El hilo de China

[muyuu]

Ojito con la foto 

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150402-the-worst-place-on-earth

Toxic Waste Spills Into Artificial Lake in Mongolia	Small | Large

[muyuu]

http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/china-rates-its-own-citizens-including-online-behaviour~a3979668/

China rates its own citizens - including online behaviour

The Chinese government is currently implementing a nationwide electronic system, called the Social Credit System, attributing to each of its 1,3 billion citizens a score for his or her behavior. The system will be based on various criteria, ranging from financial credibility and criminal record to social media behavior. From 2020 onwards each adult citizen should, besides his identity card, have such a credit code.

The regulations were announced last year, but have attracted almost no attention thus far in China and abroad. This week Rogier Creemers, a Belgian China-specialist at Oxford University, published a comprehensive translation of the regulations regarding the Social Credit System, which clarifies the scope of the system. In an interview with Dutch newspaper de Volkskrant he says: 'With the help of the latest internet technologies the government wants to exercise individual surveillance'.

In his view this surveillance will have a wider scope than was the case under the former East German system: 'The German aim was limited to avoiding a revolt against the regime. The Chinese aim is far more ambitious: it is clearly an attempt to create a new citizen.'

The intentions of the new system are not only economical, fighting fraudulent practices, but also moral. 'This is a deliberate effort by the Chinese government to promote among its citizens "socialist core values" such as patriotism, respecting the elderly, working hard and avoiding extravagant consumption', says Creemers. A bad 'credit code' can result in being not eligible for certain jobs, housing or credit to start a company. 'On the labour market you might need a certain score to get a specific job.'

Johan Lagerkvist, a Chinese internet specialist at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, agrees the system is 'very ambitious in both depth and scope, including scrutinizing individual behavior and what books people read. It's Amazon's consumer tracking with an Orwellian political twist.'

In Hong Kong a spokesperson of Human Right Watch China, Maya Wang, sees 'a scary vision of the future' in the system: 'Currently there is intensive surveillance of "sensitive groups, such as dissidents, but the social credit system goes to another level. This is an effort of surveillance of all people'.

Lagerkvist questions whether the system can be put into practice easily. 'Implementation may prove tricky, due to agency turf wars and reluctance of companies to fully comply. But it is an open question, it depends how much firepower the government will give the implementation effort.'

No doubt who is in command

The German China-expert Daniela Stockmann, political scientist at Leiden University, esteems Chinese internet firms will be reluctant, as they 'are aware of privacy concerns of their users. And also they struggle with their infrastructure to process huge amounts of data.'

But Creemers is convinced Chinese Internet giants like Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent will cooperate with the government in operating the system. These companies are 'in a symbiotic relationship with the government', he argues. Wheras in the US companies like Google or Facebook show themselves fighting for the privacy of their clients against the preying eyes of intelligence agencies, in China this is not the case. There is no doubt among key players who is in command. 'Government and big internet companies in China can exploit 'Big Data' together in a way that is unimaginable in the West', says Creemers.

Playing videogames versus buying diapers



Chinese internet firms are definitely interested, as Ant Financial, a subsidiary of ecommercegiant Alibaba, recently showed. To its popular app Alipay it added a new service which rated a person's credit worthiness on a scale of 350 to 950 points. This score is not only determined by one's lending behavior, but also by hobbies and friends. If friends have a poor lending reputation, this reflects badly on the person, just as prolonged playing of video games. Buying diapers indicates responsibility and scores therefore well.

In the Chinese press the system has been presented as rather limited focusing mostly on financial credibility. But Creemers' study shows the government wants to evaluate behavior of its citizens in various other areas as well, with the aim of 'strengthening and innovating social governance', according to the government. Innovative will be the active contribution of citizens rating other citizens. 'Imagine a Chinese person being able to rate his doctor or his professor, as is already happening in the US. And he or she might also give a bad score to polluting companies, as the system will be applied to companies and institutions as well', says Creemers.

