Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Otoño 2025

[sudden and sharp]

De moemnto... Cry freedom !



Marruecos




usa
















... Francia, a la hespera.   

[Flipback]

Te falta Tefal Nepal

[Derby]

https://archive.is/20251019121350/https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/features/2025-10-19/us-china-trade-war-xi-is-winning-against-trump#selection-1203.0-1203.53

At war. Photographer: Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

China Is Already Winning the Trade War America Wanted

Trump's “grand bargain” won’t happen at a time when tariffs and export controls have become combat by other means.

Historians may record these recent weeks as the moment when our new age of economic warfare got very real indeed. At the end of September, the US Department of Commerce announced a crackdown on provision of semiconductors and chipmaking equipment to subsidiaries of blacklisted Chinese companies. Beijing then went massive in its retaliation, unveiling export licensing requirements that weaponize China’s rare-earths dominance to an unprecedented degree.

China, wrote Dean Ball, who recently served in the Trump administration, had asserted “the power to forbid any country on Earth from participating in the modern economy,” because it had put their access to materials that underpin a wide array of strategic industries at risk. US President Donald Trump responded angrily, calling the restrictions a “moral disgrace” while also threatening China with new sanctions and heavy tariffs. If implemented, those measures would restore a de facto trade embargo between the two largest economies in the world.

To some degree, these moves are all part of the jockeying prior to the will-they-or-won’t-they summit meeting between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, which was originally scheduled for South Korea at the end of this month. Both sides have tried to salvage that summit, while mixing confrontational and conciliatory tones.

Trump, after all, has spent months searching for a big, beautiful trade deal. He says he only wants the best for China and his good friend Xi. But don’t let the attempts at summitry and deal-making obscure two harsher truths about the modern world.



First, the struggle to weaponize the global economy is rapidly escalating. For decades, China has been trying to rule key sectors and technologies. The US has, more recently, used export controls and other sanctions to protect its edge.

Yet China has now copied that playbook. It is wielding, with ruthless confidence, economic tools of real sophistication and destructive force. Welcome to an age in which vicious economic coercion, with serious national security implications, is a two-way street.

Second, there won’t be any transformative US-China bargain. History has been inhospitable to the quest for big deals that can cut through great-power rivalries. The search for an Anglo-German understanding in the early 20th century didn’t prevent the two empires from colliding on land and sea in World War I. It may actually have brought that war closer, by causing German officials to doubt the UK’s strategic will.

Likewise, the US-Soviet détente of the 1970s was initially heralded as the dawn of a new age of peace. Soon enough, it led back to a darker, more dangerous phase of the Cold War. Great-power contests are typically rooted in deep clashes of interest, rather than mere misunderstandings. Such is the case with the US-China competition today.

Sure, there will be summits, whether sooner or later. There could be deals that temporarily improve the relationship. But diplomacy between leaders won’t fundamentally change the trajectory of US-China ties, because the underlying tensions — over economic power, the future of the Western Pacific, the balance of global influence — are profound, and they are escalating. Diplomatic pleasantries aside, Xi understands this. Let’s hope Trump does, too.

How We Got Here

It's worth remembering how we got here: Trump originated the move toward a tougher China policy in his first term, which President Joe Biden carried forward in his four-year interregnum.

For a moment, it seemed that Trump was bent on intensifying the new cold war in his second term. Trump stocked his cabinet with so-called super-hawks like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz. The Pentagon completed an early defense review that was all about China’s threat to Taiwan and the Western Pacific. Most important, Trump threatened Beijing with tariffs — peaking well above 100% — while seeking to line up other countries for economic battle with Beijing.

Trump probably thought China, struggling with a soft economy, was weak. He encountered an adversary determined to show that it was strong.

Beijing punched back with retaliatory tariffs; it debuted new export controls restricting the flow of rare earths used to make everything from cell phones to missiles. Trump had initiated a showdown that threatened to empty US shelves and cripple US factories. He shifted into deal-making mode and has been there ever since.

