PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2025

[Benzino Napaloni]

Yo tengo mis dudas de que esto sea así. En la anterior crisis (2008) la construcción era motor económico y motor de empleo en el país. Ahora mismo no es así, por suerte (o por desgracia) en este punto España ha diversificado "motores", es que (aunque sorprenda) ni el turismo es el sector líder económico de España.

Así que la caída del empleo no va a ser tan acusada como en 2008. Después, las hipotecas "Ninja" no son tan habituales (algo habrá) como en 2008, incluso muchos ninja de 2008 llevan casi 20 años devolviendo préstamo hipotecario...

Aunque nos fastidie, la situación es muchísimo menos mala para el país. Nuestro único consuelo es pensar que el sector inmobiliario no tiene secuestrado al país, y por eso se le puede dejar caer.

Desde mi punto de vista, sólo es una esperanza. Ahora mismo en España las cosas están mejor que en 2008, incluso hay mucho inversor (fondo buitre o lo que queráis) extranjero, que también puede ayudar a sostener al Bicho.
Necesitamos una suma de eventos: Aumento de desempleo, represión fiscal, construir más vivienda (y muy barata), crisis externa que incluya fuerte caída del turismo en España... vamos, un cisne negro.

No se rick ... parece chungo. Ojalá PPCC esté en lo cierto, y mis impresiones sean sólo eso, mis impresiones. Como os digo siempre, encantado estaré de comerme mi owned, y estaré encantado en pagar cervezas a cualquier forero que se acerque a Barcelona y me recuerde mi error.

En toda burbuja el cisne negro siempre es la imposibilidad de que el Ponzi se mantenga indefinidamente. Siempre hay un eslabón de la cadena que cede, y si la cadena estaba tensa al máximo cae entera, como ha pasado con el apagón.

En 2008 el detonante fue el cierre del grifo del crédito, la crisis económica hizo el resto. Esta vez es cierto que la construcción no tiene la hipertrofia de entonces, y no es previsible que el paro aumente como entonces.

Esta vez el cisne negro puede ser la certeza de que no hay compradores para las viviendas que los fondos y los particulares oportunistas ya están vendiendo. En Cataluña precisamente no paran de llegarme alertas de rebajas en ventas. Poco a poco va calando la idea de que se va a topar completamente toda renta de alquiler, y los especuladores empiezan a marcharse.

No olvidemos tampoco que las empresas tienen problemas crecientes por el banano. Viendo la resistencia brutal que hay hacía el teletrabajo a tiempo completo se ve que hay un pánico tremendo a que caiga el precio de las oficinas.

Cuando la cuerda se ha tensado, ya da igual por dónde se rompa. Un desinflado "suave" no es una posibilidad porque cuando una burbuja se ha vuelto grande siempre hay quien se ha apalancado más de la cuenta y no tiene la opción de vender a pérdidas antes de que sea tarde.

[Derby]

Tiene pinta de que no ha ido muy bien... 

https://x.com/DeItaone/status/1921151865833591217

[R.G.C.I.M.]

Yo sólo guardo en la cabeza que el dolar DEBE bajar, y lo interperto todo bajo esa premisa.
De momento todo cuadra.

Sds

[Derby]

https://tippinsights.com/what-role-for-china-in-ukraine/

What Role For China In Ukraine?, By Thomas Graham & Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Project Syndicate

China presents itself as a peacemaker, but it has benefited strategically from the Russia's war. For the Chinese government's calculus to change, it would need to conclude that active engagement in postwar reconstruction would bring even greater benefits than the status quo.


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NEW YORK – The sight of Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting the Kremlin for Russia’s World War II Victory Day parade has rekindled the idea that China might finally pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. But it has been more than three years since Russia invaded its neighbor, and little suggests that China is willing to support good-faith peace negotiations.

In fact, China has continued to back Russia diplomatically, economically, and militarily. The Chinese government avoids referring to Putin’s aggression as an “invasion,” and even though it has not formally recognized Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory, it has repeatedly abstained from United Nations votes condemning Putin’s war. Publicly, China echoes Russia’s narrative, blaming NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese officials and state media accuse the United States of being “the real provocateur of the Ukrainian crisis,” and have warned it against further confrontation.

