PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[puede ser]

El país: casas en Amazon desde 6000 euros (debe ser algo nuevo porque aún ninguna tiene comentarios):

https://elpais.com/escaparate/estilo-de-vida/2026-02-27/casas-prefabricadas-baratas-amazon.html

10 casas prefabricadas en Amazon por menos de 20.000 euros con acabados de alta calidad
Elegimos propuestas, desde 6.999 euros en adelante, personalizables, de fácil montaje y con materiales de calidad que logran un aislamiento y confort óptimos

[puede ser]

https://elpais.com/opinion/2026-02-27/el-pensamiento-de-tomas-y-valiente-a-30-anos-de-su-asesinato.html?event_log=oklogin

El pensamiento de Tomás y Valiente, a 30 años de su asesinato
Revivir las virtudes del que fue presidente del Tribunal Constitucional y consejero de Estado es revivir su pensamiento, que conserva plena actualidad

Fernando Ledesma Bartret

En el Pleno del Consejo de Estado celebrado el 19 de febrero de 1996, tan sólo cinco días después del asesinato del Consejero Permanente de Estado Francisco Tomás y Valiente, pronuncié, en mi condición de presidente de la institución en aquella fecha, entre otras, las siguientes palabras: “El asesinato del muy querido consejero Francisco Tomás y Valiente nos ha dejado helado el corazón. El corazón de cada uno de nosotros que él se había ganado por su grandeza de espíritu, su bondad y su inteligencia. (…) Han asesinado al catedrático Tomás y Valiente, al expresidente del Tribunal Constitucional, al consejero permanente de Estado, por lo mucho que encarnaba y representaba y para que no siguiera hablando, para impedir que continuara escribiendo, para tapar su boca definitivamente. Su prestigio, su voz, y sus escritos llegaban a todos. Creaban opinión pública, influían en los grupos sociales más heterogéneos, intelectuales, políticos, universitarios, profesionales, sindicales, económicos, juveniles. La perspectiva que trágicamente da la muerte nos hace ver más claro que Paco Tomás y Valiente era un español sobresaliente y necesario. Sabía decir y tenía la valentía de decir lo que una inmensa mayoría pensaba. Desempeñaba una función pedagógica, social y política con la credibilidad además que da la hondura del conocimiento y la independencia de juicio (…) Su pensamiento fue siempre la expresión de los valores y los grandes objetivos constitucionales sobre los que está construida nuestra convivencia”.

Cumplidos 30 años de aquel cruel asesinato, me parece justo y necesario evocar su memoria y seguir el consejo que daba Ortega y Gasset con motivo del fallecimiento de su íntimo amigo, el toledano Francisco Navarro Ledesma: “No reduzcamos los muertos a las obras que dejaron: esto es impío. Recojamos lo que aún quede de ellos en el aire y revivamos sus virtudes”. Revivir sus virtudes es revivir su pensamiento, que conserva plena actualidad. Veámoslo.

En 1992 pronunció Tomás y Valiente la conferencia titulada Raíces y paradojas de una conciencia colectiva. En ella se pregunta: ¿Qué es España?. Y se responde: “Las naciones son, y solo son eso, realidades construidas en la historia y, en cuanto tales, de contenido y caracteres variables. La historia es libertad, no destino, y los sujetos colectivos que la hacen no son entidades definidas desde la eternidad o desde unas inmutables bases naturales, sino flexibles y relativas construcciones políticas, lingüísticas y culturales”. “Si se quiere recuperar y fomentar la conciencia nacional hay que hacerlo fundándose en una idea de nación entendida como comunidad de historia, de una historia plural y compleja; como comunidad de lenguaje, de una lengua común, no necesariamente única; como comunidad de cultura de la que somos beneficiarios (…) Entre la exaltación nacionalista y el olvido de la realidad nacional de España (…) entre unos y otros extremos tiene cabida la conciencia de pertenecer a una realidad histórica nacional, desde hace siglos reconocida con el nombre de España (…) Ni en la raza, ni en la sangre, ni en la historia la pureza es lo que vale, sino el mestizaje. Nuestra historia es rica porque es diversa y es plural”. Más adelante añadió: “La Constitución española de 1978, en cuanto equilibra la unidad de España con la pluralidad autonómica, es la más adecuada a la secular organización —o Constitución política no escrita, pero jurídicamente vinculante— de España”.

