El hilo de China

[R.G.C.I.M.]

A pesar de saber cómo está avanzando china, hace un año una amiga rusa me envió un vídeo de los aparatos de consumo e investigación que estaban sacando al mercado. Muy ágil, rápido y propagandístico.
Cacharrería digna de la guerra de las galaxias. Por la calle.
Se me heló la sangre.
Se nos van a comer vivos.

Para que china pueda plantar cara militar a usa aún faltan un par de décadas.
Fíjense en las decisiones de compra de armas mundial.
Australia y Japón están que se salen.

Es lo único que nos puede dar aire, la tensión transladada al mar de la China, aunque tendremos que intervenir más en nuestras fronteras inmediatas.

Vamos, que lo que importará el CP dentro de nada, ante la flecha de la historia será entre nada y cero.

SDS.

[Dan]

China esta usando una estrategia de influencia que le esta dando buenos resultados. Al subir el nivel tecnologico de sus productos necesita paises que se los compren y no sean solo EEUU y Europa.

Como no puede colocarle celulares a paises tercermundistas esta invirtiendo en el desarollo economico de su vecindario. Ha hecho hidroelectricas en Nepal y pasado algo del negocio textil a Vietnam y Camboya. Autenticos rios de turistas chinos llegan a Tailandia. Por alli ahora todo el mundo tiene Xiaomi o Huawei.

Algo parecido esta haciendo en Africa. Y para que el mar de China no sea la unica salida se han metido a hacer carreteras por todas partes. Myanmar, Pakistan, trenes a traves de Rusia... Su nueva ruta de la seda.

Sospecho que a EEUU no le salen ya las cuentas de una confrontacion armada aunque sean superiores militarmente. En el sentido de tener unos objetivos y poder cumplirlos, siempre que no sea meterle un bloqueo naval a China por las buenas y a ver quien aguanta mas sin respirar. No tengo claro que gana nadie con esto.

Guerras proxy para montarle un vietnam a China?. Tampoco lo veo. A dia de hoy el resto de paises asiaticos lo pondrian muy dificil. No les esta yendo mal. Paises que en principio deberian estar alineados con EEUU estan pensando que igual les va mejor haciendo de bisagra y no se lo iban a poner demasiado facil para montar una de sus coaliciones.

India esta a lo suyo solo un paso por detras de China y esta por ver que les guste tener una guerra en su parte del mundo que no hayan montado con ellos. Y un pais del que no se habla mucho pero que es el cuarto en poblacion del planeta es Indonesia, con unos 270m. A Australia seguramente le preocupan mas inmediatamente estos que los chinos (Australia son 24m).

Por cierto, China tiene planes para hacer un acelerador de particulas gigantesco para el cual necesita colaboracion internacional, o sea, montar un consorcio. Yo no diria que su estrategia a largo plazo sea de confrontacion o colonial, sino de vover a ser "el pais del medio".

https://gizmodo.com/plans-revealed-for-enormous-particle-collider-in-china-1830444169

[muyuu]

Sobre el grado de integración de Huawei con el ala militar y de seguridad del Estado Chino.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415726

Using a unique dataset of CVs, this paper analyzes the relationship between key Huawei personnel and the Chinese state security services. Based upon an analysis of this dataset, I find there is strong evidence that Huawei personnel act at the direction of Chinese state intelligence, and that there exists a deep and lasting relationship between Huawei, its employees, and the Chinese state. This should raise questions within Western governments worried about Chinese access to domestic information.

Balding, Christopher, Huawei Technologies’ Links to Chinese State Security Services (July 5, 2019)

EDIT: resumen del autor https://twitter.com/BaldingsWorld/status/1147259303268454400

[muyuu]

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-yuan-exim-idUSKCN1U1088

Citing trade risks, China’s EXIM bank chief urges faster yuan globalization


BEIJING (Reuters) - The chairwoman of China’s Export-Import Bank on Saturday called for an acceleration of reforms to internationalize the Chinese currency, warning that external risks linked to rising global protectionism could harm the financial sector.

Hu Xiaolian, speaking at a forum in Beijing, said some countries have been engaged in “constant” efforts to undermine globalization.

“Some barriers have been erected in terms of trade and investment, company cooperation, technological exchange, personnel exchanges and so on, which actually makes us worry whether the financial sector, as the ‘blood’ of the economy and an important support and guarantee for globalization, will also be impacted by this counter-current,” Hu said.

