PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2026

[Derby]

https://financialfables.substack.com/p/the-private-credit-blackhole-part

The Private Credit Blackhole - Part II
 
A few theories on what might be making the asset class so unstable

A few weeks ago I compared private credit markets to a black hole - an asset class so opaque that it’s difficult to understand what is happening inside it.

While the inner workings of black holes remain largely unobservable, scientists have developed theories to explain how they behave. It’s possible to do something similar with private credit - to piece together a view of what may be driving the growing instability within the system.

At the heart of the issue there is a simple question: is private credit facing a problem of illiquidity, or something more concerning - insolvency?

Theory #1: Private Credit is Suffering From a Lack of Liquidity

An initial theory is that the private credit black hole is facing an illiquidity crisis - where assets exceed liabilities, but cannot be converted into cash quickly enough to meet demand.

An increasing number of private credit managers have begun restricting redemptions from their funds (known as gating). The table below highlights nine separate strategies, managing over $164 billion in assets, that have gated in recent months. What stands out is not just the gating itself, but the scale of redemption requests relative to the limits imposed - particularly in the case of the Blue Owl funds.



Illiquidity-driven crises are not uncommon (the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in 2023 being a recent example), and private credit is, by design, an illiquid asset class.

But if the instability within the private credit black hole is primarily a function of illiquidity, then it is, in principle, manageable.

Given time, assets can mature, loans can be repaid, and new capital can be attracted. Periods of stress often create opportunities - allowing those with fresh capital to step in, provide liquidity, and acquire assets at attractive valuations (cough hedge funds cough).

In other words, if private credit is simply illiquid, then with enough time and patience, the system may yet stabilise.

Theory #2: Private Credit is Insolvent

A more troubling theory is that the instability within private credit is not simply a function of liquidity - but of solvency. In this case, the issue is not whether assets can be sold quickly enough, but whether they are worth enough at all.

The lack of transparency in private credit makes this difficult to assess in real time. Instead, it tends to show up in bursts - through sudden and sometimes sharp write-downs by managers.

This was highlighted last week by bond investor Jeffrey Gundlach, who pointed to the scale of write-downs in a major private credit fund (likely BlackRock). The takeaway wasn’t just the losses themselves, but how little oversight we had to the nature and scale of those writedowns.



To me, insolvency seems to be an issue among some of the higher risk firms. Years of intense capital inflows have changed the structure of the market. Increased competition among lenders has weakened underwriting standards, with more leverage, fewer covenants, and tighter pricing. That leaves borrowers more exposed as financing conditions tighten.

At the same time, exposures within the private credit black hole are not especially diversified.

U.S private credit is heavily concentrated in a relatively narrow set of sectors - most notably technology. I borrowed the troubling chart below from my former colleagues at J.P Morgan - private credits 40% of exposure to the U.S tech ecosystem is a troubling structural feature.



If valuations in the tech sector are stretched - or if profitability fails to materialise - then the kind of write-downs Gundlach is pointing to are likely to become more frequent.

Concerns around an AI-driven valuation bubble, persistent lack of profitability, and elevated leverage levels all point in the same direction: that some assets may not simply be illiquid but entirely mispriced.

Theory #3: What if it’s both?

But what if the black hole is unstable due to a combination of both insolvency and illiquidity? This is probably the most terrifying prospect for investors.

Perhaps, the system became unstable following years of poor lending practises - but managers were reluctant to take losses so kept deferring any potential losses with fresh rounds of loans. And that the solvency concerns are being magnified by the structural design of the asset class to create a supermassive, unstable black hole.

I don’t think investors are quite at this stage of panic just yet but to try and gauge their fears I built a simple index of eight of the largest U.S private credit managers - weighted not just by size, but by how exposed each firm is to private credit.

The picture isn’t great. The index is down 27% so far in 2026 and has materially underperformed since December 2021. On an individual basis, the moves have been more severe - Blue Owl is down 44% year-to-date, while Ares is down 38%.

Ultimately, we don’t know what is driving the instability of private credit, in much the same way black holes remain a mystery to us. However, this illiquidity vs insolvency concept at least provides us with a potential framework for talking about this concept asset class and try to chart a way forward.

[breades]

Aunque se me tachó de falaz, mi planteamiento goza de bastante buena salud.