Trade negotiators have met in London, Geneva, Stockholm and Madrid. Sky-high tariffs were paused and certain US tech restrictions lifted. American and Chinese officials have discussed everything from a relatively narrow deal that would allow TikTok to keep operating in the US, to broader agreements covering tariffs, export controls and other economic fundamentals.

Chinese officials hope, additionally, to secure cutbacks in US support for Taiwan; Trump has mused about ending the Ukraine war by convincing Xi to cut Moscow loose.

Hopes for a grand bargain are high among those who perpetually urge the US to quit competing with China. Harvard professor Graham Allison argues that Trump can seal a “great rebalancing” that turns a rivalry into a friendship. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang says the China hawk label has become a “badge of shame.”

Trump himself has alternated between threats to cancel the Korea summit and promises that “the U.S.A. wants to help China, not hurt it!!!” Xi has likened himself and Trump to captains of two great ships, who must take care to avoid a globe-shaking wreck.

Don’t take any of this conciliatory language too seriously. A summit would probably produce some splashy headlines. It could bring a momentary respite from the current tensions. But it wouldn’t halt the trend toward aggressive new forms of economic warfare or fix a relationship that is fundamentally competitive at its core.

Beijing’s Stranglehold Strategy Works

Economic strength is a taproot of national strength; the path to geopolitical supremacy runs through dominance in the key economic competencies of the age. So how could a rivalry between the reigning power and the chief revisionist power not become a clash for economic clout?



Beijing has long strived to make itself the world’s manufacturing powerhouse, with all the commercial and military heft that follows. Its “Made in China 2025” initiative, launched over a decade ago, aimed to build unassailable might in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and other high-tech industries. China has also helped itself to the fruits of foreign innovation through technology transfer, commercial espionage, intellectual property theft and other means, fair and foul.

“Under a situation of increasingly fierce international military competition, only the innovators win,” Xi declared. That struggle has gotten fiercer of late.

After trying for a quarter-century to tame China by pulling it into the global economy, the US has more recently tried to stanch its growing strength. In Trump’s first term, Washington hit Chinese goods with tariffs. It tried to derail Huawei’s drive for 5G dominance by constricting its access to high-end chips. Under Biden, the US dramatically broadened the technological assault.

In October 2022, the Biden administration announced sweeping export controls meant to keep Chinese firms from getting high-end chips or the inputs needed to make them. It experimented with curbs on US investment in China’s high-tech sectors. As I wrote then, this was a 21st century campaign of economic attrition. US sanctions were meant not to change China’s behavior, but simply to hold its technological innovation back.

Chinese officials understood this: According to former US officials, the tech squeeze was always near the top of Xi’s gripes in his meetings with Biden. But China wasn’t just complaining. It was assiduously working to circumvent US restrictions while developing, in Xi’s words, a “stranglehold” strategy of its own.

The White House Panics

Beijing patiently honed its economic pressure tactics, from blacklists and embargoes to investigations and opaque legal procedures. It also refined the legal and bureaucratic capabilities that would allow it to better exploit its dominance of rare-earth production — first wielded punitively against Japan in 2010 — and then deployed those capabilities as payback for Trump’s tariff onslaught this spring.

Those curbs worked better than almost anyone, in Beijing or Washington, had expected: They quickly threatened to hobble American car manufacturers and defense firms. Trump’s panicked climb-down gave China confidence that it owns escalation dominance, after years of being mostly on the defensive. Now Beijing has introduced new controls that are stunning in their scope.

The restrictions that Xi’s lieutenants recently announced require government permission to export not just rare earths but also products that contain even very small amounts of them. The restrictions would thus allow Beijing to crimp, even choke, the flow of critical products to countless industries, from advanced semiconductors to oil and gas production.

China dominates the supply chain because it accounts for about 70% of the world’s rare earth elements and about 90% of refining and processing: You just can’t make much without using something that contains Chinese rare earths.



Given how strict the requirements are, the only way that many firms will be able to navigate the licensing regime will be to turn over sensitive data about their operations. Economic coercion and an intelligence bonanza go hand in hand.