Creditworthiness


The far reaching scope of the system is confirmed by an explanation on the website of the scientific institute CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). As a result of its transformation in recent decades Chinese society has changed 'from a society of acquaintances into a society of strangers'. As a result moral conduct has suffered: 'When people's behavior isn't bound by their morality, a system must be used to restrict their actions'. Therefore it is time for the 'Social Credit System', which covers 'four major fields: politics, business, society and justice.'

According to professor Wang Shuqin, who is working on the new system, the mechanism for establishing financial creditworthiness, is practically ready to be put in practice. Without such a mechanism doing business in China is risky, she stresses, as about half of the signed contracts are not kept. 'Especially given the speed of the digital economy it is crucial that people  can quickly verify each other's creditworthiness.' Adding non-financial factors to the system, like the 'socialist core values', she regards as a bonus: 'The behavior of the majority is determined by their world of thoughts. A person who believes in socialist core values, is behaving more decent.'

'This is the most staggering, publicly announced, scaled use of big data I've ever seen', says Michael Fertik, a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and author of The Reputation Economy. 'It certainly feels about as Orwellian as your nightmares would have it be. On the other hand, it is probably a fairly inevitable evolution - an updated, Big Data version - of the longstanding Communist Party's grading of China's citizens. It's exactly what any Command state would like to do with data.'

[Lego]

Si la noticia la ponen para que nos alegremos de no estar en China porque aquí gozamos de privacidad...
 

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-10/china-open-military-base-horn-africa-next-critical-oil-transit-choke-point

[mpt]

china no va a cometer el mismo error de siglos pasados, esta vez las rutas comerciales van a ser suyas

http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferrov%C3%ADa_Transcontinental_Brasil-Per%C3%BA

http://www.telesurtv.net/news/Brasil-y-China-firmaran-acuerdos-por-casi-50-mil-millones-de-dolares-20150514-0068.html

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

百年国耻

[muyuu]

http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/21/investing/china-hanergy-stock-plunge/index.html

China's richest man lost $15 billion in one hour

(15 millardos, 15.000 millones)

The chairman of solar panel firm Hanergy (HNGSF) lost $15 billion on Wednesday when shares in the company plummeted 47% in Hong Kong trading -- in about an hour. The company saw $18.6 billion wiped off its market value.

Trading in Hanergy shares was halted Wednesday pending release -- the company said -- of an announcement "containing inside information." The company has not commented further since, and the shares are still suspended.

Li owns just over 80% of Hanergy. He failed show up for the company's annual shareholder meeting on Wednesday, which began as the shares were plunging. A company spokesperson said he was attending the opening of Hanergy's clean energy exhibition in Beijing instead.

The lack of a company statement is adding to the confusion surrounding the stock crash. Bespoke Investment, a New York research and wealth management firm, called "the Hanergy story a complete mess."

And there was another mystery crash in Hong Kong on Thursday. Goldin Financial and Goldin Properties, owned by billionaire Pan Sutong, nosedived more than 40%. Both companies said they had no idea why their shares were plunging, and that they had no information to disclose to investors. Like Hanergy, the two companies had soared to astonishing highs over the past year.

Investors, regulators and analysts have questioned Hanergy's rapid share rise, and how the company was turning a profit, for months. They've used the company as an example of the risk of investing in emerging markets.


Before Wednesday's plunge, Hanergy's shares had surged 625% over the past year, making it seven times bigger than First Solar, the top U.S. solar firm. At its peak in April, the company was worth more than $45 billion, allowing Li to overtake Alibaba co-founder Jack Ma as China's richest man, according to a ranking by Hurun released in March.

But the huge climb spurred questions over market manipulation. And more concerns were raised earlier this year, when the company said 60% of its sales came from its Beijing-based parent company, Hanergy Holding Group. Li is also chairman of the parent.

On Wednesday, Reuters reported that the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission had been investigating market manipulation for weeks, citing an unidentified source. In recent months, the Financial Times has reported on Hanergy's accounting practices and unusual price movements.

Hanergy uses a specialized technology to create thinner, more flexible solar panels. The company has 15,000 employees, and branches around the globe.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-23/new-silk-road-could-change-global-economics-forever-part-1

Part 1: The New Silk Road

Beginning with the marvelous tales of Marco Polo’s travels across Eurasia to China, the Silk Road has never ceased to entrance the world. Now, the ancient cities of Samarkand, Baku, Tashkent, and Bukhara are once again firing the world’s imagination.

