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Cita de: españavabien en Junio 02, 2015, 19:21:52 pmPeligroso es eso de crear macro-regiones. Porque al final podríamos resucitar a Castilla.Hacer resucitar a Castilla, nos llevaría a tener los mismos problemas que en UK, donde la existencia de un ente fantasmagórico que no existe oficialmente en ningún sitio pero que existe en la realidad, llamada Inglaterra y que tiene más del 80% de la población, hace que el federalismo sea inviable.UK tiene cuatro entes fantasmagóricos para casi 70 millones de habitantes, mientras que en Hispanistán nos hemos montado 17 nacioncitas con destino en lo universal. Diría que el problema territorial lo tenemos nosotros.En España no se puede rebobinar el desastre autonómico, ni fusionar, ni nada. La gente ha nacido, crecido, y reproducido, como las cucarachas del Cucal, bajo el sistema autonómico. Dile a un valenciano que lo juntas con los catalanes. O a un balear. Por decir un par.Solo un evento internacional muy, MUY catastrófico podría asustar tanto a la gente que la convenciese de formar entidades políticas más grandes, y dejar España dividida en 4-5 regiones, estados federales, o lo que fuera.Pero hablamos de algo gordísimo. Si no, es imposible. Es como tratar de convencer a un holandés de que se junte con los belgas. Imposible.
Peligroso es eso de crear macro-regiones. Porque al final podríamos resucitar a Castilla.Hacer resucitar a Castilla, nos llevaría a tener los mismos problemas que en UK, donde la existencia de un ente fantasmagórico que no existe oficialmente en ningún sitio pero que existe en la realidad, llamada Inglaterra y que tiene más del 80% de la población, hace que el federalismo sea inviable.
Acaba de llegarme este enlace desde Estrasburgo.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-0175+0+DOC+PDF+V0//ENA ver si podemos comenzar a entender qué se está cociendo a toda prisa y según dicen a escondidas.SaludosPD. Se agradecen comentarios
Yo apostaría por una dictadura férrea, siendo pragmático.
Cita de: lectorhinfluyente1984 en Mayo 30, 2015, 12:17:59 pmVaroufakis' Great Game by Hans-Werner SinnCita de: Hans-Werner SinnMUNICH – Game theorists know that a Plan A is never enough. One must also develop and put forward a credible Plan B – the implied threat that drives forward negotiations on Plan A. Greece’s finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, knows this very well. As the Greek government’s anointed “heavy,” he is working Plan B (a potential exit from the eurozone), while Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras makes himself available for Plan A (an extension on Greece’s loan agreement, and a renegotiation of the terms of its bailout). In a sense, they are playing the classic game of “good cop/bad cop” – and, so far, to great effect.Plan B comprises two key elements. First, there is simple provocation, aimed at riling up Greek citizens and thus escalating tensions between the country and its creditors. Greece’s citizens must believe that they are escaping grave injustice if they are to continue to trust their government during the difficult period that would follow an exit from the eurozone.Second, the Greek government is driving up the costs of Plan B for the other side, by allowing capital flight by its citizens. If it so chose, the government could contain this trend with a more conciliatory approach, or stop it outright with the introduction of capital controls. But doing so would weaken its negotiating position, and that is not an option.Capital flight does not mean that capital is moving abroad in net terms, but rather that private capital is being turned into public capital. Basically, Greek citizens take out loans from local banks, funded largely by the Greek central bank, which acquires funds through the European Central Bank’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme. They then transfer the money to other countries to purchase foreign assets (or redeem their debts), draining liquidity from their country’s banks.Other eurozone central banks are thus forced to create new money to fulfill the payment orders for the Greek citizens, effectively giving the Greek central bank an overdraft credit, as measured by the so-called TARGET liabilities. In January and February, Greece’s TARGET debts increased by almost €1 billion ($1.1 billion) per day, owing to capital flight by Greek citizens and foreign investors. At the end of April, those debts amounted to €99 billion.A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries – let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts. But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with Greek citizens’ euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-à-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma. Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.A similar situation arises when Greek citizens withdraw cash from their accounts and hoard it in suitcases or take it abroad. If Greece abandoned the euro, a substantial share of these funds – which totaled €43 billion at the end of April – would flow into the rest of the eurozone, both to purchase goods and assets and to pay off debts, resulting in a net loss for the monetary union’s remaining members.All of this strengthens the Greek government’s negotiating position considerably. Small wonder, then, that Varoufakis and Tsipras are playing for time, refusing to submit a list of meaningful reform proposals.The ECB bears considerable responsibility for this situation. By failing to produce the two-thirds majority in the ECB Council needed to limit the Greek central bank’s self-serving strategy, it has allowed the creation of more than €80 billion in emergency liquidity, which exceeds the Greek central bank’s €41 billion in recoverable assets. With Greece’s banks guaranteed the needed funds, the government has been spared from having to introduce capital controls.Rumor has it that the ECB is poised to adjust its approach – and soon. It knows that its argument that the ELA loans are collateralized is wearing thin, given that, in many cases, the collateral has a rating below BBB-, thus falling short of investment grade.If the ECB finally acknowledges that this will not do, and removes Greece’s liquidity safety net, the Greek government would be forced to start negotiating seriously, because waiting would no longer do it any good. But, with the stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP, its position would remain very strong.In other words, thanks largely to the ECB, the Greek government would be able to secure a far more favorable outcome – including increased financial assistance and reduced reform requirements – than it could have gained at any point in the past. A large share of the acquired resources measured by the TARGET balances and the cash that has been printed would turn into an endowment gift for an independent future.Many people in Europe seem to believe that Varoufakis, an experienced game theorist but a political neophyte, does not know how to play the cards that Greece has been dealt. They should think again – before Greece walks away with the pot.No veo la jugada. El BCE juega a largo, y además hay otros jugadores... nosotros por ejemplo. Una cantidad importante para Grecia puede ser una minucia para la unión... y un chantage no lo puede aceptar casi por definición.
Varoufakis' Great Game by Hans-Werner SinnCita de: Hans-Werner SinnMUNICH – Game theorists know that a Plan A is never enough. One must also develop and put forward a credible Plan B – the implied threat that drives forward negotiations on Plan A. Greece’s finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, knows this very well. As the Greek government’s anointed “heavy,” he is working Plan B (a potential exit from the eurozone), while Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras makes himself available for Plan A (an extension on Greece’s loan agreement, and a renegotiation of the terms of its bailout). In a sense, they are playing the classic game of “good cop/bad cop” – and, so far, to great effect.Plan B comprises two key elements. First, there is simple provocation, aimed at riling up Greek citizens and thus escalating tensions between the country and its creditors. Greece’s citizens must believe that they are escaping grave injustice if they are to continue to trust their government during the difficult period that would follow an exit from the eurozone.Second, the Greek government is driving up the costs of Plan B for the other side, by allowing capital flight by its citizens. If it so chose, the government could contain this trend with a more conciliatory approach, or stop it outright with the introduction of capital controls. But doing so would weaken its negotiating position, and that is not an option.Capital flight does not mean that capital is moving abroad in net terms, but rather that private capital is being turned into public capital. Basically, Greek citizens take out loans from local banks, funded largely by the Greek central bank, which acquires funds through the European Central Bank’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme. They then transfer the money to other countries to purchase foreign assets (or redeem their debts), draining liquidity from their country’s banks.Other eurozone central banks are thus forced to create new money to fulfill the payment orders for the Greek citizens, effectively giving the Greek central bank an overdraft credit, as measured by the so-called TARGET liabilities. In January and February, Greece’s TARGET debts increased by almost €1 billion ($1.1 billion) per day, owing to capital flight by Greek citizens and foreign investors. At the end of April, those debts amounted to €99 billion.A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries – let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts. But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with Greek citizens’ euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-à-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma. Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.A similar situation arises when Greek citizens withdraw cash from their accounts and hoard it in suitcases or take it abroad. If Greece abandoned the euro, a substantial share of these funds – which totaled €43 billion at the end of April – would flow into the rest of the eurozone, both to purchase goods and assets and to pay off debts, resulting in a net loss for the monetary union’s remaining members.All of this strengthens the Greek government’s negotiating position considerably. Small wonder, then, that Varoufakis and Tsipras are playing for time, refusing to submit a list of meaningful reform proposals.The ECB bears considerable responsibility for this situation. By failing to produce the two-thirds majority in the ECB Council needed to limit the Greek central bank’s self-serving strategy, it has allowed the creation of more than €80 billion in emergency liquidity, which exceeds the Greek central bank’s €41 billion in recoverable assets. With Greece’s banks guaranteed the needed funds, the government has been spared from having to introduce capital controls.Rumor has it that the ECB is poised to adjust its approach – and soon. It knows that its argument that the ELA loans are collateralized is wearing thin, given that, in many cases, the collateral has a rating below BBB-, thus falling short of investment grade.If the ECB finally acknowledges that this will not do, and removes Greece’s liquidity safety net, the Greek government would be forced to start negotiating seriously, because waiting would no longer do it any good. But, with the stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP, its position would remain very strong.In other words, thanks largely to the ECB, the Greek government would be able to secure a far more favorable outcome – including increased financial assistance and reduced reform requirements – than it could have gained at any point in the past. A large share of the acquired resources measured by the TARGET balances and the cash that has been printed would turn into an endowment gift for an independent future.Many people in Europe seem to believe that Varoufakis, an experienced game theorist but a political neophyte, does not know how to play the cards that Greece has been dealt. They should think again – before Greece walks away with the pot.
MUNICH – Game theorists know that a Plan A is never enough. One must also develop and put forward a credible Plan B – the implied threat that drives forward negotiations on Plan A. Greece’s finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, knows this very well. As the Greek government’s anointed “heavy,” he is working Plan B (a potential exit from the eurozone), while Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras makes himself available for Plan A (an extension on Greece’s loan agreement, and a renegotiation of the terms of its bailout). In a sense, they are playing the classic game of “good cop/bad cop” – and, so far, to great effect.Plan B comprises two key elements. First, there is simple provocation, aimed at riling up Greek citizens and thus escalating tensions between the country and its creditors. Greece’s citizens must believe that they are escaping grave injustice if they are to continue to trust their government during the difficult period that would follow an exit from the eurozone.Second, the Greek government is driving up the costs of Plan B for the other side, by allowing capital flight by its citizens. If it so chose, the government could contain this trend with a more conciliatory approach, or stop it outright with the introduction of capital controls. But doing so would weaken its negotiating position, and that is not an option.Capital flight does not mean that capital is moving abroad in net terms, but rather that private capital is being turned into public capital. Basically, Greek citizens take out loans from local banks, funded largely by the Greek central bank, which acquires funds through the European Central Bank’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme. They then transfer the money to other countries to purchase foreign assets (or redeem their debts), draining liquidity from their country’s banks.Other eurozone central banks are thus forced to create new money to fulfill the payment orders for the Greek citizens, effectively giving the Greek central bank an overdraft credit, as measured by the so-called TARGET liabilities. In January and February, Greece’s TARGET debts increased by almost €1 billion ($1.1 billion) per day, owing to capital flight by Greek citizens and foreign