www.transicionestructural.NET es un nuevo foro, que a partir del 25/06/2012 se ha separado de su homónimo .COM. No se compartirán nuevos mensajes o usuarios a partir de dicho día.
4 Usuarios y 13 Visitantes están viendo este tema.
y que hasta los votantes de Vox
El suelo no es un bien cualquiera. Quien lo retiene para especular debería tener plazos claros: o lo desarrolla o lo pone en circulación. Sin expropiaciones épicas ni discursos inflamados. Mercado puro y duro. Subasta, competencia y grúas trabajando a toda velocidad.
Cita de: tomasjos en Hoy a las 09:10:44 y que hasta los votantes de Vox Es gracioso porque VOX no tuvo representación hasta 2018, y lo hizo en Andalucía, cuando miles de votantes de Podemos se pasaron a la formación verde.Porque los más interesados en sostener la burbuja son las clases trabajadoras y humildes, con TODOS sus ahorros metidos en vivienda, y fueron las grandes beneficiadas por la debt-propelled-economy (pisitófilos y creditófagos).Lo cual nos lleva a la pregunta clave: ¿a quien defiende la izquierda? ¿a quien tiene que defender? ¿incluso en contra de sí mismos?
Cita de: CHOSEN en Hoy a las 10:57:44Cita de: tomasjos en Hoy a las 09:10:44 y que hasta los votantes de Vox Es gracioso porque VOX no tuvo representación hasta 2018, y lo hizo en Andalucía, cuando miles de votantes de Podemos se pasaron a la formación verde.Porque los más interesados en sostener la burbuja son las clases trabajadoras y humildes, con TODOS sus ahorros metidos en vivienda, y fueron las grandes beneficiadas por la debt-propelled-economy (pisitófilos y creditófagos).Lo cual nos lleva a la pregunta clave: ¿a quien defiende la izquierda? ¿a quien tiene que defender? ¿incluso en contra de sí mismos?Hay que ser muy claros con ellos, decirles que tienen que perder mucho dinero ahora y volver a ser clase obrera, reclasandose, para no perderlo todo después
Cita de: tomasjos en Hoy a las 12:20:55Cita de: CHOSEN en Hoy a las 10:57:44Cita de: tomasjos en Hoy a las 09:10:44 y que hasta los votantes de Vox Es gracioso porque VOX no tuvo representación hasta 2018, y lo hizo en Andalucía, cuando miles de votantes de Podemos se pasaron a la formación verde.Porque los más interesados en sostener la burbuja son las clases trabajadoras y humildes, con TODOS sus ahorros metidos en vivienda, y fueron las grandes beneficiadas por la debt-propelled-economy (pisitófilos y creditófagos).Lo cual nos lleva a la pregunta clave: ¿a quien defiende la izquierda? ¿a quien tiene que defender? ¿incluso en contra de sí mismos?Hay que ser muy claros con ellos, decirles que tienen que perder mucho dinero ahora y volver a ser clase obrera, reclasandose, para no perderlo todo después¿tu-ta-loco, Bro? ¿estás perico, o qué?Que quieres, ¿terminar colgado de un gancho en la plaza de tu pueblo? Como le digas a las masas pisitófilas que tienen que perder mucho dinero , no vas a tener mundo para correr.
The Dollar’s Exorbitant Privilege Is on Borrowed TimeSooner or later, every wall falls. Scott Eells/Bloomberg via Getty ImagesJust how durable is the dollar’s preeminence, and how much would it matter if the currency was dethroned? Until recently, these questions could be confidently dismissed as theoretical curiosities: All very interesting, but the world economy has organized itself around the dollar for decades and, contrary to numerous failed predictions, this isn’t about to change.President Donald Trump’s all-fronts assault on business as usual in international relations has cast things in a different light. Sometimes, the unthinkable happens.The debate about dollar dominance turns on benefits, costs and incumbency. The currency’s standing grants the US a degree of control over the world’s financial systems. That control confers power, often deployed in the form of financial sanctions. It also lets dollar borrowers (not least, the hugely indebted US government) secure funds for less than they otherwise could. Against these advantages, high demand for dollar assets implies an overvalued currency and a consequent squeeze on the nation’s manufacturers.Most economists agree that this balance of costs and benefits favors the dominant dollar. The White House sees it differently: It thinks the US can keep the benefits while eliminating the costs. Stephen Miran, a White House adviser now serving as a policymaker at the Federal Reserve, has explained the thinking. The idea is to use trade barriers to promote US manufacturing, financial interventions to keep the dollar competitive, and non-economic tools (including threats to unwind alliances) to defend the dollar’s place in the global financial infrastructure.The notion that trade barriers will strengthen the economy is questionable, to put it mildly, but set that aside: Suppose for the sake of argument that a tariff-induced splintering of global trade can indeed revive US manufacturing jobs and boost the economy. Can this policy of deliberate trade fragmentation be squared, as the administration proposes, with defending the dollar’s preeminence?The answer turns on the causes of that preeminence — which brings us to inertia. The current system seems very well entrenched. Why is that? And what might it take to unsettle the status quo?Two books published this year delve into the history of the dominant dollar: Our Dollar, Your Problem by Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University, and King Dollar by Paul Blustein, a journalist who’s spent many years covering global finance. I highly recommend both — and given their contrasting approaches, they complement each other well. Rogoff blends economic analysis with memoir (he’s both a renowned scholar and, as a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, participated in some of the episodes he relates). Blustein, as usual, presents