China is building the world’s greatest economic development and construction project ever undertaken: The New Silk Road. The project aims at no less than a revolutionary change in the economic map of the world. It is also seen by many as the first shot in a battle between east and west for dominance in Eurasia.

The ambitious vision is to resurrect the ancient Silk Road as a modern transit, trade, and economic corridor that runs from Shanghai to Berlin. The 'Road' will traverse China, Mongolia, Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Germany, extending more than 8,000 miles, creating an economic zone that extends over one third the circumference of the earth.

The plan envisions building high-speed railroads, roads and highways, energy transmission and distributions networks, and fiber optic networks. Cities and ports along the route will be targeted for economic development.

An equally essential part of the plan is a sea-based “Maritime Silk Road” (MSR) component, as ambitious as its land-based project, linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.

When completed, like the ancient Silk Road, it will connect three continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa. The chain of infrastructure projects will create the world's largest economic corridor, covering a population of 4.4 billion and an economic output of $21 trillion.

Politics and Finance:

The idea for reviving the New Silk Road was first announced in 2013 by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. As part of the financing of the plan, in 2014, the Chinese leader also announced the launch of an Asian International Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), providing seed funding for the project, with an initial Chinese contribution of $47 billion.

China has invited the international community of nations to take a major role as bank charter members and partners in the project. Members will be expected to contribute, with additional funding by international funds, including the World Bank, investments from private and public companies, and local governments.

Some 58 nations have signed on to become charter bank members, including most of Western Europe, along with many Silk Road and Asian countries. There are 12 NATO countries among AIIB´s founding member states (UK, France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Poland and Norway), along with three of the main US military allies in Asia (Australia, S. Korea and New Zealand).

After failed attempts by the US to persuade allies against joining the bank, the US reversed course, and now says that it has always supported the project, a disingenuous position considering the fact that US opposition was hardly a secret. The Wall Street Journal reported in November 2014 that “the U.S. has also lobbied hard against Chinese plans for a new infrastructure development bank…including during teleconferences of the Group of Seven major industrial powers.

The Huffington Post’s Alastair Crooke had this to say on the matter: “For very different motives, the key pillars of the region (Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan) are re-orienting eastwards. It is not fully appreciated in the West how important China's "Belt and Road" initiative is to this move (and Russia, of course is fully integrated into the project). Regional states can see that China is very serious indeed about creating huge infrastructure projects from Asia to Europe. They can also see what occurred with the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as the world piled in (to America's very evident dismay). These states intend to be a part of it.”

Buttressing this effort, China plans on injecting at least $62 billion into three banks to support the New Silk Road. The China Development Bank (CDB) will receive $32 billion, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM) will take on $30 billion, and the Chinese government will also pump additional capital into the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC).

The US: Unlikely Partner on the Silk Road:

Will the US join the effort? If the new Trans-Pacific Partnership (that pointedly leaves out both Russia and China, two Pacific powers) is any indication, US participation seems unlikely and opposition all but certain.

But there's no good reason that America should sacrifice its own leadership role in the region to China. A project as vast and complicated as the Silk Road will need US technology, experience, and resources to lower risk, removing political barriers for other allied countries like Japan to join in, while maintaining US influence in Eurasia. The Silk Road could enhance US objectives, and US support could improve the outcome of the project.

An editorial in the Wall St. Journal argues that the US proposed trade agreement and China's sponsored Silk Road project are complimentary, with the trade agreement aimed at writing rules for international trade, while the Chinese aim at developing infrastructure is necessary for increased trade.

Initial Project:

A look at the first project, currently under development, provides a good example of how China plans to proceed.

The first major economic development project will take place in Pakistan, where the Chinese have been working for years, building and financing a strategic deepwater port at Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea, that will be managed by China as the long-term leaseholder.

Gwadar will become the launching point for the much delayed Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline, which will ultimately be extended to China, with the Persian section already built and the Pakistan-Chinese section largely financed and constructed by the Chinese.

