Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[sudden and sharp]

La dictadura no es la solución. Nunca.

Es tu opinión.
El problema es que está basada en la nada más absoluta.

Si hacemos un repaso por la historia de la humanidad (grecorromana primero, hispana después) y sus grandes logros, o incluso la historia actual donde una China submedieval ha pasado a ser la mayor potencia global _a golpe de dictadura_, vemos el absoluto vacío de tu dogma.
No compro eslóganes baratos, antiguos, y a todas luces engañosos.
En ambos sistemas existen ventajas. Por eso las decisiones empresariales no son democráticas. ¿O es que la formalidad democrática es "otra cosa"?.

En cualquier caso no me quiero desviar, lo que venía a decir es que la transición hacia un sistema (ATENCIÓN: social y económico) de planificación central será mucho más complicado cuanto mayores sean las estupideces democráticas que tengamos que aguantar de las nacionalidades históricas reconocidas en la Constitución española.

No se si me explico con claridad 

Clarito, clarito...


Meridiano, incluso.



-------
Pero va a ser que no. Que no nos da la gana a los demás. (Hoy votan en Alemania, por ejemplo.)

[Benzino Napaloni]

La dictadura no es la solución. Nunca.

Es tu opinión.
El problema es que está basada en la nada más absoluta.

Si hacemos un repaso por la historia de la humanidad (grecorromana primero, hispana después) y sus grandes logros, o incluso la historia actual donde una China submedieval ha pasado a ser la mayor potencia global _a golpe de dictadura_, vemos el absoluto vacío de tu dogma.
No compro eslóganes baratos, antiguos, y a todas luces engañosos.
En ambos sistemas existen ventajas. Por eso las decisiones empresariales no son democráticas.
¿O es que la formalidad democrática es "otra cosa"... indefinida?
Defínase entonces.

En cualquier caso no me quiero desviar, lo que venía a decir es que la transición hacia un sistema (ATENCIÓN: social y económico) de planificación central será mucho más complicado cuanto mayores sean las estupideces democráticas que tengamos que aguantar de las nacionalidades históricas reconocidas en la Constitución española.

No se si me explico con claridad 

Aquí hay una falacia demasiado habitual en estos debates.

Democracia y libertad no es poder hacer lo que a uno le salga de las narices. Es aceptarnos como somos, y tratar de convivir lo mejor posible.

Si caemos en esa falacia, ese falso concepto de democracia choca con que la realidad tiene poco de democrática. Ni yo ni nadie puede elegir vivir sin comer ni respirar. Tampoco puede uno saltar por la ventana y pretender volar como un pájaro, la ley de la gravedad tiene cero libertad en ese sentido.

Pones el ejemplo de China, pero obvias que Mao es el mayor carnicero de la historia, que su política económica fue un absoluto desastre, que su Gran Salto Adelante fue en realidad un grave retroceso, todos los muertos que hubo, etc.

El único acierto de Mao fue entender a base de hostias que sus ideas habían fracasado, y que tenía que proteger a Deng Xiaoping. Le tuvo en la cárcel, sí, pero en realidad sus carceleros eran sus guardaespaldas. Estaba ahí porque no le quedó otra para mantenerle vivo y protegido para que llegase al poder llegado el momento.

En España tenemos también nuestro propio ejemplo. Para muchos que conocieron la dictadura y que aún viven aún queda un cierto sentimiento de añoranza. Obviando que la política económica hasta el 57 fueron básicamente dos décadas tiradas a la basura. Franco tuvo suerte de que hizo caso de los tecnócratas, que le avisaban de que en dos semanas el país se iba a quedar sin divisas y no habría gasolina ni para el coche de Franco. Con el consecuente peligro para él de que se armase una revolución que le sacase del poder y quién sabe si acabar como sus colegas Hitler y Mussolini. Y aún así, aunque España tuvo un claro progreso económico, no es menos cierto que fue una simple puesta al día a rebufo de los países desarrollados. Tarde, e incompleto. Y cuando vino la crisis del petróleo, que coincidió con la decrepitud de Franco, ahí se vio que la dictadura era absolutamente incapaz de afrontar los nuevos desafíos.

Ahí, aunque fuese con la ayuda de los grandes poderes económicos, la CIA, y el copón bendito, menos mal que la dictadura se desmontó desde dentro sin grandes traumas. Cayó por su propio peso porque eso no podía seguir adelante.

China y España no progresaron gracias a Mao y Franco. Lo hicieron a pesar de ellos, y porque acabaron teniendo la certeza de que no podían ir contra la realidad económica.


Para ser un dogma vacío eso de que la dictadura no arregla nada, ahí van dos ejemplos de que de vacío no tiene nada.


Lo dije hace tiempo: el que defienda imponer una dictadura me tendrá enfrente como enemigo. No es la solución, y la historia nos deja demasiados ejemplos de que el riesgo de catástrofe es demasiado elevado.