En 1992, al cesar como presidente del Tribunal Constitucional, reafirmaba Tomás y Valiente: “Con ella —con la razón jurídica— hemos procurado interpretar nuestra Constitución y potenciar los valores de libertad, justicia, igualdad y pluralismo político en esta propugnados”. “Sobre la base de esa doble legitimidad de origen y ejercicio, el Tribunal ha defendido la supremacía normativa de la Constitución, ha hecho más cohesiva y equilibrada la arquitectura vertebradora de España y ha amparado y definido los derechos fundamentales, que responden a un sistema de valores y principios de alcance universal y que asumidos como decisión constitucional básica, han de informar todo nuestro ordenamiento jurídico”.

Días antes de su asesinato, publicó el consejero Tomás y Valiente un trabajo sobre la obra de François Furet, El pasado de una ilusión. Ensayo sobre la idea comunista en el Siglo XX. En ese trabajo reitera un pensamiento que es recurrente en toda su producción académica. Dice así: “Hay algo de cuya desaparición en el horizonte intelectual de nuestros días quiero manifestar mi satisfacción. Me refiero al desengaño respecto a la existencia de leyes de la historia. Si no hay leyes de la historia es porque el hombre es libre. Libre incluso para equivocarse. Libre para vivir sin esperar a ningún Godot, sin creer en ninguna redención o salvación o revolución regeneradora, que luego ya se ve en qué quedan. No nos hagamos falsas ilusiones: la historia no está ni terminada ni resuelta en nombre de leyes conocidas. No tenemos más remedio que seguir pensando. Afortunadamente”.

En el estudio introductorio a los Discursos del asturiano Agustín Argüelles, el catedrático Tomás y Valiente recuerda que “un político, si es noble, trata de realizar ideas, de que la realidad de la sociedad a la que pertenece y en la que actúa se aproxime al universo de las ideas en las que cree (…) Si de un político hablamos, estaremos refiriéndonos a alguien esforzado en convertir el pensamiento en obra transformadora u ordenadora de la sociedad”.

Subyace en el párrafo que se acaba de transcribir una concepción de lo público con arreglo a la cual no es la acumulación de cosas materiales la causa eficiente del esfuerzo que exige el recto desempeño de la función pública, ni el móvil determinante de la autoexigencia en el servicio que se presta, sino otro tipo de compensaciones inmateriales, medibles con parámetros más próximos al prestigio moral, a la convivencia solidaria y a la búsqueda de soluciones a los problemas de los ciudadanos. Es una percepción de la cosa pública comprometida con la consecución del bienestar y con la corrección de las injustas desigualdades. Es una visión de lo público que genere en las personas actitudes de confianza, virtudes cívicas, una idea, en fin, del servicio público que facilite la entrada en nuestras vidas de las mayores dosis posibles de ilusión y de grandeza.

En el trigésimo aniversario de su asesinato, recuerdo el actualísimo pensamiento de Francisco Tomás y Valiente, un español ejemplar en el más noble y exigente sentido de la palabra.

[Derby]

https://the-blindspot.com/too-big-to-flow-financialisation-fragility-and-the-reserve-trap/

Too big to flow: financialisation, fragility and the reserve trap, Izabella Kaminska



This is a guest post by Teodor Kreczmar-Schuldorff, a pseudonym for a European financial plumbing expert who has many deep thoughts about fintech developments but is contractually obliged to repress them for the sake of personal cash flow.

The core contention of this contribution for The Peg, which is based on this unpublished paper*, is straightforward, though its implications are not.

Financialisation increases the volume and unpredictability of payment obligations, which requires more liquidity to prevent gridlock — and that liquidity ultimately has to be supplied or backstopped by the central bank.

