PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[tomasjos]

Parece que Estados Unidos ha desembarcado fuerzas especiales en Caracas.

Lo peor de todo esto es que van a quitar a Maduro no por narco y dictador, sino por el petróleo de Venezuela - cosa que Trump ha dicho explícitamente- colocando a Machado como jefa del chiringuito para garantizar el control del país.

Quiero pensar que habrá un pacto con China y Rusia bajo la mesa, porque si no no se habría atrevido.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/079f2014-ed56-4137-89ee-561d7a8226cf

Why China is doubling down on its export-led growth model

The country plans to reinforce its dominance of global manufacturing, despite persistent deflation at home and rising tensions abroad


© FT montage/Reuters

At a recent high-level government conference in Beijing, senior officials basked in China’s success the past year in its trade war with Donald Trump, boasting that the country’s system of state-directed planning was superior to unfettered US-style capitalism.

“Our five-year planning system ensures policy consistency and continuity — something western politicians can never achieve given their constant changes of government,” one senior cadre told the gathering of about 200 people in a central Beijing hotel.

For Beijing, the tariff war is the clearest evidence yet that President Xi Jinping’s strategy of investing heavily in high-tech production and industrial self-reliance is paying off, despite persistent deflation at home and growing complaints from abroad about soaring Chinese trade surpluses. 

Trump’s attempt to unilaterally impose tariffs on Chinese goods last year ended with him being forced to agree to a one-year trade truce with Xi at a summit in South Korea during October. 

The stand-off, during which China threatened to block US access to the rare earth metals vital to many advanced manufacturing processes, demonstrated for the first time Beijing’s ability to stop even Washington from decisively closing its markets against Chinese-made products.

Analysts say it will embolden China to push ahead with its export-led growth model and compete with the US for 21st century technological and economic supremacy. Beijing’s new 15th five-year plan for 2026-2030, due for release in March, envisages China not only dominating legacy industries such as steel making or toy manufacturing but also future technologies, such as robotics and artificial intelligence.



“This is a zero-sum game,” says Joerg Wuttke, a partner at consultancy DGA Group and former European Union Chamber of Commerce in China president. Based on the five-year plan goals, he predicts China could raise its global share of manufacturing from about 30 per cent to 40 per cent. 

“They’re telling other countries, don’t mess with us, don’t compete with us, you can’t beat us,” he says.

But even as China touts its domination of global manufacturing — trade figures released in December show it is set for its first surplus in goods of more than $1tn in 2025 — vulnerabilities are building in its domestic economy.

A prolonged property market slowdown has undermined local government finances, household sentiment and domestic demand, leading to deflation and falling wages. Policymakers are trying to balance keeping the country’s export machine running while issuing ever more debt to prop up the weakening domestic economy.

“In the past few years, it’s been the property sector dragging down the economy,” says Hui Shan, chief China economist at Goldman Sachs. “At this juncture, I think the economy is now dragging down property.”

The IMF’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, said in Beijing in December that China needs “more forceful measures to be implemented with greater urgency”, urging it to fix its “imbalances” in its economy. Such a large country cannot survive on exports alone, she added.

“Boosting consumption would unlock . . . a more durable source of growth.”

At the Communist party’s Central Economic Work Conference in December, the meeting that sets priorities for the following year, Xi and other senior leaders celebrated China’s “significant enhancement of its hard power” over the past five years, according to state media.

Three years after China’s economy emerged from its strict Covid controls, its global export market share has risen to 15 per cent, up from about 13 per cent in 2017, and is set to rise to 16.5 per cent by 2030, according to a study led by Chetan Ahya, chief Asia economist at Morgan Stanley. China’s share of global manufacturing value added has risen to 28 per cent.

Its trade goods surplus with the US had fallen to $239bn as of September 2025 on a 12-month trailing basis from a peak of $418bn in December 2018, according to US Census Bureau data — though much of the difference is thought to have been products redirected to the US through other countries, such as Vietnam and Mexico.



Ahya attributes part of China’s latest export success to its state-led model, which pushes investment into emerging sectors such as green energy, “even if ahead of [its] time”. China backs its bets with direct state investment in infrastructure and manufacturing, state bank lending, tax incentives and subsidies.

