PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Veranito 2025

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://x.com/sninobecerra/status/1958838854510608548

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en

Statement | 21 August 2025 | Brussels | Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security | 8 min read

Joint Statement on a United States-European Union framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade

The United States and the European Union are pleased to announce that they have agreed on a Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade ('Framework Agreement').

This Framework Agreement represents a concrete demonstration of our commitment to fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial trade and investment. This Framework Agreement will put our trade and investment relationship – one of the largest in the world – on a solid footing and will reinvigorate our economies’ reindustrialisation. It reflects acknowledgement by the European Union of the concerns of the United States and our joint determination to resolve our trade imbalances and unleash the full potential of our combined economic power. The United States and the European Union intend this Framework Agreement to be a first step in a process that can be further expanded over time to cover additional areas and continue to improve market access and increase their trade and investment relationship.

The key terms include:

• The European Union intends to eliminate tariffs on all US industrial goods and to provide preferential market access for a wide range of US seafood and agricultural goods, including tree nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foods, planting seeds, soybean oil, and pork and bison meat. The European Union will immediately take the necessary steps to extend the Joint Statement of the United States and the European Union on a Tariff Agreement announced on 21 August 2020, with respect to lobster (that expired 31 July 2025), coupled with an expanded product scope to include processed lobster.
  
  
• The United States commits to apply the higher of either the US Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate or a tariff rate of 15%, comprised of the MFN tariff and a reciprocal tariff, on originating goods of the European Union. Additionally, effective as of 1 September 2025, the United States commits to apply only the MFN tariff to the following products of the European Union: unavailable natural resources (including cork), all aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients and chemical precursors. The United States and the European Union agree to consider other sectors and products that are important for their economies and value chains for inclusion in the list of products for which only the MFN tariffs would apply.
  
  
• The United States intends to promptly ensure that the tariff rate, comprised of the MFN tariff and the tariff imposed pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, applied to originating goods of the European Union subject to Section 232 actions on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber does not exceed 15%. When the European Union formally introduces the necessary legislative proposal to enact the tariff reductions set forth in Section 1 of this Framework Agreement, the United States will reduce tariffs on automobiles and automobile parts originating from the European Union subject to Section 232 tariffs as follows: No Section 232 automobile or automobile parts tariffs will apply to covered European Union goods with an MFN tariff of 15% or higher; and for covered goods with an MFN rate lower than 15%, a combined rate of 15%, comprised of the MFN tariff and Section 232 automobile tariffs, will be applied. These tariff reductions are expected to be effective from the first day of the same month in which the European Union’s legislative proposal is introduced. The United States expects the European Union’s legislative proposals will be consistent with this Framework Agreement and enacted by the necessary legislatures. All modifications to US Section 232 tariffs will be executed in a manner that reinforces and is consistent with US national security interests. With respect to steel, aluminium, and their derivative products, the European Union and the United States intend to consider the possibility to cooperate on ring-fencing their respective domestic markets from overcapacity, while ensuring secure supply chains between each other, including through tariff-rate quota solutions.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union will negotiate rules of origin that ensure that the benefits of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade accrue predominately to the United States and the European Union.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union commit to cooperate on ensuring secure, reliable, and diversified energy supplies, including by addressing non-tariff barriers that might restrict bilateral energy trade.  As part of this effort, the European Union intends to procure US liquified natural gas, oil, and nuclear energy products with an expected offtake valued at $750 billion through 2028. In addition, the European Union intends to purchase at least $40 billion worth of US AI chips for its computing centres. The European Union further plans to work with the United States to adopt and maintain technology security requirements in line with those of the United States. in a concerted effort to avoid technology leakage to destinations of concern. The United States will endeavour to facilitate such exports once such requirements are in place.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union share one of the world’s largest economic relationships, supported by mutual investment stocks exceeding $5 trillion, and intend to promote and facilitate mutual investments on both sides of the Atlantic. In this context, European companies are expected to invest an additional $600 billion across strategic sectors in the United States through 2028. This investment reflects the European Union’s strong commitment to the transatlantic partnership and its recognition of the United States as the most secure and innovative destination for foreign investment.
  
  
• The European Union plans to substantially increase procurement of military and defence equipment from the United States, with the support and facilitation of the US government. This commitment reflects a shared strategic priority to deepen transatlantic defence industrial cooperation, strengthen NATO interoperability, and ensure that European allies are equipped with the most advanced and reliable defence technologies available.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union commit to work together to reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers. With respect to automobiles, the United States and the European Union intend to accept and provide mutual recognition to each other’s standards. Cooperation on standards plays a crucial role in enhancing the transatlantic marketplace. The European Union and United States commit to enhance opportunities for technical cooperation between EU- and US-domiciled standards development organisations with the objective of identifying and developing standards for the transatlantic marketplace in key sectors of mutual interest. The United States and the European Union commit to facilitate conformity assessments to cover additional industrial sectors.
  
