PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2025

[sudden and sharp]

[...] que, a través de su abogado, confiesa ser un defraudador ni es punible ni indemnizable. Implícitamente, llama mentirosilla dicha persona —y a su entorno—. Resulta que el tribunal ha obligado al abogado a declarar que sí recibió el encargo de confesar la defraudación y 'negociar', en vez de negarla y 'luchar en los Tribunales'. El abogado se jugaba su prestigio profesional. Tenía que escapar de ser tachado como un picapleitos capaz de confesar por su cuenta, pero en nombre de sus clientes, defraudaciones, así como negociar multas pecuniarias y penas de privación de la libertad. Máxime, tratándose de un exinspector de Hacienda del Estado.

Al margen de novios..., mujeres... hermanos....










¿Seremos capces de ver más allá y difernciar qué afecta al común de la ciudadanía... y qué no?

Pregunto.










--------
Que siga el circo... si eso.

[sudden and sharp]

[...] Nosotros, en órbita, observando lo que sucede más allá del horizonte de eventos del agujero negro popularcapitalista.

Ésta me la guardo... por lo que pueda pasar.

[el malo]

[...] Por cierto, mismo gancho, misma marca, misma gran superficie en España y en Reino Unido, 20% de diferencia en el precio (más caro en España). Me he encontrado productos de Ikea que en España cuestan EL DOBLE.

Venga... NO parece tan difícil.











-------------
¿Qué pasa con el tipo de cambio?

Pasa que algo en Ikea UK me cuesta £3 (4.05 USD al tipo de cambio de hoy) y el mismo producto en España cuesta 7€ (7.95 USD)

El tipo de cambio son los padres.

[Fomento Cemento]

OFICIALIZACIÓN OFICIOSA DE LA RECESIÓN ANGLO.—

A vuela pluma:

• El Tribunal Federal de Comercio de Estados Unidos ha declarado ilegales los aranceles recíprocos 'de Trump' impuestos a las importaciones de todo el mundo y, especialmente a México, Canadá y China. Motivación: desviación de poder (uso de potestades administrativas para fines distintos de los que las justifican).

No queda ahora desvelado el 'Trump trade' con derivados financieros. ¡Ya lo estaba! Si no, díganme a qué negocios se refería este anarcocapitalista del Ladrillo y las cripto cuando, para defenderse de la acusación de que sus marchas atrás solo eran manipulaciones del mercado, dijo aquello de que «yo no me acobardo, sino que negocio».

La clave para interpretar qué está pasando es que la volatilidad es inherente a la triple crisis coyuntural, estructural y sistémica. Los vaivenes bursátiles, cambiarios y en renta fija no los crea Trump con sus estúpidos «acuerdos del M-A-L» (Mar-A-Lago) y su 'vataya kurturah por la livertah'. Trump y su corte histriónica solo se aprovechan de la volatilidad para 'negociar'.

Lo importante es que estas añagazas anglo (bréxit, Ucrania, Gaza, Ayuso, Milei, Trump) le vienen bien al sistema capitalista en el camino hacia el verdadero día de la liberación, el día en el que nos quitamos de encima la distopía tardopularcapitalista anglo y se acaban las cuatro sobrevaloraciones que están destruyendo al sistema: inmuebles, Bolsa, Deuda y dólar.

Ahora viene la botadura del euro digital, aparentemente tímida. Habrá cabreo en EE. UU. y reacción orgullolibertaria: obligar al mundo a volcarse en su bitcóin (lo ha creado EE. UU. y es allí donde se tiene el control del mismo). Será el último clavo en su ataúd. El penúltimo, las vergüenzas de las guerras en los bordes de la UE.

La verdad es que, para el Capital & Dinero y el Trabajo & Empresa ha sido una bendición que la mayoría natural electoral de EE. UU. sea tan idiota, idiota en sentido dostoyevskiano. Van a acabar espaguetizadísimos... y los 'Trump traders, desinmobiliarizados y forrados de «odioso dinero 'fiat'».

Pero, insisto, la superbuena noticia es que, a partir de ahora, no tienen argumentos para velar la causa de la volatilidad financiera.