To unpack that a bit more, as an economy becomes more financialised, the stock of financial assets expands relative to GDP, and the volume of associated cash flows expands with it. Those flows must settle somewhere.

In the United States, they settle predominantly across the Federal Reserve’s wholesale payments system. The underappreciated effect is that financialisation mechanically increases the scale, complexity, and unpredictability of wholesale payment activity.

In essence, a larger and more intricate financial machine requires, by definition, more lubrication. When the lubrication does not keep pace, friction rises, and fragility follows.

The important context is that since the early 1980s, the United States has experienced a marked and sustained increase in financialisation.



The financial sector’s share of GDP has risen, but more tellingly so has the growth in the ratio of total financial assets to GDP.



Deregulation, financial innovation, rising public debt, and recurrent asset bubbles have all contributed. Even non-financial corporates now hold balance sheets that are far more financial in character than they were four decades ago.

Furthermore, the growth in derivatives and the globalisation of dollar-denominated assets mean that conventional measures likely understate the true scale of financialisation.

An increase in financial assets is not a passive statistic.

Securities pay coupons, mature, are refinanced, margined, and repoed. Derivatives generate variation margin calls. Asset managers rebalance. Corporates hedge. Banks fund and roll positions. Each of these activities generates payment obligations, many of which are settled through Fedwire.

There is, unsurprisingly, a close relationship between the stock of financial assets and the gross value of wholesale payments. The financial system’s arteries seem to thicken as the balance sheet of the economy grows more financial.



As it stands today, wholesale payments are settled in reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve.



These reserves function as the medium through which banks discharge liabilities to one another. For decades, reserve balances were small and relatively stable. Indeed, prior to 2008, banks had little incentive to hold excess reserves at all, not least because they earned no interest.

Instead, frictions in intraday payment flows were often addressed through daylight overdrafts provided by the Federal Reserve, as can be seen in the chart below taken from Afonso, Duffie, & Shin (2022).



As the system expanded, however, the ratio of reserves to financial assets — and to wholesale payment volumes — declined steadily.



If one views the financial system as a machine, then the 1980s and 1990s saw it grow vastly larger and more complex, with many more moving parts. Yet the quantity of lubrication, measured relative to the machine’s, was falling.

By the mid-2000s, the ratio of reserves to financial assets had reached historic lows. The same was true of reserves relative to average daily Fedwire payments. The system was operating with tighter tolerances and less margin for error.

The global financial crisis did not begin as a payments crisis. It began with a collapse in subprime mortgage valuations and the slow recognition that large quantities of securities were mispriced. Yet the deterioration in reserve ratios preceded the acute phase of the crisis. Liquidity stress intensified as confidence waned. Funding markets seized. Institutions that appeared viable under benign assumptions struggled to finance themselves. The Federal Reserve responded forcefully: policy rates were cut to the effective lower bound, and large-scale asset purchases were initiated. Reserves rose from tens of billions to trillions of dollars within a short period.



The scale of that intervention transformed the operating environment. Excess reserves became abundant. The lubrication problem appeared resolved, at least in the aggregate.



Yet subsequent episodes suggest that the underlying relationship between reserves, financialisation, and fragility did not disappear. In September 2019, repo rates spiked sharply as cash-rich institutions proved unwilling to lend against rising demand for funding. In March 2020, the “dash for cash” saw a disorderly sell-off in US Treasuries and a dramatic expansion of Federal Reserve support. In early 2023, the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and others exposed vulnerabilities linked to maturity transformation and interest rate risk. Each episode followed a period in which reserve ratios had fallen relative to financial assets or payment volumes. Each elicited additional liquidity support.

At the same time, it is important to distinguish funding liquidity from market liquidity. Funding liquidity concerns the ability of an institution to meet its obligations when due. Market liquidity concerns the ability to buy or sell assets without materially affecting their price. The two interact. Forced asset sales can depress prices, impair balance sheets, and convert liquidity problems into solvency problems. Conversely, inflated asset prices can mask underlying weakness.