a crisp, thoroughly researched and highly readable narrative. When it comes to guessing what comes next, they end up in slightly different places.Both books were close to completed before Trump was re-elected. Each includes postscripts expressing concern about where a renewal of “America First” will lead — but the stunning pace and scale of the past year’s economic disruption surely took both authors, like almost everybody else, by surprise.As things stood at the turn of the year, Blustein was inclined to think dollar supremacy was secure. “[W]hether you approve of dollar dominance or not, doubts about its durability should be put to rest,” he wrote; its standing is “almost impregnable, and will remain so barring catastrophic missteps by the US government.” His detailed accounts of earlier failed ambitions to crown a new king are persuasive. But Rogoff was less sanguine, even before the new administration put its transgressive theory of dollar supremacy into effect.In fact, there’s more agreement here than disagreement. The dollar and, in its day, sterling have shown that once a global currency standard is established, it tends to stick. The US surpassed the UK as the world’s biggest economy in the late 19th century; only after 1945 did the dollar definitively replace sterling as the global reserve currency. At the same time, push a regime hard enough and it will give way. Nothing is forever.For a time, dollar dominance can persist even if the US becomes less dominant in other respects — that is, as an economic or military power. This is because a dominant currency is convenient. By making transactions easier, it delivers so-called network benefits, a source of mutual advantage. Countries that are denied the dollar’s so-called exorbitant privilege of cheaper borrowing still share in these other benefits. If the US manages its economy competently — letting its capital market work while avoiding high inflation and financial instability — everybody gains.These benefits don’t just anchor the standard, they are also self-reinforcing. If international traders buy or sell goods invoiced in dollars, they’re likely to keep dollar-denominated financial balances. Higher demand for dollar assets raises their price, hence lowering the rate of interest on dollar loans. But if it’s cheaper to borrow in dollars, traders will also prefer to invoice in dollars (it gives them greater certainty about future dollar revenues and lets them safely borrow more cheap dollars). Hence, the link between invoicing and flows of finance runs in both directions: More invoicing in dollars means cheaper borrowing in dollars, and cheaper borrowing in dollars means more invoicing in dollars.This circle, among other factors, is capable of entrenching a currency standard — but with sufficient provocation the mechanism can also work in reverse. Less invoicing in dollars due to trade fragmentation would erode the dollar’s cost-of-borrowing advantage, which in turn would reduce invoicing in dollars.Dollar dominance is also defended in other ways, as both authors explain, not least by the lack of plausible alternatives. The euro has been hobbled by the European Union’s sluggish growth, political dysfunction and failure to create a banking and capital-markets union; the renminbi, despite reforms, by government controls and institutional incapacity. Still, given deepening dissatisfaction with US economic leadership, renewed competition for currency dominance is plausible.The administration understands this danger and has moved to deflect it — for instance, by threatening retaliation against BRICS countries if they move ahead with (as yet unformed) plans to de-dollarize. Such moves might not be enough. Indeed, in the end coercion could be counter-productive — underlining the costs of relying on the US and reinforcing the idea that an alternative is needed. The administration’s aggressive tariffs, avid use of financial sanctions that rely on the dollar-payments infrastructure, and sheer unpredictability all push the same way, neutralizing the gains that former partners see in the current order and opening their minds to alternatives.The other big threat to the dollar’s standing is the perception that US dollar assets are no longer safe. Rogoff, a trenchant critic of fiscal excess, lays great emphasis on this point. The US has become addicted to over-borrowing, he argues, guided in part by the view, following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, that ultra-low interest rates are the new normal. American politicians aren’t even discussing ways to rein in a fiscal deficit that is historically enormous even with the economy close to full employment. The prospect of insupportable debt also raises the likelihood of higher inflation as a means of implicit default — a strategy that a no-longer-independent Federal Reserve might be called on to execute.None of this bolsters confidence in dollar dominance. If Blustein is looking for “catastrophic missteps,” these would seem to qualify. The endgame needn’t be sudden or dramatic. Even if no viable competitor currency emerges, financial fragmentation can accelerate. Rather than moving to a euro standard or a renminbi standard, still hard to imagine, the world might shift by degrees to no standard and/or rival standards. There needn’t be a regime-shifting crisis — yet the world would still have lost something valuable, and the US most of all.For the moment, investors are unperturbed. The thought might be, “This too shall pass.” Trump is an outlier, and the first year of his second term has been astonishing even by his standards. He surely can’t keep this up; in due course, politics will move on and normality will resume. Maybe so. If it doesn’t, the end of King Dollar might not be our biggest problem.