China is locked in a bruising trade war with the United States, which has led to retaliatory tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of each others’ goods. The U.S. administration has also stepped up scrutiny of Chinese firms, including telecommunications giant Huawei, which has been banned from accessing the U.S. market and effectively limited from purchasing U.S. technology.

Last week, the Washington Post reported that a U.S. judge has found three large Chinese banks in contempt for refusing to comply with subpoenas in a probe into North Korean sanctions violations, adding one of them could lose access to the U.S. financial system.

“Can international currencies, as the major global reserves for payment, settlement and investment, provide security for our global business activities and economic activities?” she asked.

Hu said a changing environment in trade and investment suggests the country needs to plan better for potential trouble.

“I think the internationalization of the yuan should move faster,” Hu said.

The internationalization of the Chinese currency suffered a setback since 2016 due to more stringent government controls to curb capital outflow as the yuan weakened.

Hu stressed the need to increase the overall competitiveness of China’s financial sector as a pre-condition for a more international currency, including by boosting efforts to modernize its financial institutions, expand financial opening and innovation, and remove distortions in loan pricing.

Hu said she was encouraged that China’s central bank is taking steps to make its interest rates more market-oriented.

“More efforts need to be made in interest rate liberalization, as only by reducing controls on loan pricing through both obvious and non-obvious ways can we better reflect real demand and risks,” Hu said.

Ma Jun, a central bank adviser, said on Monday that he expects China will eventually abolish its benchmark lending rate, but did not give a clear timeline.

[saturno]

Hay posts que merecen traducirse 

https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=fr&tl=es&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bulle-immobiliere.org%2Fforum%2Fviewtopic.php%3Ff%3D204%26t%3D95773%26p%3D2352260%23p2352341

Original v/F
http://www.bulle-immobiliere.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=204&t=95773&p=2352260#p2352341

ProfGrincheux
    Publicaciones: 451
    Registrado el: 28 de febrero 2019, 20:46
Re: Estados Unidos  declara la guerra comercial
# 310 Mensaje de ProfGrincheux » 11 de agosto de 2019, 11:32

-----

A corto plazo, es probable que las acciones de la administración Trump desencadenen una crisis económica global, que en cualquier caso tendrá lugar a largo plazo, la única pregunta es su gravedad y la resistencia de los diversos actores.

A largo plazo, habrá que plantear la cuestión del grado de confianza que sus aliados o socios pueden brindar a los Estados Unidos. Muchos de los errores de la UE provienen del sentido (¿ilusorio?) De seguridad proporcionado por el paraguas nuclear de los EE. UU. Y, en el caso del Reino Unido, de la confianza en el apoyo incondicional y gratuito del poder heredero hegemónico.

Occidente no conoce bien la historia de China. Pero él está equivocado. Un cuadro de lectura del desastre experimentado por China en el siglo XIX es el siguiente:

- China fue la potencia más desarrollada en el siglo XVII e incluso en el siglo XVIII.
- era un exportador neto de bienes, no importaba casi nada, y el Estado exigió que estos bienes se pagaran en moneda metálica plateada.
- El gran consumidor de té fue importado principalmente de China y sufrió una hemorragia catastrófica de metal para el sistema monetario occidental.
El opio comenzó a consumirse alrededor de 1750 en China.
- Los comerciantes británicos y los comerciantes chinos que encontraron que el requisito monetario del estado chino contravenía los principios de la competencia libre y sin distorsiones, tenían la idea de que la regulación de las exportaciones de opio fuera de la vista de las aduanas chinas sería una buena idea.
- Gracias a la eficiencia de los agentes comerciales de la tríada, el mercado del opio experimentó unas décadas de crecimiento vigoroso, hasta el punto en que al madurar la proporción de la población masculina china productora de opio alcanzó el 27%.
-las reacciones del estado chino fueron tardías e ineficaces, especialmente porque su clase dominante manchú tenía una política discriminatoria y despectiva hacia los Hans y no veía la próxima degeneración social del opio generalizado o incluso acomodado un tiempo.
- El comercio británico y occidental decidió romper las últimas barreras al libre comercio en China. Estas potencias han desencadenado algunas guerras marítimas miserablemente perdidas por una China orientada al opio que ha llevado a la apertura de puertos libres y luego a concesiones territoriales y los desastres del período 1935-1945.

Un testimonio en la cultura popular occidental con un sesgo prochino se puede leer en el Lotus Azul [el comic de Tintin, Hergé]

Aquí hay una tabla de lectura del período iniciado en 1948.