- El conflicto en Irán es una milestone dentro de la hoja de ruta.
- La hoja de ruta tiene un transforndo de re-posicionamiento de poder imperial y control de daños. Todo lo que ha hecho EEUU fastidia muchísimo a sus enemigos, y poco a ellos mismos (asumiendo que es imposible hacer la tortilla sin romper algún huevo).
- Trump no está loco ni es tonto (quizá esté un poco dopado ), sino que es el presidente adecuado para comprar el plan, y ejecutarlo. Incluso, es perfecto para ser amortizarlo lo antes posible y 'pasar página' escondiendo la mano, si hace falta.
- El golpe a China, considerable. No hace falta que China hubiese iniciado ninguna hostilidad de guerra caliente (de suavonas, no paran). Basta que el imperio vigente lo interprete así, como un riesgo que hay que mitigar preventivamente mejor hoy que mañana. Así que por encima de todo, está el mensaje. China lo ha captado y hay que decir que está jugando bien su papel, sin nervios. Va a sacar algún rédito probablemente de los errores tácticos usanos, pero cosas como la toma de Taiwán podrían haberse vuelto al cajón para un tiempecito. No hay que perder de vista la ruta de la seda.
- El golpe a Europa, tremendo. Pero no es una carambola. Se sabe que Europa no puede defenderse sola, y que va a tardar mucho en poder dar un puñetazo en la mesa (pagar su petróleo en euros, un poner).
- Israel, aprovecha la última oportunidad poniendo muertos y ensuciándose las manos y la imagen. Genio malvado en la sombra, mis pelotas.
- Irán, destrozado. El régimen está sentenciado y sólo falta saber cuándo alguno los van a degollar desde dentro, pero nos duele que no hayan podido ser depuestos más rápidamente. (Romántico de la libertad que es uno, que no termina de gustarle bancar a un regimen teocrático medieval y sanguinario... poniendo achaques de legalidad internacional)

En cuanto a si EEUU va a dejar de ser lo que era.... es que ya no lo era; yo lo sabía sólo porque aquí lo sabían muchísimos compañeros que lo han escrito. Lo único que ha pasado es que el normie y la caspa se han caído del guindo ahora.

EEUU es el imperio maléfico que nos ha tocado vivir a nosotros, y hace cosas de imperio maléfico para impedir que otro imperio maléfico le coma demasiado pronto la tostada.

Sobre si es antes por el dólar, por la energía, por la seguridad... detalles de implementación. Es por la preponderancia (perderla lo más tarde posible), y es a por todo a la vez. ¿Y lo de la luna ?

Estando de acuerdo en líneas generales, veo cositas que no me cuadran.

USA se la ha pegado en Irán. Puede que sus objetivos "inconfesables" se hayan cumplido, pero no los confesables, y por tanto su prestigio (y el miedo que deberían dar) queda muy muy tocado.

Su estrategia de atacar desde el aire con portaaviones, no tengo tan clara que continúe funcionando. Le ha servido durante los últimos 50 años, pero ahora parece que con misiles balísticos y drones, se le puede pintar la cara al matón de la clase.

No tengo nada claro que el régimen Iraní caiga rápidamente. Puede estar tocado de muerte? Seguramente, pero a nivel de comunicación parece que los acuerdos, la tregua, o la rendición de Irán la necesita más TRUMP que Irán.

Según escuché en un podcast (la misma credibilidad que los tuits de Trump) parece que Irán lanza mayor cantidad de drones cada 7 días, que es el tiempo en que se tarda en barco entre China e irán. Eso significaría que China provee de drones a Irán para atacar a USA. Si esto es cierto... es una guerra proxy con todas las de la ley.

Si el régimen* de Irán no cae rápido todo se va a enquistar más y más. Acabará afectando de pleno a USA, y si no es este año, será el siguiente, pero creo que la Bolsa y las Big-tech se van a pegar la ostia padre. La guerra podría acelerar ese momento e impedir que las empresas de la IA salgan a bolsa antes del ostión.

Puede que en USA esté todo calculado, y todo sea control de daños... pero curiosamente creo que quien sale más beneficiado/reforzado es Rusia. Continua sobre sus inmensos recursos energéticos, estos suben de valor y acabarán quitándole las sanciones internacionales por pura necesidad.

*Por cierto, llamamos a Irán Régimen... como deberíamos llamar a Israel? Para mí son una teocracia igual que los Ayatolás.

Añado que la afirmación de Marv que he resaltado en negrita es absolutamente falsa, y me apoyo en la distinción de Gustavo Bueno sobre imperios depredadores y generadores.