[Maloserá]

Hace mucho que no escribo nada así que para romper el hielo, copio un fragmento de un artículo de Niall Ferguson el el Wall Street Journal (si no le conocéis, es un historiador conservador es-es (escocés-estadounidense). Su teoría es que cuando los imperios gastan más en intereses de deuda pública que en defensa, no duran como imperios. Y USA ha empezado a pagar más por intereses de deuda que en defensa en 2024. Me gusta la idea por su sencillez. Correlación no es causación y tal, pero se pueden intuir confounding factors (jeje el AI versión Copilot traduce "factores de confusión" que suena así como un componente de la alienación marxista)

https://niallferguson.substack.com/p/debt-has-always-been-the-ruin-of

Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next?
From Habsburg Spain to Trump’s America, there’s no escaping the consequences of spending more on interest payments than on defense.

Niall Ferguson, Feb 21, 2025

Is that the heady scent of hubris, wafting through the winter air of Washington, D.C.? So bold has President Trump been in the first month of his second term that nervous Europeans wonder if the American republic is now unabashedly an empire. Trump renames seas. He reclaims canals. He demands Greenland. He trolls Canada. His proposal for peace in Gaza is wholesale resettlement of its population. His plan for peace in Ukraine begins to look a lot like partition.

In the ancient Hellenic world, hubris was the kind of pride or arrogance that led a mortal to defy the gods. But hard on its heels there usually came Nemesis, the goddess of divine retribution. The historian prefers to exclude deities from his narrative. He discerns the more prosaic operation of budgetary constraints. For it is these, not gods, that set limits on the geopolitical ambitions of republics and empires alike.

What I call Ferguson’s Law states that any great power that spends more on debt service than on defense risks ceasing to be a great power. The insight is not mine but originates with the Scottish political theorist Adam Ferguson, whose “Essay on the History of Civil Society” (1767) brilliantly identified the perils of excessive public debt.

Ferguson understood what modern economists call the “tax-smoothing” properties of public debt: By borrowing to pay for a war or some other emergency, a government can spread the cost over multiple generations of taxpayers. But he also saw the catch. “The growing burden,” he observed, is “gradually laid,” and though a nation may “sink in some future age, every minister hopes it may still keep afloat in his own.” For this reason, public debt is “extremely dangerous…in the hands of a precipitant and ambitious administration.”

His conclusion was prophetic: “An expense, whether sustained at home or abroad, whether a waste of the present, or an anticipation of future, revenue, if it bring no proper return, is to be reckoned among the causes of national ruin.”

Economists have long sought in vain a threshold that defines how much debt is too much. My own formulation of Adam Ferguson’s idea focuses our attention on the crucial historical relationship between debt service (interest plus the repayment of principal) and national security (expenditure on defense, including investment in research and development).

The crucial threshold is the point where debt service exceeds defense spending, after which the centripetal forces of the aggregate debt burden tend to pull apart the geopolitical grip of a great power, leaving it vulnerable to military challenge.

The striking thing is that, for the first time in nearly a century, the U.S. began violating Ferguson’s Law last year. Annual defense spending—to be precise, national defense consumption expenditures and gross investment—was $1.107 trillion in 2024, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), while federal expenditure on interest payments (the government long ago gave up on paying down principal) topped out at $1.124 trillion.

These outlays can also be expressed as percentages of gross domestic product. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which uses a narrower definition of defense spending than the BEA, places it at 2.9% of GDP for last year. Net interest payments (adjusting for the interest received by bonds held by government agencies) amounted to 3.1%.

We have seen nothing like this since the era of isolationism. Between 1962 and 1989, U.S. defense spending averaged 6.4% of GDP; debt service was less than a third of that at 1.8%. Even after the end of the Cold War, the federal government was still spending, on average, roughly twice as much on national security as on interest on the debt.

The fact that the U.S. is currently projected to spend a rising share of its GDP on interest payments and a falling share on defense means that American power is much more fiscally constrained than most people realize. By 2049, according to the CBO’s latest long-term budget projection, net interest payments on the federal debt will have risen to 4.9% of GDP. If defense spending maintains its recent share of discretionary spending, it will amount to half that share of GDP.

Nor is there any real possibility that defense spending will increase dramatically. Because such spending is discretionary, it has to be appropriated by Congress every year, unlike spending on entitlement programs (which is mandatory) and interest payments (nonpayment of which would be default). If anything, budgetary constraints are likely to put downward pressure on defense spending in the decades ahead.

Read more here:

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/debt-has-always-been-the-ruinof-great-powers-is-the-u-s-next-02f16402

[Asdrúbal el Bello]

El cáncer de la inteligencia es el sectarismo.

[muyuu]

pero CHOSEN, si la dictadura ya la tenemos... al menos para todas las cuestiones que importan

[sudden and sharp]

Civil servants are leading the American resistance – with GameStop as a guide
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/20/civil-servants-trump-gamestop

[asustadísimos]

[He reeditado...
https://www.transicionestructural.net/index.php?topic=2619.msg238829#msg238829
... para incluir una imagen, hacerles una pregunta y enlazarles a un vídeo que anticipa nuestra fiesta del viernes que viene.]