Otra buena noticia es que los servicios de inspección del Estado, ya tienen cerrado el periodo a investigar durante el cual los 'Trump traders' más conspicuos han dado sus pelotazos usureros.

• En la misma línea, pero en España, el Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que llamar defraudador confeso a una persona que, a través de su abogado, confiesa ser un defraudador ni es punible ni indemnizable. Implícitamente, llama mentirosilla dicha persona —y a su entorno—. Resulta que el tribunal ha obligado al abogado a declarar que sí recibió el encargo de confesar la defraudación y 'negociar', en vez de negarla y 'luchar en los Tribunales'. El abogado se jugaba su prestigio profesional. Tenía que escapar de ser tachado como un picapleitos capaz de confesar por su cuenta, pero en nombre de sus clientes, defraudaciones, así como negociar multas pecuniarias y penas de privación de la libertad. Máxime, tratándose de un exinspector de Hacienda del Estado.

El cabreo de la novia es monumental: «En España se puede difamar». Pues nada, querida, difama, difama todo lo que quieras. A ver si es verdad que se puede.

Estamos ante algo con efectos parecidos a lo de la yihad arancelaria de Trump y el 'Trump trade'. Al ortograma capitalista le viene de perlas.

El partido de la novia se ha equivocado tomando la decisión de anticipar su congreso con la novia solo empezando a espaguetizarse. Va a tener que tragar con el espagueti todo el día de 'performance' en los medios de comunicación. Aún le queda mucho tiempo de espaguetona, luchando, lejos de la fase cabello de ángel. Lo que resta del proceso hasta la singularidad espaciotemporal del anarcocapitalismo mierdrileño, dicho desgraciado partido va estar oliendo a muerto vertical político.

Repito que esta situación es buenísima para los intereses del Capital. Porque lo que ahora toca en España es dar pasos firmes hacia la «provisión pública de vivienda básica planificada centralmente».

La 'desofertademandización' («Esto son dos curvitas, amigo») forma parte del proceso general de espaguetización del anarcocapitalismo dominguero y horterita de los 'himbersores' resentidos contra el Capital, «el Pisito no me lo toques». Este proceso se manifiesta en cosas como la dimisión conjunta del presidente de la Sareb —banco malo congelador— y del director del Servicio de Estudios del banco España.

Días históricos, este 2025.

• Ayer se conocieron las actas de la reunión del Fomc del día 6-7 de mayo y se confirmó lo que ya sabíamos: EE. UU. está lidiando con la oficialización de la recesión. La oficialización oficial de la misma será en la próxima reunión, cuando ya bajen los tipos de interés. Pero en esta se ha producido la oficialización oficiosa.

No cabe la menor duda. Leemos: «The manager noted that respondents to the Open Market Desk’s Survey of Market Expectations had materially lowered their gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts and raised their inflation forecasts for this year while significantly increasing the probability they placed on a recession occurring within the next six months».

La situación es peliaguda porque dar la recesión es inevitable y hay que hacer con un nivel de inflación indeseable. Quienes tienen poder de fijación de precios —a la postre, los caseros de los asalariados— no doblan la cerviz.

¡Se está oficializando la recesión y, con ella, los cambios estructural y sistémico, en un ambiente de soberbia inflacionaria. Nosotros añadimos lo que la Fed deja entrever: la culpa de esta esquizofrenia la tiene el resentimiento de los apegados al popularcapitalismo anarcoide y sus delirios de (falso) 'mercao', mientras estiran y estiran y estiran su extracción usuraria de rentas. Cosas de la espaguetización. El chivo expiatorio, el magnate naranja, cada día más delgaducho.

Nosotros, en órbita, observando lo que sucede más allá del horizonte de eventos del agujero negro popularcapitalista.

Llama la atención como prácticamente en cada post se acuerda de Ayuso, el novio y Trump, pero se olvida de la PSOE, Pdr Snchz y Von der Leyen.

[asustadísimos]

[He reeditado el comentario anterior...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2625.msg243516#msg243516
... para mejorarlo y añadir unas palabras sobre la irracionalidad del 'tour de force' impotente que está haciéndose contra el nuevo modelo de economía de planificación central con características capitalistas y estabilidad fiscal y monetaria.]