Imitation is flattery, and these new measures are a Chinese cousin to America’s own export controls. Yet they go significantly further, because they apply, potentially, to the whole world and can be used to throttle so many industries. China has issued its “declaration of economic war,” comments Matt Turpin, who worked for Trump’s first administration.

Xi probably doesn’t want uncontrolled escalation: He may simply have been trying to shock Washington into rolling back many of its existing tech restrictions. There remain questions about how effectively Beijing can implement such a draconian licensing regime; Chinese officials have subsequently said that most foreign buyers have nothing to fear. But if the details are murky, the message is unmistakable: China is bringing devastating firepower to the economic fight.

​There’s more of this ahead. Xi has said that he seeks to make China less dependent on the world, while exploiting technological chokepoints to make the world more dependent on China. His regime has a record of economically pummeling countries that earn its displeasure.

This month may offer a preview of an era in which China uses powerful, well-crafted tools to reshape global interdependence on its terms — just as it uses growing military strength to reshape the world’s most vital region.

High Winds and Rough Seas

“Don’t worry about China, it will all be fine,” Trump wrote on Truth Social on Oct. 12. It doesn’t seem that way in the Western Pacific.

There’s no hint of détente around Taiwan, where Beijing has made once-provocative measures the unnerving routine. Chinese forces periodically simulate blockades or quarantines. Chinese Coast Guard ships prowl the waters around Taiwan’s offshore islands; Chinese planes seek to exhaust Taiwan’s air defenses. Beijing has allegedly targeted fiber optic cables that link Taiwan to the world; shadowy cyberattacks, subversion and disinformation are rampant.

This war of nerves is meant to wear down Taiwan’s will, while also laying the groundwork for a real war, should Xi choose to fight it. And Taiwan isn’t the only danger spot.



On Oct. 13, a Chinese vessel rammed a ship from the Philippines near Thitu Island. That’s just the latest in a string of dangerous incidents that have occurred as Beijing pushes its neighbors around in the South China Sea. When and if China kills Filipino personnel in one of these encounters — it’s probably a matter of time — Washington will have to choose whether to back its treaty ally or let Beijing use calibrated violence to rewrite the region’s rules of the road.

Should war result, China is ready: That’s what Xi is telling the world. In September, he used a World War II anniversary parade to show off alliances with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, as well as new capabilities — antiship missiles, underwater drones, submarine-launched torpedoes — China might use in a Western Pacific clash. He also displayed new ballistic missiles and other nuclear capabilities that Beijing would use to try to dissuade Washington from even joining the fight.

China, Xi repeatedly says, must brace for “high winds” and “rough seas” — metaphors for crisis and conflict. Meanwhile, China’s campaign to displace US influence globally is reaching higher gear.

Beijing is debuting new aid and lending programs to exploit Trump’s pullback of foreign assistance. It is racing to shape global norms around the use and adoption of artificial intelligence. In September, Xi announced a Global Governance Initiative, meant as a vague alternative to Western leadership. He aims, as always, to drive wedges in US alliances in Europe and Asia.



A trade deal with Washington won’t slow Beijing’s military buildup or its drive for global influence. It certainly won’t halt a Chinese cyberoffensive that has racked up a record of ever-more alarming breaches. So perhaps those negotiations are merely intended to dull America’s competitive influence and blunt the US response.

A Great Wall of Steel

An attentive cynic might conclude that this is exactly what Xi thinks. Yes, he occasionally says reassuring things about US-China ties. But he has a long history of describing that relationship as fundamentally antagonistic and zero-sum.

China must strive for “a socialism that is superior to capitalism” and a future in which it will “have the dominant position,” he once remarked . In 2019, Xi argued that a vengeful America was subjecting China to a “new long march” — that is, a new struggle for supremacy and survival. At other points, he has said that the US is bent on containing and suppressing a rising China — and that Beijing’s enemies will have their “heads bashed bloody against a great wall of steel.”

The propaganda organs Xi controls make plain that China is bent on global primacy. One hawkish Chinese academic writes that an epochal power transition that will be “tumultuous, perhaps even violent” is underway.

None of this sounds like a formula for Sino-American stability. It sounds like a portent of trouble.

