PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Veranito 2025

[cujo]

En el 69 todo dios era falangista , en el 82 todo el mundo era socialista.
España es así .
El psoe o la psoe es un artefacto de las clases medias caciquiles y del funcionariado.

[el malo]

Estaba leyendo la prensa esta mañana y me he encontrado con un artículo que me ha hecho reflexionar.

https://www.lavanguardia.com/local/paisvasco/20250811/10965934/intervenidos-13-kilos-picadura-tabaco-contrabando-bizkaia-seis-destinatarios-identificados-agenciaslv20250811.html

Un dispositivo de la Guardia Civil que ha acabado con 6 detenidos para incautarse nada menos que de 13 kilos de picadura de tabaco (tabaco de liar), que iba a ser distribuída muy probablemente para uso personal. En Andorra te puedes comprar una lata de medio kilo de picadura por menos de 70€ (PVP). Un dispositivo y 6 detenciones por mercancía por un valor de 1800€. Pero aaaamigo, con la AEAT hemos topado.

En España hay crímenes y crímenes. Matar a alguien puede costarte 5 años de cárcel, pero defaudar puede costarte 80 años (asesor de Ana Duato). Robar a tu vecino, o de las arcas públicas es un cachete. Robar (dejar de pagar) a la AEAT te cuesta la ruina. Si lo haces con premeditación y alevosía además te cuesta muchos años de cárcel. Para el Gobierno es menos malo matar que no pagar impuestos.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/352f58a4-ee6d-4cc4-bd3e-b0398abfb376

HSBC flags 73% of Hong Kong commercial property loans as risky

Prolonged slump in retail spending and sluggish office demand put Europe’s largest lender on notice




Almost three-quarters of HSBC’s Hong Kong commercial property loan book was flashing warning signs by the end of June, as a prolonged slump in retail spending and sluggish demand for office space weighed on Europe’s largest bank.

HSBC is Hong Kong’s largest lender and the territory is the single largest source of income for the bank by geography. HSBC has made $32bn of commercial real estate loans in the territory, out of a $234bn Hong Kong loanbook.

Hong Kong’s prime office rents have fallen more than 20 per cent since 2022, and vacancy rates are at record highs of about 19 per cent, according to commercial real estate group Cushman & Wakefield. 

The bank said the amount of Hong Kong commercial real estate loans marked as bearing increased credit risk had almost tripled since the start of the year, from $6.5bn to $18.1bn, after it updated an internal model that predicts the probability of a borrower defaulting.

Although loans at greater credit risk are still performing, those considered “impaired” also increased, from $4.5bn to $5.1bn.

“Banks are now more aggressive in clearing up their non-performing loans this year. [In the second] quarter, we [see] about half of the transactions are financially stressed,” said Reeves Yan, head of capital markets at CBRE.

The jump means that 73 per cent of HSBC’s Hong Kong commercial real estate loans are either impaired or marked as having increased credit risk, up from less than 30 per cent a year ago. HSBC put aside $1.1bn for expected credit losses in the second quarter, of which $400mn was for Hong Kong commercial real estate exposure.

“Clearly, there are a number of stressed real estate companies in Hong Kong . . . it is definitely flashing significant warning signs and has done so for a while,” said Michael Makdad, an Asian financial analyst at Morningstar.

Historic family conglomerate developers such as New World Development, which pulled off an $11bn refinancing at the end of June, have been the focus of much of the stress in the local real estate market.

Big developers have written down the value of their property portfolios by billions of dollars in recent years during a market downturn.

But much of HSBC’s pain is within Hang Seng Bank, its local Hong Kong lender, which analysts said had a higher proportion of loans to smaller real estate developers and players, some of which are now experiencing acute financial difficulties.



Hang Seng’s non-performing loan ratio stood at 6.7 per cent at the end of June, the highest it has ever been — including during the Asian financial crisis in 1999 — according to data compiled by Goldman Sachs.

Smaller Hong Kong developers have also been struggling under high debt and suppressed profits. A brief drop in the territory’s Hibor lending rate did not have a sustained benefit for real estate companies. 

“The problems are with smaller and medium-sized companies in the commercial real estate space, not the diversified groups,” said Gurpreet Singh Sahi, an analyst at Goldman Sachs.