[sudden and sharp]

Argentina vuelve a los mercados por todo lo alto: los inversores compran el plan Milei para la economía
https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/noticias/13388354/05/25/argentina-vuelve-a-los-mercados-por-todo-lo-alto-los-inversores-compran-el-plan-milei-para-la-economia.html
    Argentina había quedado fuera de los mercados y sin capacidad de financiación exterior
    Recauda 1.000 millones de dólares con un bono que se pagará en pesos a vencimiento
    Ahora, la economía se recupera, la inflación se modera y Argentina vuelve al mercado

[asustadísimos]

[No me olvido de «la PSOE, Pdr Snchz y Von der Leyen». Ya he dicho que el PSOE —al que le tocó montar el modelo popcap en España en los 1980— lo está bordando ahora desde la óptica del ortograma; que el Sr. Sánchez es el sustituto óptimo de Von der Leyen como presidente de la Comisión, el día en que se declare la estabilización; y que Lagarde tiene infinitamente más clase que esta. El problema está en quienes ven la política como si fuera el fútbol. ¡Vivan el Rey, España, la UE y el euro!]

[Derby]

P. S.: La noticia sobre el estridente acelerón en valores-de-catálogo inmobiliario en España, a la que enlaza más arriba 'senslev'...
https://www.eleconomista.es/vivienda-inmobiliario/noticias/13388175/05/25/el-precio-de-la-vivienda-sube-un-148-en-mayo-el-aceleron-mas-intenso-de-toda-la-serie-historica.html
... en realidad, de lo que habla es de la inminencia del hostión inmobiliario. No puedo dejar de vincularlo con las dos dimisiones de esta semana, la del presidente de la Sareb y la del director del Servicio de Estudios del banco España.

No se está vendiendo nada a precios de catálogo. Se pasan ofertas a los fondos por debajo de precio y no las aceptan.

[Derby]

https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/05/29/the-courts-block-trumps-tariffs-can-he-circumvent-their-verdict

The courts block Trump’s tariffs. Can he circumvent their verdict?

American trade policy is in chaos


Photograph: Mark Abramson/New York Times/Redux/Eyevine

Decades ago, when Victor Owen Schwartz first tasted cold, polished ginjo sake, it was a “light-bulb moment”, he has written. His firm, which imports alcohol to America from over a dozen countries, began adding the drink to its list. It now offers varieties from 19 breweries.

But all of this was threatened when Donald Trump announced sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs on April 2nd or “Liberation Day”, as the president labelled it. The levies were touted as a remedy to America’s trade deficits. Mr Schwartz could not simply pass the cost on to buyers: he has to post his price a month in advance to regulators. Another bulb lit up: Mr Schwartz decided to fight the tariffs in court. He joined with the Liberty Justice Centre, a legal-advocacy outfit, and several other small firms, including a pipemaker, a maker of women’s cycling gear and an importer of fishing tackle.

On May 28th they landed a big catch. The United States Court of International Trade ruled that Mr Trump lacked the authority to impose his reciprocal tariffs. In response to another complaint, it also ruled against “trafficking tariffs” inflicted on Canada, China and Mexico. These levies were meant to cajole leaders of the three countries into cracking down further on the flow of fentanyl, a synthetic opioid.

Investors welcomed the news: futures contracts on America’s S&P 500 index jumped by 1.5%. Financial markets have repeatedly punished Mr Trump for his recklessness. On April 9th, after Treasury yields spiked, Mr Trump was persuaded to suspend the highest Liberation Day tariffs until July 9th. China’s reciprocal levy, which reached 125%, was also cut for 90 days after talks in Geneva. But even after these climbdowns, a residual 10% stayed in place on almost all of America’s trading partners, and the fentanyl tariffs remained on Canada, China and Mexico.