Other economists say the whole society is geared towards production — from the financial and education systems down to rules governing residency that create a huge pool of cheap migrant labour.  

China’s strategy is to reduce its own dependence on other countries while increasing their reliance on its supply chains, analysts say. The next five-year plan should call for “substantial improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance”, according to recommendations from the Communist party’s Central Committee.

The aim of the leadership is to build “an economic fortress”, says one government adviser in Beijing, achieving self-reliance in everything from food to tech but keeping trade open for Chinese exports and to absorb foreign technology. It also plans to fortify its export machine by setting up factories in other countries, allowing it to circumvent tariffs and further embedding Chinese companies into global supply chains, and trading in intermediate goods. 

“In countries such as Vietnam and across south-east Asia, many primary goods are exported from China as intermediate products, processed locally, and then re-exported under foreign brands — forming a new and increasingly important trade pattern,” said the senior government official at the conference in Beijing.



In the meantime, China would welcome foreign investment into its domestic market, the official said, provided it fostered “advanced manufacturing, modern services, high-tech industries and sectors related to energy conservation and carbon reduction”.

The days of US, European and Japanese manufacturers using China as a cheap assembly line are ending. Many such companies report a growing sense that they are unwelcome in China unless they bring superior or new technology. 

A recent report from the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, “Dealing With Supply Chain Dependencies”, stated that “European companies in some strategic sectors are being pushed out, due to regulatory barriers or formidable competition that has benefited from China’s industrial policies.”

During a recent visit to Beijing, one senior European businessman says he was shocked by the reception he received at one of the ministries. Previously welcomed as a valued foreign investor, he said a senior figure at the ministry treated him like a diplomatic adversary and accused Europe of being an unreliable partner.

Others told him the Europeans should stop fixating on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and human rights. “We like Donald Trump,” another official told him. “Why? Because he doesn’t talk about Ukraine and human rights. We can make deals with him.”

Europe is China’s biggest export market after south-east Asia, but Beijing’s success in the trade war with Trump has made it more dismissive of all-comers, the person says.

“China is single-handedly focused on the United States,” the person says. “They think that if they can handle Trump, they can handle Europe easily.” He adds: “The Chinese believe that ‘we can always deal with Europe on our terms. And if it’s not on our terms, we don’t talk to them’.”

Yet for Europe and China’s other large trading partners, the country’s increasing trade imbalances are becoming, in the words of French President Emmanuel Macron, “unbearable”. 

In an article in the FT last month, Macron called on China to “address its internal imbalances” or “Europe will have no choice but to adopt more protectionist measures”. Its goods surplus with the EU last year was €305.8bn, compared with €297bn in 2023 and a record €397bn in 2022.

Aside from China’s industrial policies and barriers to entry, a further problem for its trading partners is its currency. The renminbi depreciated by about 8 per cent against the euro during 2025 in nominal terms, and economists estimate that the real effective exchange rate — a weighted average against a broader basket of currencies — has fallen 18 per cent from its peak in March 2022.



This real depreciation is being driven by China’s persistent deflationary pressures. Producer prices have declined every month for more than three years as supply outstrips domestic demand in almost all sectors.

The decline in prices also masks an increase in the volume of China’s exports, which has increased its global market share. “In real terms, the increase in that gap between exports and imports has been larger than in nominal terms,” says Louis Kuijs, chief economist of Asia Pacific at S&P Global Ratings, who estimates that China’s goods export volumes have risen 43 per cent since early 2020 but imports of goods have risen just 15 per cent.

China’s real exchange rate is likely to continue falling over the next two to three years, given Beijing’s limited efforts to combat domestic deflation, according to New York-based Rhodium Group.

“A weak renminbi, persistent deflation and excess capacity in China will . . . steadily erode the bite of conventional trade defence tools,” Rhodium said in a December report on the outlook for the renminbi. “That leaves European policymakers with hard choices: either accept ever-growing exports from China . . . or move towards structural action that restricts trade.”

But for China’s trading partners, using tariffs or other steps to counter its surpluses is bound to meet with stiff resistance — as Trump discovered. 