China no es un imperio maléfico. Ni siquiera es un imperio, por el momento. Si llega a serlo, pasarán muchos lustros para que pueda ser maléfico; los mismos lustros que le aguante el sistema en pie sin grietas. Exactamente igual que el imperio gusano, que tuvo sus lustros de gloria, pero hace demasiado tiempo que sólo trae miseria y por eso tiene que caer.

[Derby]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dollar-international-role-trajectory-resembles-roman-denarius-by-barry-eichengreen-2026-04

The Decline and Fall of the Dollar Empire, Barry Eichengreen

The United States does not have an emperor like ancient Rome's Nero, but its politics are increasingly subject to rule by one man who threatens its democratic traditions. And just as Nero undermined the Roman denarius—arguably the world's first international currency—America's ruler poses a growing threat to his country's currency.

SEOUL – There is angst in the air about the US dollar’s once and future global role. For insight into the greenback’s prospects, pundits have looked to the British pound sterling, the dollar’s predecessor as the dominant international currency, and asked how economic stagnation, heavy debts, and failed geopolitical adventures, like that in Suez in 1956, conspired to rob it of its global role.

But informed observers can draw on a much longer history of international currencies—units used in cross-border transactions—stretching from the Dutch guilder of the 17th and 18th centuries back to the Florentine florin of the 14th and 15th centuries and the silver denarius of ancient Rome.

In fact, it can be argued that the Roman denarius was the first true international currency. Hoards have been found not only throughout the former territories of the Roman Empire but also along the Silk Road from India and Sri Lanka to China.

The dates of these coin hoards coincide with the arrival in Europe of merchandise from these same parts of Asia, highlighting the importance of Rome’s trading prowess and commercial span in supporting its currency. The Romans had cargo ships of unprecedented size capable of long voyages. No surprise, they took their native coin with them.

Political unification of the Mediterranean Basin under Roman rule further encouraged commercial activity. This activity was regulated by Roman officials, backed by a formidable military, and facilitated by the availability of a stable and uniform money. To ensure quality, only the Roman authorities were permitted to mint silver and gold coin. Coinage was under the authority of the Senate, whose members received regular reports from the tresviri, junior magistrates overseeing the mints.

Reflecting this authority, the silver content of the denarius remained stable, in both weight and purity, for 300 years. Uniform coinage meant that merchants, when accepting payment, knew what they were getting. It allowed them to make payment without requiring physical movement of heavy and valuable coin or bullion. And, because coin could be provided in one place against sales and receipts in another, thereby avoiding the costs and risks of transporting precious metal, currency began to shade into credit, anticipating the development of modern financial markets.

Thus, we see in Rome the core requirements for a widely accepted international currency: quality assurance, commercial prowess, a sophisticated financial system, political checks and balances, and geopolitical security for the issuer.

The Roman case also reminds us that these prerequisites should not be taken for granted. The Roman state, as it aged, became more bureaucratic. The Republic’s democratic traditions, which allowed the Senate to check excessive emission, gave way to rule by one man, whose imperial whims, including over money, could go unchecked.

The rule of law waned, and corruption grew pervasive, as property was increasingly concentrated in the hands of the politically connected. Provisioning a large army required levying taxes that absorbed as much as one-third of Rome’s income, undercutting the empire’s commercial activities. Heavy taxes encouraged evasion by large estate owners, in cahoots with functionaries (often large estate owners themselves) responsible for collecting the payments.

As a result, debasement—reductions in the silver content of the denarius—started under Emperor Nero, who churned out additional coin in a desperate effort to finance his ambitious program of canal building, as well as to reconstruct Rome following the great fire of 64 AD, build his extravagant 300-room Domus Aurea palace, and prosecute costly wars on multiple fronts. The tresviri were subordinated to central imperial authority.

Subsequent emperors followed Nero down this slippery slope. Older coins were hoarded or melted down as the economy was flooded with near-worthless new denominations. Within a couple of centuries, the international role of the denarius was no more.

It is not hard to hear echoes of this ancient history in current anxiety around the dollar. China has overtaken the United States as a trading power. President Donald Trump’s tariffs are driving other countries into China’s arms and encouraging them to cut preferential trade deals among themselves.

The US hasn’t debased the dollar, but there is plenty of talk about the so-called “debasement trade,” where foreign investors shift away from US Treasuries for fear that high government debt and threats to the independence of the Federal Reserve will erode the greenback’s purchasing power. The country may be militarily secure, but the fiscal costs of unleashing that military in the Middle East only heighten worries about debt and dollar depreciation.

America does not have an emperor, but its politics are increasingly subject to rule by one man who threatens its democratic traditions. Institutionalized corruption has become the norm, not the exception.