The distinction between solvency and liquidity is conceptually clear but operationally elusive. An institution is insolvent when the fair value of its liabilities exceeds that of its assets. Yet fair value is itself a function of market conditions. A bank may be economically viable over the long term yet technically insolvent at distressed prices. It may also appear solvent in a bubble, sustained by inflated collateral values and cheap funding.

Financial history offers many examples of entities that survived far longer than fundamentals would suggest, supported by financial engineering or outright fraud.



In an environment of persistently high asset prices and abundant liquidity, unviable firms can persist and even expand. They may borrow cheaply against overvalued assets, acquire competitors, and reinforce the cycle. The opportunity cost is borne by the wider economy, which allocates capital to low-return uses.

When central banks respond to stress by lowering rates and injecting reserves, they address immediate funding pressures but may also sustain these dynamics. Yet, treating solvency problems as liquidity problems risks distorting price signals and weakening the market’s capacity to allocate capital efficiently.

The expansion of reserves after 2008, however, reduced friction in wholesale payments and diminished the need for daylight overdrafts.

Yet abundant reserves do not necessarily reside where fragility is greatest. Smaller banks or non-bank intermediaries may hold liquidity claims that are not matched by stable funding. As central banks expand their balance sheets, banks often expand their own, increasing liquidity transformation. When the central bank later attempts to shrink reserves, balance sheets do not always contract symmetrically. The system can become dependent on a high level of aggregate reserves to sustain a given volume of activity, especially when such holdings are regulated into the system for financial stability purposes.

To some degree this is fair enough. Empirical work suggests that lower reserve levels are associated with greater delays in payments and reduced willingness to lend in repo markets. This is consistent with the intuition that less lubrication increases friction. At the same time, high reserve levels may encourage maturity mismatch and leverage.

In reality, the relationship is not linear but cyclical. Falling reserve ratios can heighten the severity of liquidity events. Rising reserves can reduce immediate stress while sowing the seeds of future vulnerability.

The uncomfortable conclusion is that increased financialisation, as measured by the growth of financial assets relative to GDP and payment volumes, increases systemic fragility. The common policy response — lower rates and higher reserves—can mitigate acute funding stress but may entrench structural dependence on abundant liquidity. Over time, the financial system may require ever greater reserve balances to function smoothly, particularly if its scale and complexity continue to expand.

This is problematic since such reserves must, for the most part, be funded at the government’s expense through greater indebtedness.

This leaves central banks with a difficult choice. They may attempt to maintain stability within an increasingly financialised system by supplying ample reserves and intervening decisively during stress. Alternatively, they may consider whether the underlying scale and structure of financial activity should be constrained, accepting that lower reserve levels in a highly financialised system are likely to be associated with greater fragility.

Rolling back decades of financialisation would not be costless, something that is increasingly evident from the Trump administration’s attempt to rebalance the system through tariffs. Yet sustaining it through perpetual liquidity support carries its own risks.

The question is not simply what constitutes the lowest comfortable level of reserves.

It is whether a system built on ever-expanding financial claims can operate safely without continuous and growing central bank lubrication. If liquidity support repeatedly masks solvency issues and mispricing of assets, the long-term damage may outweigh the short-term relief.

The machine can be kept running with more oil, but if obtaining the oil consumes more value than the machine incrementally produces, further enlargement ceases to make economic sense.

*https://the-blindspot.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Finacialisation-Reserves-and-Liquity-52.docx

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/6731dc3d-d43b-487a-a6f2-e6c8b2a7ac92

Collapse of UK property lender sends shockwaves through Wall Street

Lenders weigh losses linked to Market Financial Solutions, linked to Bangladeshi politician’s real estate empire


MFS collapsed into administration after entities tied to the group filed a court application that cited ‘real and serious concerns about mismanagement’ of the business © Laura Zapata/Bloomberg

Wall Street lenders are scrambling to understand the extent of losses on billions of pounds they lent to a UK-based mortgage provider that collapsed suddenly amid fraud allegations, reigniting fears of poor underwriting standards in the booming market for asset-backed lending.