“Other countries will find it increasingly difficult to impose tariffs on China because . . . the supply chain leverage that China has is indeed quite powerful,” says Goldman’s Shan.

China’s control of rare earths — it accounts for 90 per cent of global refining capacity — is mirrored across several other industries, such as batteries for electric vehicles and drones and the refining of the lithium and cobalt that goes into them, says Eddie Fishman, author of Chokepoints. 

“We saw earlier this year, even if big US tariffs might be able to inflict pain on China, you can’t do it without causing a recession at home,” Fishman says.

One of China’s most striking supply chain chokeholds from a western perspective, he says, are active pharmaceutical ingredients used to make medicines. In some, he estimates that China has 80 per cent market share.  

As China moves up the value chain, dominating the technologies of tomorrow such as electric vehicles, the US and other countries are becoming more vulnerable, he adds. 

Even in semiconductors, while the US retains a technological edge, China’s strong position in legacy chips was shown during the recent dispute at Nexperia. When the Dutch government seized temporary control of the Netherlands-based but Chinese-owned company, Beijing responded by blocking Nexperia’s exports.

The US has its own leverage, such as its control of the global financial system through the dollar, but Donald Trump’s threats to the institutional independence of the Federal Reserve and China’s own efforts to internationalise its payments system and diversify its reserves risk eroding that. 

“I think if China is allowed to persist with this economic model . . . and the west doesn’t respond with anything besides hoping that market forces sort it out, then yes, China is going to seize more chokepoints over time,” says Fishman. 

China’s trading partners among emerging economies are especially vulnerable to this kind of coercion, economists say. Developing countries need Chinese inputs for their own manufacturing sectors, but are at risk of losing their industry because of cheap imports. 

“Chinese mercantilism is at least as big a threat, if not much bigger, to the prospects of emerging countries as American tariffs are,” says George Magnus, research associate at Oxford university’s China Centre and former chief economist of UBS.

A thousand kilometres from Beijing, in China’s ancient capital Xi’an, Chen does not share the confidence of the party’s economic cadres.

“It was better in previous years,” says the food stall owner, who declined to give his full name, as he looks out at the throngs of tourists passing through the vast Grand Tang Dynasty Everbright City shopping district. “Sales began to decline [in 2024] and have not been good [in 2025].”

The buildings here are modelled on those of the dynasty that ruled China from the 7th to the 10th century, and many tourists rent period costumes to pose for photos. But there are few other signs they are spending money.

Since last year, President Xi has increasingly emphasised the importance of domestic demand for the economy, with the party’s magazine Qiushi releasing a collection of his past speeches on the subject in December.

The party has announced birth subsidies, lifted restrictions on real estate prices and, in a bid to tackle deflation, launched a campaign against “involution”, seeking to stop companies engaging in destructive price competition.



But the party’s piecemeal moves have failed to decisively lift sentiment or reflate the economy. Retail sales expanded 1.3 per cent in November against a year earlier, the slowest pace of growth since December 2022, when China lifted its Covid restrictions. Property prices and investment have plunged. While a large part of the investment fall could be due to statistical issues, analysts believe at least some of it is real. 

The faltering domestic economy, weakened by a property slump that started in 2021 when Beijing sought to deleverage the sector, is the alter ego of China’s export boom. Deflation makes China’s goods more competitive on international markets, but at home it erodes corporate profitability and increases debt relative to profit or revenues. Private sector economists have warned for years about the limits of China’s export and investment-led growth model, but now even some government advisers are chiming in. 

At the conference in Beijing, a government adviser from a prominent state think-tank pointed out that China’s GDP deflator, the widest measure of prices in the economy, had been negative for a record 10 consecutive quarters, surpassing the seven-quarter record set during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.

“Persistent price declines create a disconnect between the data and how the economy feels, since they affect both household incomes and corporate profits,” the adviser said. “Falling prices not only distort perceptions but also dampen expectations, making it harder to boost consumption or drive investment.”

To boost domestic demand, the adviser argued, China should increase the share of fiscal spending devoted to public services such as education, childcare, healthcare and social security — measures that would indirectly lift household purchasing power. The greater potential, he added, lies in services rather than goods.