Some analysts said there was evidence that Hong Kong, which has some of the world’s most expensive real estate, was seeing its property crisis bottom out with demand recovering, citing major office transactions, including by Jane Street and the Hong Kong Exchange.

In a statement to analysts last week, HSBC chief executive Georges Elhedery said the bank’s Hong Kong real estate clients were working “through some short-term challenges”.

“But in the medium to long term, we remain confident in the supply and demand dynamic in Hong Kong and the appeal of Hong Kong real estate at large and, therefore, remain constructive and optimistic.”

[muyuu]

En el 69 todo dios era falangista , en el 82 todo el mundo era socialista.
España es así .
El psoe o la psoe es un artefacto de las clases medias caciquiles y del funcionariado.

y ahora de extremo centro

[puede ser]

La división de Ucrania por líneas étnicas y culturales - lógico desde el punto de vista del abandono de la idea imperial y la construcción de un estado nación lo más homogéneo posible donde entren todos los territorios habitados por rusos, y aún falta el norte y parte de este de Kazajstan,

Bueno. Nacionalismo étnico, eh???

Y luego hablamos de fantasías hitlerianas...

La esencia de lo hitleriano era el exterminio de otros pueblos para ocupar su territorio por parte de una raza superior, lleva el nacionalismo a convertirse en algo distinto. Es puro imperialismo depredador, no diferente del del anglosajón en América del norte, por poner un ejemplo.

No hay nada de hitleriano en lo que planteo. Si quiere le concedo que puede parecer Volkischt, pero no más que la creación del estado turco con Kemal, o de Alemania e Italia, o de Polonia u otros tantos. Yo lo veo como la ultima fase de creación de un estado nación y de abandono de la idea imperial.

En mi opinión, el nacionalismo (sea étnico-cultural o de otro tipo) es basura ideológica. Históricamente, podríamos decir que en algunos casos acertó, pero por los motivos equivocados. Me refiero a si lo entendemos como una fuerza anti-imperialista y si consideramos que efectivamente ha contribuido históricamente a la desintegración de imperios depredadores y al fin del colonialismo.
El nacionalismo étnico-cultural es una basura tal que permite lecturas contrarias como son el pangermanismo y por otro lado la independencia bávara o austriaca, según el momento, el lugar y el contexto.
Sobre su papel como fuerza anti-imperialista (real y efectiva)...No sé, creo que habría que hacer un análisis muy detallado en cada caso y en cada proceso. El Imperio Austro-Húngaro se desmembró porque otros imperios se lo impusieron. El nacionalismo centrípeto italiano acabó con Italia queriendo generar su propio imperio (del alemán ni hablamos). La independencia de USA no creo que inicialmente fuese un movimiento nacionalista y por supuesto tenía poco de étnico-cultural, fue una revolución burguesa en una parte del territorio del imperio y algo parecido podríamos decir de las independencias de las colonias españolas en américa.
El fin del colonialismo europeo en el siglo XX se debió a la sustitución de unos imperios por otro, con otra forma de funcionar pero, al fin y al cabo, un imperio.

Al ajo. No creo que la integración de los estados de Rusia y Ucrania en la UE se pueda ver como un sueño hitleriano. De hecho Hitler no quería integrar nada. Para los nazis estaba Alemania (lo que ellos pensaban según su versión del nacionalísmo étnico-cultural) y el campo de las afueras hacia la derecha del mapa.
Fíjense si la UE es hitleriana que las adhesiones se hacen firmando un acuerdo internacional entre estados soberanos y hace poco uno de esos estados se salió del acuerdo porque soberanamente lo decidió.

Soy consciente de que hay gente a la que le revienta la UE y dice aquello de que es un error porque un Danés no tiene nada que ver con un Siciliano y que eso es contranatural y argumentos parecidos. Ellos están en el rollo étnico-cultural. Una gilipollez que lo mismo vale para decir que un catalán es lo suficientemente diferente de un fragatino y que por eso tiene que haber una frontera en el Cinca.
Sólo el derecho determina quién es español o ciudadano de la UE. Como si mañana integramos a Gabón, lo que significaría única y exclusivamente que las relaciones entre Gabón y los otros miembros están regidas por el acuerdo de adhesión.