Firms including Barclays, Jefferies and Apollo’s Atlas SP Partners, its structured credit arm, extended £2bn of financing to Market Financial Solutions. The London-headquartered firm previously lent to a Bangladeshi politician before it collapsed into insolvency on Wednesday amid accusations of double-pledging of its collateral.

Others potentially nursing losses stemming from MFS include TPG, the Texan private equity firm, and Avenue Capital, the distressed debt specialist, according to two people familiar with the situation.

There might be a shortfall in collateral backing loans to MFS entities of as much as £930mn, according to two people with direct knowledge of the matter.

The incident has triggered a sense of déjà-vu for lenders who are still dealing with the fallout from the dual collapse of US businesses First Brands Group and Tricolor Holdings, both of which also face fraud investigations by the US Department of Justice. The episode has also added weight to JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon’s prophecy that there are more “cockroaches” lurking in credit markets.

The CEO of the world’s largest bank added on Monday that some of his rivals are doing “dumb things” in pursuit of high returns, reminding him of the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis.

Worries about lenders’ exposure have weighed on their shares since MFS collapsed. Jefferies’ shares were down 10 per cent in New York trading on Friday, while Barclays’ closed down 4.2 per cent in London.

London-based MFS, whose registered address was in a fashionable street in Mayfair, collapsed into administration earlier this week after entities tied to the group filed a court application that cited “real and serious concerns about mismanagement” of the business, “serious irregularities in the management of the key bank accounts” and “a significant shortfall” in collateral that they said could amount to £238mn.

Amber Bridging Limited and Zircon Bridging Limited, the two MFS group entities that filed the application and which have £1bn outstanding, are both in administration. Insolvency practitioners from AlixPartners have been appointed to MFS.

Barclays is among the largest lenders to the group — which claimed it could “deliver loans as large as £50mn, in as little as three days” — with about £600mn of exposure, according to the judge overseeing the case. The British lender also provided banking services to MFS. Barclays froze the group’s accounts prior to it filing for administration, according to people familiar with the situation.


Barclays is among lenders facing losses stemming from MFS’s collapse © Jason Alden/Bloomberg

Numerous credit hedge funds are now analysing the company’s finances, anticipating that its lenders will begin dumping its debt at deep discounts as they attempt to claw back any value they can.

Founded by Paresh Raja in 2006, MFS claimed to offer “complex, property-backed lending” made up of short-term bridging loans for real estate investments.

A large part of its business involved backing dozens of property deals linked to Saifuzzaman Chowdhury, a former land minister in Bangladesh. Along with his family members, he built a sprawling $295mn property portfolio from 1992 until August 2024, when the government of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh collapsed amid student protests.

The MFS entities first started giving Chowdhury-linked companies loans in mid-2019, just after he took a post in the Dhaka government and he was starting to build a British property empire.

They are listed as being involved in 291 of the 495 charges registered by the companies against properties in England and Wales. Last year, the UK’s National Crime Agency froze 342 properties linked to Chowdhury, worth about £185mn, as part of “an ongoing civil investigation”.



As an active politician when the loans were made, Chowdhury should have been subject to particular scrutiny, especially as his official asset declarations in Bangladesh listed his net worth at only around $2.3mn.

In January 2025, in response to questions as to how Chowdhury passed MFS’s checks, the lender’s lawyers at Harbottle & Lewis told the FT: “MFS has a team that conducts extensive client due diligence and, where necessary, enhanced due diligence on all prospective borrowers.”

MFS financed its business with debt from some of Wall Street’s largest financial institutions, pledging the loans it made to customers as collateral to its own lenders. Banks including Barclays, Jefferies, Santander and Wells Fargo, as well as private credit firms Atlas and Castlelake, all chipped in to provide the family-owned and run mortgage lender billions of pounds.

According to its 2024 accounts, MFS secured £1.3bn in “new institutional funding to support increased lending demand”, on top of £1.1bn it had already received from lenders.

