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PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024 por Elcasco
[Hoy a las 13:22:08]


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Mensajes recientes

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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por Elcasco en Hoy a las 13:22:08 »
https://x.com/marcopabst/status/1795747498436268453

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🚨 The German property crash is beginning to crystallise

German property transaction volumes have been sluggish since interest rates started to inflect higher in late 2021.

However, whilst overall volumes in April of this year were weak, a significant increase in insolvency-related transactions is noteworthy.
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💥 Year-to-date, a record EUR1.6bn of distressed sales have already been recorded, according to Savills, making up 24% of overall transaction volumes - a new record.

This, of course, is as much a reflection of a spike in foreclosure sales as it is the result of lacklustre overall transaction activity in the German market.

The spike is somewhat explained by several large transactions, amongst them the sale of Berlin's KaDeWe luxury department store out of the Signa insolvency to Central Group.

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😳 It is very likely that distress-related transaction volumes will remain high for some time for several reasons:
(1) non-performing property-related loans at banks have increased 2.5x to EUR14bn,
(2) open-ended real estate funds saw almost EUR2bn in redemptions since August of last year and
(3) over the next 2 1/2 years, EUR25bn of bonds issued by real estate companies will mature, many of which need to be refinanced.

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📉 Property prices in Germany are still declining: multi-family homes are now down 30% from their mid-2022 peak. Apartments were hit less and lost 14.5% over the last two years. Commercial real estate across its various categories is also down in the high-teens from peak.

🎉 The good news: rental yields have increased across all segments and are now back to levels last seen in 2013/14.
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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-29/ecb-to-impose-first-ever-fines-on-banks-for-climate-failures

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ECB to Impose First-Ever Fines on Banks for Climate Failures

Several lenders didn’t progress enough on risk assessment
Fines per day can technically be up to 5% of daily revenue


The European Central Bank is set to take the unprecedented step of imposing fines on several lenders for their protracted failure to address the impact of climate change.

As many as four lenders face penalties after not meeting deadlines set by the ECB for assessing their exposure to climate risks, according to people familiar with the matter. The amounts aren’t final yet and may be largely symbolic, the people said, who asked not to be named as the move isn’t public.

A spokeswoman for the ECB, which directly oversees more than 100 banks, declined to comment.

The imposition of fines still marks an unusually harsh step toward forcing banks to comply with the ECB’s views on how they should manage climate risks. The move comes after years of pressure, with former banking supervision head Andrea Enria stating in a September interview with Bloomberg that the ECB would resort to such sanctions as an alternative to higher capital requirements.

The fines rack up every day and can amount to as much as 5% of a lender’s daily average revenue. For a bank with annual revenue of €10 billion ($10.9 billion), for example, that would suggest daily penalties of as much as €1.4 million in the toughest scenario, although the actual fines imposed may be much smaller.

The banks singled out for penalties are now accruing daily fines for as long as the deficiencies persist, the people said. Mitigating factors may be taken into account as well, meaning some fines could be reduced or even negated, said one of the people.

The ECB has repeatedly warned that lenders aren’t doing enough to prepare for the fallout of extreme weather shocks on asset values, or the risk that clients with big carbon footprints might go out of business. The watchdog has said it initially threatened 18 banks with penalties, implying that ECB pressure is leading to results for most firms.

European regulations require banks to assess whether they are — or will be — exposed to material risks, and that they reflect that in their capital reserves. The ECB has said lenders typically need to understand all the relevant drivers of climate and environmental-related risk and how these are affected given their exposures.

The rigor with which the ECB is pushing banks to manage their climate risk stands in contrast to the approach taken by the Federal Reserve, with Chairman Jerome Powell saying the Fed has “narrow, but important, responsibilities regarding climate-related financial risks.” Banks in Europe have warned that the schism in regulatory environments risks putting them at a competitive disadvantage to their US peers.

Frank Elderson, a member of the ECB’s Executive Board, has shown little inclination to slow down European efforts on climate. In a May 8 blog post, he wrote that “a materiality assessment is not just a ‘nice to have’ — knowing your risks is a precondition for being able to address them.”

While some banks have started to set aside capital to cover climate-related risks and improved their risk management, Elderson listed several deficiencies, including:

*Not considering all relevant risk categories

*Focusing only on transitional risks and omitting physical risks, or only looking at a subset of geographic regions

*Using a net approach rather than gross to identify risks, undermining banks’ ability to measure actual impact and plan for mitigation

¿Multas porque llueva (o no)?
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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por el malo en Hoy a las 11:48:18 »
The writing is on the wall...


