PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Verano 2023

[muyuu]

Lo que pasa en China desde Mao e incluso antes es un aceleracionismo del sálvese quien pueda. Funciona muy bien en el contexto actual, pero también es terreno fértil para los cataclismos económicos y para que lleven décadas defraudando datos.

De todos modos China tiene todos los ingredientes para salir muy reforzada en la próxima década a pesar de su invierno demográfico. Su modelo no es ser EEUU, sino el Japón imperial con su "esfera de coprosperidad" y su mano de hierro incluídas.

[JENOFONTE10]

CONCON PERRHIJOS

DERECHA CONCON.—
Milei, judío, soltero y que odia a sus padres, ha dedicado su victoria a sus 'cinco hijos de cuatro patas', sus perros.

Por otro lado, el prelado de origen vasco denunció que «es un drama la existencia de los ‘perrijos’ en nuestra cultura» y se mostró preocupado por ver cada vez más carritos de bebés sin niños y con perros dentro. «Dejen a los perros ser perros», pidió el obispo.

https://infovaticana.com/2023/08/04/munilla-se-apunta-a-hacer-lio-en-la-jmj-nadie-nace-en-un-cuerpo-equivocado/

Animales de compañía SIN HIJOS para habitar viviendas caras y estériles, vacías de cónyuges fecundos.

Izquierdas o derechas. Liberales o conservadores. Todos somos PLU. Incluso los partidos animalistas extraparlamentarios, por ahora.

Saludos.

[Derby]

Los concon son individualistas. Van a por sus objetivos personales: «tu respeto irrestricto por mi proyecto de vida y mi propiedad» (cita de Benegas Lynch hijo), dicen obscenamente. Pero son maleducados. No respetan tu proyecto de vida ni tu propiedad. Y son maleducados a sabiendas y se regodean porque se creen intocables.

Absolutamente. Esto está siendo insoportable. El nivel de mala educación, impertinencia y obscenidad es de lo nunca visto. Y los muy horteras se piensan, porque la realidad los ha validado casi toda su vida, que tienen todo el derecho a comportarse como scum y a tratar al resto peor aun. A mí me deja atónita, incapaz de reaccionar...¿Dónde ha quedado la vergüenza?

[Benzino Napaloni]

De todos modos China tiene todos los ingredientes para salir muy reforzada en la próxima década a pesar de su invierno demográfico. Su modelo no es ser EEUU, sino el Japón imperial con su "esfera de coprosperidad" y su mano de hierro incluídas.

Pero también tiene un reto mayúsculo. Como ya se ha dicho, China en su momento tendrá que afrontar cambios sociales como Alemania y Japón en su día. Y España también tuvo su ración. Nada más venir el turismo los más carcas se escandalizaron de la poca ropa en la playa, pero la necesidad de divisas mandaba.

Volviendo al presente, China tuvo problemas en el mundial de fútbol porque el público salía en la televisión arrejuntao y sin mascarilla. Allí aún estaban chupando "Covid cero" cuando en Europa ya estábamos más que vacunados y liquidando los últimos restos. Si China quiere ser moderna, tiene que superar eso y mucho.

[Derby]

https://twitter.com/NewsLambert/status/1691800899352473610

@NewsLambert Goldman Sachs: U.S. housing affordability is back to historic lows

[Derby]

https://twitter.com/NewsLambert/status/1691630860854784450

@NewsLambert IF U.S. incomes spiked 69%, we'd return to pre-pandemic housing affordability levels.

IF U.S. home prices fell 41%, we'd return to pre-pandemic affordability.

IF mortgage rates fell 4.3 percentage points (from 7.26% to 2.96%), we'd return to pre-pandemic affordability.

[breades]

Zonas económicas especiales de China
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zonas_econ%C3%B3micas_especiales_de_China

Las ZEE

China estableció sus primeras cuatro zonas económicas especiales (ZEE) entre 1980 y 1984 en cuatro ciudades: Xiamen, Shenzhen, Zhuhai y Shantou, además de una provincia, Hainan.45​ Las características de estas zonas iniciales son únicas y poseen diferencias respecto al resto de áreas incorporadas por el gobierno en los años posteriores.

