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https://www.economist.com/international/2024/05/29/is-your-rent-ever-going-to-fall

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International | Control yourself!
Is your rent ever going to fall?

Too often politicians tout awful solutions for helping tenants



Illustration: Rob en Robin

An entire generation of tenants is tearing its hair out. Across the rich world—from America to New Zealand—millions spend more than a third of their disposable income on rent. The squeeze extends from social democracies that prize strong tenancy rights to Anglophone countries that prefer homeownership—and it is mostly getting worse. The good news for anxious renters is that they are gaining a louder voice as their numbers swell. The bad news is that campaigners and politicians mostly focus on the wrong kinds of solutions to their woes.

The 20th century saw an astonishing rise in homeownership. In 1920 about 20% of Britons owned their own home; by 2000, 70% did. Many Anglophone countries followed a similar path. Even in countries less attached to the idea of owning, private renting became less common after a boom in social housing.

The story in the 21st century has been different.
Rod Hick of Cardiff University in Wales calculates that in countries such as Britain, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain, homeownership rates fell by ten percentage points in the decade or so to 2018. Data on renting are patchy. But figures from the OECD, a club of rich countries, show that there has been a shift towards renting in most wealthy countries since 2010 (see chart 1). A bigger private-rented sector is probably here to stay, predicts Peter Kemp of Britain’s Oxford University.


Chart: The Economist

One of the most dramatic shifts has been in Britain. A fifth of the population now rent privately, up from a tenth in the early 2000s—an increase of more than 6m renters. It was a British bank, Halifax, that coined the term “generation rent” in 2011. But British millennials, born between 1981 and 1996, were not special. A sagging jobs market, high house prices, rising rents and tighter mortgage rules left many youngsters less able to afford a first property.

Employment and housing pressures have eased somewhat. Generation Z, which includes those born between 1997 and 2012, is now earning much more than millennials did at the same age. Cooling housing markets may be helping some millennials get their first set of keys, albeit often with the help of mum and dad. But others remain stuck. In Britain half of renters are now over 35. What was seen in many places as the sector for the young and footloose is increasingly home to families and the elderly. Politicians are beginning to fret about a coming wave of retired renters.

Rents have risen particularly sharply in the past three years, fuelled by workers returning to cities after the pandemic and by wages rising even as the supply of properties remains constrained. High interest rates have crimped already inadequate levels of building. Housing starts in Sweden were down by 50% in the first quarter of 2023. And lending rules remain tight.

Some tenants complain about insecurity and grotty conditions. But the biggest problem, particularly for those on low incomes, is affordability. The definition of “unaffordable” is open to debate, but the OECD and others commonly focus on housing that accounts for more than 30% of gross income or, alternatively, 40% of disposable income (ie, income after tax and social-security charges). In 2022 almost half of American households in the private-rental sector were being charged more than 30% of gross income, according to the Joint Centre for Housing Studies at Harvard University in America.

That was the highest level on record—and up by 2m in three years. Across the rich world, rents at 40% or more of disposable income are common (see chart 2). And those data miss large black markets—where sublets do not comply with regulations—in countries such as Sweden and Germany.


Chart: The Economist

High rents do not just lighten people’s wallets. A dysfunctional rental market can make it harder for those on low incomes to get good jobs. Stockholm’s metro is part of one of the best public-transport networks in the world. Yet one in five businesses says high costs and a shortage of affordable housing make it difficult to hire young workers. Lucas Persson, a 28-year-old who works at a think-tank, says many of his friends have considered leaving the city. Spotify, a Swedish music-streaming business, has called the broken rental market a barrier to expansion.

Many of those taking up the cause of renters choose to blame landlords—or as some activists call them, “social parasites”. The urge to control prices often follows. In 2022 the Scottish government introduced a rent freeze. Sadiq Khan, London’s mayor, has long wanted to do the same. Cities in France and Germany have tightened rent controls in response to rising unaffordability. The Australian Greens say a rent freeze would rein in “wealthy property moguls”.

In America there have long been rent controls for existing tenants in New York and San Francisco. In recent years Oregon and California have passed state-wide laws; since 2023 Michelle Wu, the mayor of Boston, has been trying to follow suit.

The appeal of all this to politicians is fairly obvious, says Professor Kemp. Landlords are unpopular (Joe Biden has reassured voters he will be “cracking down” on them). So, too, in many places is building houses. By contrast, rent controls often attract broad support: after all, who is against lower rents? Even better, they cost the government nothing upfront and can be set up at the stroke of a pen.

Economists object. Rent controls first became popular in the aftermath of two world wars—a time when tenants were a large voting block. Milton Friedman attacked controls in an essay in 1946, warning that they would result in the “haphazard and arbitrary allocation of space, inefficient use of space, [and] retardation of new construction”. Liberal economists regard controls as a zombie policy.

No city today better demonstrates the distortions Friedman warned of than Stockholm. On paper Sweden’s system of rent controls, the hyresreglering, is the strictest in the world. A powerful tenants’ union negotiates with landlords, holding rents as much as 50% below the market. In practice lots of people lose out. Swedes must join waiting lists for a rent-controlled apartment: in central Stockholm the average wait is 20 years; across the city it is about half that. Many who reach the front of the queue are in their 50s and own a home. Young Swedes often have to put up with expensive sublets agreed to under the table, laments Mr Persson.

Those lucky enough to have a flat refuse to move. Families come up with ingenious ways of passing contracts to distant relatives. If a couple is so bold as to want more space for children, they must engineer a complex chain of swaps. Or resort to bribes. In 2021 a court case revealed that a woman paid SKr2.4m, or $220,000, for a black-market contract for an apartment in Ostermalm, a posh part of Stockholm.

“The queue system allocates scarce apartments to wealthy, upper-middle class Swedes while those who need them live in shitty, uncertain accommodation outside the city,” says Brett Christophers, a geographer at Uppsala University in Sweden. Swedes like to think their approach is fair and progressive. But immigrants fare worst of all because they find the system hardest to navigate, according to Fredrik Kopsch of Lund University, also in Sweden.