Sé que en este foro hay gente a la que le va todo eso de los orígenes aristotélicos o cristianos de Europa . A mi el debate sobre el texto de la constitución europea sobre ese aspecto me parecía totalmente improductivo. Me gusta cómo quedó, sin ninguna referencia:

Artículo I-2

Valores de la Unión

La Unión se fundamenta en los valores de respeto de la dignidad humana, libertad, democracia, igualdad, Estado de Derecho y respeto de los derechos humanos, incluidos los derechos de las personas pertenecientes a minorías. Estos valores son comunes a los Estados miembros en una sociedad caracterizada por el pluralismo, la no discriminación, la tolerancia, la justicia, la solidaridad y la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres.

.

Y de ahí se deriva todo (bueno, no, porque la constitución no está ratificada).

No sé si alguien lo señaló ya, pero en la línea de lo que comentas me parecen altamente significativos los posicionamientos de la Iglesia Católica y del PP-VOX en el conflicto de Jumilla.
El catolicismo es universalista, con lo que entra en contradicción con teorías del Gran Reemplazo o alusivas a esencialismos "greco-romano-judaico-supremacistas"

[Derby]

https://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20250812/10968893/precio-alquileres-deja-emancipacion-juvenil-minimos-15-menores-30-anos-vive-fuera-hogar-familiar.html

En España
El precio de los alquileres deja la emancipación juvenil en mínimos: solo un 15% de menores de 30 años vive fuera del hogar familiar

Los jóvenes deben destinar más del 92% de su sueldo para alquilar solos y uno de cada cinco de los que trabajan está en riesgo de pobreza

Emanciparse nunca fue tarea fácil, pero para la mayoría de los jóvenes de hoy es una misión casi imposible. Con el precio medio del alquiler en máximos históricos (1.080 euros mensuales) y unos salarios que no crecen tanto, vivir solo supone tener que dedicar más del 92% del sueldo a pagar esa renta, y al menos el 35% si se opta por apañarse con una habitación en un piso compartido.

Pero es que, además, aunque el desempleo juvenil ha bajado al 19%, entre los menores de 25 años todavía es del 25%, y más de un tercio de los que trabajan compagina empleo con estudios, lo que repercute en sus ingresos. De hecho, uno de cada cinco jóvenes está en riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social a pesar estar trabajando.

Ese es el escenario que describe el último informe del Observatorio de Emancipación del Consejo de la Juventud en España (correspondiente al segundo semestre de 2024) y que explica, en gran medida, por qué sólo el 15,2% de los menores de 30 años vive fuera del hogar familiar.

Es el peor dato de emancipación para un segundo semestre desde que existen registros, y sitúa la tasa de emancipación 11 puntos porcentuales por debajo del máximo registrado antes de la gran recesión de 2008 y 3,5 puntos por debajo del nivel prepandemia.

Cabe pensar que una parte importante de esos jóvenes no se va de casa porque aún está estudiando y los mantienen sus padres, pero la tasa de emancipación apenas supera el 26% entre los que ya tienen empleo.

Comprar una vivienda exige dedicar el salario íntegro durante 14 años

Porque si los alquileres están caros, la compra de vivienda tampoco está a su alcance: tomando como referencia el precio medio de compraventa, un joven debería dedicar todo su salario durante 14 años para poder acceder a una propiedad.

Por eso, prácticamente seis de cada diez jóvenes emancipados son inquilinos, y prácticamente la mitad de ellos comparte piso. Sólo un 19,7% de los jóvenes emancipados vive solo.

De todos modos, el informe del Observatorio de Emancipación del Consejo de la Juventud en España también constata que ha diferencias significativas en función de la comunidad autónoma donde residen. A finales de 2024, la Comunidad de Madrid y Catalunya presentaban las tasas de emancipación juvenil más alta (17,9% y 17,6%, respectivamente) mientras que Castilla-La Mancha y Andalucía registraban las cifras más bajas (10,6% y 12%, respectivamente).

No obstante, si se compara con un año antes, Catalunya es, junto con las Islas Canarias, la comunidad donde más ha disminuido la emancipación juvenil.