Ayer mismo: Va a ser obligatorio renovar el 60% de los ascensores de la UE. Estamos tan en respiración asistida que la actividad económica es por decreto. Inventamos PIB obligando y por decreto. Donde no hay mata...

Creo que comenté por aquí una anécdota de la anterior crisis (y si no, la comento ahora). Uno de los comensales en una mesa muy diversa era un alto cargo de una de las empresas de ascensores más importantes del mundo. Después de la comida, con las copas, me acerco y nos ponemos a hablar. Le pregunto que cómo veía la cosa después del estallido de la burbuja en España y me respondió con toda tranquilidad que no había problema, que para eso estaba el gobierno  :biggrin:

Me dijo (palabras casi textuales) "mira, de vez en cuando los grandes fabricantes presentamos nuestras propuestas de mejora y seguridad. Por ejemplo, un botón de llamada que conecte con la central en caso de que alguien se quede atrapado dentro. Después nos reunimos con el Ministro del ramo que toque y a los 6 meses tenemos normativa nueva (y miles de ascensores por toda España que actualizar)."

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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por senslev en Hoy a las 11:07:23 »
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Carta interna: Siemens Energy quiere eliminar 4.100 puestos de trabajo en Gamesa

https://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/industrie/gamesa-internes-schreiben-siemens-energy-will-4100-jobs-bei-gamesa-streichen/29822482.html

https://beamspot.substack.com/p/bateriasque-baterias

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En este caso, un monotemático sobre el tema de “Baterías” y de cómo NO son ninguna solución.

Por otra parte, no puedo “acusar” a los tecnooptimistas de no dar información y no darla yo tampoco.

Que quede claro, que precisamente empecé por pedírsela “a los expertos”. Deformación profesional. No me han dado nada más que largas, cosa sospechosa.

Pero yo trabajo o he trabajado de eso, así me he liado la cabeza a la manta, y por aquí he empezado.

Hay más: esto es sólo una parte de un planteamiento de “solución” al problema de la intermitencia y de sus implicaciones

https://www.eleconomista.es/economia/amp/12839195/crisis-energetica-en-argentina-el-gobierno-corta-el-gas-a-la-industria-por-escasez-en-plena-ola-de-frio

Sigue la cosa calentita, esto es como la inflación, serán cosas mías.



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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por Derby en Hoy a las 10:05:57 »
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-30/china-vanke-in-advanced-talks-with-banks-for-6-9-billion-loan

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China Vanke in Advanced Talks With Banks for $6.9 Billion Loan

China Vanke Co., the Chinese state-backed developer that’s become the latest flashpoint in the nation’s property crisis, is in advanced talks with major banks for a loan of about 50 billion yuan ($6.9 billion), people familiar with the matter said.

If signed, it would be the largest loan in Asia Pacific, excluding Japan, since Taiwan-based National Housing and Urban Regeneration Center’s $14 billion deal in 2022, according to Bloomberg-compiled data. Talks over the facility, led by Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, began a few months ago after financial regulators instructed the banks to offer funding support to the developer, said the people, who asked not to be identified as the matter is private.(...)
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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por Derby en Hoy a las 09:37:10 »
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-30/us-banks-have-a-commercial-property-blind-spot-risk-study-warns

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US Banks Have a Commercial Property Blind Spot Risk, Study Warns

Term loans and credit lines for REITs add to systemic risk
Fed stress tests should consider such lending, authors say


Large US banks may be more exposed to commercial property than regulators appreciate because of credit lines and term loans they provide to real estate investment trusts, according to a new study.

Big banks’ exposure to CRE lending grows by about 40% when that indirect lending to REITs is added, wrote researchers including Viral Acharya, a professor of economics at New York University. That’s largely been missed in the debate about the risks the troubled industry poses to lenders, they argue.

“Everyone is focusing on on-balance sheet loans by banks,” Acharya, a former deputy governor at the Reserve Bank of India, said in an interview. “We should not get caught in a blind spot that large banks have relatively less exposure than smaller banks.”

REITs have faced challenges since the start of the pandemic as working from home threatens the long-term value of offices while high borrowing costs have hurt many multifamily investments. Some investors responded by pulling money from trusts over the past two years, including those managed by Starwood Capital Group and Blackstone Inc., which limited redemptions to preserve liquidity.