  
• Recognising the importance of continued engagement to resolve longstanding concerns, the European Union and the United States commit to work together to address non-tariff barriers affecting trade in food and agricultural products, including streamlining requirements for sanitary certificates for pork and dairy products.
  
  
• Recognising that production of the relevant commodities within the territory of the United States poses negligible risk to global deforestation, the European Union commits to work to address the concerns of US producers and exporters regarding the EU Deforestation Regulation, with a view to avoiding undue impact on US-EU trade.
  
  
• Taking note of the US concerns related to treatment of US small and medium-sized businesses under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the European Commission, in addition to the recently agreed increase of the de minimis exception, commits to work to provide additional flexibilities in the CBAM implementation.
  
  
• The European Union commits to undertake efforts to ensure that the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) do not pose undue restrictions on transatlantic trade. In the context of CSDDD, this includes undertaking efforts to reduce administrative burden on businesses, including small- and medium-sized enterprises, and to propose changes to the requirement for a harmonised civil liability regime for due diligence failures and to climate-transition-related obligations. The European Union commits to work to address US concerns regarding the imposition of CSDDD requirements on companies of non-EU countries with relevant high-quality regulations.
  
  
• The European Union reaffirms that US conformity assessment bodies can be designated as Notified Bodies in accordance with the Sectoral Annex for Telecommunications Equipment to the Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the European Community and the United States (1998) to carry out the tasks in relation to all essential requirements, including cybersecurity, in the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU. In addition, the United States and the European Union will commit to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement on cybersecurity.
  
  
• The European Union and the United States commit to strengthen cooperation and action related to the imposition of export restrictions on critical mineral and other similar resources by third countries.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union commit to discuss high-standard commitments related to intellectual property rights protection and enforcement.
  
  
• The European Union and the United States commit to work together to ensure strong protection of internationally recognised labour rights, including with regard to the elimination of forced labour in supply chains.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union commit to address unjustified digital trade barriers. In that respect, the European Union confirms that it will not adopt or maintain network usage fees. The United States and the European Union will not impose customs duties on electronic transmissions. The United States and the European Union intend to continue to support the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organization and seek the adoption of a permanent multilateral commitment.
  
  
• The European Union intends to consult with the United States and US traders on digitalisation of trade procedures and implementation of the legislation currently proposed on EU Customs Reform.
  
  
• The United States and the European Union agree to strengthen economic security alignment to enhance supply chain resilience and innovation by taking complementary actions to address non-market policies of third parties as well as cooperating on inbound and outbound investment reviews and export controls, as well as duty evasion. This includes addressing non-market practices, unfair competition, and lack of reciprocity in public procurement with respect to third countries. The United States and the European Union will cooperate on further implementation measures.

The United States and the European Union, in line with their relevant internal procedures, will promptly document the Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade to implement this Framework Agreement.

Details

Publication date	21 August 2025
Author	Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security
Location	Brussels
Country or region	United States
Trade topics	Negotiations and agreements

Saludos.

[patxarana]

This investment reflects the European Union’s strong commitment to the transatlantic partnership and its recognition of the United States as the most secure and innovative destination for foreign investment.

Jajajajajaja, ya ni disimulan.

[sudden and sharp]

Pues qué queréis que os diga...





... yo lo veo como siempre. 

[Derby]

Una visión de un futuro caótico con la caída del dólar.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/what-happens-if-dollar-is-no-longer-world-leading-reserve-currency-by-dennis-j-snower-2025-08

When the Dollar Falls

By driving up the federal debt, undermining central-bank independence, and imposing sweeping tariffs on key allies, US President Donald Trump is striking at the heart of America’s financial power. If the dollar were to lose its reserve-currency status, the resulting realignment would be neither gradual nor orderly.

LONDON – For decades, the dollar’s position as the world’s leading reserve currency has provided the United States with extraordinary advantages: the ability to borrow at low interest rates, run large current-account deficits, and finance budget shortfalls by printing money without necessarily triggering inflation. But since the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, warnings about the “end of America’s exorbitant privilege” have grown into a steady drumbeat.

The concerns are well-founded. Trump’s policies – from his attacks on the US Federal Reserve to his hands-off regulatory stance toward cryptocurrencies – are systematically undermining the dollar’s reserve-currency status. Losing the dollar’s primacy would invariably jeopardize the long-term health of the US economy.

But focusing solely on America’s fading privilege is like noticing a few trees ablaze while missing the wildfire igniting behind them. The loss of the dollar’s reserve-currency status would reverberate far beyond America’s borders, sending shockwaves throughout the global economy.

Financial markets, always on the lookout for potential risks, need only a critical mass of participants to believe that the threat is real for it to become so. Once enough investors begin selling a vulnerable asset, more follow.