Not all forms of rent control are equally harmful—and their impact depends on where and how they are implemented. One reason the idea never dies is that proponents keep adapting it. The most destructive policies see rents artificially capped or frozen at a fixed level. Most governments have long since abandoned these. But every so often one is mad enough to try again, such as the authorities in Berlin in 2020 and Scotland in 2022.

More common now are controls that seek to limit rent increases within tenancies, for instance to a fixed percentage above inflation. The idea behind these is that landlords and tenants do not always have equal bargaining power, so in theory landlords can gouge tenants by taking advantage of high moving costs. Yet if such policies create a wedge between controlled and market rents, they will still encourage landlords not to invest in their properties and tenants not to move.

In Boston Ms Wu proposed an annual cap on increases of CPI plus 6%—a level few landlords would try to exceed. But the problem is that once politicians have control over rental prices, they are tempted to keep bearing down on them, which gums up the market. In Germany recent clampdowns have done exactly that, according to Stefan Kofner of the country’s Görlitz University. In Sweden the cost of rent-controlled apartments fell far below market rents long ago.

Price controls can act like a ratchet: easy to tighten but very hard to relax. Sweden’s parliament has debated reforms for years; in 2021 a modest proposal helped cause a government to fall. If the concern is protecting tenants from gouging, Anglophone countries should improve tenants’ ability to appeal against above-market increases or challenge bad behaviour.

Rent controls are most damaging when supply is constrained and demand is high, squeezing those searching for somewhere to live. The hyresreglering is failing partly because wealthy municipalities around the city have increasingly resisted new building, says Mr Kopsch. American lefties talk dreamily of Vienna, where 80% of the city’s inhabitants live in rent-controlled apartment blocks. Last year the New York Times even dubbed it a “Renters’ Utopia”. But that city’s planning laws have long made it easy to keep adding apartment blocks and, in any case, its population has barely increased since the second world war. Seeing Vienna-style rent controls as the answer to problems in Manhattan misses the point.

The foundations of change

One city provides a good model for helping renters, however. Frustratingly, its lessons are being ignored. In 2016 Auckland in New Zealand, which had some of the least affordable housing in the world, passed a law allowing more dense development on three-quarters of residential land. Lawmakers particularly wanted to encourage more apartments within walking distance of the city centre, public transport or commercial areas.

A housing boom followed—adding 44,000 homes in seven years, equivalent to around 8% of current stock. A new study by Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy of the University of Auckland estimates that the extra homes have held rents almost 30% below where they otherwise would have been. In 2021 Jacinda Ardern, New Zealand’s then prime minister, passed a law nudging other cities to follow Auckland’s lead. But progress has stalled. All around the world, the only way renters will get a better deal is for cities to enable more building. In Stockholm, Mr Persson is not optimistic. In a few years he hopes to get a rent-controlled flat in Rinkeby-Kista, a suburb struggling with crime that is 12km outside of the city. ■

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Que en Canadá lanzan millones y no solucionan nada y aquí no solucionamos nada pero no lanzamos millones. No sé que es preferible.

Yo creo que también lanzamos millones igual, todo sea por sostener el inmobiliario como vehículo de inversión.

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https://www.marketwatch.com/story/u-s-manufacturers-shrink-in-may-as-orders-drop-industrial-side-of-the-economy-is-soft-ed4916a0

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‘The manufacturing side of the economy appears to have stalled,’ ISM says

ISM manufacturing index falls to 48.7% in May



American manufacturers are treading water. AFP via Getty Images

The numbers: A key barometer of U.S. factories fell to a three-month low as new orders waned and businesses were reluctant to invest due to high interest rates.

“The manufacturing side of the economy appears to have stalled,” said Timothy Fiore, chairman of the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing index.

The index fell to 48.7% in May from 49.2% in the prior month. Numbers below 50% signal that the manufacturing sector is contracting.

The ISM report is viewed as a window into the health of the economy. Economists polled by the Wall Street Journal had forecast the index to rise slightly last month.

Big picture:
The industrial side of the economy is unlikely to generate sustained growth until interest rates fall and a lower cost of borrowing entices consumers and business customers to buy more goods or invest.

“Companies are extremely cautious with any form of investment,” Fiore said.

At the same time, higher prices of raw materials such as oil, plastics, copper, aluminum are putting upward pressure on prices. That could keep inflation elevated.

Market reaction: The Dow Jones Industrial Average DJIA, -0.48% fell, but the S&P 500 SPX, -0.18%, rose in Monday trades.

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https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2024/06/03/financial-capital-is-not-scarce-so-why-do-we-pay-so-much-for-it/

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Financial capital is not scarce, so why do we pay so much for it?

(...)This is a situation which Keynes has said has outlived its usefulness. It's time that we imagined a world where low interest rates were there in perpetuity and we worked out how to manage capital better.

Not so that money goes into stupid things, like pushing up the price of shares or the price of homes inappropriately, but into the productive well-being of the economy, so that we have the technology we need to meet our needs.

And our needs are really big, because without investment, we can't manage climate change.

And these issues are intimately related.

6
Se veía venir, verdad?  ;)

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/blackstone-s-59-billion-property-trust-hit-by-starwood-fallout

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Blackstone’s $59 Billion Property Trust Hit by Starwood Fallout


Property trusts have come under heightened pressure as real estate values have plunged.Photographer: Alex Kraus/Bloomberg

A $59 billion Blackstone Inc. property trust is contending with the fallout from a rival’s decision to enforce stricter limits on investors.

Repurchase requests by investors in Blackstone Real Estate Income Trust ticked up in May, according to a shareholder letter Monday, after rival Starwood Real Estate Income Trust tightened limits. Starwood’s decision further chilled investor sentiment about a real estate sector hammered by rising rates.

BREIT’s board agreed to allow the trust to exceed a 2% monthly limit in order to be able to fulfill all of its withdrawal requests in May. In both April and May, BREIT has returned about 4.4% of its net asset value to investors.

The trust has “no plans” to change its share repurchase program, according to the letter.