En 1984, dado el éxito cosechado en tan pocos años, se establecieron catorce nuevas ciudades costeras: Dalián, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghái, Ningbó, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Cantón, Zhanjiang y Beihai.45​

En 1985 se establecieron cinco regiones geográficas: la península de Liaodong, el delta del Changjiang, al sur de la provincia de Jiangsu y al norte de la provincia de Zhejiang, la península de Shandong (parte de la provincia del mismo nombre), la conurbación urbana Xiamen- Zhangzhou-Quanzhou, parte de la provincia de Fujian y el delta del Zhujiang al sur de la provincia de Fujian; una provincia (Hebei) y una región autónoma (Guangxi).45​ En 1990, el gobierno chino decidió abrir una nueva área en Pudong, distrito de la ciudad de Shanghái, a inversiones extranjeras, así como en más ciudades en el valle del río Yangtsé.45​

Desde 1992, el Consejo de Estado abrió una serie de ciudades fronterizas y todas las capitales de provincia interiores, además de las regiones autónomas. Se han establecido un total de 15 zonas de libre comercio, 49 de desarrollo económico y tecnológico a nivel estatal45​ y 53 zonas de desarrollo industrial y de alta tecnología, por lo general en grandes y medianas ciudades. Como resultado, existe en China un sistema diversificado y armonizado por niveles de apertura e integración entre áreas costeras, fluviales, fronterizas e interiores.

 

Planificación central ¿te suena?

En China sólo hay un sistema: el del PCCh.

[sudden and sharp]

No, no me suena. Son zonas especiales. También hay de las otras, las comunistas, con planificación central y planes quinquenales.

[Derby]

No hay día en el que no salgan publirreportajes sobre:
• lo mucho que 'valen' los pisitos occidentales y
• lo poco que 'vale' el éxito económico chino.

https://www.ft.com/content/21a2e806-0a7e-4e98-aa21-013c027bbac1

China’s housing market is . . . not good

How long until it bans property data releases as well?

China’s decision to stop publishing youth unemployment statistics is pretty funny. Unfortunately, the data it still publishes has looked deeply unfunny lately.

Last week China fell into d*******n, and yesterday the People’s Bank of China attempted to get ahead of data showing slowing retail sales and industrial output with a pre-emptive rate cut. But that’s done little-to-nothing to calm things down.

China’s much-touted reopening boom seems to have fizzled out incredibly quickly. As Matt Klein points out, it is now probably growing more slowly than the US — which is pretty wild when you remember that China has comfortably been the single biggest contributor to global GDP growth since the financial crisis, adding the equivalent to almost three Germanys.

We got even more dour data today. The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics’ new home price data for July averaged an annualised seasonally adjusted month-on-month decline of 2.5 per cent for the 70 cities measured, according to Goldman Sachs calculations.



Lower-tier cities saw the biggest declines, but the housing downturn is looking increasingly broad-based, with even tier-1 cities like Shenzhen suffering a slight dip in prices. Kelvin Lam from Pantheon Macro notes that 49 out of the 70 cities surveyed saw new-home price declines in July, compared to just five in March.

Existing home prices are also still falling, with a 0.5 per cent month-on-month decline in July, and analysts are sceptical the PBoC’s rate cut will do much to dent the trajectory. Easier monetary policy “may only lead to an “L-shaped” recovery in the sector in coming years”, Goldman noted.

JPMorgan’s China economists are also alarmed at recent developments. In a note this morning they wrote (with JPM’s emphasis below):

Secondary home prices continued to underperform, with a consistent drop in both month-on-month and year-on-year terms, across all city tiers. This has further narrowed the price gap with new home prices. As we have flagged, if the secondary home prices fall below new home prices, this could be a game-changer in that a mutually reinforcing decline in new home prices and secondary home prices may be formed, leaning the way for the Japanification risk to materialize.

This obviously isn’t happening in isolation either. The recent default of Country Garden Group has underscored the widening damage caused by the real estate rot, while the troubles of Zhongrong Trust has done the same for China’s vast shadow banking industry.

Here are JPMorgan’s analysts again. Alphaville’s emphasis below:

In recent weeks, we see mounting financial risks from the property sector (e.g., Country Garden), the shadow banking sector (e.g. Zhongrong Trust), and LGFVs. Country Garden Group, the sales champion of China’s housing market in 2017-2022, missed coupon payments for USD bonds last week and is managing to fulfill the repayment during the 30-day grace period. While the incremental contagion in the credit market may be smaller compared to the Evergrande default episode in 2021, as around two-thirds of private developers have already defaulted, it could become a source of significant downside risk to our GDP growth forecast in 2H and 2024, and intensify the financial risk concerns. The developers’ liquidity distress also points to limited capability and low incentive to purchase land, and start new home projects. Ensuring home completion of existing projects will be the priority.

Last week, Zhongrong Trust was reported to have delayed payment of maturing wealth products, and its largest shareholder, Zhongzhi Group has run into liquidity distress in recent months. Our banking analysts estimate that Zhongrong Trust’s total AUM at risk could be as high as 67bn yuan, and the contagion risk to the trust industry or other alternative financing channels is rising. While developers’ exposure to trust financing is likely limited, with the outstanding balance at 1.1 trillion yuan by 1Q23, 7% of all trust financing or 5% of developers’ debt (7% for private developers, and 1% for SOE developers), LGFVs’ trusting financing exposure could be larger.