Chart: The Economist

Investors hoped their disapproval would keep America’s president in check. But they had generally not thought that Mr Trump would face opposition from the courts, too. His orders imposing the fentanyl tariffs and reciprocal levies had cited a 1977 law called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). It has its roots in the Trading with the Enemy Act, passed after America joined the first world war in 1917, which gives the president leeway to interfere in international economic transactions during national emergencies. Mr Trump had declared both the fentanyl situation and America’s persistent trade deficits to be such crises. Often the courts defer to the president on matters of foreign policy and national security.

This deference does not apply when it comes to enforcing limits on the president’s authority that Congress has specified, the court argued. The law requires, among other things, that any measures taken “deal with” the emergency declared. The administration conceded that the fentanyl tariffs were an attempt to gain leverage over the countries in question, so they could be forced to change their behaviour. But dealing with a problem, the court said, requires a more “direct” link.

While the fentanyl tariffs fell on the basis of plain English, the reciprocal tariffs were brought down by lofty constitutional principles. In recent years courts have argued that the executive branch cannot rely on ambiguous delegations of power to take actions of great consequence, a principle known as the “major-questions doctrine”. IEEPA does not mention tariffs, but does give the president the power to “regulate” imports. Relying on it to “authorise anything as unbounded” as global tariffs, the court said, was inconsistent with both the major-questions doctrine and the established idea that Congress cannot delegate its powers to the president wholesale.

The administration’s power to impose universal tariffs, the court argued, is specified in a different law: the 1974 Trade Act. This permits the president to respond to balance-of-payments crises, which might include the trade deficits that so irk Mr Trump, with tariffs of up to 15% for up to 150 days. It also allows unlimited levies on specific trading partners whose trade policy the administration judges to be “unjustifiable” or to “[burden] or restrict” American firms. But such unlimited levies can only be imposed after extensive investigation, a public notice and a comment period. Importantly, Congress specified these restrictions after President Richard Nixon used the Trading with the Enemy Act to levy a temporary universal tariff in the Bretton Woods crisis of 1971—the main precedent to which Mr Trump appealed.

It is to these alternative powers that Mr Trump can now be expected to turn. A universal tariff of 10% applied under the Trade Act would give the administration about five months to have the ruling overturned on appeal, during which time officials might also run Section 301 investigations to establish a country-by-country basis for tariffs. But it would be hard to investigate every trading partner at once. It seems likely that the disputes will find their way to the Supreme Court. At that point they would be presided over mostly by justices who have been strong proponents of the major-questions doctrine.

The market reaction to the judgment was muted compared with the enormous falls seen after April 2nd. That is, in part, because so many investors have come to assume negotiations with America’s trading partners will result in deals which stop the “reciprocal” tariffs from ever coming into full effect. Those talks will now be muddied by the unclear nature of the administration’s authority to follow through on its threats. Indeed, analysts at Goldman Sachs, a bank, warn that trade uncertainty has increased, rather than decreased, as a consequence of the court’s decision. Unless Mr Trump has a light-bulb moment of his own, America’s importers will be doing business in the dark. ■

[Derby]

https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-macro-40fe6dc0-3c7d-11f0-849c-33ef6bedac27.html

1 big thing: Messy trade landscape now messier

The Trump 2.0 trade war has created two distinct economic risks: one from the cost of tariffs for businesses and consumers, the other from the pall of uncertainty hanging over companies that rely on imports.

The big picture: The first of those has been diminished, and the latter worsened, after the Court of International Trade's ruling late yesterday that Trump overstepped his emergency authority with a sweeping new tariff regime.

It means tariff relief in the near term, but a more complex outlook for policy in the medium term, as the ruling navigates appeals and/or the Trump administration seeks alternate legal approaches to accomplish its goals.

There's a reason the S&P 500 is up only 1% in pre-market trading today, despite a seemingly big win for business interests. This could get messy, and nobody knows quite where it will lead.

By the numbers: The Yale Budget Lab's tally shows that, following yesterday's court action, the U.S. has an effective 6.9% tariff on all imports, down from 17.8% earlier this month. (It was around 3% when Trump took office.)

Catch up quick: The three-judge panel's ruling found that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, which Trump invoked to levy tariffs on nearly every good from every country, does not "confer such unbounded authority."