Property trusts have come under heightened pressure as real estate values have plunged. Last month, the $10 billion Starwood Real Estate Income Trust capped monthly redemptions at 0.33% of net asset value, down from its previous 2% monthly limit, as it faced a liquidity crunch.

Blackstone President Jon Gray said Starwood’s issues led more BREIT investors to ask for their money back.

“There’s been some news based on this SREIT dynamic that creates some increase in redemptions, but nothing like what we experienced back in the beginning of 2023,” Gray said at an investor conference in May.

BREIT’s outflow requests began to rise in late 2022 and the trust had to impose its limits as interest rates climbed and real estate values fell, threatening returns for investors in the trust that had been a major growth engine for Blackstone. In March, BREIT marked what appeared to be a milestone and allowed investors to withdraw as much as they wanted.

The firm said its requests declined until the last two weeks of May 2024, when SREIT set more restrictive limits on redemptions. Blackstone, without mentioning the REIT by name, tried to set itself apart from Starwood’s vehicle. BREIT said in the shareholder letter that its portfolio and liquidity — it can tap into about $7.5 billion — is “materially different” to its rival and cited its bets on data centers and student housing.

Total net returns at the Blackstone trust have fallen sharply since borrowing costs began climbing in early 2022. A popular share class of BREIT gained 2.2% through April of this year after a 0.5% loss in 2023.

The Starwood trust generated a total return of 1.67% this year through April, following a loss of 8.6% in 2023.

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https://www.ft.com/content/cbb9b949-1262-4d72-9ee7-6035c3e022d2

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Fed official says interest rates should stay on hold for ‘extended’ time

Neel Kashkari warns cutting too early could risk US economic prosperity


A top Federal Reserve official has called for interest rates to stay on hold for an “extended” time, saying lowering borrowing costs before inflation was under control would put the foundations of US prosperity at risk.

Neel Kashkari, Minneapolis Fed president, also told the FT podcast The Economics Show that Americans’ “visceral” hatred of inflation meant that some people would prefer a recession to a jump in prices.

“The economy is, in the US, quite strong, the labour market is strong, inflation is coming down and many, many people are deeply unhappy about the status of the economy,” he said. “I think it’s because of the high inflation that they’ve experienced.”(...)

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https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/04/23/why-a-stronger-dollar-is-dangerous

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Finance and economics | Battles to come
Why a stronger dollar is dangerous

It sets the stage for a nasty new Trump-China clash, among other things



Photograph: Getty Images

The dollar is looking increasingly formidable. As American growth has stayed strong and investors have scaled back bets that the Federal Reserve will cut interest rates, money has flooded into the country’s markets—and the greenback has shot up. It has risen by 4% this year, measured against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, and the fundamentals point to further appreciation. With a presidential election looming, and both Democrats and Republicans determined to promote American manufacturing, the world is on the verge of a difficult new period of strong-dollar geopolitics.

This situation is made still more difficult by the fact that the currency’s strength reflects weakness elsewhere. By the end of 2023, America’s economy was 8% larger than at the end of 2019. Those of Britain, France, Germany and Japan each grew by less than 2% during the same period. The yen is at a 34-year low against the dollar. The euro has dropped to $1.07 from $1.10 at the start of the year (see chart 1). Some traders are now betting that the pair will reach parity by the beginning of next year.



Should Donald Trump win in November, the scene is therefore set for a fight. A strong dollar tends to raise the price of American exports and lower the price of imports, which would widen the country’s persistent trade deficit—a bugbear of Mr Trump’s for many decades. Robert Lighthizer, the architect of tariffs against China during Mr Trump’s time in the White House, wants to weaken the dollar, according to Politico, a news website. President Joe Biden has made no public pronouncements on the currency, but a strong dollar complicates his manufacturing agenda.

Elsewhere, a mighty greenback is good for exporters that have costs denominated in other currencies. But high American interest rates and a strong dollar generate imported inflation, which is now exacerbated by relatively high oil prices. In addition, companies that have borrowed in dollars face steeper repayments. On April 18th Kristalina Georgieva, head of the IMF, warned about the impact of these developments on global financial stability.

Many countries have ample foreign-exchange reserves that they could sell to bolster their currencies: Japan has $1.3trn, India $643bn and South Korea $419bn. Yet any relief would be temporary. Although sales slowed the strengthening of the dollar in 2022, when the Fed began raising interest rates, they did not stop it. Central banks and finance ministries are loth to waste their holdings on fruitless fights.

Another option is international co-ordination to halt the greenback’s climb. The start of this was on display on April 16th, when the finance ministers of America, Japan and South Korea expressed concern about the slump of the yen and won. This may be the precursor to more intervention—in the form of joint sales of foreign-exchange reserves—to prevent the two Asian currencies from weakening further.

But as much as these countries may want to be on the same page, economics is unavoidably pulling them apart. After all, yen and won weakness is driven by the gap in interest rates between America and other countries. South Korea’s two-year government bonds offer a return of around 3.5%, and Japan’s just 0.3%, while American Treasuries maturing at the same time offer 5% (see chart 2). If interest rates stay markedly higher in America, investors seeking returns face a straightforward choice—and their decisions will buttress the dollar.



Then there are countries with which America is less likely to co-operate. According to Goldman Sachs, a bank, China saw $39bn or so in foreign-exchange outflows in March as investors fled the country’s languishing economy—the fourth most of any month since 2016. The yuan has weakened steadily against the dollar since the beginning of the year, and more rapidly from mid-March, since when the dollar has risen from 7.18 yuan to 7.25. Bank of America expects it to reach 7.45 by September, when America’s election campaign will be in full flow. That would put the yuan at its weakest since 2007, providing a boost to China’s government’s latest export drive. Cheap Chinese electric vehicles may be about to become even cheaper, infuriating American politicians.

Even protectionists in America may be willing to overlook allies’ weak currencies, at least for a time. They are less likely to for China. This raises the risk of further tariffs and sanctions, and maybe even the return of China to America’s list of currency manipulators. So long as America’s economy outperforms, the dollar is likely to remain strong. And so long as American politicians see that as a cause for concern, trade tensions will rise.