Los jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan son menos del 3%, frente a más del 35% que compagina ambas cosas
Consejo de la Juventud de España

Los datos recabados por el Consejo de la Juventud de España desmontan también la imagen de una juventud pasiva, que ni estudia ni trabaja. “Menos del 3% de los jóvenes están en esa situación, frente a un 35,5% que compagina estudios y trabajo”, enfatizan el informe.

Desde el Consejo critican que las administraciones no hagan nada mientras los jóvenes ven como empeoran sus condiciones de vida, cómo unas pocas personas se lucran con el negocio de la vivienda mientras ellos no tienen acceso a ella, a un espacio mínimo y seguro para poder desarrollarse.

Y recuerdan el impacto que tiene para la salud mental, en términos de ansiedad, depresión y estrés, el vivir con la incertidumbre que conllevan los empleos precarios, las viviendas inadecuadas y el miedo a no llegar a fin de mes.

https://www.idescat.cat/dades/ep/ep2025s1ca.html

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-12/hong-kong-builder-parkview-seeks-loan-extension-as-talks-drag-on

Hong Kong Builder Parkview Seeks Loan Extension as Talks Drag On

Hong Kong developer Parkview Group Ltd. is seeking a three-month extension on a $940 million loan due Friday, in a bid to get more time to negotiate a refinancing deal with banks, according to people familiar with the situation.

The loan, backed by the Parkview Green complex in Beijing’s Chaoyang district, is set to mature on Aug. 15, the people said, asking not to be identified discussing private matters.

Parkview has been in refinancing talks with banks for months, Bloomberg has reported. However, the company still hasn’t secured sufficient support from banks, as worries grow over its liquidity, the people said.

The situation is becoming urgent because if Parkview doesn’t manage to finalize a deal or receive an extension before the loan matures, it risks a potential default, threatening the future of one of Beijing’s most iconic malls. The lengthy discussions with banks underscore the continued challenges facing China’s commercial real estate sector, as funding conditions tighten amid falling property values and dwindling cashflows. (...)

[Derby]

https://www.wsj.com/economy/the-u-s-marches-toward-state-capitalism-with-american-characteristics-f75cafa8

The U.S. Marches Toward State Capitalism With American Characteristics

President Trump is imitating Chinese Communist Party by extending political control ever deeper into economy


President Trump is seeking political control over agencies that have operated at arm’s length from the White House.

A generation ago conventional wisdom held that as China liberalized, its economy would come to resemble America’s. Instead, capitalism in America is starting to look like China.

Recent examples include President Trump’s demand that Intel’s chief executive resign; the 15% of certain chip sales to China that Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices will share with Washington; the “golden share” Washington will get in U.S. Steel as a condition of Nippon Steel’s takeover; and the $1.5 trillion of promised investment from trading partners Trump plans to personally direct.

This isn’t socialism, in which the state owns the means of production. It is more like state capitalism, a hybrid between socialism and capitalism in which the state guides the decisions of nominally private enterprises.

China calls its hybrid “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The U.S. hasn’t gone as far as China or even milder practitioners of state capitalism such as Russia, Brazil and, at times, France. So call this variant “state capitalism with American characteristics.” It is still a sea change from the free market ethos the U.S. once embodied.

How we learned to love state capitalism

We wouldn’t be dabbling with state capitalism if not for the public’s and both parties’ belief that free-market capitalism wasn’t working. That system encouraged profit-maximizing CEOs to move production abroad. The result was a shrunken manufacturing workforce, dependence on China for vital products such as critical minerals, and underinvestment in the industries of the future such as clean energy and semiconductors.

The federal government has often waded into the corporate world. It commandeered production during World War II and, under the Defense Production Act, emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic. It bailed out banks and car companies during the 2007-09 financial crisis. Those, however, were temporary expedients.

Former President Joe Biden went further, seeking to shape the actual structure of industry. His Inflation Reduction Act authorized $400 billion in clean-energy loans. The Chips and Science Act earmarked $39 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. Of that, $8.5 billion went to Intel, giving Trump leverage to demand the removal of its CEO over past ties to China. (Intel so far has refused.)


Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan

Biden overrode U.S. Steel’s management and shareholders to block Nippon Steel’s takeover, though his staff saw no national-security risk. Trump reversed that veto while extracting the “golden share” that he can use to influence the company’s decisions. In design and name it mimics the golden shares that private Chinese companies must issue to the CCP.