- China fue profundamente humillada.
- La nueva dinastía que se estableció en 1948 es una dinastía Han que se distingue por una tendencia a impulsar amplias transformaciones sociales económicas y culturales.
- Indiscutible es la calidad de la clase dominante que surgió de la Revolución Cultural y mis colegas chinos están muy agradecidos con él por su éxito económico. Esta calidad parece deteriorarse a medida que la tendencia al conservadurismo reaparece si leo entre líneas, pero es para confirmar.
- El período 1948-1978 se considera positivo en China, ya que es el período durante el cual China se ha convertido en una potencia militar a ser respetada. Mao es el único personaje en los billetes y su retrato domina simbólicamente el lugar donde la dinastía actual muestra su poder.
- El socialismo con características chinas es una forma de capitalismo autoritario.
- China aspira al menos a la paridad estratégica con los Estados Unidos.
- Está lista para todos los golpes baratos que ha visto a sus oponentes occidentales prodigar. Ella se ríe alea moral, tanto como Trump, pero de una manera más secreta, según los preceptos de Sun Tzu, un híbrido oriental de Clausewitz y Maquiavelo. Por ejemplo, presta dinero a países en dificultades para obtener sus recursos naturales y económicos en el patrón colonial tradicional.
- Una ironía de la historia es que utiliza el arma comercial para socavar la posición de sus oponentes y ha logrado revertir los términos de intercambio al obtener conocimientos tecnológicos, industriales y comerciales pagados. que es una moneda muy superior a las reliquias bárbaras del bimetalismo.
- Si puede hacer colapsar la economía de Estados Unidos, lo hará, es su principal oportunidad para recuperar Taiwán y garantizar la hegemonía regional.
- Probablemente no pueda. Por el momento.
-Podría suceder que China se contente con ser respetada, económica y culturalmente, y no se sienta obligada a extender su hegemonía más allá de la región de la que tradicionalmente es el poder dominante. Esta es la hipótesis optimista.

La fuente principal de la interpretación anterior es la interpretación del simbolismo político de todo dentro de un radio de 2 km alrededor del retrato de Mao en la Plaza Tiananmen, el lugar donde se simboliza el simbolismo de El poder político chino. Además de muchas discusiones con colegas chinos u otros. Nunca creí tampoco que los chinos eran idiotas simplemente buenos en la fabricación de productos industriales malos. Si los frecuentas un poco, esta idea se disipa rápidamente.

La asimilación del PCCh a una dinastía como la Ming pretende enfatizar la continuidad de la historia china es como la asimilación de la Quinta República a la monarquía de Luis XIV, un artificio retórico, una provocación, un Invitación a pensar.

No he leído el libro de Peyrefitte tan de moda en la década de 1970, no sé si su contenido es similar al de la cuadrícula anterior, pero todos conocen el título. Bueno, aquí estamos por al menos 20 años.

Trump lo hace muy mal y es un peligro público, pero expone las contradicciones de Occidente y sus errores de razonamiento. Lo peor de todo fue la idea de que la democracia es consustancial con el capitalismo, su etapa final, una estupidez que algunas personas creen y ha servido mucho en la adhesión de China a la OMC.

[muyuu]

https://112.international/finance/germany-calls-on-eu-to-ban-china-from-buying-companies-devalued-due-to-coronavirus-51406.html

Germany calls on EU to ban China from buying companies devalued due to coronavirus

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-launches-new-twitter-accounts-90-000-tweets-covid-19-n1207991

China launches new Twitter accounts, 90,000 tweets in COVID-19 info war

China has pushed out 90,000 tweets since the start of April from 200 diplomatic and state media accounts in a COVID-19 information war offensive.

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-19/chinese-embassy-australia-credit-coronavirus-inquiry-a-joke/12262968

Chinese embassy ridicules Australia for claiming vindication for global coronavirus inquiry

[saturno]

Sanciones chinas a la venta de armas de empresas EEUU a Taiwan
https://www.vozpopuli.com/internacional/china-sanciones-eeuu-armas-taiwan_0_1404459694.html

China ha anunciado este lunes que ha impuesto sanciones a las empresas estadounidenses Lockheed Martin, Boeing Defense y Raytheon por su vinculación con un preacuerdo para vender armas a Taiwán por valor de 1.800 millones de dólares (1.519 millones de euros).


El portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores chino Zhao Lijian, citado por el rotativo 'Global Times', ha afirmado que las sanciones son "en respuesta a la venta de armas" y también alcanzan a "otros particulares y entidades", aunque no especificó los detalles.