While there is no concrete official breakdown of LGFVs’ overall interest-bearing debt by instrument type, we estimate that out of the 56 trillion yuan LGFV interest bearing debt, around 24% is LGFV bonds, 60% is bank loans, and 15% is shadow credit such as trust loans. In this sense, the spillover impact from recent trust sector liquidity distress to the LGFVs could be larger than that to the property sector. Besides, with the ongoing and likely intensifying sluggishness of the land market, LGFVs’ liquidity could face rising challenges. The reported 1 trillion yuan local government debt resolution scheme signals local governments’ funding difficulties, especially those with heavy reliance on land sales, but the resolution scale is small compared to the size of total LGFV debt and, hence, it is more an effort to mitigate near-term liquidity pressure. With renewed trust sector liquidity distress and intensified property and land market weakness, we think LGFV debt related risk is rising, altogether pointing to mounting systemic financial risks.

We think the urgency for housing policy relaxation is rising. Other than macro and financial drags, a double-dip in the housing market, especially after the housing policy shift last November that aimed to increase funding support for developers, may also shake the market confidence in the ability of the Chinese government to control risk and stabilize growth. The slow pace of policy moves and absence of concrete action in the past few weeks (after the Politburo meeting) are puzzling, and have been gradually eroding market patience. We expect housing policy easing measures will be announced in the coming weeks, e.g., lower down payment requirements, relaxation in first home mortgage definition and relaxation in home purchase restrictions.

[breades]

No, no me suena. Son zonas especiales. También hay de las otras, las comunistas, con planificación central y planes quinquenales.

Era una pregunta retórica, era y es evidente que no.

 

[sudden and sharp]

Lo que era evidente es que no era por lo de Hong Kong. (Y Macao, ya puestos.)

Es evidente que no es planificación central (como el euro) sino dictadura pura y dura.

Será evidente como paso de discutir contigo tus tonterías partir de ahora.

[Derby]

Pero la verdad es que la derecha ostenta la hegemonía cultural, a la par que es la que padece degeneración moral. Y la prueba es doble: la impunidad de los malos modales de la derecha concon y la desmovilización de las izquierdas a través del Registro de la Propiedad. En Madrid se ve muy bien. La pija es la marquesa de Hala-A-Pagar. La cheli, la atea.

Inmediatamente he recordado el principal estándar moral que contiene el Código Civil (yo soy iuscivilista hasta la médula): el buen padre de familia. No requería ni definición, porque ya se sabía cómo debía comportarse un buen padre de familia. Ya nadie sabe qué significa auctoritas o que el ejercicio del poder sin un sentido de responsabilidad desemboca en la fuerza bruta.

https://dpej.rae.es/lema/buen-padre-de-familia

buen padre de familia

Civ. Criterio moral usado en la legislación tradicional para valorar determinadas conductas en defecto de otras reglas expresas más específicas.
Por ejemplo, a falta de instrucciones del mandante, el mandatario hará todo lo que, según la naturaleza del negocio, haría un buen padre de familia (CC, art. 1719 ); el depositario de bienes secuestrados está obligado a cumplir respecto de ellos todas las obligaciones de un buen padre de familia (CC, art. 1788); el acreedor debe cuidar de la cosa dada en prenda con la diligencia de un buen padre de familia (CC, art. 1687); y el gestor oficioso debe desempeñar su encargo con toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia (CC, art. 1889). Es posible en ciertos casos eludir la responsabilidad si se prueba que se actuó como un «buen padre de familia» (CC, art. 1903). Y el juez puede reducir las obligaciones de juego en lo que excediere de los usos de un buen padre de familia (CC, art. 1801).

[asustadísimos]

['Scum', además de escoria humana, es el juego de palabras del título del manifiesto fundacional del anarco-feminismo, escrito por Valerie Solanas, 'Society for Cutting Up Men', en el que, después de un par de párrafos introductorios, se lee:
 
— «The male is completely egocentric, trapped inside himself, incapable of empathizing or identifying with others, of love, friendship, affection or tenderness. He is a completely isolated unit, incapable of rapport with anyone. His responses are entirely visceral, not cerebral; his intelligence is a mere tool in the service of his drives and needs; he is incapable of mental passion, mental interaction; he can’t relate to anything other than his own physical sensations. He is a half dead, unresponsive lump, incapable of giving or receiving pleasure or happiness; consequently, he is at best an utter bore, an inoffensive blob, since only those capable of absorption in others can be charming. He is trapped in a twilight zone halfway between humans and apes, and is far worse off than the apes because, unlike the apes, he is capable of a large array of negative feelings—hate, jealousy, contempt, disgust, guilt, shame, doubt—and, moreover he is aware of what he is and isn’t.»
https://editions-ismael.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/1968-Valerie-Solanas-S.C.U.M.-Manifesto.pdf

Habría que entender este escrito como una performance artística,...