Biden officials had mulled a sovereign-wealth fund to finance strategically important but commercially risky projects such as in critical minerals, which China dominates. Last month, Trump’s
Department of Defense said it would take a 15% stake in MP Materials, a miner of critical minerals.
Many in the West admire China for its ability to turbocharge growth through massive feats of infrastructure building, scientific advance and promotion of favored industries. American efforts are often bogged down amid the checks, balances and compromises of pluralistic democracy.

In his forthcoming book, “Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future,” author Dan Wang writes: “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.”

To admirers, Trump’s appeal is his willingness to bulldoze those lawyerly obstacles. He has imposed tariffs on an array of countries and sectors, seizing authority that is supposed to belong to Congress.

He extracted $1.5 trillion in investment pledges from Japan, the European Union and South Korea that he claims he will personally direct, though no legal mechanism for doing so appears to exist. (Those pledges are already in dispute.)

Trouble with state capitalism

There are reasons state capitalism never caught on before. The state can’t allocate capital more efficiently than private markets. Distortions, waste and cronyism typically follow. Russia, Brazil and France have grown much more slowly than the U.S.

Chinese state capitalism isn’t the success story it seems. Barry Naughton of the University of California, San Diego has documented how China’s rapid growth since 1979 has come from market sources, not the state. As Chinese leader Xi Jinping has reimposed state control, growth has slowed.
China is awash with savings, but the state wastes much of it. From steel to vehicles, excess capacity leads to plummeting prices and profits.

The U.S. hasn’t fared any better. Interventions made in the name of national security or kick-starting infant industries lead to boondoggles like Foxconn’s promised factory in Wisconsin or Tesla’s solar-panel factory in Buffalo, N.Y.

State capitalism is an all-of-society affair in China, directed from Beijing via millions of cadres in local governments and company boardrooms. In the U.S., it consists largely of Oval Office announcements lacking any policy or institutional framework. “The core characteristic of China’s state capitalism is discipline, and Trump is the complete opposite of that,” Wang said in an interview.

Means of control

State capitalism is a means of political, not just economic, control. Xi ruthlessly deploys economic levers to crush any challenge to party primacy. In 2020, Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma, arguably the country’s most famous business leader, criticized Chinese regulators for stifling financial innovation. Retaliation was swift. Regulators canceled the initial public offering of Ma’s financial company, Ant Group, and eventually fined it $2.8 billion for anticompetitive behavior. Ma briefly disappeared from public view.


Ant Group founder Jack Ma

Trump has similarly deployed executive orders and regulatory powers against media companies, banks, law firms and other companies he believes oppose him, while rewarding executives who align themselves with his priorities.

In Trump’s first term, CEOs routinely spoke out when they disagreed with his policies such as on immigration and trade. Now, they shower him with donations and praise, or are mostly silent.

Trump is also seeking political control over agencies that have long operated at arm’s length from the White House, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Reserve. That, too, has echoes of China where the bureaucracy is fully subordinate to the ruling party.

Trump has long admired the control Xi exercises over his country, but there are, in theory, limits to how far he can emulate him.

American democracy constrains the state through an independent judiciary, free speech, due process and the diffusion of power among multiple levels and branches of government. How far state capitalism ultimately displaces free-market capitalism in the U.S. depends on how well those checks and balances hold up.


President Trump fired the head of the BLS, claiming manipulated jobs numbers after a report of slowed hiring. While revisions were more dramatic than usual, these numbers are always revised. WSJ explains.

[asustadísimos]

[He reeditado...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2628.msg247279#msg247279
... para añadir la definición académica de 'bono nocional' y para precisar otras cosas.
No es un comentario tan clarificador como el comentario...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2628.msg246587#msg246587
... pero es importante otra línea de trabajo, la de las moscas cojoneras del dinero y su trimurti: ladrillos, criptos y oro-papel.]

[newclo]

https://www.wsj.com/economy/the-u-s-marches-toward-state-capitalism-with-american-characteristics-f75cafa8

The U.S. Marches Toward State Capitalism With American Characteristics

President Trump is imitating Chinese Communist Party by extending political control ever deeper into economy


President Trump is seeking political control over agencies that have operated at arm’s length from the White House.