Does this augur the fall of the American Empire, much as Nero’s rule augured the fall of the Roman Empire? We don’t need an oracle to know that none of these developments bodes well for the dollar.

[Derby]

https://breakingthenews.net/Article/US-'blockade'-of-Hormuz-Strait-goes-into-effect/66056909

US 'blockade' of Hormuz Strait goes into effect

The naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian ports, as previously announced by United States President Donald Trump, has gone into effect at 10 pm ET on Monday.

Trump previously said that any ship headed to Iranian ports would face interdiction, although it currently remains unclear how the blockade will be enforced. Tehran had already warned that no port in the Persian Gulf would be safe if Trump went along with the blockade. The US leader's actions did not secure support from the United Kingdom or other allies.

Previously, diplomatic discussions between Washington and Tehran in Pakistan failed to bring a resolution, while the two-week ceasefire remained in force.

[sudden and sharp]

Etnografía de China
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Etnografía_de_China




Veamos:



































Mapa de China, desde la antigüedad hasta la actualidad
https://www.reddit.com/r/Sino/comments/j6t8hv/map_of_china_from_ancient_to_present_day/?tl=es-es

[Derby]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/wartime-inflation-ai-deflation-new-macroeconomic-conditions-by-dambisa-moyo-2026-04

The Coming Inflation-Deflation Whipsaw Dambisa Moyo

Other than the pandemic-era supply-chain disruptions, business leaders and investors have not had occasion to think much about either inflation or deflation. But that needs to change, because we are now facing both an immediate threat of higher prices and a longer-term prospect of rapidly falling labor, goods, and services costs.

LONDON—We are living through a rare moment in which two powerful forces are pulling prices in opposite directions. Markets must grapple with both the immediate threat of higher inflation from geopolitical tensions and conflagrations, as well as the longer-term risk of AI-driven deflation.

At the start of this year, many forecasters expected oil prices to hover around $50 per barrel, owing to what looked like relatively large inventories and flat global demand. Yet now, Brent futures have breached $100, with some predicting prices as high as $150.

The US-Israeli war with Iran has disrupted transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which generally accounts for around 20% of the world’s 100 million barrels in daily demand. That makes this the largest oil-supply shock in the history of the global oil market. By comparison, the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the 1990 Gulf War, and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine cut global supply by 7%, 6.5%, and 3%, respectively.

Not only have oil and natural gas prices risen well over 30% since the war began, but the shock has extended across the commodity complex, hitting everything from fertilizer (30% of which passes through the Strait) and the polyethylene (50%) used in plastics to helium (about 33%), a critical input for semiconductors, and thus for the AI revolution. Global shipping and insurance costs have also spiked, making the Iran war the biggest threat to maritime trade and supply chains since COVID-19. And because physical infrastructure is being destroyed, the effects could prove more persistent. Qatar estimates that rebuilding certain liquefied natural gas facilities could take as long as five years.

The longer-term ramifications of such losses are already showing up in revisions to the inflation and interest-rate outlook. The OECD is now forecasting 4.2% inflation in the US—more than 200 basis points above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target. Higher inflation has obvious negative implications for businesses, whose margins will be compressed, and for consumers, whose real (inflation-adjusted) wages will be eroded.

Meanwhile, the market has gone from pricing in one or two Fed rate cuts this year to anticipating a possible hike. Of course, the Fed may treat the current energy-price shock as “transitory” and avoid tightening its policy; but it will also recognize that the broader disruption to commodity supplies could be prolonged.

In any case, a rate hike would affect corporate capital-allocation decisions, debt issuances, and portfolio structures. The United States already has a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100%, and since its government bonds have relatively shorter maturities, it is more vulnerable to a fiscal crunch from higher interest rates.

Moreover, US 30-year mortgage rates have risen to over 6%, implying that the housing market could be severely affected in a higher-inflation scenario. Bond yields have risen and stock prices have fallen, though it remains to be seen how far these price adjustments will go (much depends on the length of the conflict and degree of infrastructure damage).

Ultimately, short-term price increases and concomitant rate hikes would fuel additional demand destruction (lower spending), possibly leading to a recession. Of course, the degree of pain would depend on how governments respond to the commodity shock, and how willing policymakers are to accept a fall in aggregate demand and the macroeconomic downturn that comes with it.

