Tema: PPCC-Pisitófilos Creditófagos-Otoño 2022

[sudden and sharp]

No pasa nada, no? Solo es un artículo, aquí colgamos de todo, y estoy seguro que no es por posicionarnos simplemente porque nos ha llamado la atención.

The US Just Lost 26 Years' Worth of Progress On Life Expectancy
Posted by BeauHD on Tuesday October 18, 2022 @11:30PM from the trending-in-the-wrong-direction dept.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Scientific American:

With a few notable exceptions -- such as during the 1918 influenza pandemic, World War II and the HIV crisis -- life expectancy in the U.S. has had gradual upward trajectory over the past century. But that progress has steeply reversed in the past two years as COVID and other tragedies have cut millions of lives short. U.S. life expectancy fell by a total of 2.7 years (PDF) between 2019 and 2021 to 76.1 years -- the lowest it has been since 1996, according to provisional data recently released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The drop was 3.1 years for male individuals and 2.3 years for female ones. Non-Hispanic Native American and Alaska Native peoples saw the biggest decline -- a staggering 6.6 years. But every racial and ethnic group suffered: life expectancy decreased by 4.2 years in the Hispanic population, by four years in the non-Hispanic Black population, by 2.4 years in the non-Hispanic white population and by 2.1 years in the non-Hispanic Asian population.

"Basically, all the gains between 1996 and 2019 are as if they never happened," says Elizabeth Arias, director of the U.S. life table program at the NCHS and co-author of a report on the new data. COVID deaths drove much of the decline as the country grappled with the world's worst pandemic in a century. But unintentional injuries -- largely driven by drug overdoses -- also played a significant role, the data show. Increases in deaths from heart disease, chronic liver disease and suicide also contributed. "This isn't supposed to happen," says Philip Cohen, a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, who studies demographic trends and inequality. "I think it's a wake-up call for us ... that we can't put public health on autopilot; that we don't have this invisible hand of development just raising living standards over time." The drop in life expectancy would have been even more stark if it had not been partially offset by declines in influenza and pneumonia deaths, which were likely reduced by pandemic-related precautions such as masking and social distancing.

Saludos.

¿Se puede ser más ciego o hipócrita? ¿Y qué hay conque sean el país desarrollado con mayor número de muertes violentas, y con muchísima diferencia...?

Corregidme si me equivoco... pero la esperanza (matemática) de vida lo tendrá en cuenta todo. ¿No?

Dojes los datos por todas las causas... y la calculas... y luego haces una serie a intervalos temporales, anual por ejemplo. Y ya. Ahora, si ha caído, pues lo ha hecho.

[wanderer]

No pasa nada, no? Solo es un artículo, aquí colgamos de todo, y estoy seguro que no es por posicionarnos simplemente porque nos ha llamado la atención.

The US Just Lost 26 Years' Worth of Progress On Life Expectancy
Posted by BeauHD on Tuesday October 18, 2022 @11:30PM from the trending-in-the-wrong-direction dept.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Scientific American:

With a few notable exceptions -- such as during the 1918 influenza pandemic, World War II and the HIV crisis -- life expectancy in the U.S. has had gradual upward trajectory over the past century. But that progress has steeply reversed in the past two years as COVID and other tragedies have cut millions of lives short. U.S. life expectancy fell by a total of 2.7 years (PDF) between 2019 and 2021 to 76.1 years -- the lowest it has been since 1996, according to provisional data recently released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The drop was 3.1 years for male individuals and 2.3 years for female ones. Non-Hispanic Native American and Alaska Native peoples saw the biggest decline -- a staggering 6.6 years. But every racial and ethnic group suffered: life expectancy decreased by 4.2 years in the Hispanic population, by four years in the non-Hispanic Black population, by 2.4 years in the non-Hispanic white population and by 2.1 years in the non-Hispanic Asian population.