Goldman’s Shan says tackling the root macroeconomic causes of the domestic slowdown, such as the property slump, would be the best way of reflating the economy.

For now, however, there is no end in sight for Xi’s supply-side driven economic path. A large-scale domestic stimulus targeting household incomes would mean directing funds away from the investment and high-tech manufacturing-led model, which was still favoured by policymakers. 

“Policymakers think of it [the supply-driven model] as a success, not a failure,” says Shan. “And with the rare earth leverage helping China to manage trade tensions, it’s going to extend the runway for China’s exports too.”

[Derby]

https://www.benzinga.com/m-a/26/01/49679742/trump-blocks-2-9-million-hiefo-emcore-chip-deal-over-china-linked-national-security-concerns

Trump Blocks $2.9 Million HieFo-Emcore Chip Deal Over China-Linked National Security Concerns

President Donald Trump signed an executive order on Friday blocking a semiconductor deal between HieFo Corp. and Emcore Corp., citing national security concerns related to China.

Trump said there is “credible evidence” that “HieFo Corporation, a company organized under the laws of Delaware (HieFo) and controlled by a citizen of the People's Republic of China…might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”

In 2024, the companies announced that they had completed a deal to sell New Jersey-based Emcore’s chips business and indium phosphide wafer fabrication operations for about $2.9 million.

Additionally, the executive order mandates that HieFo divest all interests and rights in the Emcore assets within 180 days.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) will oversee enforcement, ensuring compliance with the national security directive.

Trump’s move is the latest aimed at cracking down on Chinese access to advanced semiconductor technologies. Last month, his administration announced plans to impose tariffs on Chinese semiconductor imports in June 2027.

In 2017, CFIUS recommended blocking several acquisitions, including Oregon-based Lattice Semiconductor (NASDAQ:LSCC), citing similar national security concerns, showing that executive intervention in foreign corporate deals has long been part of U.S. policy to protect critical technologies.

U.S. Counters China’s Tech Reach

Trump’s recent move adds to a series of actions taken by the U.S. government to counter China’s technological advancements.

In September 2025, Trump extended the deadline for TikTok‘s divestment from Chinese parent company ByteDance, following discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Meanwhile, U.S. lawmakers have pushed for legislation to prevent the Trump administration from granting China broader access to advanced artificial intelligence chips from companies such as Nvidia Corp (NASDAQ:NVDA) and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc (NASDAQ:AMD) for the next 2.5 years.

Trump’s decision to block the HieFo-Emcore deal is the latest in a series of actions aimed at maintaining U.S. technological superiority and countering China’s growing influence in the global tech industry.

[Derby]

https://www.baha.com/Trump-Maduro-captured-in-large-scale-strike-on-Venezuela/news/details/65419666

Trump: Maduro captured in large-scale strike on Venezuela

US President Donald Trump announced Saturday that the United States had executed a "large-scale" military operation against Venezuela, claiming that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife had been captured and flown out of the country.

"The United States of America has successfully carried out a large-scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolás Maduro, who has been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the country," Trump wrote in a post on Truth Social.

He added that more details would be provided at a news conference scheduled for 11:00 am at Mar-a-Lago. The announcement follows a morning of explosions and reports of US military activity in Caracas, where airstrikes and the presence of troops were reported.

[Fomento Cemento]

Pues parece que le han trincado:

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/2097d5e6-5e59-4af8-bcda-3707d8e9f9ef

How the UAE-Saudi Arabia alliance ruptured

Relationship between the Gulf’s heavyweights has developed into open confrontation


MBS, left, and MBZ © FT montage/APAimages/Reuters/AFP/Getty Images

It was a covert military shipment docking at a Yemeni port that finally brought simmering tensions between Gulf heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dramatically into the open.

Riyadh had for weeks been unsuccessfully using diplomatic channels to pressure a UAE-backed Yemeni faction to withdraw from provinces it had seized next to the Saudi border in December. Now, Saudi Arabia alleged, the UAE was shipping weapons and armoured vehicles to the group, the separatist Southern Transitional Council.