The pipeline is also set to traverse the country, following the Karakoram Mountain Highway towards Tibet, and cross the Chinese western border to Xinjang. The highway will also be widened and modernized, and a railroad built, connecting the highway to Gwadar.

Originally, the plan was to extend the pipeline to India, with Qatar joining Iran as natural gas suppliers, forging what some considered a “peace pipeline” between India and Pakistan, but India withdrew, under pressure from the US along with its own concerns over having its energy supplies dependent upon its adversary, Pakistan.

India's Counter:

Not surprisingly, India, a US ally, countered China's initiative with one of its own, announcing a new agreement to build a port in Iran on the Arabian Sea, only a few hundred miles from Gwadar, bringing Iranian energy to India via Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan.

Although it would offer an alternative to the Chinese-backed Gwadar initiative, the US warned India not to move ahead with the port project before a final nuclear agreement between Iran and the West is actually signed.

Both the Chinese and Indian projects are clearly in defiance of international sanctions on Iran, but both countries appear unconcerned. The Chinese could also be accused of a ‘double dip’ sanctions violation, given the immense and continuing trade deals it negotiated with Russia.

The rest of the business world is sure to follow, or risk losing out in what is certain to be a new “gold rush” towards Asia in a world still struggling with the lingering effects of the great recession. And New Delhi pointed out the harsh truth: American energy companies are also trying to negotiate deals with Iran. Following on the heels of the US visit, the German mission is due in Tehran soon, with the French beating everyone to the punch in an earlier visit.

What then of sanctions? Sanctions only work in a world united behind them. If a large part of the world chooses to ignore sanctions, they become unenforceable.

Conclusions:

China and much of the world is intent on developing the largest economic development project in history, one that could have dramatic ripple effects throughout the world economy.

The project is expected to take decades, with costs running into the hundreds of billions of dollars, if not trillions. What that will mean for the world economy and trade is almost inconceivable. Is it any wonder then, that the world’s largest hedge funds, like Goldman Sachs and Blackstone, are rushing to market new multi-billion dollar international infrastructure investment funds?

No doubt a project as large and complex as this is likely to have failures, and is certain to face many western geopolitical obstructions. Assuredly, the “great game” will continue. Look no further than US President Barack Obama, who also senses the urgency. “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region,” he said in defense of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

In a world where economic growth is tepid, with Europe still struggling with the aftermath of the global recession, along with China's growth slowdown, where else could a project that promises so much opportunity be found?

It's a good bet that giant iron mining companies like Vale, that have seen their business fall to a thirteen-year low, are currently busy figuring how much steel goes into construction of a new, high speed 8,000 mile railroad. If the project is successful, it could very well spark a boom across the entire depressed international mining, commodities, and construction sectors.

Consider how many jobs could be created in a decades-long construction project that spans a huge region of the world. In practically every sector, the prospects are enormous for a revival of trade and commerce.

The ancient Silk Road increased trade across the known world, but the Road also offered far more than trade. One of its least anticipated benefits was the widespread exchange of knowledge, learning, discovery, and culture.

Beyond the riches of silks, spices, and jewelry, it could be argued that the most important thing that Marco Polo brought back from China was a famous nautical and world map that was the basis for one of the most famous maps published in Europe, one that helped spark the Age of Discovery. Christopher Columbus was guided by that map and was known to have a well-annotated copy of Marco Polo's travel tales with him on his voyage of discovery of a new route to India.

For the world at large, its decisions about the Road are nothing less than momentous. The massive project holds the potential for a new renaissance in commerce, industry, discovery, thought, invention, and culture that could well rival the original Silk Road. It is also becoming clearer by the day that geopolitical conflicts over the project could lead to a new cold war between East and West for dominance in Eurasia.

The outcome is far from certain.

Coming soon, Part 2: Cold War or Competition on the New Silk Road.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

[Currobena]

Piensa que esto es porque el gobierno chino quiere pinchar su burbuja inmobiliaria, con lo que los inversores ser han movido a la bolsa. Aquí pasará algo parecido con el mfbh.