Atlas said that “following a breach of contractual terms by Market Financial Solutions, ATLAS proactively put two warehouses into default last week and is pursuing all legal avenues to maximize recoveries”. The firm has about £400mn of exposure to MFS, accounting for about 1 per cent of its balance sheet.

Raja managed to secure billions of pounds in financing for MFS as its sole director with full control over the business.

“Paresh has oversight of all departments within MFS, ensuring every element of the business is performing to its utmost potential,” a submission for the 2026 Property Awards states.

Some of the entities linked to MFS list Raja’s wife, Prathiba Raja, as a director. The pair are the only two shareholders of MFS.

But in London court proceedings this week the judge overseeing the case raised accusations of fraud, citing creditor allegations that MFS had been double-pledging its assets to lenders who could now have a right to less collateral than they thought.

In a statement made earlier this week, Raja said that it was “an extremely difficult moment for everyone connected with Market Financial Solutions. As a family-founded business that has been built over nearly 20 years, this is not a decision that has been taken lightly.”

“The current situation does not reflect a failure of the underlying business or the quality of our assets,” he added, “but rather a technical and procedural impasse that has temporarily limited our access to everyday banking facilities . . . I remain fully committed to preserving value and doing everything possible to support a positive outcome for all stakeholders”.

The collapse of MFS comes after the unravelling last year of US car parts supplier First Brands — which is accused of double-pledging and faking invoices — and auto lender Tricolor Holdings, sparking concerns over underwriting standards throughout Wall Street.

Jefferies, which has a roughly £100mn exposure to MFS, was stung by losses when First Brands collapsed last year before its founder Patrick James was charged with fraud in January. The bank was one of the car parts supplier’s largest financial backers.

MFS did not respond to an email seeking comment. Raja did not respond to messages sent to him through LinkedIn, or via his lawyers.

TPG said its total exposure was £44mn, which it believed totalled less than 2 per cent of MFS’s loan exposures.

AlixPartners, Avenue, Barclays, Jefferies, Santander and Wells Fargo declined to comment. Castlelake did not respond to a request seeking comment.

The FT was unable to reach Chowdhury for comment.

Last year, responding to questions relating to the FT investigation into Chowdhury, his estate agent said that “funds used by Mr Chowdhury to purchase UK property originated from legitimate businesses in the UAE, US and UK”.

[Derby]

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/blue-owl-turmoil-adds-strain-2-trillion-us-private-credit-sector-2026-02-27/

Blue Owl turmoil adds to strain in $2 trillion US private credit sector


A logo for Blue Owl Capital is displayed on a midtown Manhattan office building in New York City, U.S., February 24, 2026. REUTERS/Brendan McDermid Purchase Licensing Rights

Summary

*Blue Owl's turmoil weakens private credit sector confidence
*AI advances threaten software companies in private credit portfolios
*Private credit market faces increased competition and valuation concerns

NEW YORK, Feb 27 (Reuters) - The $2 trillion private credit industry, which has expanded over the past decade from financing leveraged buyouts to areas banks dominated, is facing fresh strain from turmoil at Blue Owl Capital, a major private lender.

Sentiment was already hit by questions about valuation and transparency, and specific situations such as the bankruptcy of auto-parts supplier First Brands, which some private credit players had exposure to.

Concerns have been compounded by troubles at Blue Owl (OWL.N), which emerged late last year when it moved to limit withdrawals from a fund. In recent days, the firm has worried investors by selling shares of other alternative asset managers.

The collapse of UK mortgage provider Market Financial Solutions is adding to wider concerns about lending standards and the fast-growing market for private finance.

Some say the industry's size is working against it. State Street estimates the addressable market for private credit has grown to more than $40 trillion, including investment-grade credit.

"Private credit's golden era is not over yet, but the days of generating equity-like returns might be," said Kyle Walters, U.S. private equity analyst at PitchBook. "Moreover, private credit has reached a certain scale in recent years, leading to more players entering the asset class and increasing competition."