Riyadh was infuriated. It bombed the shipment, publicly accused the UAE of supporting the Yemeni faction’s offensive and called for Abu Dhabi to pull its remaining troops from the war-torn state. The UAE rejected the Saudi allegations but said it would withdraw its forces as it sought to de-escalate the crisis.

The extraordinary escalation plunged the Saudi-backed Yemeni government into chaos. But its repercussions could be felt far wider, pitting important US allies, big trading partners and the Arab world’s two most influential leaders against each other: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, or MBZ.

“It’s worrying because it compromises efforts to address every point of tension in the region — Yemen, Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan,” said Dan Shapiro, a former US diplomat now at the Atlantic Council. “Each of those will be harder to solve if Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not on the same page and see their interests in conflict.”


Damaged military vehicles after an air strike carried out by the Saudi-led coalition in the port of Mukalla, Yemen © AFP via Getty Images

A decade ago, the two Gulf states’ long alliance seemed destined for an energising new chapter between ambitious leaders.

MBZ, who at 64 is more than two decades older than MBS, was an early backer of his Saudi counterpart’s drive to modernise and promote a more moderate version of Islam in the deeply conservative kingdom.

The UAE had long profited from acting as a base for foreign companies doing business in Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil exporter and the Gulf’s largest economy. But Abu Dhabi was wary of the social and political risks of the conservative nation on its doorstep stagnating. Attempts at reform were welcomed.

As their relationship blossomed, MBZ promoted MBS and his plans in Washington. Some analysts suggested the older, more experienced Emirati acted as the millennial prince’s mentor — a characterisation dismissed in Riyadh.

In the region, they joined forces to assert power: the UAE was Riyadh’s main partner when MBS led a coalition to intervene against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen’s civil war in 2015. They also spearheaded a regional embargo imposed on Qatar in 2017 — which triggered the last Gulf crisis.


Some analysts suggest MBZ, the UAE president, right, acted as a mentor for the Saudi crown prince MBS, left, — a characterisation dismissed in Riyadh © Bandar Algaloud/Saudi Kingdom Council/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

But as MBS became more confident and consolidated his power, he sought to propel his nation into what he believed was its rightful role on the global stage — and friction between the two assertive, absolute monarchies resurfaced.

“Each saw itself as the natural leader: Saudi believes its size and symbolic power should prevail, while the UAE believes its trailblazing power is more in sync with global dynamics,” said Emile Hokayem at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Under MBZ, the UAE used its financial clout and relationships in the west to become arguably the most influential Arab state, despite its small size. After the 2011 popular uprisings threatened the status quo in the Middle East, the UAE became the most assertive regional actor as it sought to push back against Islamist movements and shape the region in its vision.

Hokayem said Saudi Arabia and the smaller, agile UAE “have very different risk profiles, domestically and globally, and different views of how the region should be structured”.

Tensions first surfaced in Yemen in 2019 when the UAE shifted policy and announced it would withdraw its troops, which were the Saudi-led coalition’s main foreign force on the ground. The same year, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government accused the UAE of bombing its forces as the Gulf states backed competing anti-Houthi factions.


UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council fighters in Yemen in 2019. Tensions surfaced between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in 2019 when Abu Dhabi said it would withdraw troops from Yemen © Nabil Hasan/AFP/Getty Images

Economic rivalry also intensified, reaching a high in 2021 when MBS launched a campaign to coerce multinationals to move their regional headquarters from the UAE to Riyadh. Corporates were given three years to make the move or risk losing out on lucrative government contracts. Emiratis viewed the move as a direct challenge to Dubai’s role as the region’s leading finance hub.

Differences have also festered over Syria, the Sudanese civil war and crude production quotas determined by Opec+ — the oil cartel of which Saudi Arabia is the de facto leader.

As tensions ebbed and flowed, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the UAE’s national security adviser and MBZ’s brother, would be dispatched to Riyadh to smooth over their differences.

Considered less ideological than MBZ, Sheikh Tahnoon has good relations with the Saudis. But as the gaps between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi widened and the power dynamics shifted, his task became harder, a former US official said.