investors. At the end of April, those debts amounted to €99 billion.A Greek exit would not damage the accounts that its citizens have set up in other eurozone countries – let alone cause Greeks to lose the assets they have purchased with those accounts. But it would leave those countries’ central banks stuck with Greek citizens’ euro-denominated TARGET claims vis-à-vis Greece’s central bank, which would have assets denominated only in a restored drachma. Given the new currency’s inevitable devaluation, together with the fact that the Greek government does not have to backstop its central bank’s debt, a default depriving the other central banks of their claims would be all but certain.A similar situation arises when Greek citizens withdraw cash from their accounts and hoard it in suitcases or take it abroad. If Greece abandoned the euro, a substantial share of these funds – which totaled €43 billion at the end of April – would flow into the rest of the eurozone, both to purchase goods and assets and to pay off debts, resulting in a net loss for the monetary union’s remaining members.All of this strengthens the Greek government’s negotiating position considerably. Small wonder, then, that Varoufakis and Tsipras are playing for time, refusing to submit a list of meaningful reform proposals.The ECB bears considerable responsibility for this situation. By failing to produce the two-thirds majority in the ECB Council needed to limit the Greek central bank’s self-serving strategy, it has allowed the creation of more than €80 billion in emergency liquidity, which exceeds the Greek central bank’s €41 billion in recoverable assets. With Greece’s banks guaranteed the needed funds, the government has been spared from having to introduce capital controls.Rumor has it that the ECB is poised to adjust its approach – and soon. It knows that its argument that the ELA loans are collateralized is wearing thin, given that, in many cases, the collateral has a rating below BBB-, thus falling short of investment grade.If the ECB finally acknowledges that this will not do, and removes Greece’s liquidity safety net, the Greek government would be forced to start negotiating seriously, because waiting would no longer do it any good. But, with the stock of money sent abroad and held in cash having already ballooned to 79% of GDP, its position would remain very strong.In other words, thanks largely to the ECB, the Greek government would be able to secure a far more favorable outcome – including increased financial assistance and reduced reform requirements – than it could have gained at any point in the past. A large share of the acquired resources measured by the TARGET balances and the cash that has been printed would turn into an endowment gift for an independent future.Many people in Europe seem to believe that Varoufakis, an experienced game theorist but a political neophyte, does not know how to play the cards that Greece has been dealt. They should think again – before Greece walks away with the pot.
Casi cualquier persona razonablemente avisada llega, en algún momento, a una conclusión parecida. Y entonces el dilema se convierte en ético, porque de lo que estamos hablando es de la dignidad humana. Es decir, si tal cosa hubiere.Los que se decantan por hacer cosas por el pueblo pero sin el pueblo, son pragmáticos, pero rebajan a la persona a la condición de ganado, y por supuesto, dejan a un lado el amor.
Y yo me pregunto, si no amas al ser humano, tal y como es, ¿qué sentido tiene querer guiarlo, cuidarlo y procurar su bien a expensas de sus propios deseos, por muy inadecuados que se te antojen?
Cita de: españavabien en Junio 02, 2015, 19:21:52 pmPeligroso es eso de crear macro-regiones. Porque al final podríamos resucitar a Castilla.Hacer resucitar a Castilla, nos llevaría a tener los mismos problemas que en UK, donde la existencia de un ente fantasmagórico que no existe oficialmente en ningún sitio pero que existe en la realidad, llamada Inglaterra y que tiene más del 80% de la población, hace que el federalismo sea inviable.Pues yo creo que esa Castilla, de facto, existe. Existe una Castilla sociológica que no entiende que hay sitios donde todo sobre España está mal si se usan sus lentes. España con las gafas de Castilla se ve desenfocada desde fuera de Castilla. Desde el ordinal del Rey para abajo nada encaja.
La jugada es sencilla, al pasar el tiempo y al reducirse la contrapartida de las cuentas corrientes en manos de ciudadanos y empresas griegas las perdidas por la futura salida del euro no existen. Grecia podria salir del euro, instaurar el novadracma, quebrar, quebrar su banco central, y la mayor parte de los griegos forrados con activos en euros, pero pasivos en dracmas.El griego medio puede acabar con un monton de euros por alli repartidos, y debiendo un porron de dracmas que en realidad poco valen.Varu es listo, y ademas es un jodido cabron.