Yes, but: The president has several other tools of unilateral power over tariffs and trade that he could invoke, even if appeals courts uphold the trade ruling.

They require more detailed legal processes, however — a comment period, a process for importers seeking exemptions, and so on — that are less conducive to Trump's favored across-the-board tariff-setting.

State of play: That toolkit includes some 1974 trade law callbacks from Trump's previous term, and potentially a new one, each known by the section of trade statutes from which the authorities derive.

Section 301 authority allows the president to enact tariffs in retaliation for unfair trade practices in an industry by other countries, but only after a process of study and appeals. It has been used on many Chinese imports by both the first Trump and Biden administrations.

Section 232 allows tariffs on goods found to have national security implications. Trump used it on steel and aluminum imports, including from allies.

Section 122 allows something closer to Trump's all-tariffs-on-everybody strategy — but not indefinitely. It allows up to 15% tariffs without a formal review process, but only for 150 days.

Between the lines: That all tilts the balance toward tariffs on goods where there's a clear national security nexus or justifiable claims of unfair practices — and away from consumer goods like coffee, bananas, or t-shirts.

It sets up a scenario where many items could still end up facing quite high tariffs, but only for strategic goods and only after more protracted procedures are followed.

It implies less inflationary impact on Americans' day-to-day commodity goods and more of the burden falling on importers of industrial inputs, where the national security or unfair practices cases are stronger.

Businesses get time to adjust — a double-edged sword, because it also means a longer period of uncertainty about what the endgame looks like.

The bottom line: "In macro terms, the trade shock may be less severe, but trade uncertainty may be prolonged in particular in strategic sectors, with some risk Trump lashes out to restore leverage," wrote Evercore ISI's Krishna Guha in a note.

2. What happens next

The Trump administration has nine days to wind down the expansive tariff regime enacted under IEEPA, according to the ruling — unless the appeals court grants the White House a stay on the decision.

Why it matters: Millions of businesses — which will be owed refunds for these tariffs, if the decision is upheld — are in a new state of limbo as the case makes its way through the courts system, and possibly all the way to the Supreme Court.

What they're saying: "Obviously there will be an appellate process, but I'm guardedly optimistic," Ilya Somin, one of the lawyers who argued the case on behalf of small businesses, told reporters this morning.

"We got a unanimous ruling from judges appointed by presidents of both parties — including one appointed by Donald Trump himself," Somin added, noting the appellate process could "work fast and be done within a few weeks."

The intrigue: Businesses could take advantage of this window and bring in imports — much like they have in recent months — in case the reduced tariffs don't stick.

"There is a strong likelihood that the Appeals court will not issue a stay on the decision of the trade court. That would mean that for the next 4-8 weeks, there will be no fentanyl and no reciprocal tariffs," Ajay Rajadhyaksha, an economist at Barclays, wrote in a client note this morning.

"In this case, we would expect substantial front-loading in the next two months — as companies (and households) try to get in as many goods as they can," Rajadhyaksha wrote.

The twist: The trade deficit is likely to continue to explode in the weeks ahead, mainly due to tariff-related uncertainty.

"Between the front-loading before April, and what is now coming, the US trade deficit for H1 2025 is likely to be extremely large," Rajadhyaksha wrote, referring to the first half of 2025.

[Raf909]

P. S.: La noticia sobre el estridente acelerón en valores-de-catálogo inmobiliario en España, a la que enlaza más arriba 'senslev'...
https://www.eleconomista.es/vivienda-inmobiliario/noticias/13388175/05/25/el-precio-de-la-vivienda-sube-un-148-en-mayo-el-aceleron-mas-intenso-de-toda-la-serie-historica.html
... en realidad, de lo que habla es de la inminencia del hostión inmobiliario. No puedo dejar de vincularlo con las dos dimisiones de esta semana, la del presidente de la Sareb y la del director del Servicio de Estudios del banco España.

Esto significa que no se está vendiendo "nada"?

No se está vendiendo nada a precios de catálogo. Se pasan ofertas a los fondos por debajo de precio y no las aceptan.