"Basically, all the gains between 1996 and 2019 are as if they never happened," says Elizabeth Arias, director of the U.S. life table program at the NCHS and co-author of a report on the new data. COVID deaths drove much of the decline as the country grappled with the world's worst pandemic in a century. But unintentional injuries -- largely driven by drug overdoses -- also played a significant role, the data show. Increases in deaths from heart disease, chronic liver disease and suicide also contributed. "This isn't supposed to happen," says Philip Cohen, a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, who studies demographic trends and inequality. "I think it's a wake-up call for us ... that we can't put public health on autopilot; that we don't have this invisible hand of development just raising living standards over time." The drop in life expectancy would have been even more stark if it had not been partially offset by declines in influenza and pneumonia deaths, which were likely reduced by pandemic-related precautions such as masking and social distancing.

Saludos.

¿Se puede ser más ciego o hipócrita? ¿Y qué hay conque sean el país desarrollado con mayor número de muertes violentas, y con muchísima diferencia...?

Tranquilo, que no lo decía por el bueno de Cadavre, sino por quién ha escrito ese despropósito.

[wanderer]

Bueno, si en España así como en la mayoría de países desarrollados, la principal causa de muerte entre los 20-40, digamos, es el suicidio, en los EEUU eso diría que está ampliamente sobrepasado por las muertes violentas (por armas de fuego, sobre todo).

Luego la adicción a sustancias, que afecta predominantemente a hombres blancos de clase baja (a los woke, eso ni les importa un pimiento), y a la población general, la dificultad de acceso a servicios médicos decentes (o aún si se tiene un seguro, a ver qué cubre realmente y con qué coberturas, que lo de arruinarse por tratamientos médicos está a la orden del día).

Que uno será antianticapitalista, pero los EEUU dejan pero mucho mucho que desear en demasiadas cosas.

[Negrule]

Nada Wanderer, lo comentaba más que nada porque es un foro que me gusta y me desagrada cuando noto tensión, o alguna “picabaralla” tonta, solo es eso.

Salut

No pasa nada, no? Solo es un artículo, aquí colgamos de todo, y estoy seguro que no es por posicionarnos simplemente porque nos ha llamado la atención.

The US Just Lost 26 Years' Worth of Progress On Life Expectancy
Posted by BeauHD on Tuesday October 18, 2022 @11:30PM from the trending-in-the-wrong-direction dept.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Scientific American:

With a few notable exceptions -- such as during the 1918 influenza pandemic, World War II and the HIV crisis -- life expectancy in the U.S. has had gradual upward trajectory over the past century. But that progress has steeply reversed in the past two years as COVID and other tragedies have cut millions of lives short. U.S. life expectancy fell by a total of 2.7 years (PDF) between 2019 and 2021 to 76.1 years -- the lowest it has been since 1996, according to provisional data recently released by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The drop was 3.1 years for male individuals and 2.3 years for female ones. Non-Hispanic Native American and Alaska Native peoples saw the biggest decline -- a staggering 6.6 years. But every racial and ethnic group suffered: life expectancy decreased by 4.2 years in the Hispanic population, by four years in the non-Hispanic Black population, by 2.4 years in the non-Hispanic white population and by 2.1 years in the non-Hispanic Asian population.

"Basically, all the gains between 1996 and 2019 are as if they never happened," says Elizabeth Arias, director of the U.S. life table program at the NCHS and co-author of a report on the new data. COVID deaths drove much of the decline as the country grappled with the world's worst pandemic in a century. But unintentional injuries -- largely driven by drug overdoses -- also played a significant role, the data show. Increases in deaths from heart disease, chronic liver disease and suicide also contributed. "This isn't supposed to happen," says Philip Cohen, a professor of sociology at the University of Maryland, who studies demographic trends and inequality. "I think it's a wake-up call for us ... that we can't put public health on autopilot; that we don't have this invisible hand of development just raising living standards over time." The drop in life expectancy would have been even more stark if it had not been partially offset by declines in influenza and pneumonia deaths, which were likely reduced by pandemic-related precautions such as masking and social distancing.

Saludos.

¿Se puede ser más ciego o hipócrita? ¿Y qué hay conque sean el país desarrollado con mayor número de muertes violentas, y con muchísima diferencia...?

Tranquilo, que no lo decía por el bueno de Cadavre, sino por quién ha escrito ese despropósito.