Zhao adelantó la semana pasada que China daría "una respuesta legítima" después de que el Departamento de Estado estadounidense anunciara su intención de vender a Taiwán tres lotes de armas que incluyen misiles SLAM-ER y unidades HIMARS, un sistema lanzamisiles múltiple ligero.

Para que la venta se materialice, deben aprobarla tanto el Congreso estadounidense como el Legislativo taiwanés, según la agencia oficial taiwanesa CNA.

[JoaquinR]

Sanciones chinas a la venta de armas de empresas EEUU a Taiwan
https://www.vozpopuli.com/internacional/china-sanciones-eeuu-armas-taiwan_0_1404459694.html

Esto es raro. Meterse a hacer ruido con sanciones antes de que se vote en el Congreso USA. ¿Por qué? Tienen la opción super fácil e indetectable de contribuir a campañas electorales variadas para que el Congreso vete las ventas, mientras que al hacer ruido público fuerzan a los políticos USA a ceder ante china públicamente (suicidio político) o votar a favor de la venta de armas. Y las sanciones son a empresas como Lockheed, Boeing Defense y Raytheon, que no pueden vender sus productos a China de todas formas.

En mi opinión, parece que quieren que USA venda esta tanda de armas a Taiwan, o no les importa y les interesa más hacer ruido. Esto puede ser para meter miedo a empresas y particulares para futuras acciones que sí les importen, o para comprobar hasta qué punto USA puede reaccionar, o para cien cosas que no veo.

¿Alguien entiende esto?

[saturno]

  China's Secret Spacecraft Looks To Have Landed At This Remote Base With A Massive Runway
The craft, which is thought to be a spaceplane designed to land on a traditional runway, also appears to have launched a small payload into orbit.

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK AND TYLER ROGOWAY
SEPTEMBER 8, 2020 THE WAR ZONE




Satellite imagery that The War Zone has obtained from Planet Labs and other data suggest that China's recently tested experimental reusable spacecraft may have touched down at a remote air base with a massive runway near the Lop Nor nuclear test site in the northwestern portion of the country this weekend. The object's return to earth occurred after spending approximately two days in orbit. This strongly points to the secretive craft being a spaceplane of some kind that lands on a traditional runway. The U.S. government has also now cataloged two new as yet unidentified Chinese objects in space, which could be small satellites, that appear to be linked to this spacecraft's brief trip.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36270/this-remote-base-with-a-massive-runway-looks-to-be-where-chinas-secretive-spacecraft-landed

XThanks - http://www.bulle-immobiliere.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=205&t=95993&p=2475284&hilit=Chine#p2457429

[Lem]

https://twitter.com/RushDoshi/status/1329076203609677826

Beijing sent a list of 14 grievances to Australia supposedly justifying its economic coercion against it.

The list is revealing.

It shows the PRC holds countries responsible for their free *civil societies* & serves as a template for illiberal order-building.

The Sydney Morning Herald - @smh (https://twitter.com/smh/status/1328959892435197954): Beijing has issued an extraordinary attack on the Australian government, accusing it of "poisoning bilateral relations" in a deliberately leaked document that threatens to escalate tensions between the two countries https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/if-you-make-china-the-enemy-china-will-be-the-enemy-beijing-s-fresh-threat-to-australia-20201118-p56fqs.html?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1605683701

Some thoughts: 1/

The list is long:

- Investment scrutiny
- Huawei
- Interference legislation
- Visas
- COVID inquiry
- HR criticism
- SCS stance
- Spreading US "disinformation"
- BRI disinterest
- Think tanks
- PRC journalists
- Reporting cyber attacks
- CCP criticism
- Media

2/

An old view was that China used econ coercion when core interests had been crossed. That's outdated.

The list is also notable in other respects:

1) It is hypocritical
2) It expects AUS to give up sovereignty in key areas
3) It punishes AUS for the actions of its citizens

3/

The PRC does what it accuses AUS of doing. It:

- limits foreign investment
- limits foreign involvement in its politics
- erects visa barriers
- treats journalists far worse
- condemns other governments
- has antagonistic media
- limits provincial foreign policy freelancing

4/

Some of these complaints ask AUS to effectively surrender partial sovereignty.

The PRC is saying Australia must:

- allow states like Victoria to run their own FP
- allow PRC interference in politics
- allow Huawei access
- not restrict investment
- not report cyberattacks

5/

Some of these are punishments for civil society's actions, not the government's:

- think tank research
- media criticism
- criticism by individual officials

We've seen this before in China's punishment of Norway and Sweden.