Crucially, America’s “exorbitant privilege” is not a tribute owed to it for being the world’s leading superpower. It is simply a byproduct of how a reserve currency works. Like individuals, countries need a reliable store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of account. As foreign economies grow, so does their appetite for dollar-denominated assets such as US Treasuries and corporate bonds. This demand enables the US to run persistent current-account and trade deficits.

Moreover, US government deficits are largely financed through the sale of Treasuries, prized worldwide as a safe-haven asset. Because much of that liquidity is absorbed by foreign holders, the Fed can purchase these Treasuries with newly created dollars without boosting inflation. Strong international demand for US debt also holds down domestic interest rates, as investors are willing to accept low yields in exchange for the safety of dollar-denominated securities.

The Coming Reserve-Currency Realignment

To serve as a global reserve asset, a currency must be safe, liquid, stable, and widely accepted. This depends on seven key conditions. First, the issuing country must maintain macroeconomic stability: low inflation, sustainable public debt, and sound fiscal and monetary policies that assure investors and central banks that the currency will retain its value over time.

Second, the issuing country must have deep and liquid financial markets, offering safe, highly tradable assets – particularly sovereign bonds – capable of absorbing large cross-border flows. Government debt can be an asset only when investors believe the debt will be managed responsibly and repaid.

Third, a politically independent central bank committed to price stability is essential to a currency’s credibility, particularly when monetary policies are transparent and anchored in rules.

Fourth, reserve currencies must be freely tradable and exchangeable across borders with minimal restrictions.

Fifth, the judicial system must uphold the rule of law. In particular, it must protect property rights, ensure that foreign investors can enforce contracts, and provide avenues for recourse to resolve disputes.

Sixth, a reserve currency must be seen as a global public good rather than a tool for promoting national self-interest – a perception that hinges on constructive global leadership and active multilateral engagement. And lastly, the currency’s issuer must be a trade and finance powerhouse, because established network effects are necessary to encourage widespread use.

Trump’s policies have weakened each of these pillars of American economic dominance. The massive tax cuts at the heart of his grossly mislabeled “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” unaccompanied by any real spending restraint, are projected to add trillions of dollars to the national debt, jeopardizing macroeconomic stability. Although demand for US Treasuries remains strong, mounting debt and the risk of default – exacerbated by Trump’s use of the debt ceiling as political leverage – have eroded investor confidence.

At the same time, the Fed’s independence has come under strain as Trump publicly pressured policymakers to slash interest rates and suggested replacing Chair Jerome Powell and other officials with political loyalists. Although capital controls were not imposed, the administration’s threats to  block Chinese stock listings and exclude adversaries from SWIFT have fueled uncertainty over future access.

Trump’s use of executive authority to sanction foreign firms, freeze the central-bank assets of countries like Venezuela, demand a 15% cut of the revenues from sales of advanced microchips to China, and impose high import tariffs on longstanding allies has cast further doubt on US policy credibility. As a result, allies are exploring euro- or renminbi-based alternatives, and some central banks have begun diversifying away from dollar holdings toward gold and other assets, accelerating the dollar’s decline.

If doubts about the dollar’s long-term reliability are allowed to take hold, the reserve-currency realignment will be neither gradual nor orderly. The more probable outcome is financial panic, since expectations of currency shifts tend to be self-fulfilling. If investors expect the dollar to fall, they will sell dollar assets to avoid losses. This, in turn, will drive the dollar down, validating the initial fear.

The faster the dollar falls, the more urgently others will seek to exit their positions. Major central banks and pension funds could rapidly shift reserves into gold, euros, or renminbi, pushing up Treasury yields as buyers demand higher returns to offset increased risk. A falling greenback could also trigger margin calls on leveraged dollar trades, forcing funds and banks with significant exposure to liquidate other assets, spreading instability across global markets.

There Is No Alternative

If Trump continues to impose aggressive tariffs and seize foreign-held assets, rivals like the ten-member BRICS+ group of major emerging economies may openly abandon the dollar. This could set off massive foreign-exchange-reserve shifts and a global scramble for non-dollar safe havens.

Yet the alternative safe-haven bond markets – primarily Germany, Switzerland, and Japan – are far too small to absorb the enormous capital currently concentrated in dollar assets, particularly US Treasuries, which total $28 trillion, with about $8.5 trillion held by foreigners. The UK gilt market is similarly undersized.

In Europe, the absence of a fiscal union and a safe-asset equivalent to US Treasuries not only constrains the supply of Eurobonds but also undercuts eurozone cohesion. Meanwhile, China’s sovereign-bond market remains limited as a reserve haven because of capital controls, lack of full currency convertibility, political opacity, and weak legal protections.

To be sure, sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds – issued by institutions like the European Investment Bank, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Germany’s KfW – could gain some reserve status thanks to their reliability and multilateral backing. But that is more a long-term prospect than an immediate solution.