[Derby]

https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/bank-england-says-ldi-crisis-shows-non-banks-need-stronger-rules-2022-10-19/

Bank of England says LDI crisis shows non-banks need stronger rules

LONDON, Oct 19 (Reuters) - A decade on from the global financial crisis, non-banks are still not being properly regulated as rocketing interest rates point to new weak points such as emerging market funds, Bank of England Deputy Governor Jon Cunliffe said on Wednesday.

Liability-driven investment funds (LDI) in Britain were last week forced by regulators to build up their liquidity defences after the Bank of England had to buy UK government bonds to avoid the funds collapsing due to a spike in gilt yields.

Cunliffe warned that more stresses could emerge as global financial markets adjust to a rapid rise in interest rates, with "weak" points predominantly in non-banks like leveraged funds.

"The areas I would look to see stress where you might see stress is emerging markets, particularly with the strength of the dollar, and emerging market bond funds," Cunliffe told the Treasury Select Committee.

The global financial crisis prompted regulators to tighten capital rules for banks, but disagreements between central banks, who focus on financial stability, and securities regulators scuppered initial efforts to regulate "shadow" or non-banks like various types of investment funds.

The funds industry has also lobbied hard to stop heavier types of regulation, such as requirements to hold much bigger liquidity buffers or capital reserves.

In financial stability terms, there is a gap globally between the powers of the financial stability authorities and the data they can see on non-banks, Cunliffe said.

Without  coordinated global action, it would be difficult for one jurisdiction to make changes in such cross-border sector.

Cunliffe said the banking system is now resilient to quite considerable stress, but non-bank finance is not as resilient to liquidity problems, as seen with LDI and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Central banks had to inject liquidity in markets to avoid money market funds freezing up when economies went into lockdown in March 2020.

"I actually do think that there needs to be more attention to financial stability and macro prudential issues between authorities like the Bank of England, and the securities regulators who are responsible for those markets," Cunliffe said.

Cunliffe said stress tests of banks and non-banks may also need to be tougher and go beyond the magnitude of shocks seen historically given what happened to markets during COVID and with LDI.

[wanderer]

Una de moloneo lelo que seguro que hará las delicias de Bencino Napoleoni:

Un soldado, tras las pruebas con las gafas de combate de Microsoft: “Esto va a hacer que nos maten”
Microsoft trabaja desde hace 4 años en adaptar sus gafas de realidad aumentada HoloLens al campo de batalla. Un test reciente del Ejercito estadounidense indica que no han superado cuatro de seis apartados en evaluación
https://www.larazon.es/tecnologia/20221018/fltnfcqr6zh7jdi6hbd4k5ymf4.html

[Benzino Napaloni]

Una de moloneo lelo que seguro que hará las delicias de Bencino Napoleoni:

Un soldado, tras las pruebas con las gafas de combate de Microsoft: “Esto va a hacer que nos maten”
Microsoft trabaja desde hace 4 años en adaptar sus gafas de realidad aumentada HoloLens al campo de batalla. Un test reciente del Ejercito estadounidense indica que no han superado cuatro de seis apartados en evaluación
https://www.larazon.es/tecnologia/20221018/fltnfcqr6zh7jdi6hbd4k5ymf4.html

Simplemente... https://www.meneame.net/story/soldado-tras-pruebas-gafas-combate-microsoft-esto-va-hacer-nos/c03#c-3

(click to show/hide)

Me he reído tanto al leer este comentario que no se me ocurre cómo mejorarlo .

[Benzino Napaloni]

Málaga no encuentra camareros, comerciales y transportistas pese ser los puestos más demandados

El IMFE califica como una "amenaza" la falta de demanda de empleados con estudios universitarios -El perfil más frecuente de demandante de empleo es una mujer de 45 años sin formación o con estudios secundarios
Ana I. Montañez Málaga | 19·10·22

https://www.laopiniondemalaga.es/malaga/2022/10/19/empleo-malaga-encuentra-camareros-comerciales-transportistas-77438374.html

Málaga no encuentra camareros, comerciales ni transportistas. Son los perfiles especializados que con más dificultad se cubren en la capital, pese a que la actividad económica se apuntala prácticamente sobre el sector terciario.