A generation ago conventional wisdom held that as China liberalized, its economy would come to resemble America’s. Instead, capitalism in America is starting to look like China.

Recent examples include President Trump’s demand that Intel’s chief executive resign; the 15% of certain chip sales to China that Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices will share with Washington; the “golden share” Washington will get in U.S. Steel as a condition of Nippon Steel’s takeover; and the $1.5 trillion of promised investment from trading partners Trump plans to personally direct.

This isn’t socialism, in which the state owns the means of production. It is more like state capitalism, a hybrid between socialism and capitalism in which the state guides the decisions of nominally private enterprises.

China calls its hybrid “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The U.S. hasn’t gone as far as China or even milder practitioners of state capitalism such as Russia, Brazil and, at times, France. So call this variant “state capitalism with American characteristics.” It is still a sea change from the free market ethos the U.S. once embodied.

How we learned to love state capitalism

We wouldn’t be dabbling with state capitalism if not for the public’s and both parties’ belief that free-market capitalism wasn’t working. That system encouraged profit-maximizing CEOs to move production abroad. The result was a shrunken manufacturing workforce, dependence on China for vital products such as critical minerals, and underinvestment in the industries of the future such as clean energy and semiconductors.

The federal government has often waded into the corporate world. It commandeered production during World War II and, under the Defense Production Act, emergencies such as the Covid-19 pandemic. It bailed out banks and car companies during the 2007-09 financial crisis. Those, however, were temporary expedients.

Former President Joe Biden went further, seeking to shape the actual structure of industry. His Inflation Reduction Act authorized $400 billion in clean-energy loans. The Chips and Science Act earmarked $39 billion in subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing. Of that, $8.5 billion went to Intel, giving Trump leverage to demand the removal of its CEO over past ties to China. (Intel so far has refused.)


Intel CEO Lip-Bu Tan

Biden overrode U.S. Steel’s management and shareholders to block Nippon Steel’s takeover, though his staff saw no national-security risk. Trump reversed that veto while extracting the “golden share” that he can use to influence the company’s decisions. In design and name it mimics the golden shares that private Chinese companies must issue to the CCP.

Biden officials had mulled a sovereign-wealth fund to finance strategically important but commercially risky projects such as in critical minerals, which China dominates. Last month, Trump’s
Department of Defense said it would take a 15% stake in MP Materials, a miner of critical minerals.
Many in the West admire China for its ability to turbocharge growth through massive feats of infrastructure building, scientific advance and promotion of favored industries. American efforts are often bogged down amid the checks, balances and compromises of pluralistic democracy.

In his forthcoming book, “Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future,” author Dan Wang writes: “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.”

To admirers, Trump’s appeal is his willingness to bulldoze those lawyerly obstacles. He has imposed tariffs on an array of countries and sectors, seizing authority that is supposed to belong to Congress.

He extracted $1.5 trillion in investment pledges from Japan, the European Union and South Korea that he claims he will personally direct, though no legal mechanism for doing so appears to exist. (Those pledges are already in dispute.)

Trouble with state capitalism

There are reasons state capitalism never caught on before. The state can’t allocate capital more efficiently than private markets. Distortions, waste and cronyism typically follow. Russia, Brazil and France have grown much more slowly than the U.S.

Chinese state capitalism isn’t the success story it seems. Barry Naughton of the University of California, San Diego has documented how China’s rapid growth since 1979 has come from market sources, not the state. As Chinese leader Xi Jinping has reimposed state control, growth has slowed.
China is awash with savings, but the state wastes much of it. From steel to vehicles, excess capacity leads to plummeting prices and profits.

The U.S. hasn’t fared any better. Interventions made in the name of national security or kick-starting infant industries lead to boondoggles like Foxconn’s promised factory in Wisconsin or Tesla’s solar-panel factory in Buffalo, N.Y.

State capitalism is an all-of-society affair in China, directed from Beijing via millions of cadres in local governments and company boardrooms. In the U.S., it consists largely of Oval Office announcements lacking any policy or institutional framework. “The core characteristic of China’s state capitalism is discipline, and Trump is the complete opposite of that,” Wang said in an interview.