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https://stevesaretsky.substack.com/p/no-panacea

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No Panacea

Happy Monday morning!

Housing affordability, or lack thereof, is all the rage these days. Politicians from every colour of the political rainbow are rallying around restoring some semblance of price stability, or so they say.

They’ve been working hard lately, through mass rezoning, tax breaks on new rental construction, and even housing catalogues. In fact, billions of dollars are being thrown at the problem.

How will we know if any of it worked? For most people they’d tell you housing affordability will have been achieved when prices are lower.

However, in a recent podcast interview with The Globe & Mail, Trudeau said the quiet part out loud.

For affordability to improve, do home prices have to come down?

“No. I think housing prices and houses will always be valuable in this country,” but “anyone who hopes for housing prices to remain on the kind of trajectory they’ve been on over the past decade or two should maybe think about what kind of society or world they want to live in.”

On the other hand, “housing needs to retain its value,” because “it’s a huge part of people’s potential for retirement and future and nest egg.”



In other words, everyone wants affordable housing but nobody wants their house to become affordable.

Trudeau just reiterated what we already knew. Housing is politically backstopped, and we must not jeopardize the 30 year bull market. After all, the tax free primary residence has become the defacto retirement plan for most boomers.

Inflating home prices have also been a boon for government coffers. The tax revenues derived from housing via capital gains taxes, property transfer taxes, development fees and property taxes are what underpin the entire system.

Trudeau’s freudian slip was an admission of what we already knew, maintaining home prices is a matter of national security.

So how else do we achieve housing affordability? We are told we can build our way out, yet housing starts are crashing as we speak, despite billions being thrown at municipalities to unlock zoning.

Over in the orange corner, Jagmeet says we should build affordable housing on all federally owned land. However, an analysis from the Globe & Mail this week highlights the grim reality.

Using the government’s federal registry of properties, The Globe identified federally-owned land that is at least half an acre in size, sitting vacant or occupied by a building not more than two storeys, and located in municipalities with at least 10,000 people.

After a months-long analysis, The Globe found 613 pieces of lazy land in cities and towns across the country – a collection of federal real estate large enough to create about 288,000 new housing units.

In other words, if we took all the under utilized federally owned land and redeveloped it for affordable housing we would create 288,000 new housing units which is the equivalent to just over a years worth of completions in any given year.

So now what?

If we could get incomes to rise faster than house prices, over a long enough period of time, housing could slowly get more affordable. But that is no quick fix, and everyone is looking for quick fixes.

The fact that real GDP per capita has now been declining for seven consecutive quarters isn’t helping that idea either. According to RBC we are now marred in what appears to be a lost decade.



People don’t like to hear this but there really is no panacea for housing in this country. This is just the uncomfortable truth.

Housing affordability will ultimately be achieved through some form of an exogenous shock outside of the governments control, creating a temporary over supply of housing and lower prices. Kind of like what we’re experiencing now with an inflationary shock that ripped interest rates higher and will probably keep them there for the foreseeable future, regardless of what the BoC does this week.

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https://annpettifor.substack.com/p/time-to-tighten-financial-seatbelts

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Time to tighten financial seatbelts?

Interest rate hikes as a guide




In the run-up to the Great Financial Crisis I repeatedly warned that high real central bank rates of interest were like ‘a dagger aimed at a bubble of debt’. As I wrote on the Open Democracy site in 2003 in a piece titled The Coming First World Debt Crisis:

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When interest rates begin to rise again, when debt costs soar both for corporates and households, when defaults and bankruptcies increase more rapidly than now, then the tipping point will be reached.

The point about the impact of higher interest rates is well illustrated by the above FT chart published after the GFC.

The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England began hiking rates in 2004. Alan (‘the Maestro’) Greenspan and the Federal Open Market Committee hiked aggressively each quarter. They did so until the dagger burst the bubble of debt in August 2007.

I was reminded of their decisions by a chart posted by the Bank of England this last week. The Bank, led by an overtly political governor, Andrew Bailey, began hiking in February, 2022 and since then Monetary Policy Committee members have hiked higher and faster than the Federal Reserve between 2004-2007.



Now we know that levels of public and private debt as a share of global income (GDP) were high in 2007 when the Great Financial Crisis broke. Back then, public debt was 61% of global GDP; private debt was 134 % of GDP; and the total of both public and private debt was 193% of GDP.

We also know that debt is global. High UK rates impact debtors from afar. Many US and Australian-based so-called ‘Private Equity’ firms have, since the GFC, dumped large amounts of debt on UK companies, including Thames Water, ASDA, Morrisons, the AA and Liverpool football club.

It took just four years for the dagger of high real rates of interest to burst the 2007 debt bubble.

Since then, and going into the pandemic, volumes of both public and private debt have expanded according to the IMF.



Today, global private and public debt is near 250% of global income.



The Bank of England began the latest round of interest rate hikes in December, 2021. Subsequent hikes have been more rapid and more brutal than the Fed’s hikes over three years to 2007.

December, 2024 will mark three years since the Bank of England began raising rates.

Who knows what will happen then?

Given recent history, it might be wise to tighten your financial seatbelts.

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https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ecb-rate-cuts-premature-given-uncertain-forecasts-and-structural-issues-by-axel-a-weber-2024-05

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The Danger of Premature ECB Rate Cuts, AXEL A. WEBER*

By embarking on a new cycle of interest-rate cuts now, the European Central Bank appears to be relying too heavily on flawed forecasts and ignoring economic and geopolitical realities. Faced with the risk of either cutting interest rates prematurely or maintaining an overly restrictive monetary policy, the ECB has not chosen wisely.

FRANKFURT – With inflation in the eurozone dropping from a peak of 10.6% in October 2022 to 2.6% in May 2024, the European Central Bank is optimistic that inflationary pressures will continue to ease. Its March projections show inflation averaging 2.3% in 2024, before falling to 2% in 2025 and 1.9% in 2026. Thus, the ECB is expected to cut its key policy rate, the deposit facility rate, from 4% to around 3.75% on June 6.