“Tahnoon used to go regularly to Saudi Arabia to tend the grass, and the worse things were, the longer he would stay,” the former official said. “Now MBS is king in all but name, it’s affected Tahnoon’s ability to do his relationship mending.”

Analysts say the Gulf states still have more in common than not, and both sides talk of their “brotherly” neighbours. But in recent months, the war in Sudan has put them at odds.


The UAE’s national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan, left, and MBS in Riyadh in September 2025 © Al Askar/UAE Presidential Court/Reuters

Both had backed the Sudanese military leadership that took over after Omar al-Bashir was ousted in 2019. But when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group turned their guns on each other, differences emerged between the Gulf nations.

Riyadh is closer to the SAF, which it sees as representing the state, but the UAE thinks it is infiltrated by Islamists. Abu Dhabi is alleged to have instead supplied weapons to the RSF, which has faced accusations of genocide. The UAE denies arming the militia.

MBS voiced his concerns about the Sudan conflict and the RSF with Donald Trump during a White House visit in November.

Soon after the Trump-MBS meeting, the latest Yemen crisis erupted. In December, the UAE-backed STC faction — which is ostensibly part of the Yemeni government — seized control of the two provinces by Saudi borders, Hadhramaut and al-Mahra.

Riyadh believes Abu Dhabi wrongly thought that MBS raised the issue with the US president of sanctioning the UAE over its alleged support for the RSF — and then greenlit the STC’s advance out of anger with the kingdom.

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, an Emirati academic, said linking the events in Yemen to differences over Sudan was “wild analysis”.



The conflict in Yemen had stagnated after Riyadh agreed to a truce with the Houthis in 2022 and sought to extract itself from the war, with MBS focusing on his domestic agenda.

But the separatist offensive dealt a severe blow to Saudi Arabia’s influence, as well as the Yemeni government it backs. And, in Riyadh’s thinking, it impinged on its national security.

“Yemen is Saudi Arabia’s backyard,” said Firas Maksad, managing director for the Middle East and north Africa at Eurasia Group. “The offensive launched by UAE-backed forces . . . crossed Saudi redlines.”

Maksad said Abu Dhabi’s decision to withdraw its remaining forces provided an “off-ramp from what otherwise would be a head-on collision with significant fallout”.

However, the risk, Maksad said, was that the crisis “could transform Saudi-UAE geopolitical competition to a personal showdown between the region’s leading strongmen”.

[CHOSEN]

EEUU metido hasta las trancas en Ucrania, en Taiwán, ahora en Venezuela, además de Libia, Irak y Siria, y a punto de entrar en Irán para avanzar en el gran Israel.
A ver si resulta que al final el tigre no era de papel. 
Tenemos que invitarlos a Eurovisión.
Pero ya, ya, ya.

[asustadísimos]

LA ERA CERO SE INAUGURA CON UNA DERROTA DE RUSIA & CHINA EN HISPANOAMÉRICA.—

Venezuela, para EE. UU.

Solo se entiende de verdad la invasión de Venezuela por EE. UU. en clave de la administración de la corrección valorativa del dólar.

Ucrania, para Rusia; y, lo quede del país, para la UE, con el permiso de EE. UU. para los negocios importantes.

Esto, sin olvidar que, gracias a Bulgaria, en 2007, el alfabeto cirílico se convirtió en la tercera escritura oficial de la UE. En 2026, en el euro ya figura la palabra 'евро', igual que en ruso.

Y para China, ¿qué?

El popularcapitalismo es historia. La «2025 National Security Strategy» pretende ser la escritura unilateral de partición del mundo. Pero tenemos que hablar los demás, ¿o no somos una comunidad? Igual hay que hablar a hostia limpia.

Bienvenidos a la 'planificación central', ¡ja!, capitalista.

[sudden and sharp]

EEUU metido hasta las trancas en Ucrania, en Taiwán, ahora en Venezuela, además de Libia, Irak y Siria, y a punto de entrar en Irán para avanzar en el gran Israel.
A ver si resulta que al final el tigre no era de papel. 
Tenemos que invitarlos a Eurovisión.
Pero ya, ya, ya.

Todos, haliados, de Putin&Co...


....curiosamente.