Means of control

State capitalism is a means of political, not just economic, control. Xi ruthlessly deploys economic levers to crush any challenge to party primacy. In 2020, Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma, arguably the country’s most famous business leader, criticized Chinese regulators for stifling financial innovation. Retaliation was swift. Regulators canceled the initial public offering of Ma’s financial company, Ant Group, and eventually fined it $2.8 billion for anticompetitive behavior. Ma briefly disappeared from public view.


Ant Group founder Jack Ma

Trump has similarly deployed executive orders and regulatory powers against media companies, banks, law firms and other companies he believes oppose him, while rewarding executives who align themselves with his priorities.

In Trump’s first term, CEOs routinely spoke out when they disagreed with his policies such as on immigration and trade. Now, they shower him with donations and praise, or are mostly silent.

Trump is also seeking political control over agencies that have long operated at arm’s length from the White House, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Reserve. That, too, has echoes of China where the bureaucracy is fully subordinate to the ruling party.

Trump has long admired the control Xi exercises over his country, but there are, in theory, limits to how far he can emulate him.

American democracy constrains the state through an independent judiciary, free speech, due process and the diffusion of power among multiple levels and branches of government. How far state capitalism ultimately displaces free-market capitalism in the U.S. depends on how well those checks and balances hold up.


President Trump fired the head of the BLS, claiming manipulated jobs numbers after a report of slowed hiring. While revisions were more dramatic than usual, these numbers are always revised. WSJ explains.

Otra muesca en el revólver ?
El Capitalismo Centralizado (Planificado)

[asustadísimos]

[Acabo de añadir otra nota en...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2628.msg247279#msg247279
... sobre el pan de oro italiano.]

[newclo]

EL ORO-PAPEL NO ES ORO NI SIGNO QUE LO REPRESENTE.—

Si todos los inversores de oro-papel exigieran la entrega física de su 'oro', no habría suficiente oro físico para cumplir... ¡en toda la galaxia! Por cada onza de oro físico disponible se estima que hay más de 200 de oro-papel cotizado en mercados organizados.

El oro-papel son tiques variopintos impresos por entidades mercantiles privadas: ETF, opciones y futuros, derivados financieros complicados que también se liquidan por diferencias, acciones o participaciones o bonos de empresas mineras o de sociedades o fondos de inversión que, incluso, puede que no tengan nada que ver con el oro ni directa ni indirectamente.

Los tiques no tienen por qué obligar a nada a sus emisores.

Más aún, los emisores no tienen por qué tener ni un solo gramo de oro en su Activo, aunque sus oficinas estén decoradas con carteles del Krugerrand.

En España, un merchero chatarrero te puede crear una sociedad de capital sin Capital (sin Capital gracias a la reforma mercantil del PP, consentida por el PSOE); ponerle de nombre 'No Sé Qué Mierdrileña de Recuperación de Metales Nobles'; y al día siguiente montar un 'mercao' con 'certificados' de oro nocional* (sic, con o), y crear y publicitar en redes sociales un gráfico con la evolución de 'valor' de su oro-papel no cotizado, solo amparado por la hipotética obligación de contrapartida de la sociedad sin Capital emisora; y siempre habrá un 'influencer' dispuesto a subir un vídeo de YouTube entrevistándole en un decorado andorrano, con el titular «El oro es dios».

Ni que decir tiene que el comercio de estos tiques de humo da lugar a un jugoso negocio de comisiones y corretajes de emisores y gestores, con su característico laxismo angloléxico**.

Cuando los cripto-bro dicen eso de que «las criptos son el oro de internet o digital» (versión moderna del papel) tienen toda la razón, je, je.

Lo increíble del oro-papel es que, a la vista de los gráficos de cotización de estos tiques de humo, los 'ejpertos' sesudos —incluso orgánicos de los servicios de estudios públicos o semipúblicos— salen a escena y dicen, por ejemplo: «el oro está apreciándose porque los bancos centrales lo están atesorando dado lo conscientes que son de la basura que es su propio dinero». Y tú vas y te lo crees, y te despluman con el oro... o no, porque del daño al dinero se aprovechan todas las estafas.

