer: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg

Chinese Premier Li Qiang urged government officials to strengthen their efforts to stabilize the stock market and nurture the real estate market to help shield the economy from heightened trade tensions with the US.

Li also called for strengthening the country’s counter-cyclical measures in the face of a complex and challenging external environment, state-run broadcaster China Central Television reported, citing a State Council meeting he chaired on Friday.

Efforts should also be made to prioritize stabilizing employment and foreign trade, while promoting consumption, according to the report.

The comments build on Li’s efforts to rally government officials about the economy. Concerns about trade tensions between the world’s two largest economies continue to weigh on investor sentiment and strategists at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. have cut their targets for key Chinese stock indexes for a second time this month.(...)