Tranquilo visi, sólo era una boutade, ya sabéis que a menudo hablo muy suelto... Pero ojo, que sólo he exagerado un poquito. Retiro lo de férrea, que parece que se trata de dar muchos palos y encarcelar o "desaparecer" disidentes, y lo sustituyo por "Sólida": Pero supongo que no es eso lo que te deja ojiplático. Veamos:Cita de: obcad en Junio 03, 2015, 20:58:07 pmCasi cualquier persona razonablemente avisada llega, en algún momento, a una conclusión parecida. Y entonces el dilema se convierte en ético, porque de lo que estamos hablando es de la dignidad humana. Es decir, si tal cosa hubiere.Los que se decantan por hacer cosas por el pueblo pero sin el pueblo, son pragmáticos, pero rebajan a la persona a la condición de ganado, y por supuesto, dejan a un lado el amor. No es rebajar a la persona a la condición de ganado; es asumir que, como sociedad, en agregado, somos políticamente inmaduros (por no decir, directamente, infantiles), y sí, también con una componente borreguil muy acusada. Supongo que son dos cosas bastante relacionadas.Pongámonos en la hipótesis (improbabilísima, pero estamos hablando de fundamentos) de que un golpe de estado nos trajera a alguien capad de de articular una TE de libro, con su reforma teritorial y administrativa, su separación de poderes, su coto a la impunidad, la despolitización de la educación, la sanidad y la vivienda, una reforma electoral o hasta un proceso constituyente etc etc. Todo cojonudo, pero por las bravas y contra la voluntad furiosa de la MN. Pregunta: ¿Ese "dictador" ha ido contra la dignidad de los españoles o se la ha devuelto? ¿Habrá demostrado amor o desapego hacia su prójimo? Yo sabría argumentar las dos cosas, sobre todo porque "dignidad" es un concepto bastante complejo y poliédrico.CitarY yo me pregunto, si no amas al ser humano, tal y como es, ¿qué sentido tiene querer guiarlo, cuidarlo y procurar su bien a expensas de sus propios deseos, por muy inadecuados que se te antojen? No es incompatible. La relación padre/hijo es un ejemplo fácil de que el verdadero amor a alguien puede requerir, en determinadas circunstancias, imponerte contra la voluntad de aquellos a los que amas. Sobre todo si las otras opciones son ver cómo se autodestruye cuando tú podías evitarlo, o, porqué no, tratar de sacar algún provecho.No se trata tampoco de que los deseos del amado "se te antojen inadecuados", como si habláramos del tamaño de las minifaldas o la dieta fast food. Se trata de que sabes a ciencia cierta que esos deseos llevan a un desastre social que la gente es incapaz de prever ni valorar, porque el mundo es como es y la gente es la que es. Además, una cosa son los deseos llamémosles "profundos" de la gente, (paz, justicia, futuro ) y otra sus antojos, manías o ideítas sobre cómo conseguirlo. Argumento que el dictador de mi novela está cumpliendo los deseos más profundos de ese hipotético pueblo, y haciéndolo por amor. (Es mi novela y la acabo como quiero)
Acusar de inmadurez a la sociedad, para justificar una tecnocracia dictatorial es muy cuestianable. Diganme algún dictador que haya llevado a su pueblo un nivel de prosperidad parecido al de Occidente[...]
Acusar de inmadurez a la sociedad, para justificar una tecnocracia dictatorial es muy cuestionable.
Diganme algún dictador que haya llevado a su pueblo un nivel de prosperidad parecido al de Occidente
Cuestiono también el ego de ciertas personas que se ven como líderes, porque en esencia una persona que se crea merecedor de dirigir a los demás no es buena persona.
Pero aunque todo eso fuera cierto, no tiene derecho la gente a equivocarse? No son libres de votar a quien quieran? Aunque sea al PPSOE por más que nos pese, tienen su derecho y nadie puede ir en contra de su voluntad.
CitarPongámonos en la hipótesis (improbabilísima, pero estamos hablando de fundamentos) de que un golpe de estado nos trajera a alguien capad de de articular una TE de libro, con su reforma teritorial y administrativa, su separación de poderes, su coto a la impunidad, la despolitización de la educación, la sanidad y la vivienda, una reforma electoral o hasta un proceso constituyente etc etc. Todo cojonudo, pero por las bravas y contra la voluntad furiosa de la MN. Esto es irreal, es soñar con un héroe salvador que no existe.
Pongámonos en la hipótesis (improbabilísima, pero estamos hablando de fundamentos) de que un golpe de estado nos trajera a alguien capad de de articular una TE de libro, con su reforma teritorial y administrativa, su separación de poderes, su coto a la impunidad, la despolitización de la educación, la sanidad y la vivienda, una reforma electoral o hasta un proceso constituyente etc etc. Todo cojonudo, pero por las bravas y contra la voluntad furiosa de la MN.