... si no fuera porque, a los pocos meses Valerie Solanas disparó con un revolver calibre 22 contra Warhol,...

... el cual, años más tarde, utilizaría esa arma de fuego como tema en una famosa serie de su obra; algo de ello pudimos verlo en Madrid, en la galería de Fernando Vijande, con el propio Warhol presente (no se vendió nada y la galería tuvo que comprarlo todo). La feminazi pasó por la cárcel. Y la declararon esquizofrénica. Todos, todas y 'todes' la abandonaron y murió como genuina 'scum'.

Los concon (contestarios conservadores) son siniestros anarco-capitalistas, también con personalidad dividida, mitad antisistema capitalista, mitad promodelo popularcapitalista. Empezaron a morir en todo el mundo el día que Trump fue echado de la presidencia de EEUU. ¡Que les den! Solo hacen daño. Iván Espi ha hecho muy bien dando el portazo, harto de hacer de constestatario.]

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-16/fed-saw-significant-inflation-risk-that-may-merit-more-hikes

Fed Saw ‘Significant’ Inflation Risk That May Merit More Hikes

*Fed issues minutes of July 25-26 policy meeting in Washington
*Some officials also saw downside risks to economic activity

Federal Reserve officials at their last meeting largely remained concerned that inflation would fail to recede and suggested they may continue raising interest rates.

“Most participants continued to see significant upside risks to inflation, which could require further tightening of monetary policy,” according to minutes of the US central bank’s July 25-26 policy meeting published Wednesday in Washington.

“Some participants commented that even though economic activity had been resilient and the labor market had remained strong, there continued to be downside risks to economic activity and upside risks to the unemployment rate,” the Fed said.

Policymakers raised the target range for their benchmark rate by a quarter point at the meeting, to 5.25% to 5.5%, the highest level in 22 years. That marked a resumption of increases after they left rates unchanged at the previous gathering for the first time since early 2022.

While quarterly projections last updated in June showed most officials at the time favored two more increases in 2023, Chair Jerome Powell emphasized after the July decision that the Fed would take things meeting by meeting.

Restrictive Policy

“We intend again to keep policy restrictive until we’re confident that inflation is coming down sustainably to our 2% target, and we’re prepared to further tighten if that is appropriate,” Powell told reporters on July 26.

Following release of the minutes, Treasury yields remained higher, while the S&P 500 index extended its losses on the day and the dollar added to its gains.

Public remarks from officials on the Federal Open Market Committee since the July meeting suggest the strong degree of consensus underpinning the aggressive tightening campaign of the last year and a half may be starting to fray.

Some, such as Philadelphia Fed President Patrick Harker, have indicated the central bank might not need to keep raising interest rates. Others, including Fed Governor Michelle Bowman, have taken the opposite view.

“Most participants continued to see significant upside risks to inflation, which could require further tightening of monetary policy,” according to minutes of the US central bank’s July 25-26 policy meeting published Wednesday in Washington. Kailey Leinz reports.

“A number of participants judged that, with the stance of monetary policy in restrictive territory, risks to the achievement of the committee’s goals had become more two-sided, and it was important that the committee’s decisions balance the risk of an inadvertent overtightening of policy against the cost of an insufficient tightening,” the minutes stated.

While the FOMC’s 11 voting members unanimously agreed to raise interest rates in July, the support wasn’t unanimous among the broader panel of about 18 officials, as two favored leaving rates unchanged or “could have supported such a proposal,” the minutes showed.

Trader Expectations
 
Investors currently do not expect another rate increase this year, according to futures contracts, though the implied odds of a hike at the Oct. 31-Nov. 1 meeting are higher than those for their next meeting on Sept. 19-20.

They continue to see the US central bank cutting rates in 2024, with the benchmark rate seen falling to around 4.25% by the end of next year.

Fed watchers will listen for a possible signal at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole conference in Wyoming next week, where Powell is expected to deliver remarks.

Key economic data published since the July gathering have largely supported the notion that Fed officials have some time to deliberate over the need for more tightening.

Quarterly releases on employment costs and unit labor costs showed a deceleration in the pace of increases, while a measure of consumer prices excluding food and energy logged the smallest back-to-back monthly advances in more than two years.

The minutes also conveyed optimism about the outlook for the US economy as the Fed’s influential staff economists “no longer judged that the economy would enter a mild recession toward the end of the year.”

Still, they expected economic growth over the next two years “would run below their estimate of potential output growth, leading to a small increase in the unemployment rate relative to its current level.”

[Derby]

https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/dutch-economy-slid-recession-inflation-interest-rates-hit-102308923

The Dutch economy has slid into recession as inflation and interest rates hit exports and spending

The official Dutch statistics office says the Netherlands has fallen into a recession after exports and household spending fell back amid rising interest rates intended to rein in inflation