High Stress

REITs are companies that own, operate or lend to income-producing real estate. They are obliged to make large dividend payouts each year, meaning they’re comparatively cash poor. As a result, they tend to draw down credit from banks when they’re worried about redemptions and there’s high stress in the wider economy, making it a concern for the researchers.

That can create “sudden encumbrance of capital and/or liquidity,” the report says. Regulators should better incorporate a lender’s exposure to property investment trusts when conducting stress tests on bank capital, it added.



The risk from draw-downs can’t be easily managed by banks because borrowers decide when they make them, which “can exaggerate banks’ cyclical risks”, according to the report. In some cases, the money seems to be used to buy additional properties, the researchers found.

“Collateral damage to the largest banks from intensive credit line draw-downs means that systemic risk from total CRE exposure is probably much greater than if you only look at direct exposure,” said Manasa Gopal, an assistant professor of finance at Georgia Tech, who’s one of the report’s authors.

Of the largest five US banks by market capitalization, Morgan Stanley has the highest percentage of its own credit lines committed to REITs, according to fellow co-author Max Jager, assistant professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. Still, on an absolute basis Morgan Stanley’s exposure is smaller than its peers’. A company spokesperson declined comment.

Higher Fees

Credit lines to REITs have grown at a much faster rate than to other borrowers, and lenders should charge higher fees for the products to compensate for the risk they’re assuming, the researchers said.

Months before Blackstone REIT halted redemptions toward the end of 2022, the firm secured an increase in its credit line at a little changed or unchanged spread “despite the obviously increased credit and draw down risks,” according to the report.

“BREIT has a proactive and disciplined approach to managing liquidity,” a representative for Blackstone said in a statement. “It has maintained ample levels of liquidity through the cycle to run its business effectively and has a strong balance sheet.”

Large US banks had $345 billion of indirect exposure to commercial real estate in the fourth quarter of 2022, the analysis found. That’s up from $109 billion in the same period of 2013.

Still, leverage ratios for REITs remain low. Their debt to market assets ratio stood at 33.8% at the end of the first quarter, according to research by representative body NAREIT, meaning they “are facing less stress” than counterparts with higher debt loads.

In the wake of the pandemic, much of the risk to banks from lending to stressed REITs was mitigated by the Federal Reserve’s backstop measures that ensured banks had sufficient liquidity to meet demands, Acharya said. That might not always be the case.

“The credit line has an episodic aspect to it, you don’t know exactly when that event is going to happen,” he said. “The risk is that we don’t know exactly how the episodes play out.”
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Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por BIZIRAUN en Hoy a las 09:28:24 »
 Los empresarios advierten de que Gipuzkoa tiene un problema con la falta de vivienda y no con los salarios

https://www.diariovasco.com/economia/empresas/guipuzcoanas/empresarios-gipuzkoa-jovenes-vivienda-20240529113353-nt.html#vtm_modulosEngag=lomas:deportes/futbol:noticia:5

¡Cadavre, yo te invoco!
9
Transición Estructural / Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Primavera 2024
« Último mensaje por Derby en Hoy a las 09:19:03 »
https://www.ft.com/content/18b931cb-5ab5-43c6-812b-50c57b4c7688

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Shared ownership has created new victims of precarious housing
What used to be a good deal compared with private renting has become a financial trap


Reeling from the impact of the Grenfell Tower tragedy and the still-unfolding damp and mould scandal, social landlords may be breathing a sigh of relief this week at the prospect of a new, more sympathetic government. They would be foolish to relax. Public scrutiny is likely to return as another crisis heads towards them: the desperate plight of shared owners.

Shared owners tend to be lower-middle income families. Priced out of the mainstream housing market, they buy a share of a property (usually less than 50 per cent of its value, raising a deposit of usually between 5 and 10 per cent of that share’s value) and rent the remainder from a housing association. The product was designed more than three decades ago to meet the needs of low-paid key workers, such as teachers and nurses, in Britain’s expensive cities. It worked well: as their salaries increased over time, they could “staircase” up to take full ownership of their homes. Meanwhile, the property itself rose in value. It offered a good deal compared with private renting.

In the last 20 years, things changed. As the cost of housing spiralled, with the average house price tripling between 1999 and 2019, the product became popular with a growing group of priced-out people on middle incomes. Funding for social housing from central government was cut dramatically in the years since 2010, forcing housing associations to be creative in finding ways to house the poorest families. They did it by building shared ownership homes and channelling the profits back into social housing. They were balancing their books on the backs of the not-quite-poor.