That brings us to the potentially deflationary medium- and longer-term outlook. As AI and related technologies advance, they could push down the prices of labor, commodities, and possibly even public goods such as education and health care. In fact, the prices of goods ranging from household furnishings and televisions to software and telecommunications services were already declining rapidly well before the arrival of large language models (as Mark J. Perry of the American Enterprise Institute showed in 2018). Now, AI promises to accelerate the trend.

Specifically, AI and AI-powered robotics could materially reduce the need for human workers. A recent Goldman Sachs report suggests that while the coming AI era may create new kinds of jobs, some 300 million full-time roles will be vulnerable in the meantime. Similarly, the venture capitalist Vinod Khosla (an investor in OpenAI) argues that AI will be capable of doing 80% of jobs by 2030, effectively automating a large portion of the $15 trillion US labor market.

Even if the effect is nowhere close to that large, the second-order effects spurred by AI will be essentially deflationary. Higher technology-driven productivity and more labor-replacing robots will mean less disposable income and demand, and perhaps lower tolerance for massive corporate margins as governments face an expanding welfare bill.

Still, if AI can handle a greater share of production and services in agriculture, manufacturing, health care, and education, the cost of living would drop significantly. That is why Khosla asks us to imagine a substantial increase in purchasing power, where an income of $10,000–$30,000 in 2040 would enable the same standard of living as $100,000 does today.

In such a deflationary environment, however, private and public debt burdens would explode. This points to a larger problem: other than the COVID-era supply-chain shocks, most investors and business leaders simply have not had a reason to think much about inflation or deflation. If we are indeed entering an era with fundamentally different conditions, we may not be prepared.

Faced with such extraordinarily rapid and widespread changes, business leaders, CEOs, and investors need to improve their understanding of not only short- and long-term price dynamics, but also of how these may interact. We must begin to grapple with the combined risk of considerably higher inflation in the near term, followed by persistent deflation in the coming years.

[Derby]

https://www.baha.com/Meloni-Trumps-words-about-the-Pope-unacceptable/news/details/66058367

Meloni: Trump's words about the Pope 'unacceptable'

talian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said in a statement on Monday that United States President Donald Trump's comments about Pope Leo XIV are "unacceptable." Trump had previously expressed criticism of the pontiff and refused to apologize.

"The Pope is the head of the Catholic Church, and it is right and normal that he should call for peace and condemn all forms of war," Meloni stressed. The Italian prime minister is often seen as one of Trump's allies in the European Union.

Moreover, the US president also triggered controversy for posting an image presumed to depict him as Jesus Christ. Earlier today, Trump said it meant to represent him as a doctor and "had to do with the Red Cross." He later took down the image from his Truth Social account.

[Derby]

https://www.investing.com/news/economy-news/us-housing-shortage-is-at-least-10-million-singlefamily-homes-white-house-says-93CH-4610942

US housing shortage is at least 10 million single-family homes, White House says


US housing shortage is at least 10 million single-family homes, White House says

Investing.com -- The US has a shortage of at least 10 million single-family homes, according to a new report from White House economists, a higher figure than some previous estimates from the government and the private sector.

The Council of Economic Advisers’ latest annual Economic Report* of the President stated that if homebuilding and the growth of the single-family housing stock had continued at their historical pace instead of falling after 2008, there would be 10 million or more additional single-family homes today.

The government-controlled Freddie Mac said in November 2024 that the US was 3.7 million housing units short of what was needed based on demand from a growing population. The National Association of Realtors estimated in June 2021 that the shortage was 5.5 million units, based on tracking trends over the previous 20 years compared with construction rates from 1968 to 2000.

This article was generated with the support of AI and reviewed by an editor. For more information see our T&C.

*https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/ERP-2026-6.-Protecting-and-Rebuilding-the-American-Dream-of-Homeownership.pdf

[Saturio]

https://www.baha.com/Meloni-Trumps-words-about-the-Pope-unacceptable/news/details/66058367

Meloni: Trump's words about the Pope 'unacceptable'

talian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said in a statement on Monday that United States President Donald Trump's comments about Pope Leo XIV are "unacceptable." Trump had previously expressed criticism of the pontiff and refused to apologize.

"The Pope is the head of the Catholic Church, and it is right and normal that he should call for peace and condemn all forms of war," Meloni stressed. The Italian prime minister is often seen as one of Trump's allies in the European Union.

Moreover, the US president also triggered controversy for posting an image presumed to depict him as Jesus Christ. Earlier today, Trump said it meant to represent him as a doctor and "had to do with the Red Cross." He later took down the image from his Truth Social account.

Yo creo que Trump le intentó meter mano a Meloni o algo. Semejante cambio...