Es una de las conclusiones que se extraen de un informe sobre la situación laboral de la capital malagueña desarrollado por el IMFE, el Instituto Municipal para la Formación y el Empleo del Ayuntamiento de Málaga, a través de encuestas realizadas a los demandantes de empleo y empresas inscritas en su Agencia de Colocación.

Esa falta de perfiles especializados en la hostelería, la venta al público y la logística contrasta, por un lado, con las búsquedas de los demandantes de empleo registrados en esta entidad municipal, que no necesariamente están en paro, ya que pueden tener un trabajo y aspirar a medrar profesionalmente en otro puesto que le ofrezca mejores condiciones.

Pues bien, la Agencia de Colocación del IMFE detecta que los empleos más solicitados por los usuarios están relacionados con los servicios, el comercio/consumo y la hostelería, que coinciden con los empleos que más cuesta cubrir en Málaga.

Nivel de estudios

Para entender esta paradoja, conviene observar el nivel de estudios de los encuestados, universitarios en su mayoría (42%), seguidos de los titulados en Formación Profesional (27%) y Bachillerato/ESO (12%). En menor medida, hay usuarios que cuentan solo con estudios Primarios (5%) o con un certificado de profesionalidad (2%).

A esto se añade lo que las empresas consultadas (el 31% pertenecientes al sector servicios y el 10% a la hostelería) señalan como principales problemas a la hora de cubrir una vacante: que los candidatos cuentan con poca experiencia (54%), que no tienen la formación necesaria (43%) o que carecen de habilidades técnicas adaptadas al trabajo (33%). Esto puede reflejar que o bien existe una sobrecualificación de los aspirantes o que esa formación no casa con el puesto para el que se presentan.

De hecho, los propios demandantes encuestados opinan que la formación más demandada para los puestos que buscan no es la universitaria ni superior, sino la Formación Profesional así como contar con las habilidades técnicas específicas para desenvolverse en un puesto concreto.

Baja demanda de empleados

Esta baja demanda de empleados con estudios universitarios se califica como una de las "amenazas" detectadas en el análisis del IMFE sobre el mercado laboral de Málaga, a lo que se le suma el riesgo de una "fuga de cerebros" en la capital, al tener una "formación avanzada" que les empuja a buscar mejores oportunidades.

No obstante, frente a esta situación se detecta como una "oportunidad" el aumento de las empresas tecnológicas que se instalan en Málaga, así como el tirón del Parque Tenológico, factores "cruciales" en el desarrollo económico de la ciudad.

Para ello, el concejal de Educación, Juventud y Fomento del Empleo, Luis Verde, destaca el "apoyo decidido a las ramas tecnológicas e intentar que los grandes agentes de formación nacional e internacional tengan su espacio en Málaga". Este boom tech, añade Verde, supone también la llegada de teletrabajadores extranjeros que eligen la ciudad para asentarse.

Condiciones laborales

Por otro lado, las condiciones laborales en estos sectores son también un importante factor disuasor entre la población, especialmente la joven, a la hora de optar un puesto de trabajo.

"Mahos (hostelería) y Aehcos (hoteles) nos comentaban que una vez finalizada la pandemia, hay muchas personas que no quieren volver al turno partido o buscar la jornada continua, por ejemplo", responde Luis Verde, a preguntas de la prensa. "El sector de la construcción está muy falto. Tras el parón de la pandemia,la ingente cantidad de obra pública y privada hace que falte mano de obra cualificada. Para acceder a esos trabajos, tiene que existir una formación".

Verde insiste, asimismo, en la falta de operadores logísticos, en un momento de auge del comercio electrónico (e-commerce en Málaga). "Hay una carencia de conductores de transporte brutal para dar cobertura a la basta demanda que existe".

¿Cuál es el perfil del demandante de empleo?

Según este estudio del IMFE, el perfil del demandante de empleo en la ciudad, es una mujer mayor de 45 años que no tiene formación o tiene estudios secundarios, en paro de larga duración y que busca empleo en el sector servicios, el comercio y la hostelería. Asimismo, tampoco busca ser emprendedora.

De hecho, el 50% de los encuestados en paro tienen más de 45 años, donde se detecta una mayor necesidad de formación específica. En cuanto a los trabajos a tiempo parcial, están concentrados mayoritariamente en las mujeres (57%).