Because when it goes wrong, shared ownership is a very bad deal. Shared owners now face a triple threat to their finances, placing many in a desperate position. Higher mortgage payments are compounded by housing associations rapidly increasing rents on their portion of the property — linked to the consumer price index, which has shot up in the last two years. In the wake of the building safety crackdown sparked by the Grenfell fire, service charges for building maintenance (including remediation on cladding, or 24-hour security guards) have also rocketed.

The shared ownership agreement requires a buyer to take on the maximum equity they can afford when assessed for eligibility. The day they complete and collect their keys, they are already financially stretched. No shared owner enters the agreement with the capacity for rapid and vertiginous growth in monthly housing costs. Yet one shared owner I interviewed in east London described how their service charge had almost doubled since signing her agreement at the end of 2018. Meanwhile, her rent has risen from £630 to £883; her mortgage repayments have also doubled. Her total monthly repayments are now more than £2,000. They are stuck in a building yet to have cladding fully removed — meaning the lease cannot be extended and the property cannot be remortgaged.

Many shared owners now feel far worse off than in private rentals, even though in London rents have risen by 7 per cent in the last year. They are desperate to get out, but even many who own flats in blocks without issues around cladding or fire safety say they cannot find a buyer. The combination of house price inflation and rents that make saving for a deposit unthinkable has pushed even shared ownership out of reach of the lower-middle income market. The ongoing political battle over the future of leasehold has only added to the uncertainty for prospective buyers.

In March, a long-running select committee inquiry finally reported: MPs concluded that shared ownership was now failing to provide an affordable route to home ownership. Worse than that, it has become a form of financial entrapment. Housing associations and successive governments should be challenged about their role in creating it.
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La herencia universal de nuestros padres
Quien tiene una hipoteca firmada antes de 2011 seguirá disfrutando de esta deducción hasta que termine de pagarla. Así que la herencia universal de nuestros padres la estamos pagando, todavía, los hijos. También los que no tienen casa en propiedad

María Álvarez · 2024.05.24

Bloques de viviendas y construcción de nuevas torres en Bilbao. EFE/Miguel Toña

En las últimas elecciones generales, Sumar propuso implementar una herencia universal. La idea no era nueva. Es una propuesta de Thomas Piketty que plantea distribuir las herencias para acabar con la reproducción de las rentas del capital, que están creciendo mucho más deprisa que las rentas del trabajo. De esta manera todos heredaríamos una parte de la riqueza, y no solo los que tienen padres con patrimonio.

Para que tenga un efecto sobre la desigualdad, esa redistribución se tiene que hacer al inicio de la vida. Sin ese impulso, cuando los jóvenes llegan a la edad en la que heredan, la desigualdad es tan grande que ya no se puede arreglar.

La propuesta de Sumar descafeinaba bastante la original de Piketty -que propone una herencia de 120.000 euros por persona-, pero dio igual.

Se lio parda.

En las redes y en los medios, miles de personas -que sospecho que no se encontraban entre los beneficiaros de la medida- parecieron enfurecer ante la idea de dar 20.000 euros a cada persona a los 18 años. Por su parte, el statu quo se hizo el indignado: Feijóo calificó la medida de “broma” y el jefe de la patronal pidió “seriedad” en las propuestas.

¿Era una medida disparatada la herencia universal? Yo creo que no. No solo eso: si existe hoy una clase media en España -y gran parte de Europa- es porque la generación de nuestros padres recibió una herencia universal en los primeros años de su vida adulta con la que los crecidos después de 2000 no podemos ni atrevernos a soñar.

Claro que no fue una transferencia monetaria en un pago único, como proponía Piketty, pero eso no quiere decir que no existiera. Ocurrió de la siguiente manera:

Para empezar, entre 1960 y 1990 se construyó en Europa aproximadamente el 50% de todo el stock actual de vivienda. En España, el II Plan Nacional de la Vivienda del regimen franquista construyó 4 millones de casas entre 1961 y 1975 y 3 millones más hasta 1980 duplicando el tamaño del parque, que pasó de 7 a 14 millones de viviendas en esos 20 años.