Markets foresee this as the first of many cuts that will substantially lower the ECB’s policy rates over the next two years. The signaling effect and the timing of the move are indeed significant, because this marks only the fifth time since the ECB’s inception (26 years ago) that it has initiated a new rate-cut cycle. But while a forward-looking monetary policy is commendable, it faces inherent limitations, particularly given the uncertainty of economic forecasts.

After all, predicting inflation beyond a one-year horizon is notoriously difficult, and this uncertainty has only increased in recent years. The ECB’s own failure to address the recent surge of inflation in a timely and effective manner was partly owing to inaccurate forecasts. Model-based forecasts, by design, tend to revert to historical averages in the medium term, and history also suggests that long-term inflation projections often converge to the central bank’s targets. Thus, the ECB’s forecasts showing declining inflation are partly a result of historical bias.

Moreover, the lingering effects of pandemic-related measures (such as inflated central-bank balance sheets and higher fiscal deficits), coupled with economic sanctions on Russia, are also challenging to model and predict. Equally, additional geopolitical risks – including the Middle East conflict and escalating tensions between the United States and China – further complicate the inflation outlook, with most inflation risks tilting to the upside.

Structural changes also point toward higher inflation. Obvious sources of inflationary pressure include tight labor markets (driven by aging populations); extensive investments in the energy transition, energy security, and defense; deglobalization; and the eventual costs of rebuilding Ukraine.

Currently, the annual inflation rate in the eurozone remains above 2%, and recent trends are worrisome. Looking at consumer price levels (instead of growth rates) shows that, after a slight decline in late 2023, consumer prices have accelerated in 2024, rising at an annualized pace of 3.1% so far this year (measured by the seasonally adjusted Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices).

With consumer inflation above 2% and accelerating, historically low unemployment, and rapid wage growth (negotiated wages increased by 4.7% year on year in the first quarter), initiating a rate-cut cycle now could lead to another serious policy misstep. The ECB already erred previously, in 2021-22, when it based its monetary policy on faulty forecasts, and it now seems poised to repeat the mistake. Relying on undependable forecasts and ignoring current economic realities is not a forward-looking policy; it is a hope-based one.

Forecast uncertainty presents significant challenges for all central banks, since successful policymaking requires reasonably accurate foresight. As the reliability of forecasting wanes, effective risk-management becomes crucial. Under conditions characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, monetary policy must avoid significant errors, above all.

The ECB could make either of two potential mistakes: an overly restrictive policy or a premature easing. An overly restrictive policy could cause a recession and deflation, potentially threatening the stability of financial markets or real-estate prices. While undesirable, this scenario does not pose an existential threat to the eurozone. The ECB has ample leeway, tools, and experience to combat deflation if necessary.

Conversely, premature easing could reignite inflation, forcing the ECB to reverse its initial cuts and to hike rates to higher levels than today. This scenario really could threaten the eurozone’s stability, as highly indebted member states might face unsustainable debt dynamics, with bond markets questioning their ability to repay. Central banks would then come under more pressure from governments, leading to fiscal dominance. If they are reluctant to do what is necessary, inflation could become persistent.

Persistent inflation, generated by an overly expansionary policy, is clearly the more perilous scenario. Yet this is precisely the risk that the ECB will be taking by launching a new rate-cutting cycle now. A premature shift to easing could undermine its credibility and heighten future inflation risks. By overlooking the asymmetry of risks, the ECB is exhibiting poor risk management. Central banks should not allow market pressures to dictate their policies. Premature easing is a dangerous gamble.

*Axel A. Weber, Co-Chair of the Bretton Woods Committee Multilateral Reform Working Group, is a former chairman at UBS Group and a former president of the Deutsche Bundesbank.

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https://elpais.com/ideas/2024-06-02/por-que-cada-vez-menos-gente-se-siente-clase-trabajadora.html

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Por qué cada vez menos gente se siente clase trabajadora

Solo un 10,3% de la población se considera clase trabajadora en España, mientras un 58,6% se autopercibe como clase media. ¿Por qué cada vez menos gente siente que pertenece a un grupo social desfavorecido?


El estereotipo de la clase obrera es este: los trabajadores saliendo de la fábrica en una película de los hermanos Lumière, los turnos en la cadena de montaje, los currantes de mono azul con la frente empapada en sudor y las manos manchadas de grasa, las vidas familiares y austeras en barrios de extrarradio, la solidaridad sindical, los mineros cortando carreteras. Parece un retrato sacado de un tiempo pretérito. En cierta forma, lo es.

El Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) determinó en 2019, basándose en los datos de ocupación de la ciudadanía, que el estatus socioeconómico (no es exactamente lo mismo que la clase social) del 41% de la población era el de obreros, cualificados o no cualificados. Entre los primeros se encuentran, por ejemplo, los carpinteros, los maquinistas, los cocineros o los trabajadores de artes gráficas; entre los segundos, los jornaleros, los peones de la construcción, los reponedores de supermercado o los teleoperadores. Tal vez la épica haya desaparecido, pero los obreros siguen ahí. Y son muchos.

Sin embargo, cuando se pregunta a la gente, se hace evidente el cambio mental. Solo un 10,3% de los encuestados se consideran de clase obrera o trabajadora (la encuesta agrupa los dos términos), mientras que un 58,6% se autoperciben como de clase media (alta, media o baja), según el Barómetro del CIS de febrero de 2024. Existe una fuerte divergencia entre los resultados empíricos y la percepción de los hechos. La ciudadanía prefiere no verse como de clase trabajadora, aunque trabaje. Debido a los fuertes cambios económicos y sociales operados en las últimas décadas, la conciencia de clase va menguando, y van surgiendo nuevos perfiles, como el precariado o las infraclases, más apropiados para la coyuntura actual.