[muyuu]

Lo de Shenzhen es acojonante, más aún teniendo en cuenta su legislación sin apenas garantías a la propiedad de los extranjeros.

Recuerdo que estuve mirando vivienda por allí alrededor del año 2000. Estuve de paso en 2012, cruzando desde Hong Kong, y lo que ha cambiado la cosa es bestial. Algunos han dado unos pelotazos que dejan los patrios a la altura del betún, y aquello da bastante más vértigo ya que las expropiaciones a precios irrisorios ocurren con relativa frecuencia.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Piensa que esto es porque el gobierno chino quiere pinchar su burbuja inmobiliaria, con lo que los inversores ser han movido a la bolsa. Aquí pasará algo parecido con el mfbh.

Hoy hay otro artículo bastante completito:

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-05-26/why-china-so-desperate-blow-most-epic-stock-bubble

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-economic-growth-by-andrew-sheng-and-geng-xiao-2015-05

HONG KONG – The People’s Bank of China has cut interest rates for the third time in six months, in order to lighten the debt burdens of companies and local governments. But the PBOC’s monetary easing – accompanied by complementary fiscal and administrative adjustments – has done little to increase demand for new loans. Instead, it has triggered a sharp rise in China’s stock markets. The question now is whether that could turn out to be a very good thing.

There is little doubt that China’s economy is shifting gears very quickly. Official statistics show a slowdown in real growth in the old manufacturing and construction-based economy, reflected in declining corporate profits, rising defaults, and an increase in non-performing loans in poorer-performing cities and regions. Meanwhile, the government’s policies to tackle corruption, overcapacity, excess local-government debt, and pollution have put downward pressure on investment, consumption, and the government’s capacity to deliver its promised growth rate.

With harder budget constraints imposed by the central government, local officials and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have curbed their spending on investment, and are now being overly cautious. In the short run, this restructuring could lead to localized balance-sheet recessions, despite the authorities’ efforts to create a more accommodating macroeconomic environment.

The private sector, by contrast, is picking up steam, with recent administrative reforms having contributed to a 54% rise in business registrations since March 2014. Increased innovation and the rise of the services sector have helped China move beyond its role as the world’s factory to develop its own version of the Internet of Things, driven by platform companies like Alibaba and Tencent.

Some 14.3 million new stock-market trading accounts were opened in China last year. And the PBOC’s interest-rate cuts, together with reductions in banks’ mandatory reserve ratios, have fueled a rise in the Shanghai, Shenzhen, and ChiNext indices of 95%, 198%, and 383%, respectively, since January 2013. Chinese stock-market capitalization grew from 44% of GDP at the end 2012 to 94% of GDP earlier this month.
This has important potential implications – both positive and negative.

On the positive side, the revival of China’s stock market in a low-interest-rate environment represents an important shift in asset allocation away from real estate and deposits. Roughly 50% of Chinese savings – amounting to as much as half of GDP – lie in real estate alone, with 20% in deposits, 11% in stocks, and 12% in bonds. To compare, in the United States, real estate, insurance, and pensions each account for about 20% of total savings, with 7.4% in deposits, 21% in stocks, and 33% in bonds.

Rising stock-market capitalization also helps to reduce the real economy’s exposure to bank financing. The US is much more “financialized” than China, with stocks and bonds amounting to 133% and 205% of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2013. Those ratios were only 35% and 43%, respectively, in China. Meanwhile, China’s bank assets amounted to 215% of GDP – more than double America’s 95%.

Finally, China’s surging stock prices increased net wealth by CN¥37 trillion ($6 trillion), equivalent to 57% of China’s GDP, in just 18 months. If stock prices can be sustained, the implications for consumption, liquidity, and leverage will be profound. Smart households and entrepreneurs could take profits and reduce their debts. Similarly, both private enterprises and SOEs could use market buoyancy to raise equity to fund new investments.