[Manu Oquendo]

Y a todo esto sobre el secuestro de Nicolás Maduro y su esposa ¿dónde se ha metido Rodríguez Zapatero? ¿Sigue libre con su recién ganada fortuna o, como circula por las redes, se ha vestido de lagarterana?

Sobre el comentario de Chosen acerca de un acuerdo tácito con Rusia, es posible que esté acertado. "Odessa para ti y sal de mi barrio venezolano"

Mientras tanto la UE hace como los cipayos de toda la vida: las tropas coloniales adoptan comportamientos más radicales que los del imperio. Lo ilustraba muy bien aquel Emilio Salgari, uno de los grandes novelistas de nuestra infancia.

La Psicología del Cipayo es digna de interés. Es tanta su dependencia anímica del poder imperial --a costa de su propio pueblo-- que en las etapas finales actúa en contra de los intereses de sus sociedades.

Pasó en la India y está pasando con la Comisión Europea de Von der Leyen que, abandonada por Trump, se muestra como una ávida guerrera contra Rusia a la que acercamos nuestros misiles y nuestra OTAN faltando a nuestra palabra (not one inch) por iniciativa de Bush padre y de los POTUS que le siguieron.
Todas las decisiones que ha ido tomanto Úrsula VDL no han hecho otra cosa que empeorar la vida y las perspectivas de los miembros de una UE que poco a poco va adquiriendo rasgos cada día más totalitarios. Exactamente lo que vaticinó Solana en Marzo de 2022

Y de momento sin reacción alguna por parte de los partidos que la promovieron: Socialistas y Populares europeos. Siempre de la manita.

Feliz año
 
 

[Frommer]

Espero que el payaso naranja horripilante al menos ya no vaya por ahi pidiendo el nobel de la Paz.

[Mistermaguf]

LA ERA CERO SE INAUGURA CON UNA DERROTA DE RUSIA & CHINA EN HISPANOAMÉRICA.—

Venezuela, para EE. UU.

Ucrania, para Rusia.

Y para China, ¿qué?

El popularcapitalismo es historia. Bienvenidos a la planificación central capitalista.

Taiwan, está claro. Veremos si China escala militarmente sobre la isla, cosa que me parece poco probable de manera directa.

En cualquier caso, esto significa que EE.UU. no pondrá obstáculos directos en el hinterland chino.

No veo tan claro lo de derrota chino-rusa en latinoamérica. Más bien lo veo como un pacto a tres bandas sobre las áreas de control de los tres bloques. Medio oriente queda como moneda de cambio y baza de negociación y ajuste: por el momento sigue el orden angloimpuesto desde 1946, con el proxi Israel al mando.

Europa no pinta nada, y probablemente lo mejor es que no pinte nada en este entuerto. Tenemos la oportunidad de emanciparnos con vía propia: para eso habrá que deshacerse de unas cuantas figuritas molestas.

Feliz comienzo de la era cero.

[sudden and sharp]

A Maduro le han entregado los "suyos"...







Esperar y ver.

[muyuu]

EEUU metido hasta las trancas en Ucrania, en Taiwán, ahora en Venezuela, además de Libia, Irak y Siria, y a punto de entrar en Irán para avanzar en el gran Israel.
A ver si resulta que al final el tigre no era de papel. 
Tenemos que invitarlos a Eurovisión.
Pero ya, ya, ya.

lo de Venezuela es un metesaca que a EEUU no solamente no le va a costar dinero, sino que les saldrá muy rentable

PS: además, la caída de Maduro y potencialmente un cambio de régimen o precarización de Irán, cambian la posición de negociación con Rusia, que para EEUU es mucho más importante

[CHOSEN]

A Maduro le han entregado los "suyos"...

Entregado a la policía en la comisaría de la Casa Blanca.

La posición actual de EEUU es ridícula.
Pretenden juzgar al dirigente de otro país, acusándolo de no-se-qué (delito de ser aliado de Putin dicen por ahí... )
No entiendo nada.
Quién lo va a juzgar.
¿Un tribunal militar?
¿Un tribunal federal?
¿El congreso?
Y el partido demócrata que representa al 50% de la población ¿en que posición queda?

Esto es un sinvivir!!!