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-05-29/spain-opens-doors-to-1-million-migrants-to-boost-workforce

Spain Bets on 1 Million Migrants to Keep Its Economy Growing

The country is bucking European trends with its most ambitious migration push to date, including a proposal for a “mass regularization” of undocumented foreign workers.

(...)Historically a country of emigration, Spain only became a country of immigration in the early 2000s as the economy grew, with foreigners taking jobs that Spaniards couldn’t do, or didn’t want. It has, as a result, experienced one of the fastest demographic shifts in developed nations this century, OECD data show, with the share of foreign-born rising from 1.6% to 14% of the population in less than 30 years.

Roughly 94% of migrants who arrive in Spain do so legally, Sánchez said. National Statistics Institute data from 2023 shows that more than 40% of them are Spanish-speaking Latin Americans, who share a similar religious and cultural background as Spaniards, and don’t need a visa thanks to agreements between Spain and their home countries. Around 23% come from other parts of Europe. And 15% come from Africa. About half of those who arrive via irregular routes, like Gueye, will be deported; the rest will be allowed to stay, usually because they are minors or due to complications related to finding out where they are from.



“Spain needs to face the fact that it’s not a transit country anymore, its buoyant economy means that it’s the primary destination for many,” State Secretary for Migrations Pilar Cancela said, adding that the goal is “regularized, safe and organized” migration.

Successive governments — left and right-wing — have argued that pulling undocumented workers into the formal economy is necessary because in many developed countries, Spain included, people are having fewer children, or none at all. Without newcomers, the Spanish population is projected to shrink by more than one-third by the end of the century, data from the National Statistics Institute show. A low birthrate — Spain’s dropped to 1.19 babies per woman last year, its lowest level since records began in 1941 — means labor shortages, which in turn, leads to less tax revenue to pay for a growing number of pensions and health care, and ultimately to economic stagnation.

The approach is paying off, according to the Bank of Spain. Legally employed foreigners were the most significant contributor to gross domestic product per capita growth between 2022 and 2024. Spain’s economy expanded 3.2% last year, outpacing that of Germany, France and Italy, and it accounted for 40% of eurozone growth.(...)

[Derby]

Esto significa que no se está vendiendo "nada"?

En lo que yo vivo a diario, no o poquísimo...que vendría a ser nada.

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-29/goldman-s-waldron-says-bond-traders-fear-debt-more-than-tariffs

Goldman’s Waldron Says Bond Traders Fear Debt More Than Tariffs

Bond traders are becoming increasingly spooked by mounting levels of US government debt — and it’s now a concern that holds more risk than tariffs, according to Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s president.

“While all the attention was on tariffs, I think the attention rightly is shifting — certainly in the bond market — to the US budget debate and the fiscal picture, which I would characterize as somewhat concerning,” John Waldron said at a Bernstein conference Thursday. “I think the big risk on the macro right now is actually not so much tariffs.”(...)

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/4c94f8e1-565d-4f3a-934d-3a06b2665b38

Powell tells Trump that Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy will depend on data and outlook

Central bank chair meets US president at the White House to discuss economic expectations


The talks between Trump and Powell follow pressure from the US president on the Fed chair to lower interest rates © Reuters

Jay Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve, told Donald Trump that US monetary policy would be dictated solely by economic data and the outlook, as they held their first meeting of the president’s second term.

The talks between Trump and Powell follow pressure from the US president on the central bank chair to lower interest rates in order to blunt the impact of the administration’s trade policies.

According to the Fed, Powell “did not discuss his expectations for monetary policy, except to stress that the path of policy will depend entirely on incoming economic information and what that means for the outlook”.

The US central bank said Powell had been invited by Trump to the White House to “discuss economic developments including for growth, employment, and inflation”.

“Chair Powell said that he and his colleagues on the FOMC will set monetary policy, as required by law, to support maximum employment and stable prices and will make those decisions based solely on careful, objective, and non-political analysis,” the Fed said, referring to the interest rate-setting Federal Open Market Committee.

Trump has in the past considered removing Powell from his post as Fed chair before his term ends in May 2026 — a possibility that has unnerved markets by calling into question the Fed’s independence.

But the US president last month said he had “no intention of firing [Powell]”, in comments that soothed investors.