Sobre los jóvenes, el 80% asegura que se ha formado recientemente y el 30% manifiesta su interés por emprender su propio negocio.

Casualmente, Málaga es una de las ciudades con más subidas de precios inmobiliarios de los últimos tiempos, lo cual sospecho que elimina una cantidad enorme de potenciales candidatos, a los que básicamente trabajar allí no les resultaría rentable.

A llorar a la llorería.

Cuando confiesen que el precio del ladrillo es lo que está jodiendo la economía, será porque estará todo al borde del colapso.

Ya lo sabéis, con el rescate de 2012 y lo que vino después perdí totalmente la fe en que aprenderíamos algo y que se trataría de no repetirlo. Con el invierno demográfico no necesito fe, lo que va a ocurrir son simples matemáticas.

Las empresas más espabiladas ya recurren al teletrabajo a saco siempre que sea posible. Para los demás puestos, no van a quedar más narices que una redistribución de la población.

[Derby]

https://citywireamplify.com/2022/10/blame-policymakers-not-ldis-for-the-current-crisis/

Blame policymakers, not LDIs, for the current crisis

Robert Kyprianou, who proposed LDI strategies during his fund management career, says it is right to review governance and leverage, but markets remain unconvinced UK policymakers are competent.

(...) Enter centre stage liability-driven investments (LDIs). A solution created by clever investment bankers and asset managers more than 20 years ago in response to the pension community’s twin challenges of asset-liability management and underfunded final salary schemes. In a nutshell: hedge your long-term liabilities through derivatives and use the cash to invest in markets to close the funding gap.

This worked fine until a collection of exceptional events triggered a severe market dislocation and large-scale collateral calls to support those supposedly risk-reducing derivatives. As the scale of collateral calls turned into behemoth gilt sales, the spectre of a deathly ‘self-reinforcing spiral’ forced the BoE to intervene.

As a proposer and manager of LDI strategies in those early days of their life, we packaged a sophisticated idea wrapped in state-of-the-art systems. It was a creative solution to a real need, so we and the industry sold a lot. By 2021, the Investment Association estimated that LDI notional contracts had reached £1.6tn – a nice little earner for the asset management industry, and a mainstream go-to solution for defined-benefit (DB) pension schemes.

How do I feel when I hear talk of war rooms and emergency intervention and mum and dad’s pension being at risk – the UK’s own Lehman Brothers moment?

Fund manager Terry Smith has described the asset-liability matching at the core of LDIs as a ‘misguided investment strategy’. Instead, he advocates that ‘pension funds should get back to investing in assets with the likely greatest return over the long term: equities’.

Unfortunately, this forgets that, despite the efforts of the investment consultant community to identify the optimal asset allocation and best investment managers, the traditional bond/equity approach had left many DB schemes underfunded and requiring top-ups from their sponsors. The rise of LDIs was in response to this reality.

The criticism also ignores the role LDIs played in protecting the solvency of DB schemes during the long years of unlimited quantitative easing and zero interest rates, which drove real yields to negative levels. Nor does the proposed solution recognise that of the 9.7 million people reliant on DB pensions, nearly all are in closed schemes and roughly half are already drawing a pension. For such fast-maturing schemes, the asset-liability mismatch risk should be lowered over time.

The blame game is well under way in the media and among pundits, focusing on trustees, consultants and bankers. This is akin to attacking the builders of shoreline defences when they leak in the face of an extreme earthquake. Focusing on the fallout distracts attention from the fundamental cause of the tsunami – the competency of our policymakers.

Firstly, our central bank slammed the quantitative easing and zero-interest-rate accelerator pedal too hard for too long, like joyriders in a new Maserati. It ignored the massive build-up in liquidity and savings. Then Covid-19 provoked supply disruptions and gargantuan fiscal support programmes. Eventually, with the help of a war, the dam broke and inflation took off. The central banks were now caught with their trousers down, with interest rates well below an equilibrium level.

In the catch-up race that has followed, some central banks have been slower than others – the performance of the sterling before the chancellor’s mini-Budget would suggest that ours was not only behind the curve but also behind the pack. The BoE’s tardiness has already imposed the need for higher interest rates as the UK economy enters a recession.