6/

China is not obligated to trade with AUS, but that misses an interesting point.

The deployment of coercive economic leverage to shape AUS internal behavior is a kind illiberal of order-building.

This list is a partial guide to the norms of that illiberal order.

/End

[muyuu]

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/chinas-housing-bubble-has-been-curbed-deputy-central-bank-governor-3321216

China's housing bubble has been curbed: deputy central bank governor

BEIJING : The bubbling trend of China's property sector has been curbed as measures to support the industry are gaining traction, Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China Pan Gongsheng said on Friday, adding the property sector is improving.

China will push forward the transformation of the property sector and insist that housing is for living, not for speculation, Pan said.

New home sales in China rose sharply in February from a slump in the previous month, buoyed by a rise in demand in small and medium-sized cities after the scrapping of COVID curbs and supportive property policies, a private survey showed on Monday.

[muyuu]

https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/12173683/03/23/Los-fletes-de-barcos-crecen-un-64-en-febrero-por-la-apertura-de-China.html

Saludos.

[muyuu]

https://www.expansion.com/economia/financial-times/2023/03/07/6407458c468aebb3038b4654.html

Saludos.

[muyuu]

he conocido personalmente un par de casos parecidos a este, de gente que emigró a China alrededor de 2000-2005 a sus primeros trabajos (yo fui a Japón) y se han vuelto un poco acojonados con el ambiente durante los últimos 3 ó 4 años, en algunos casos con dificultades al tener ya toda su vida montada en China pero sin más remedio ante una hostilidad cada vez mayor en ciudades recientemente cosmopolitas, si bien durante muy poco tiempo en el contexto histórico de China

----------


https://www.persuasion.community/p/leaving-china

Leaving China

Why expatriates like me abandoned the futures we planned in China.

Mar 17

by Blake Stone-Banks

It’s difficult for me to imagine a better place to have lived for the past two decades than China. The country’s rise has been exhilarating, and I have no doubt its future will be as well. But as China opens from its harsh zero-Covid policies, I find myself, along with many long-term expatriates in the country, making my exit to return home to the United States due to political upheavals that have put into question the futures we have long imagined in the Middle Kingdom.

When I arrived in China as a student in 2000, none of my friends owned a phone—cell or landline. We used beepers and public phones for communication. Quickly, though, the technology we used would come to match or leapfrog the kind used by our peers in the Western world. My friends’ first phones would be cell phones, not landlines; mobile payment would precede credit cards; and the social media application WeChat would transform the landscape of life, work, commerce, and governance in ways those in the West still don’t grasp.

Those two decades, however, had their dark spots too. I had friends woken in the night and interrogated about their political beliefs, and I had friends forced to flee for speaking out about gender rights and other social issues. Oppression in China is real and effective. But in order to live everyday life, most people living in China find it necessary to turn a blind eye until it affects them directly.

That became impossible during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the force of China’s technocracy was on full display. Families were torn apart and businesses shuttered. When the government stopped renewing citizens’ passports, the claustrophobia of not being able to leave and the paranoia about what might come next became unbearable. Almost everyone I knew who had a way out took it, even expatriate friends who had been living in China since the 1980s.

Although China hasn’t released any updated numbers, the country’s pre-pandemic census suggests that some had begun to leave even before the Covid crackdown. From 2010 to 2020, Shanghai’s expat population dropped from 208,000 to 163,000. A survey by the European Chamber of Commerce in April 2022 found that 85 percent of foreigners living in China said the lockdown had made them rethink their futures in the country. And before I left, I would frequently walk around formerly expat-rich districts like Shanghai’s French Concession or Beijing’s Sanlitun and be the only foreigner on the street.

China’s expat exodus is occurring during a precarious time for the country: In 2022, China’s total population decreased by more than 800,000 — the first population decline in more than sixty years. Now that the failed zero-Covid policies have been lifted, China is desperately looking to win back both foreign investment and foreign professionals. But the question remains if foreigners will return, and what the lives they lead in post-Covid China will look like.

As then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s plane approached Taiwan last August, I was attending a business dinner in Anhui, a province in eastern China, with several Chinese nationals. It was difficult to talk business as everyone was occupied checking their phones for news of Pelosi’s plane.