But the rapid run-up in equity prices also carries considerable risks – namely, the possibility that the financial sector will misuse the newfound liquidity to finance more speculative investment in asset bubbles, while supporting old industries with excess capacity. That is what happened in 2008-2009, when a run-up of the Shanghai index (which reached 6,092 in October 2007), together with the government’s CN¥4 trillion stimulus package, sustained overcapacity in traditional industries. Most of the credit went to real estate and local infrastructure projects, effectively reinforcing the most problematic trends in China’s economy.

This time, one hopes, will be different. But even if Chinese retail investors begin to channel their money toward innovative ventures, identifying the companies and industries most likely to succeed will be difficult.

In the US, the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000 entailed a $4 trillion loss in market capitalization. But the US managed to avoid a systemic crisis. If China’s animal spirits are allowed to operate through market mechanisms, distinguishing real value from aspirational prices, China, too, can stay the course toward the new economy, despite the failures and consolidation that will inevitably occur.

As China’s animal spirits are channeled, they will increasingly test the authorities’ resolve to resist price intervention, instead allowing market forces to propel the business cycle. This will not be easy, given that the PBOC has plenty of additional room for monetary easing.

Indeed, at the end of last year, China still had CN¥22.7 trillion of statutory reserves, amounting to 36% of GDP, that had long been used to “sterilize” its large foreign-exchange holdings. Such “locked liquidity” can be returned to the market in the form of new bank credit or new equity.

That is why the real test of China’s administrative reforms is whether, through improved bankruptcy mechanisms and regulations that block fraud and market manipulation, they allow – and even facilitate – the effective functioning of market forces. With animal spirits – not the authorities – guiding it, China can build the high-value-added, high-tech economy it needs to compete in the future.

[muyuu]

http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21652337-economic-dangers-chinas-manic-bull-market-goring-concern

A goring concern

The economic dangers of China’s manic bull market

THE slowdown in China’s property market has been cruel to makers of wooden flooring. After double-digit growth for much of the past decade, sales have slumped. Kemian Wood Industry, which used to boast of the quality of its composite floorboards, took radical steps to deal with the downturn. It switched its focus to online gaming and changed its name. After its rechristening as Zeus Entertainment in early March, its share price doubled in short order. This past week, though, its transition plan hit a snag. CCTV, the state broadcaster, accused it of being one of a series of companies that are “fabricating themes and telling stories” to inflate their share prices.

Zeus Entertainment denies the allegations. But the wider trend is clear. At least 80 listed Chinese firms changed names in the first five months of this year. A hotel group rebranded itself as a high-speed rail company, a fireworks maker as a peer-to-peer lender and a ceramics specialist as a clean-energy group. Their reinventions as high-tech companies appear to have less to do with the gradual rebalancing of China’s economy than with the mania sweeping its stockmarket.


The Shenzhen Composite Index, which is full of tech companies, has nearly tripled over the past year. Even frothier is ChiNext, a board for startups that is now valued at 140 times last year’s earnings (see chart 1). A multiple of 50 would already be very optimistic for even the whizziest firms. ChiNext is supposed to be China’s answer to NASDAQ. It does indeed closely resemble NASDAQ—but as it was in 1999, just before the dotcom bubble went pop. There is no telling when the Chinese frenzy will end, but a sharp correction seems inevitable. Such a reversal would cast a long shadow over China’s economy.


As in any bubbly market, there is a debate about just how inflated Chinese stock prices are. The average price-earnings (PE) ratio on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, home to the country’s biggest firms, is 23—lofty but not much higher than America’s S&P 500 share index. That, however, is a skewed picture. Banks have the heaviest weighting on the Shanghai exchange and they have been largely left behind by the rally. (That is a warning sign in itself since bank shares tend to track the broader economy.) The median share in Shanghai now has a PE of 75. Chen Jiahe of Cinda Securities, a

brokerage, calculates that nearly 85% of listed companies have higher valuations today than at the height of China’s stock bubble in 2007—which ended in a big bust. Global investors are not buying into the mania: the shares of companies listed in both Hong Kong and Shanghai are now 30% more expensive in the latter.