Hasta el 70% de estas viviendas se hicieron en suelo público, promovidas por el Estado y por los ayuntamientos, catalogadas como viviendas de protección oficial (aunque después se pudieron vender en el mercado libre) y a precio de saldo. Así se dio casa al aluvión de trabajadores que iban a componer esa incipiente clase media.

Viviendas en España por año de construcción

Es por esto que, en 1992, en España se pagaba una vivienda con los ingresos de 3 años de una familia (cuando muchas veces solo había un salario por hogar). Hoy hay que invertir 8 años (con dos salarios) y a eso hay que sumar todos los años que pasamos pagando alquiler porque es imposible comprar sin un trabajo estable y muchos ahorros.

A partir de 1980 la iniciativa pública empieza a dejar de construir y toma la delantera la iniciativa privada, que hasta 2000 construiría casi 7 millones de viviendas más. Se siguió vendiendo suelo público y construyendo hasta que en 2008 explotó la burbuja y la construcción cayó en picado.

Viviendas libres y protegidas 1980 - 2020

Como consecuencia, en España pasamos de un 30% de población viviendo de alquiler en 1970, a un 11% en 2000 y ahora estamos volviendo al 30% de alquiler.

Todo ese suelo cedido, todo ese esfuerzo de construcción de un parque nuevo de viviendas, no fue sino una gigantesca herencia universal que un país dio a una generación. Un acuerdo para hacer un inmenso esfuerzo como país para construir una clase media. No volvió a suceder.

No solo esto. Desde 1979 hasta 2011 estuvieron vigentes en España unas ayudas a la compra de vivienda que permitían desgravar del IRPF entre el 15% y el 25% del coste de la adquisición. Estas ayudas han costado algo así como 100.000 millones de euros hasta hoy.

No me malinterpreten. Esta herencia universal que recibieron nuestros padres fue el impulso democratizador más importante que ha acometido la sociedad europea en toda su historia. Sin ella yo, que soy nieta de una jornalera y de un albañil, no estaría escribiendo estas líneas.

Y todos conocemos las historias de progreso que trajo esta herencia. Gente que vino del pueblo cuyas hijas son ministras. Gente que había crecido en chabolas y se jubiló con casa, coche y piso en la playa. Una transformación total de la vida y de la sociedad. Pequeñas fortunas amasadas a base de ahorro. Una nueva clase media, un nuevo país.

Pero si hay una brecha generacional que es innegable es la brecha imaginaria. Esa que dice que la generación que hizo la Transición fue una cohorte de sacrificados trabajadores que levantaron el país con el sudor de su frente -y nada más- mientras los crecidos más allá de 2000 somos una panda de lloricas que solo queremos paguitas para gastarlas en cañas.

Y con esta brecha sí que hay que acabar, porque es injusta y falsa. No hubiera habido un milagro español, ni una generación de la Transición que levantara el país, sin esa gigantesca herencia universal que tuvieron a bien darse, colectivamente, nuestros padres. Es más, es que las ayudas a la compra de vivienda todavía no se han terminado de pagar. Quien tiene una hipoteca firmada antes de 2011 seguirá disfrutando de esta deducción hasta que termine de pagarla. Así que la herencia universal de nuestros padres la estamos pagando, todavía, los hijos. También los que no tienen casa en propiedad.

Ninguna generación se esfuerza más que otra. Todas hacen lo mejor que pueden con los tiempos que les toca vivir y los mayores llevan quejándose de los jóvenes desde Sócrates. Si la generación que se hizo mayor en los 70 tiene la posición económica que tiene es por su esfuerzo, sí, pero también porque se repartieron el suelo urbano entre los que estaban. Si todo esto no fue una pantagruélica herencia universal, que venga Dios y lo vea.

Y ahora están ocurriendo dos cosas. Una, que tenemos una situación insoportable en la sociedad, donde unos tuvieron herencia universal y esperan de otros que hagan lo mismo, sin ella. Por eso tenemos la percepción de que los jóvenes no se esfuerzan. Pero imagínense las cosas que podría hacer la generación de jóvenes de hoy, si no tuvieran que trabajar como mulas para pagar un alquiler perenne.

Y la otra, más grave, es que las rentas del capital de esa primera generación se están reproduciendo, como explica Piketty, a una velocidad que multiplica la capacidad que tienen los trabajadores de generar riqueza. Y cuanto más tiempo pase, más desigualdad habrá, hasta que acabemos con una sociedad partida por la mitad entre quienes pudieron heredar al principio de su vida, y quienes no.
Saludos.
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