Step forward the new chancellor. Kwarteng’s special fiscal operation, however well-meaning, could not have come at a worse time. All the market could see was unfunded fiscal stimuli poured onto unfunded fiscal fires. Even worse, it puts fiscal policy in direct conflict with monetary policy.

The subsequent two-day collapse in the gilt market that pushed LDIs into the limelight was the worst on record, forcing the BoE’s hand in the name of financial stability and, embarrassingly, compelling it to reverse its programme of belated quantitative tightening.

Until the mini-Budget announcement, LDI strategies had managed well the 2.5-percentage-point rise in long gilt yields in the year to date. They could not handle so well the unprecedented shock waves that followed the two-day 1.25-percentage-point jump in response to the mini-Budget.

Collateral waterfalls behind the derivatives embedded in LDI strategies were tested to the limit, generating intense conversations with plan sponsors over the viability of the hedges. Sell assets in fire sales, inject more cash from sponsors or allow hedges to be closed that would leave funds exposed to funding risk – these were the choices faced by trustees of the more exposed DB schemes.

There are lessons for trustees and their sponsors. They will not have enjoyed being at the mercy of the markets and will not want to be the weakest wildebeest at the back of the herd.

Leverage and the liquidity of collateral are the key areas of focus that trustees will be reviewing with their consultants and sponsors. Specifically, are funds using their leverage to overinvest in illiquid assets chasing the illiquidity premium; and is there enough governance and management flexibility behind LDIs given the daily collateral requirements, especially in the case of pooled funds?

Pressuring trustees to address the events in a way that leaves liabilities unhedged – in order to reduce liquidity risk from an unprecedented incident – is surely not a desirable outcome.

In any case, it would not address the key problem. This is less a pension fund liquidity crisis and more a crisis of confidence in policymakers and policy. Instead of asking whether we can trust pension fund trustees and their strategies, we should be challenging our policymakers.

The long hours and fraught meetings are not over for many trustees. The BoE’s emergency programme is due to end on 14 October. What then? Markets remain unconvinced that a return to responsible and competent economic and financial management by our policymakers is imminent.

[Derby]

https://www.businessinsider.es/gran-renuncia-espanola-no-estudie-carrera-servir-platos-1139821#

"Prefiero tener menos dinero que aguantar esto, no estudié una carrera para servir platos": 4 jóvenes cuentan qué hay detrás de la 'Gran Renuncia' española

Ahora mismo en España hay más trabajadores que nunca renunciando a sus trabajos. En lo que va de año, el número de dimisiones se ha disparado a máximos históricos, hasta alcanzar las 46.065 personas entre enero y agosto de 2022.

[Benzino Napaloni]

https://www.businessinsider.es/gran-renuncia-espanola-no-estudie-carrera-servir-platos-1139821#

"Prefiero tener menos dinero que aguantar esto, no estudié una carrera para servir platos": 4 jóvenes cuentan qué hay detrás de la 'Gran Renuncia' española

Ahora mismo en España hay más trabajadores que nunca renunciando a sus trabajos. En lo que va de año, el número de dimisiones se ha disparado a máximos históricos, hasta alcanzar las 46.065 personas entre enero y agosto de 2022.

Detrás de la Gran Renuncia española lo único que hay es que ahora se puede. Empieza a equipararse la oferta de trabajo con la demanda. Las ganas de mandarlo todo a la mierda hace mucho que estaban ahí:

Un 16.5% de trabajadores españoles desean que se hunda su empresa o no les importa.

De 2010 es el artículo, ahí lo dejo.

[sudden and sharp]

Esta SÍ que es buena...   

El Banco de España entrará en pérdidas en 2023 y hará un 'roto' de 1.800 millones al Tesoro
https://www.vozpopuli.com/economia_y_finanzas/banco-espana-perdidas.html
El proceso de normalización monetaria podría llevar al supervisor español a incurrir en un resultado negativo, tal y como reconoce el gobernador del Banco de España, Pablo Hernández de Cos

"Nuestros análisis muestran que lo más previsible es que en 2023 el Banco de España -al igual que la inmensa de bancos centrales del Eurosistema- incurramos en resultados negativos", recalcó Hernándes de Cos. Como consecuenciua, el Banco de España no aportará ingresos a las cuentas públicas en 2023.