Examples of excess abound. A pet-food company trades on 221 times earnings, a sauna-maker on 285 and a manufacturer of fans on 732. Chinese stocks have long had a tenuous relationship with economic reality, but the current rally has gone to new extremes. Growth in the first quarter fell to 7% year on year, the weakest figure since 2009. And monthly data suggest that the slowdown has deepened in the second quarter. But stocks are still racing ahead (see chart 3). Almost 8m brokerage accounts were opened in the first quarter of 2015 alone (see chart 4). A shift to monetary easing and fiscal stimulus—and expectations of more to come—help explain why the rally began. But the longer it continues, the more it looks like irrational exuberance.

One common view about the bull run is that the government is behind it, and could bring it to a halt if it chose, just like flipping a switch. The truth is that even the Communist Party, though powerful, struggles to steer the stockmarket along its desired path. Official media did talk up shares as “cheap” in the early days of the rally, but the government had tried for years without success to breathe life into the previously torpid market, cutting stock-trading taxes and freezing new listings to limit the supply of shares. In recent weeks the balance of official rhetoric has started to turn against the market, highlighting the growing risks. The report by CCTV about companies “telling stories” followed a vow by the securities regulator to crack down on market manipulation. “It’s like crying wolf. Because there have been repeat warnings but few serious consequences, investors pay even less attention,” says Shao Yu of Orient Securities, a brokerage.

If the bubble does burst, it would undoubtedly hurt the Chinese economy. Leverage has played a big part in the rally: margin financing for share purchases has increased five-fold over the past year to more than 2 trillion yuan ($325 billion; see chart 2). Debt has also worked its way into the market through other channels such as “umbrella trusts”, which used to allow banks to lend to wealthy investors without encumbering their balance-sheets. Credit Suisse estimates that 6-9% of China’s market capitalisation is funded by credit, nearly five times the average in the rich world.

The presence of so much leverage means that the eventual correction is likely to be sharp as investors race to repay loans. This is new territory for China. When its last bubble burst in 2007, the government had yet to allow margin financing. “Now, the odds are that it will inflict a much bigger loss on households,” says Helen Qiao of Morgan Stanley, a bank.

Nevertheless, the immediate damage from a crash should be manageable for China. The free-float capitalisation of the stockmarket is just about 40% of GDP; in rich countries it is typically more than 100%. ChiNext accounts for less than a tenth of GDP. Moreover, the rally has been less helpful for the economy than often imagined. A sustained slowdown in retail sales indicates that there has been little positive wealth effect from rising share prices. Some households may have even held off from buying things to put more into the market. The corollary is that a market tumble need not spell too much gloom, at least in the short term.

The longer-term repercussions of the mania are more worrisome. After the 2007 crash, investors lost faith in China’s stockmarket for years. Equity issuance slowed to a crawl. Companies had little choice but to tap banks for funding, one of the reasons why Chinese debt levels soared from 150% of GDP in 2008 to more than 250% today. Many hoped that the current rally would put China’s financial system on a better footing by allowing companies to raise more cash through equities and reduce their reliance on debt. This is only beginning: share issuance is stronger this year but still accounts for just 4% of corporate financing. If the rally turns to rout, it would undermine that shift. “Regulators want a slow bull market,” says Larry Hu of Macquarie Securities. Instead, they have a raging beast.

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-jobless-economic-growth-by-keyu-jin-2015-06/spanish

BEIJING – El primer ministro chino, Li Keqiang, señaló recientemente que la creación de empleos es un punto crucial del “objetivo último de crecimiento con estabilidad” de su país. Su comentario es de lo más acertado. De hecho, una de las características más impresionantes del ascenso de la economía china es que incluso en un contexto de crecimiento del PIB de dos dígitos, el empleo creció a una insignificante tasa anual promedio de 1.8% de 1978 a 2004. Los hogares, parece, no han recibido muchos de los beneficios del desarrollo económico en China.