Indeed, the weaponization of the global economy is accelerating. Beijing is fighting its economic battles ever more aggressively, while building strength for a potential military collision. The underlying structure of Sino-American relations is getting terribly precarious. The question is whether Trump grasps this ugly truth.

There are encouraging signs: Investments in domestic rare-earths production, moves to accelerate America’s AI innovation, initiatives meant to light a strategic fire under allies and put the Pentagon on something closer to a war footing.

There are also more worrying indicators: Ill-timed trade fights with friends in Europe and Asia; a tendency to use export controls as bargaining chips rather than tools of strategic competition; a willingness to slow arms transfers to Taiwan to avoid angering Beijing; and an ambivalence about whether America should continue patrolling Eurasian hotspots or pull back to the Western Hemisphere.

Above all, there is the perpetual uncertainty that attaches to a president who understands, intuitively, the role that power and leverage play in securing decent outcomes — but also has a bad habit of hoping personal relationships can resolve geopolitical disputes.

If Trump uses his dealings with Xi to manage tensions in the short run, while preparing urgently for the future, he’ll be on the right track. If he really believes that personal diplomacy will make everything fine, then he, and America, will be in for nasty shocks.

[sudden and sharp]

Te falta Tefal Nepal

E Indonesia.



Que no se diga:








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Hay video: (descargable)   

https://www.tiktok.com/@ostincris12/video/7546223728774876433

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/opinion/noticias/13597246/10/25/urge-construir-mas-viviendas.html

https://www.eleconomista.es/vivienda-inmobiliario/noticias/13597391/10/25/la-construccion-pincha-las-viviendas-terminadas-bajan-el-114-y-agravan-la-falta-de-oferta.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/13597456/10/25/las-electricas-forzaran-al-gobierno-a-pronunciarse-sobre-el-futuro-de-almaraz.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/transportes-turismo/noticias/13596775/10/25/jose-antonio-santano-clavero-transportes-y-movilidad-sostenible-las-tasas-aeroportuarias-estan-entre-las-mas-competitivas-de-europa.html

https://www.eleconomista.es/transportes-turismo/noticias/13596606/10/25/el-cielo-unico-el-net-zero-y-los-precios-grandes-retos-en-pleno-record-de-viajeros.html

https://www.eleconomista.es/transportes-turismo/noticias/13597237/10/25/el-sector-aereo-aspira-a-liderar-en-europa-a-traves-de-la-digitalizacion-y-el-combustible-sostenible-saf.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/13596604/10/25/el-ejercito-de-eeuu-quiere-construir-reactores-nucleares-en-todas-sus-bases-militares-incluidas-las-instalaciones-de-rota-y-moron.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/branded-content/noticias/13591739/10/25/daniel-fernandez-salvador-director-general-de-grupo-retiro-vende-tu-casa-y-quedate-a-vivir-en-ella-para-siempre.html

Saludos.

[tomasjos]

Mientras tanto, Bernardos por fin dice lo que todos sabíamos por aquí, que esto es un desafío del Propietariado al Estado. Por ello debe ser aplastado sin miramientos, el Estado no puede ser desafiado por ningún particular o alianza de particulares y que semejante soberbia quede impune

Gonzalo Bernardos, economista, señala al "pánico de los propietarios" como la raíz de la crisis del alquiler https://share.google/CLSWFZ31tBPyAsHJC



Gonzalo Bernardos, economista, señala al "pánico de los propietarios" como la raíz de la crisis del alquiler
El experto en finanzas denuncia que la exigencia de ingresos de 2.000 euros por parte de muchos caseros está reduciendo la oferta de alquiler en ciudades como Madrid y Barcelona

17 OCT 2025 19:41
Actualizada 17 OCT 2025 19:53
Gonzalo Bernardos es un economista español, profesor universitario, consultor y analista habitual en diversos medios de comunicación. Es doctor en Economía por la Universidad de Barcelona (UB), donde ejerce como Profesor Titular en el Departamento de Teoría Económica.