“Necesitamos entender qué quieren decir las personas cuando no se definen como clase trabajadora. Si eso es visto como vergonzoso o propio de un grupo que no tiene voz política, entonces cada vez menos gente se identificará así”, opina la historiadora británica Selina Todd, autora de El pueblo, auge y declive de la clase obrera (Akal). Es curioso: el presidente Pedro Sánchez apeló en 2022 a la “clase media trabajadora”, causando cierto revuelo terminológico. Hubo quien señaló que su objetivo era hacerle ver a la clase media que también trabaja, una jugada interesante desde un partido cuyo nombre contiene la palabra obrero. Por otro lado, el término proletariado ya solo es utilizado por un 0,1% de los encuestados, como un resto arqueológico de un pasado remoto.

En los países occidentales, tras la deslocalización y la desindustrialización, se ha pasado a una economía posfordista: predominan los trabajos líquidos en el sector de la información, la tecnología o los servicios. Trabajos que no duran toda la vida y no otorgan sentido ni identidad. En la fábrica, el roce hacía el cariño (y el sindicato), pero la terciarización, atomización y automatización del trabajo (y el teletrabajo) no colaboran a que la población se autoperciba como de clase trabajadora. Todos somos de clase media. Currantes son los otros.

¿Quién es de clase trabajadora?

“Yo me preguntaría: ¿tengo que madrugar el lunes para trabajar? ¿Puedo vivir sin trabajar? Si necesito trabajar, si no vivo de rentas y otros beneficios empresariales, es que soy de clase trabajadora”, dice José Saturnino Martínez García, autor de Estructura social y desigualdad en España (Catarata). Los que trabajan en una oficina, en la tecnología, en la cultura, en las llamadas profesiones liberales no suelen considerarse clase trabajadora, mucho menos obrera. Sin embargo, el 77% de los españoles opinan que la explotación laboral es habitual y un 40% está descontento con el salario, según un estudio realizado por la agencia 40dB para este periódico. Curiosamente el 82% está conforme con su trabajo, lo que podría encajar con esa conversión en clase media aspiracional: la tarea nos satisface, aunque las condiciones no sean buenas. Es cuestión de esforzarse, y así triunfar.

En la segunda mitad del siglo XX el ascensor social funcionó con brío: las familias invirtieron en vivienda, se alcanzó la seguridad vital y cierta comodidad, los hijos de los obreros pudieron ir a la universidad… dejando de ser obreros. “Después de la II Guerra Mundial, algunos países introdujeron la socialdemocracia, un sólido Estado de bienestar y un empleo casi pleno para ganarse el apoyo de la clase trabajadora. Esto se debió a la presión de los sindicatos y también de personas que habían ascendido en el movimiento obrero para ingresar en la política nacional”, dice Todd. Paradójicamente, en el corazón de las luchas obreras estaba el germen de su declive. Algunas corrientes sociológicas hablan, no sin controversia, de un “aburguesamiento”: los trabajadores mejoraron notablemente su nivel de vida, pero también quisieron alejarse de sus orígenes.

“Se creó así cierta distinción: ahora está bien visto venir de la clase obrera, pero no tanto serlo, y estar en tránsito para llegar a la clase alta”, abunda Martínez. No es extraño escuchar a los que alcanzan el éxito presumir de humildes orígenes, aquella infancia grisácea correteando por el barrio de ladrillo visto. Pero se abandonan el imaginario, la conciencia y la tradición reivindicativa, que queda como alimento para nostálgicos con el puño en alto. Y se abre un hueco difícil de llenar en la identidad y base social de la izquierda (un hueco donde trata de medrar la ultraderecha). Una tradición tan significada puede suponer otro motivo por el que ciertos trabajadores no se identifiquen con ese historial de huelgas y sindicatos, sobre todo en tiempos en los que el centro político se ha escorado a la derecha, se sigue agitando el fantasma del comunismo y se promueve el más feroz individualismo. La mayoría prefiere identificarse como clase media aspiracional, inmersa en los algodones de la cultura del ocio y el consumo. Con el debilitamiento de la clase obrera y la difuminación de la clase media, hay quien alerta de una creciente dualización de la sociedad entre los más ricos y las infraclases, como hace el sociólogo José Félix Tezanos, y presidente el CIS, en La sociedad dividida (Malpaso).

Lo mencionado, sin embargo, no quiere decir que el mundo del trabajo haya ido a mejor: “Si la clase obrera se aburguesó, la clase media se está proletarizando”, señala Martínez, “y se hacen muchos esfuerzos por hacer pasar la lucha de clases como una lucha generacional, culpando al sistema de pensiones, sin criticar las contradicciones del capitalismo”. Después de la caída de la hegemonía socialdemócrata de posguerra, con la llegada del orden neoliberal, se da la vuelta a la tortilla: las condiciones laborales empeoran, se busca mano de obra en países con menor regulación laboral y medioambiental y, en fin, la parte de la tarta destinada a los que trabajan cada vez es menor. La clase obrera pierde poder político: la afiliación sindical es baja y la abstención electoral suele ser mayor en los barrios de trabajadores. Aumenta la desigualdad.

Del proletariado al precariado

Con la disolución del proletariado como clase, llegan nuevas tipologías laborales como el precariado. dice el econom“Se define por el trabajo inestable e inseguro, la falta de narrativa ocupacional o sentido de dirección, la presión constante para hacer una gran cantidad de tareas por las que no es remunerado”,ista Guy Standing, autor de libros como Precariado. Una carta de derechos (Capitán Swing). En las austeras y apretadas filas del precariado se encuentra buena parte de la fauna laboral de nuestra época: riders, kellys, sanitarios, periodistas, vigilantes, camareros, informáticos, trabajadoras domésticas, trabajadores culturales, etcétera.

Tal vez su emergencia se refleje en que actualmente más personas se definan como de clase baja o pobre (18% entre ambas, según el CIS) que como clase trabajadora (11%). Es decir, si uno es reponedor, rider o tiene un puesto precario, es probable que diga antes que es pobre a que es trabajador. Este colectivo tiene una particularidad llamativa, que también le diferencia del viejo proletariado: es la primera clase en la historia que está sobreformada; es decir, su nivel medio de estudios es superior al necesario en los trabajos que puede obtener. Y, muy notoriamente, el precariado no tiene control sobre su tiempo, según señala Standing en su último libro, The Politics of Time (La política del tiempo, sin edición en español). Y la vida está hecha de tiempo.