Stacked column chart showing private credit AUM to double by 2030

BLUE OWL PAIN

Blue Owl's turmoil matters well beyond the firm itself because of its scale, role in private credit markets, and close ties with institutional investors, corporate borrowers and wealthy individuals.

The firm, which managed more than $300 billion in assets as of December 31, said last week it would sell $1.4 billion of assets across three funds, return part of the proceeds to some investors and pay down debt. It permanently removed an option for investors in the smallest vehicle, mainly wealthy individuals, to withdraw some funds every quarter.

Blue Owl declined to comment, but pointed to an earlier statement that it is accelerating the return of capital to investors within the timeframe announced at the offering.

Credit rating firm Moody's said Blue Owl's latest decision to pivot away from traditional quarterly redemptions has sharpened investor focus on how semi‑liquid private credit vehicles manage redemptions, especially with growing retail participation.


Grouped column chart showing Private Credit expansion into consumer ABS is expected to continue, according to estimates by Moody’s Rating

"Retail investors tend to be less patient and predictable than institutional investors," said Johannes Moller, vice president for Moody's Ratings, in a report on Tuesday.

Moller said rising redemption pressure is showing up across the private credit market — including at perpetual non‑traded loan vehicles, or BDCs, which offer retail and high-net-worth investors access to private credit — amid concerns about valuations and liquidity terms.

As alternative managers push further into the retail channel, Moody's expects liquidity management, disclosure, and fund structure design to become more central to investor decision‑making — and potentially a drag on returns.

Blue Owl shares are down 29% year to date, while other major alternative asset managers are also lower. Shares of Blackstone (BX.N) are down nearly 27%, Apollo Global Management (APO.N) is down over 26% and Ares Management (ARES.N) is down almost 31% this year.


Alt asset managers stock performance in past 12 months

Blackstone and Ares declined to comment, but pointed to recent comments by senior executives. Apollo did not respond to a request for comment.

"We enter 2026 in a position of strength," said Ares CEO Michael Arougheti on the company's earnings call, citing strong underlying performance across the portfolio, and improving capital markets and M&A backdrop.

Blackstone CFO Michael Chae said at a financial conference this month credit quality remains strong, but cautioned about an increase in defaults for the industry from an extremely low level.

"The structural advantages will continue to produce superior results. So, overall, outstanding momentum to our credit business as we move into 2026," he said.

SOFTWARE EXPOSURE STRESS

Shares of other private equity firms and alternative asset managers are also facing mounting unease over valuations of software companies that they own and lend to, as artificial intelligence threatens to upend business models.

"It’s not clear that things have fundamentally changed, but there’s an idea that there's a technology risk that may not have been fully priced in or contemplated as recently as three, six, or 12 months ago," said Christian Hoffmann, head of fixed income at Thornburg Investment Management.

INDUSTRY GROWTH

The private credit industry has evolved from providing direct loans to middle-market companies to asset-backed finance — loans backed by collateral such as hard assets.

Banks have also announced their private credit foray with JPMorgan Chase (JPM.N) setting aside $50 billion for its direct lending push last year, while others have partnered with alternative asset managers on private credit strategies.


Donut charts showing Total investments by U.S. life insurers & U.S. P/C insurers

A recent Moody's report showed U.S. banks had lent nearly $300 billion to private credit providers as of June 2025. Banks loaned a further $285 billion to private equity funds and had $340 billion in unutilized bank lending commitments available to these borrowers.


Bar chart showing US banks’ private credit loan exposure

Moody's has projected the industry's size to double to $4 trillion by 2030, but cautioned deepening ties between private credit funds and traditional financial institutions could heighten contagion risk in a downturn.

JPMorgan said this week it was watching the private credit market closely.

"I'm shocked that people are shocked. The reality is in this environment, as the world gets more volatile, as you get towards the end of the cycle, this outcome should be expected," Troy Rohrbaugh, co-CEO of JPMorgan Chase's commercial and investment bank, told investors on Monday, referring to private credit concerns.