El economista ha señalado el "pánico de los propietarios" como la causa principal de la crisis del alquiler en España. Según su análisis, el miedo de los propietarios a posibles impagos, la "inquilokupación" y la inseguridad jurídica está provocando que retiren sus inmuebles del mercado, reduciendo drásticamente la oferta de viviendas en alquiler y, en consecuencia, disparando los precios.

También se debe a la falta de oferta o a las altas exigencias de los propietarios. A diferencia de la percepción de que los precios suben por la alta demanda, Bernardos argumenta que el problema fundamental es la falta de oferta. El pánico de los dueños los lleva a no poner sus casas en el mercado de alquiler, lo que exacerba la escasez y encarece las viviendas disponibles.

"Hoy, en Barcelona y en Madrid te van a exigir que cobres como mínimo 2.000 euros para alquilar una vivienda", una barrera que excluye a amplios segmentos de la población y tensiona el acceso a la vivienda. Según Bernardos, esa exigencia no solo es el reflejo de la aversión al riesgo del propietario, sino también de la falta de políticas que reduzcan la incertidumbre jurídica y económica del arrendamiento.

Priorizar la compra de vivienda como ahorro
Bernardos completa su diagnóstico con recomendaciones concretas: aconseja a muchos ciudadanos que prioricen la compra de vivienda como ahorro de futuro, llegando a calificarla como un "mejor plan de pensiones" para ciertos perfiles, y advierte sobre prácticas especulativas como el fraccionamiento de pisos para invertir que, a su juicio, distorsionan el mercado.

Un problema multifactorial
Críticos y expertos recuerdan, no obstante, que las soluciones técnicas (más vivienda pública, incentivos fiscales para el alquiler estable, aumento de la oferta de vivienda protegida) requieren memoria política y recursos. La tesis de Bernardos —que la percepción de riesgo por parte del propietario es decisiva— aporta una pieza relevante al puzle, pero no agota las causas estructurales del problema: precio del suelo, fiscalidad, oferta de vivienda nueva y mercado laboral siguen siendo variables clave.



Por cierto, el señor " Hacer ....haga" coincide con mi planteamiento, por una vez

https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2025-10-20/aznar-entrevista-derecha-captura-inmigracion-discurso-xenofobo_4228793

[...]. ¿Le preocupa el creciente poder de los multimillonarios tecnológicos y su expulsión por participar en la política? Los Ford o los Rockefeller eran aprendices a su lado.
R. Para todo demócrata, para todo demócrata liberal, el control del poder es fundamental. Y, por lo tanto, nunca ha existido tanto poder concentrado en tan pocas manos sin que sepamos exactamente y seamos conscientes qué es lo que se hace con ello todos los días. La concentración de poder es brutal porque afecta a miles de millones de personas. ¿Qué es lo que quieren los gigantes tecnológicos que viven de los datos de las personas? Creo que los estados y los gobiernos deberían ser mucho más responsables. Si esos grupos y esas empresas llegan a ser más poderosos que los estados será muy peligroso para la libertad del ser humano. [...] 

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/retail-consumo/noticias/13595734/10/25/nestle-despedira-a-16000-empleados-pese-a-los-buenos-resultados-el-mundo-esta-cambiando.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/industria/noticias/13597311/10/25/santa-barbara-tiende-la-mano-a-indra-y-descarta-una-batalla-legal-contra-moncloa.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/mercados-cotizaciones/noticias/13596556/10/25/las-recompras-de-acciones-creceran-un-9-en-wall-street-a-pesar-de-que-el-sp-500-cotice-en-sus-maximos-historicos.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.eleconomista.es/mercados-cotizaciones/noticias/13595894/10/25/conclusiones-del-efimero-crash-en-las-criptomonedas.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://x.com/sninobecerra/status/1979200344333709357

https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/13596006/10/25/a-anos-luz-por-la-vivienda-la-brecha-de-riqueza-entre-baby-boomers-y-jovenes-se-multiplica-por-siete-en-20-anos.html

https://www.europapress.es/economia/laboral-00346/noticia-salarios-espana-creceran-media-35-tanto-ano-2026-michael-page-20251007110410.html

Saludos.