Soon, the entire restaurant grew deathly quiet. Not just our table but every person in the restaurant was staring at the live stream of the radar tracking Pelosi’s arrival. At the table next to us, a young couple on a date spent their entire dinner in silence, staring at the glow of their phones. The only sound in the restaurant was the bleep of the radar on their smartphones.

“Don’t worry. You’ll be fine if there’s war,” the company’s CEO comforted me. “You speak Chinese.” The topic of war between America and China had come up with increasing frequency over the past year, often in business contexts, often when I was the only American in the room. No one knew what that would look like, and no one wanted to know.

Back in Shanghai a week later, after another three-day lockdown for my family, I had dinner with a friend who was a Party member and former official who still had some connections. I told him I was thinking of leaving. As a father of two American citizens, I did not like to see kids in the park playing “war” or to watch the military propaganda frequently shared in WeChat groups. He reiterated what more than a few connected families had told me, that Xi’s zero-Covid policies had been unpopular, and that most people, even in government, thought it would be very bad for China to continue shutting the outside world out. Specifically, he reminded me that as we headed into the Party Congress in October, China’s government was not a one-man show.

“There are different contingents, and elders, and former leaders all of whom have a big say. Yes, Xi may get the third term, but when he walks out, look at who’s on his left and his right. Those will be their people, not Xi’s.”

At the Party Congress in October, however, Xi removed the old brass and installed only loyalists. By his side was Li Qiang, the new premier and Xi loyalist who had overseen the Shanghai lockdown earlier that year. Hu Jintao, China’s leader before Xi, was forcibly led out of the Congress in front of the global media.

Since moving back to the America from China a few months ago, I am often asked if I wish I had stayed to see China reopen, if perhaps I left too early. Now connected with former China expats and Chinese here in America, a common answer is it’s still too early to tell. At a basic level, I know several foreigners, myself included, who have no plans to move back until a successor to Xi is named. It is difficult to point to many countries on a positive trajectory under a leader with unchecked power and without term limits.

Foreigners returning to China or moving into China for the first time will find a vastly different landscape than that prior to Covid. China’s leadership has made clear that they will prioritize unification and Party integrity over the economy and the well-being of their people. Although there is no leader yet in the wings to take over from Xi in the next ten years (let alone the next five), leadership does evolve and dialogue remains more important than ever.

Where expatriates of the past decades were drawn by the possibilities of China’s growing openness, the new generation will live under tightening restrictions and greater uncertainty. Alongside heightened geopolitical tensions, this will likely stem the flow of expats from America, Europe, Japan and Korea. As a consequence, new expat communities from other countries like Brazil, Russia, and India may take root.

Regardless of where they are from, a new generation of expats will be good for both China and the world. Because the more engagement the country has with the rest of the world, the less likely it will be to isolate itself from the global community and turn inward. Though I’m not on my way back anytime soon, I hope that the next generation of expats finds a home, and a future, in China.

Blake Stone-Banks first moved to China in 2000. Following China’s zero-Covid policies, he returned to the United States at the end of 2022.

[Reiter]

¿No está sucediendo demasiado rápido? Es un proceso que debía ser gradual y llevar años.

Russia embraces China’s renminbi in face of western sanctions

“the use of the yuan in payments between Russia and countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America”.

https://www.ft.com/content/65681143-c6af-4b64-827d-a7ca6171937a

China, France companies complete first cross-border Yuan settlement of LNG trade

https://dailytimes.com.pk/1078843/china-france-companies-complete-first-cross-border-yuan-settlement-of-lng-trade/

Brazil, China strike trade deal agreement to ditch US dollar

https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/brazil-china-strike-trade-deal-agreement-ditch-us-dollar

Saudi Arabia Considers Accepting Yuan Instead of Dollars for Chinese Oil Sales

https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-considers-accepting-yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541

Saudi Arabia takes step to join China-led security bloc, as ties with Beijing strengthen

https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/29/saudi-arabia-takes-step-to-join-china-led-security-bloc-as-ties-with-beijing-strengthen.html

... Y otras que se podrían mencionar, de las cuales la más destacada es la tregua que China ha logrado entre Iran y Arabia Saudí que puede llevar a la pacificación de Yemen y Siria, y la más siginificativa, la amenaza "de proporciones bíblicas" de una congresista a Argentina si fabrica cazas chinos. Nada de seducirles con contraofertas y amenazas veladas como de costumbre, en directo para que lo vea todo el mundo.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqiexFMO-9E)


Tengo la sensación de que ocurren demasiadas cosas al mismo tiempo.