La explicación superficial de la brecha entre el crecimiento del PIB y el aumento del empleo atribuye este resultado a la reestructuración de empresas estatales ineficientes (SOEs, por sus siglas en inglés), que contribuyó al desplome  del empleo en el sector público, de 112.6 millones a 67 millones entre 1995 y 2004. Sin embargo, hay una razón que es crucial: el sesgo chino hacia la industrialización. Durante mucho tiempo el gobierno chino ha considerado la industrialización como un aspecto clave del crecimiento. En la campaña “un Gran paso adelante” del dirigente Mao Zedong, los metales chatarra se fundían para satisfacer metas de producción de acero descontroladamente optimistas y así impulsar un rápido desarrollo industrial. Ahora, el gobierno promueve proyectos industriales y de infraestructura que mediante la promoción de la inversión y la generación de ingresos fiscales, permiten a la economía alcanzar metas de crecimiento ambiciosas pero ya reflexionadas.

El problema es que el sector de manufactura no contribuye en mucho a la creación de empleos, sobre todo porque el relativo alto crecimiento de la productividad  del sector –en promedio más de 10% anual en las dos últimas décadas– constriñe la demanda de más trabajadores. En contraste, el sector de servicios chino ha registrado solo alrededor de 5% de crecimiento anual de la productividad, y por ende, ha sido un motor mucho más efectivo de creación de empleos.

De hecho, el sector servicios es el responsable de una gran proporción en la creación de empleos en numerosas economías avanzadas. Aunque, si bien, 80% de la fuerza laboral estadounidense se concentró en las industrias del sector servicios en 2012, solo 36% de los trabajadores chinos trabajaron en el sector servicios. Para impulsar los empleos del sector servicios, el gobierno chino tiene que flexibilizar su marco normativo, disminuir las barreras de acceso en sectores de telecomunicaciones, entre otros, y fomentar la movilidad laboral.

La concentración de China en la producción industrial es problemática en otros sentidos: hace un uso intensivo de capital, debido en gran parte a las distorsiones provocadas por las políticas del gobierno. Más allá de mantener las tasas de interés en niveles inferiores a los del mercado, el gobierno ofreció a las industrias del automóvil, la maquinaria y el acero, entre otras, acceso preferencial a créditos asequibles , tratamiento fiscal favorable y apoyo con inversiones públicas. Dichas políticas incitaron a las empresas a adoptar tecnologías de uso intensivo de capital, lo que ensombreció las ventajas comparativas naturales de la fuerza laboral.

Al mismo tiempo, las intervenciones del gobierno han limitado el crecimiento de las empresas del sector privado impidiéndoles  el acceso al financiamiento. Aunque las SOEs emplean solo 13% de la fuerza laboral total y contribuyen con alrededor de 30% del PIB, absorben la mitad del total de las inversiones. Juntos, bancos y gobierno ofrecen aproximadamente 35% de las inversiones a las SOEs, pero solo 10% de inversiones hacia las empresas privadas.

No obstante, el uso de la fuerza laboral de las empresas privadas es significativamente más intensivo que el de las SOEs –que usan casi cuatro veces más capital– y por ende han sido las principales creadoras de empleo en China en década recientes. Con un crecimiento promedio del empleo de 10.4% anual, el sector privado compensó en parte los despidos en las SOEs entre 1995 y 2004. El sector informal creció aún más rápido, a una tasa anual de 24%, aunque de una base baja.

Dados los beneficios obvios de un sector privado próspero y en rápida expansión, el gobierno chino debería tomar medidas para asegurar que dichas empresas –en especial las pequeñas y medianas empresas que a menudo están fuera del mercado de créditos– pueden acceder al capital que necesitan para expandirse. Esto conduciría inevitablemente al auge en la creación de empleos.

La verdad incómoda es que los hogares chinos se han beneficiado muy poco del milagro de crecimiento económico de su país. En efecto, la proporción para las familias del ingreso nacional ha decrecido significativamente en la última década, y frente a las economías avanzadas hay una marcada diferencia, donde la proporción es consistentemente más alta.

Al permitir la prosperidad del sector privado y fomentar el cambio hacia una economía orientada a los servicios, el gobierno chino podría estimular el crecimiento del empleo y, a su vez, el consumo interno. Como parece reconocer Li, el reequilibrio estructural es necesario no solo para mejorar el bienestar de los ciudadanos chinos, sino también para incentivar la estabilidad social y económica en un momento de profunda incertidumbre mundial.