Y como me dijo una vez un obeso mórbido: «El Ladrillo no es el rey; es el oro, que es transportable».
__
* DRAE: Bono nocional. Bono puramente teórico que se crea para servir como activo subyacente en futuros sobre tipos de interés.
** Actitud excesivamente permisiva hacia la incorporación o uso no crítico de vocabulario inglés (anglicismos) en otra lengua, incluso cuando existen equivalentes adecuados en el idioma original. Junto con el «odio al dinero» (para que tú te separes de él), constituyen las dos columnas de las retóricas engañosas de los timos y estafas.
*** A diferencia del pan de oro verdadero (de 22 o 24 quilates), está compuesto por aleaciones de metales comunes (cobre, zinc, estaño o aluminio); pero el acabado que se consigue es excelente, aunque hay pan de oro italiano de baja calidad y barnices adhesivos malos. Se vende en librillos de láminas separadas con papel de seda y su precio es 10 veces menos que el auténtico. Hasta el mejor pan de oro decae con el tiempo.
« última modificación: Hoy a las 14:26:15 por asustadísimos »

Buenas tardes

No recuerdo si este vídeo de Cava lo hemos compartido ya por aquí pero lo considero muy interesante, por si tienen tiempo e interés:

https://youtu.be/7mq-Iz67J1o

Recientemente también hablamos por el foro de ciertos vicios, que si hay más consumidores de coca de los que nos pensamos, que en realidad es más bien que el que se mete cree que el resto también lo hace...
Así, hablando entre colegas y sin que salga de aquí, sólo presuntamente....
Ustedes creen que Cava.... ?

... Aunque me interesan más sus opiniones sobre los temas del vídeo, eh ?

Salud !
y disfruten con sus seres queridos

[asustadísimos]

[La estafa de la agencia de viajes que, después de cobrarte, no puede devolverte nada porque «estoy intervenida por la T.I.A. (Mortadelo y Filemón)» funciona igual que la estafa de las criptos, incluso que el Ladrillo y el oro-papel.

Hay dos aspectos comunes interesantes, aparte de otros:
• el factor falsa iliquidez: «tu dinero está, solo que de momento no puedo liquidártelo»;
• el factor amenaza de judicialización: «te callas porque que, si no, querellazo por difamación o revelación de secretos».]

[Derby]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c24zzj0y3mmo

US inflation holds but underlying prices creep up

US inflation held steady in July as lower energy costs offset price rises for coffee and tools.

The latest official figures showed consumer prices rose 2.7% in the year to July but underlying figures - which are seen as a better indicator of economic trends - show that inflation ticked up to the highest level since February.

Investors are watching inflation data to see whether US tariffs on global imports are feeding through into prices.

The US Federal Reserve has, so far, held interest rates as it assesses whether inflation will rise because of the levies despite pressure by President Donald Trump to cut borrowing costs.

Underlying inflation, which strips out food and energy costs, rose by 3.1% which is the fastest pace in six months, according to Tuesday's data.

Other recent figures have suggested that the world's largest economy is starting to feel the hit from new taxes on imports, as households clamp down on spending and firms hesitate to hire in the face of the measures.

Seema Shah, chief global strategist at Principal Asset Management, said she still expected the Federal Reserve to lower borrowing costs in September to give the US economy a boost.

However, she warned the decision could grow more complicated in the months ahead.

"There is some sign of tariff pass through to consumer prices but, at this stage, it is not significant enough to ring alarm bells," she said.

"The concern for the Fed is that with inventory run-down, the tariff-induced boost to inflation is likely to grow over the coming months, meaning that inflationary pressures are likely to pick up just as the Fed starts to resume rate cuts."

[Hinel]

Recientemente también hablamos por el foro de ciertos vicios, que si hay más consumidores de coca de los que nos pensamos, que en realidad es más bien que el que se mete cree que el resto también lo hace...
Así, hablando entre colegas y sin que salga de aquí, sólo presuntamente....
Ustedes creen que Cava.... ?

... Aunque me interesan más sus opiniones sobre los temas del vídeo, eh ?

Salud !
y disfruten con sus seres queridos
[/quote]

Cava, es un antiguo predicador de otra época. Ahora, después de arruinarse, varias veces, parece que está teniendo repercusión en redes. Es de la época, de Antonio Saez del Castillo. Son gente que han pretendido venderse como especuladores en los mercados, pero que su negocio, siempre ha sido, vender cursos.
Respecto a su conocimiento de la realidad, ni caso. Son muy limitados. Saludos.