Large corporations with strong balance sheets, such as Apple or Microsoft, may serve as quasi-sovereign alternatives. But private credit carries substantial risk – especially in times of global financial stress – and cannot be a substitute for sovereign liquidity. Bitcoin and “digital gold” are viewed by some as hedges against fiat-currency risk, but their high volatility, along with regulatory uncertainty and scalability issues, prevent them from absorbing significant reserve flows.

Other options are equally limited. Central banks – particularly those of China, Russia, and Turkey – have been accumulating gold reserves, but the global supply of gold is finite. While special drawing rights (the International Monetary Fund’s reserve asset) could become more prominent if the dollar’s credibility collapses, SDRs are not market-traded assets, as their liquidity is centrally managed and politically contested. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), such as China’s e-CNY and the proposed digital euro, could eventually serve as channels for cross-border liquidity once they are interoperable and widely adopted. But that is unlikely in the short term.

In short, if confidence in the dollar as the world’s reserve currency begins to falter, the resulting realignment will likely resemble a frantic scramble for safety, with no true alternative readily available. Such a panic could fracture today’s integrated global financial system into regional or bloc-based networks.

This instability could be exacerbated by cryptocurrency markets, which operate with far less oversight than traditional financial markets and are set to be even less regulated under the current US administration. Most cryptocurrencies are far more volatile than fiat currencies or traditional safe assets, making them unsuitable as a stable store of value.

Deregulated cryptocurrency markets, particularly those built around stablecoins, pose growing systemic risks to US Treasury markets. Because stablecoins are typically pegged to the dollar, their issuers hold large reserves in short-term, highly liquid assets, primarily Treasuries and cash or cash equivalents. A sharp break from the dollar peg or a sudden loss of confidence in a major stablecoin could lead to a large-scale liquidation of Treasuries to meet redemption demands – a crypto version of a bank run. Such a sell-off could drain liquidity from Treasury markets, distort short-term yields, and cause spillovers into other asset classes, including mortgages and corporate bonds.

Moreover, cryptocurrencies – especially stablecoins and CBDCs – could challenge the US dollar’s dominance in global payment flows. If widely adopted, they would divert transaction volumes away from dollar-based systems such as correspondent banking and SWIFT. But without coordinated international regulation, crypto-based payment systems risk fragmenting financial oversight, obscuring capital flows, facilitating money laundering and terrorism financing, and restricting smaller economies’ ability to manage their monetary policies.

The growing use of cryptocurrencies in cross-border settlements could also increase exposure to cyberattacks and network disruptions. Their use for sanctions evasion, illicit transactions, and tax avoidance is already chipping away at the dollar’s role in the shadow-banking system, with profound implications for sanctions enforcement and economic stability.

The Costs of Fragmentation

As trade barriers rise and foreign-exchange volatility intensifies, financial flows, reserve holdings, payment systems, and capital markets are becoming increasingly confined to competing regional blocs. Financial fragmentation also impedes currency convertibility, disrupts SWIFT-style messaging systems, and complicates regulatory coordination. These frictions create exchange-rate mismatches, legal uncertainty, and delays in cross-border payments.

When commerce and finance are divided between spheres of interest, capital is allocated according to geopolitical loyalties rather than market fundamentals. The result is a disjointed global economy characterized by slower growth, reduced productivity, and higher capital costs – especially for non-aligned developing economies.

Meanwhile, fragmentation curtails the ability of global institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the Bank for International Settlements to maintain stability, coordinate crisis responses, and establish universal standards. As a result, more responsibility is being shifted to regional bodies like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

As countries redirect reserves toward regional alternatives, global liquidity could shrink while risk premiums surge. In this environment, competing blocs are more likely to adopt beggar-thy-neighbor policies, including competitive devaluations and export controls. Escalating rivalries over currency dominance, reserve status, and payment systems will increase the weaponization of financial tools like sanctions, capital controls, and reserve seizures, heightening the risk of instability and prolonged economic downturns.

It gets worse. As economic interdependence unravels, with deepening geopolitical divisions inevitably accelerating the creation of separate clearing systems, digital currencies, and regional trade systems, the loss of key restraints on armed conflict will increase the likelihood of military confrontation.

Given the stakes, framing the dollar’s decline merely as the end of America’s “exorbitant privilege” misses the larger story. The fate of the greenback is not a parochial American concern but a global problem. If a fragile yet manageable equilibrium underpinned by multilateral cooperation gives way to financial balkanization, the coming decades will be defined by economic conflict and the constant threat of all-out war.

Dennis Snower, Founding President of the Global Solutions Initiative and President Emeritus of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, is a visiting professor at University College London and a professorial research fellow at INET Oxford. He is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an international research fellow at Oxford University’s Said Business School, and a research associate at the Harvard Human Flourishing Program.