El 48% de los asalariados en España tienen trabajos precarios, un 75% en el caso de los más jóvenes, según datos de Comisiones Obreras. Standing distingue ahí tres grupos: los atávicos, aquellos que han caído de familias y comunidades obreras y perciben a sus espaldas un pasado perdido (suelen ser caladero de la extrema derecha populista); los nostálgicos, que han perdido el presente y no se sienten arraigados a ningún lugar (por eso, sienten desafección y no votan), son migrantes y minorías, y los progresistas, que poseen el mayor nivel educativo y lo que han perdido es el futuro: no ven opciones políticas que les ofrezcan un provenir halagüeño. “Creo que los atávicos han llegado a un pico y ahora están menguando, pero sus líderes seguirán ganando elecciones hasta que la izquierda ofrezca políticas progresistas”, dice el economista, pensando en Geert Wilders en Países Bajos, Giorgia Meloni en Italia y, por supuesto, Donald Trump en Estados Unidos.

La tecnología tiene una influencia decisiva. En los años noventa coge fuerza el acelerón tecnológico y el trabajo comienza a hacerse cognitivo: se habla entonces del cognitariado. La digitalización rampante provoca deslocalización y precarización, por un lado, e implicación del conocimiento y la innovación, por otro. “La transformación de las últimas décadas es ambigua”, dice por correo electrónico el pensador Franco Bifo Berardi (su último libro es Medio siglo contra el trabajo, publicado por Traficantes de Sueños), “los trabajadores tienen una potencia de transformación importante, pero al mismo tiempo se ha perdido la subjetividad social [la también llamada conciencia de clase] debido al efecto tecnológico”. La precariedad trae una competencia entre los trabajadores que rompe la solidaridad. La deslocalización trae la soledad, la falta de una relación afectiva con el territorio. Y, así, la clase obrera (que para Bifo todavía existe) pierde capacidad de acción política. “El cognitariado, que en décadas pasadas yo creía capaz de actuar en un proceso de recomposición, se ha revelado hasta hoy incapaz de tener autonomía”, dice el italiano. Esa falta de capacidad hace que la protesta ante la injusticia se vehicule muchas veces a través de opciones nacionalistas y de ultraderecha.

Paralelamente, el término cuidatoriado ha sido impulsado por la socióloga María Ángeles Durán: designa a ese colectivo de mujeres que, con su trabajo doméstico y de cuidados, no remunerado, ha mantenido la sociedad a flote e incluso, según la teórica Silvia Federici, permitió la acumulación de capital. También el antropólogo David Graeber señaló que la clase trabajadora es ahora la clase cuidadora (caring class).

“La clase trabajadora nunca estuvo solo conformada por trabajadores de fábricas; el grupo más grande de trabajadores en Europa hasta la II Guerra Mundial era el de las sirvientas domésticas, la mayoría mujeres, muchas migrantes”, dice Todd. Uno de los grandes problemas a la hora de comprender a la clase obrera, y fuente de debilidad de los sindicatos, ha sido obviar esta composición. Un 54% de las mujeres y un 67% de los migrantes tienen trabajos precarios actualmente, según Comisiones Obreras.

El malestar sigue ahí

Aunque la conciencia de clase está de capa caída, se siguen dando muestras de descontento: las protestas de los agricultores, los chalecos amarillos y otros movimientos que trabajan por el cambio social. A veces las protestas son capitalizadas por la ultraderecha. El malestar está ahí, no se ha disuelto en el aire, y requiere soluciones. “Tanto el mundo como el activismo están cambiando. Necesitamos más medios e investigación sobre iniciativas de base como cooperativas de vivienda, decisiones ambientales y campañas comunitarias para comprender en toda su amplitud lo que la gente quiere y cómo busca conseguirlo”, dice Todd. Son necesarios políticos que presenten alternativas a lo que la historiadora define como “suicidarse para poner pan en la mesa, trabajar todas las horas con la esperanza de que los hijos reciban una educación o morir en la pobreza”.

La clase obrera fue en un tiempo el llamado sujeto de emancipación, es decir, el colectivo que iba a cambiar el mundo (para mejor). Durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX, y hasta hoy, esa certeza ha ido mutando, y lo laboral ha perdido protagonismo en el debate social en favor de lo identitario, lo cultural o lo medioambiental, lo que ha generado un notorio cisma en la izquierda. En los últimos tiempos, sin embargo, se han registrado destellos de protagonismo de lo laboral, por ejemplo, en el fenómeno de la Gran Dimisión, en Estados Unidos, y en un renacimiento de las luchas sindicales en sectores tradicionales, como la industria del motor, o inopinados, como las grandes empresas Starbucks o Amazon, de fuerte tradición antisindical. O en la industria de Hollywood. “Lo cierto es que la situación de los trabajadores ha empeorado”, concluye el sociólogo Martínez, “pero la lucha contra esa precariedad está en el corazón de la lucha obrera”.

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Volodymyr Zelenskyy says China helping Russia by sabotaging peace summit

Ukraine president urges US to go further to ease curbs on using weapons it supplies


Volodymyr Zelenskyy has accused China of helping Russia to pressure countries not to attend a planned peace summit this month, as Ukraine’s president urged other Asian leaders to join the event.

Speaking in Singapore at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue defence forum, Zelenskyy said Beijing, which has refused to attend the June 15-16 summit in Switzerland, was trying to disrupt the event for Moscow.

The Ukrainian leader said China was “in the hands” of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Zelenskyy also criticised China for supplying Russia with dual-use items that the US says are being used to rebuild Moscow’s defence industry.

“With Chinese support to Russia, the war will last longer,” Zelenskyy said at a news conference on Sunday after speaking at the defence forum, which is attended by many defence ministers from the Indo-Pacific region.