For his part, Xi has shown no signs of reconsidering the Sino-Russia “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era.” Over the past three years, he and Putin have met nine times in person – more than any other two world leaders. Shortly after Donald Trump’s inauguration this year, Xi and Putin pledged that their countries would “deepen strategic coordination, firmly support each other, and defend their legitimate interests.” Xi’s state visit this week comes when China is rallying support in opposing Trump’s tariff war.

Economically, China has extended Russia a lifeline as Western sanctions have intensified.Sino-Russian bilateral trade soared from $147 billion in 2021 to a record $245 billion in 2024.  Chinese consumer products, notably automobiles and smartphones, rapidly poured in as Western brands withdrew. By early 2023, Chinese smartphones accounted for more than 70% of the Russian market.

Similarly, China is poised to import more energy from Russia in 2025 (likely at heavily discounted prices), which will help the Kremlin finance its war effort. Since 2023, Russia has become China’s top crude oil supplier. Despite the risk of penalties, small regional Chinese banks have continued processing payments for sanctioned Russian banks and companies. While China has not openly provided direct lethal aid, it has exported to Russia a steady stream of dual-use items, notably microchips essential for precision-guided weaponry.

Despite its close ties with Russia, China has tried to present itself as a peacemaker. In February 2023, it released a peace framework; and in May 2024, it partnered with Brazil on a six-point initiative to end the war. A Chinese special envoy has since visited several countries, including Russia and Ukraine, to promote the proposal. But China’s plans amount to lofty principles with little substance. It is less interested in ending the war than in winning goodwill across the Global South and refurbishing its image in Europe.

Why should it be otherwise? China benefits strategically as long as the war stays within Ukraine, the nuclear risk remains low, and its “unlimited partner,” Russia, does not lose. The conflict diverts US attention from the Indo-Pacific, giving China more room to advance its interests. It has also deepened Russia’s political and economic dependence on China, improving China’s access to Russian resources via routes beyond the US Navy’s reach.

Meanwhile, Chinese firms in strategic sectors, such as the drone-makers DJI, EHang, and Autel, have cashed in by selling products to both sides. In early 2023, direct drone shipments to Ukraine exceeded $200,000, while shipments to Russia topped $14.5 million. Despite sanctions, DJI’s drones continued reaching Russian forces through smaller distributors in China, the Middle East, and Europe.

Even if China was truly open to facilitating peace talks, Ukraine would remain rightly skeptical of its neutrality. Xi has ignored Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s repeated requests to meet, and did not speak with him until April 2023 – over a year after Russia’s invasion. China showed limited interest in Ukraine’s ten-point peace formula, released in November 2022, and it skipped a global summit (attended by 92 countries) on the issue in June 2024. Instead, China released its joint peace proposal with Brazil, which Ukraine saw as an attempt to undermine its own peace formula and another sign that China is more interested in advancing its own agenda than in ending the war.

The US has little leverage to change China’s position. More tariffs or sanctions could backfire, and Trump’s tariffs have alienated much of the world, including China. Instead of bending, China may align even more closely with Russia to thwart America’s negotiations and strengthen its renminbi-based financial system, undermining US sanctions and economic clout.

Still, Trump could appeal to Xi’s desire for global stature. By offering China a major role in Ukraine’s reconstruction, the US would grant China’s leadership the prestige it craves. Moreover, China would become an invested stakeholder in Ukraine’s security, providing a more sustainable deterrent against future Russian aggression.

Ukraine has been part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative since 2017. Before Russia’s invasion, China had nearly $3 billion in BRI-related contracts in Ukraine and had leased up to 10% of Ukraine’s farmland. Those investments were likely wiped out, but China did not protest; its economic loss was inconsequential compared to its strategic gains from the war.

A lasting peace could tempt China to return. Ukraine’s industrial, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors offer new markets for Chinese firms squeezed by overcapacity at home and rising tariffs abroad. Giving China a stake in Ukraine’s reconstruction could transform it from a passive pro-Russia bystander into an active participant in peacemaking.

The reconstruction bill will be too large for the West to foot on its own. A year ago, the World Bank estimated the costs at $486 billion (about 2.6% of China’s GDP in 2024) over the next decade, and this price tag has only risen since then. The West will have no choice but to seek assistance, including from the Gulf states and China.

But the first task is to encourage China’s interest in engagement. Perhaps the only way to do that is to convince China’s leaders that the US will not accept Ukraine’s capitulation and will continue to support it until a just settlement is reached.