Que den gracias a que en este foro somos bancocentristas... porque si no las puyas podrían ser feroces. 

[Derby]

Esta SÍ que es buena...   

El Banco de España entrará en pérdidas en 2023 y hará un 'roto' de 1.800 millones al Tesoro

Precisamente ahora mismo estaba leyendo:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-19/uk-treasury-to-transfer-11-billion-to-boe-to-cover-qe-losses

UK Treasury to Transfer £11 Billion to BOE to Cover QE Losses

*Payment is first evidence of taxpayer hit from bond-buying
*Government has already made a £828 million advance to APF

The UK Treasury is set to transfer more than £11 billion ($12.4 billion) to the Bank of England this fiscal year to cover projected losses in its bond-buying program, according to a person familiar with the situation.

The capital transfer was detailed in an update to the “Central Government Supply Estimates” published on Tuesday by the Treasury. The new £11.175 billion injection is listed under “assistance to financial institutions -- payment to the Bank of England.”

Parliament is set to debate the payment, which will cover losses for six months, on Monday. The BOE is to begin active sales of its quantitative easing program next month.

The transfer is a key milestone for QE’s journey from government cash cow to liability. The BOE began buying bonds in 2009 and has transferred around £120 billion in profits from the scheme to the Treasury so far.

The sharp rise in interest rates and the steep fall in gilt prices ahead of the BOE’s planned sales have now reversed the flows for the first time. An initial £828 million already been transfered.

In a written ministerial statement, Andrew Griffith, financial secretary to the Treasury, said the government is seeking parliamentary approval for the disbursal this month. Until members of Parliament approve the transfer, an £828 million advance has been made from the “Contingencies Fund.”

The BOE bought £895 billion of government and corporate bonds between 2009 and 2021 to provide economic support after interest rates were cut as low as they could go. The recent fall in bond prices, after interest rates shot up, has left the remaining the £838 billion portfolio of gilts carrying a market loss of about £200 billion.

As the BOE’s purchases are indemnified by the Treasury, any losses will be borne by taxpayer.

BOE officials have repeatedly stressed that the QE program was designed to support the UK economy, thereby protecting jobs and incomes, not to make a profit and should be seen in that context. The BOE declined to comment for this story.

However, the costs of the program are hitting at the worst possible time for Prime Minister Liz Truss’s government, which now needs to find large savings to balance the books in the wake of its disastrous budget last month.

(... ) A spokesman for the Treasury said “the new chancellor remains very committed to bank independence and has full confidence in it.”

[Derby]

[Derby]

https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/bt-pensions-scheme-lost-12-bln-assets-after-uk-mini-budget-annual-report-2022-10-18/

BT pensions scheme lost $12 bln in assets after UK 'mini-budget' -annual report

LONDON, Oct 18 (Reuters) - The British Telecom (BT.L) pension scheme, one of Britain's largest, lost around 11 billion pounds ($12.44 billion) in assets in recent weeks, it said in its annual report on Tuesday, as bond yields soared following the UK government's botched 'mini-budget'.

"Following the year-end, there was a significant fall in the value of the scheme's assets, during a period of significant market volatility in the second half of September," BT said in its report for the year ending June 30.

"Prior to the Bank of England's gilt market intervention, there was an estimated 11 billion pound fall in the value of the scheme's assets."

The hit to the scheme's assets underscores how dramatic the moves in financial markets were for pension fund users of so-called liability-driven investment.

The BT scheme was a heavy user of liability-driven investments, a derivatives strategy at the heart of pension schemes' dash for cash to cover their positions as bond yields jumped following the UK fiscal statement on Sept. 23.

The scheme said that interest rate and inflation hedge ratios had been increased to around 95% and 90% coverage during the last few years.

The Bank of England had to intervene to stabilise the bond market on Sept. 28 and stop some pension funds from running out of short-term cash.

The BT pension scheme had already lost 10.4 billion pounds in assets to 46.9 billion pounds over its 2021/22 financial year, "largely driven by the performance of our liability hedging investments", it said in the annual report.

The scheme's estimated funding position had not gotten worse as a result of the market moves, it said.