Zelenskyy also met US defence secretary Lloyd Austin, his first meeting with a senior US official since the Biden administration partially lifted its ban on the use of some American-supplied weapons to strike military targets inside Russian territory across the border from Kharkiv region.

The Pentagon said Austin had used the meeting to “reiterate unwavering US support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression”.

At the press conference, Zelenskyy said the shift on US-supplied weapons was appreciated but still “not enough.” The White House still bars Ukraine from using long-range ATACMS missiles inside Russia.

The Ukrainian leader also questioned how China could insist that it respected the territorial integrity of other nations when it was enabling Russia to prosecute its war against Ukraine.

Zelenskyy went to Singapore to urge countries to participate in the summit in Switzerland. “We need the support of Asian countries,” Zelenskyy said at the press conference.

Zelenskyy said he did not meet any Chinese officials in Singapore.

Earlier on Sunday, Chinese defence minister Dong Jun told the forum that China had not provided weapons to either party in the war in Ukraine. He said Beijing had “strict” export controls on dual-use items and had “never done anything to fan the flames”.

Washington has not accused Beijing of supplying weapons to Russia. But it says China has provided technology such as engines for drones and cruise missiles and machinery to make ballistic missiles.

Zelenskyy said 106 nations, and 75 leaders, had agreed to attend Ukraine’s peace summit.

Speaking at the Shangri-La event on Friday, Cui Tiankai, a former Chinese ambassador to Washington, said China would not attend because Russia was not invited. He said it was “impossible” to achieve peace without the participation of both parties in the conflict.

Dutch defence minister Kajsa Ollongren told Cui that Chinese participation would help. “I regret that China does not use its position as one of the countries that has an intense dialogue with President Putin,” said Ollongren.

China has published its own position paper on the Ukraine war that fails to condemn Russia’s invasion and contains veiled criticisms of Nato.

But while it has tacitly supported Russia, with Chinese state media copying Moscow’s talking points on the war, Beijing has been scathing of Israel’s actions in the war in Gaza.

The absence of Russia and China from the Switzerland summit has cast doubt about how much it can achieve. The Swiss government has said others could follow and a second meeting could include Moscow.

The summit will address three of the issues in Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan — security concerning nuclear facilities, food security and the release of prisoners of war — as well as the return of Ukrainian children forcibly taken to Russia.

Zelenskyy has spent months planning the summit and trying to attract as many countries and leaders as possible. He has strongly urged global south nations as well as presidents Biden and Xi to attend.

“The peace summit needs President Biden,” Zelenskyy said this week. “His absence would only be met by an applause by Putin, a personal, standing applause by Putin.”

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Nestlé CEO says feeding ageing populations a priority as birth rates fall

World’s largest food group wants to focus on products that boost health of elderly



Nestlé is developing products that address the concerns of ageing populations, including avoiding micronutrient deficiencies © Joni Hanebutt/Alamy

The chief executive of Nestlé said feeding ageing populations had become a major priority as the world’s largest food company and infant formula pioneer reckons with dwindling birth rates around the globe.

“You’re seeing there is a longer term secular trend towards globally lower birth rates,” said Mark Schneider. The 50+ age group in most countries around the world is going to increase significantly over the next 10 to 20 years. With that, and with the specific nutritional needs of that age group, there is an opportunity for us.”

Schneider said the company was focused on developing products that directly address the concerns of ageing populations, including maintaining a target weight, preserving muscle mass, avoiding micronutrient deficiencies and controlling blood sugar levels.

The former chief executive of healthcare group Fresenius has already invested heavily in specialised nutrition — fortified drinks, protein powders, vitamins and supplements — and led the company’s first foray into drugs with peanut allergy treatment Palforzia, which it sold last year after doctors failed to take it up.

Over the past 15 years food giants such as Nestlé, Danone and Mars have diversified away from just groceries into higher-growth sectors like specialised nutrition, petcare and coffee.

The category, which also includes infant formula, made up 15 per cent of Nestlé’s profits last year, compared with 50 per cent at French competitor Danone. Nestlé’s portfolio is weighted more towards adult and medical nutrition at 30 per cent compared with Danone’s 20 per cent.

“We’re not walking away from what we got started on, which is infant nutrition,” added Schneider, who in 2016 became the first ever outsider to be appointed to the helm of the Swiss multinational. “But we do see that in most economies around the world, the bigger demographic opportunity is among the middle aged and elderly.

Last year the company announced it was closing an infant formula factory which serves the Chinese market, citing a sharp decline in the country’s falling birth rates. The number of deaths outstripped the number of births in the country by 2mn in 2023.


Mark Schneider: ‘When we talk about healthy ageing in humans, it is not only longevity but also about improved quality of life in your later years’ © Fabrice Coffini/AFP via Getty Images


Schneider acknowledged that the group had made errors in China.

“In China what happened in the last decade was a number of mistakes that prevented us from fully capturing the opportunity. A couple of ventures didn’t work out,” he said, citing the acquisition of peanut milk brand Yinlu and the loss of market share in infant formula.

The opportunity in providing nutritional products for ageing populations intersects with the opportunity presented by the growing uptake of obesity drugs, he added.

Research shows, for example, that people using GLP-1 weight-loss drugs struggle to maintain muscle. Nestlé has responded by launching a line of ready meals — Vital Pursuit — which contain extra protein and fibre, and portioned to suit a GLP-1 user’s appetite.

“When we talk about healthy ageing in humans, it is not only longevity but also about improved quality of life in your later years,” he said.

The ageing opportunity also applied to pets, another growth driver for the group, he added.

“As you become beholden to a particular pet, you want to preserve its lifespan as much as possible and avoid any medical issues.” The company sells a smart litter box system for cats, which can detect health conditions based on the animal’s behaviours and weight changes.

Schneider said premiumisation in wealthier markets, where pets are increasingly seen as fully entitled household and family members, was still driving growth in pet food and petcare sales.

The other driver was “caloric conversion” in emerging markets, he said, where people were switching away from using household food waste to feed their animals dedicated pet food.

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