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/b60db188-2b58-42eb-8bb2-5ca97ff5e0b6

Centre-right CDU/CSU wins, say exit polls

Germany’s centre-right CDU and CSU parties have won the federal elections with about 28.5 to 29 per cent of the vote according to exit polls, paving the way for CDU leader Friedrich Merz to become chancellor at a time of economic and political upheaval in Europe’s largest democracy.

The far-right Alternative for Germany co-led by Alice Weidel recorded its best result with 19.5 — 20 per cent of the vote on Sunday, according to the preliminary projections by state broadcasters ARD and ZDF. That is double what the anti-immigration party achieved in 2021.

Meanwhile Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democratic Party won just 16 to 16.5 per cent of the votes.

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/19d4bef2-51db-4f9a-b9d3-f8dd56468e90

Zelenskyy offers to step down in exchange for peace and Ukraine’s Nato membership

President’s comment comes a day before third anniversary of Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said for the first time that he is willing to step down as Ukraine’s president if the move secured Nato membership or lasting peace for his country.

“If it brings peace for Ukraine, if you really need me to leave my post, I’m ready. I can exchange it for Nato [membership],” Zelenskyy told reporters at a press conference in Kyiv on Sunday. “If such conditions exist [I will step down] immediately.”

“I am focusing on security today and not in 20 years' time . . . I won’t be in power for decades,” Zelenskyy said ahead of the third anniversary of Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine on Monday.

The startling offer to step down, while improbable given the dim prospects of Nato accession, is a sign of the extreme pressure on the Ukrainian leader as the US hurries to hatch a peace deal with Moscow.

The Trump administration has made several concessions to Russia, including agreeing to normalise relations after bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia last week, while excluding Nato membership for Ukraine.

Trump described Zelenskyy last week as a “dictator” while blaming Kyiv, rather than Moscow, for starting the war.

Russia launched its biggest drone strike against Ukraine on Sunday, firing 267 drones against multiple targets across the country.

Ukrainian officials say Washington is also trying to strong-arm Zelenskyy into signing a deal that would award the US large amounts of the proceeds from extracting Ukrainian mineral deposits.

US officials presented Kyiv last week with a plan to channel up to $500bn in proceeds from resource extraction into a fund that would be 100 per cent owned by the US. Trump has described the plan as repayment for previous US military aid.

Zelenskyy pushed back against the Trump administration’s demands.

“I know we had $100bn [of assistance from the US] but I’m not going to acknowledge $500bn, no matter what anyone says,” Zelenskyy said. “I’m not going to sign something that ten generations of Ukrainians will be paying for.”

Zelenskyy also rejected an assertion by US treasury secretary Scott Bessent in an op-ed for the Financial Times that a minerals “partnership” with the US would strengthen Ukraine’s security.

Zelenksyy challenged “a certain logic” in Washington that the presence of US companies would deter further Russian aggression, pointing out that several US businesses had operations in Ukraine when Russia first attacked in 2014.

“This does not provide a 100 per cent guarantee that the Russians won’t return to places that [US companies] have entered,” Zelenskyy added.

Zelenskyy has said that Nato membership for Ukraine is the ultimate security guarantee against future Russian military aggression. But the Trump administration has poured cold water on the idea, with US secretary of defence Pete Hegseth saying at the Munich Security Conference last weekend that he did “not believe that Nato membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement”.

He also ruled out deploying US troops in Ukraine after the war with Russia ends, which Zelenskyy said on Sunday that he would like to see as part of a deal on rare and critical minerals that his administration is negotiating with the White House.

The Trump administration has argued that a deal would fuel postwar growth in the country, but Kyiv has pushed back. Zelenskyy said on Sunday that, as it is proposed now by Washington, it would be too costly and would not provide adequate security guarantees.

Zelenskyy said he was convinced Trump “wants to end this war and will help us to do that” but was also worried that the US president would present a mere ceasefire as “great success”.

“We want to guarantee security for our people,” he said.

[Derby]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-surprise-attack-on-europe-by-joschka-fischer-2025-02

Trump’s Surprise Attack on Europe, Joschka Fischer

European leaders knew that Vladimir Putin in the East and Donald Trump in the West would be a strategic nightmare scenario. Yet they did almost nothing to achieve greater political unity and stronger defense capabilities in anticipation of precisely this outcome.

BERLIN – When Donald Trump won the US presidential election last November, European elites apparently thought that the United States would become a little more isolationist, a bit more nationalist. But otherwise, continuity would prevail. Trump would demand that Europe pay more for its defense, but NATO – and the all-important US security guarantee for Europe – would survive.

Today, following senior US officials’ flurry of appearances at major European summits, we know that this was a grand error. Trump wants nothing less than a complete rupture with the rules and alliances that generations of US policymakers painstakingly and successfully built in the decades after World War II. From now on, Russia, not the European Union, will be America’s close partner. It is no longer the solidarity of democracies that counts in Washington, but the agreement of autocratic rulers of global powers; might once again prevails over law.

This is obvious in Trump’s approach to the war of annihilation that Russia is waging in Ukraine. Trump wants to end the war as quickly as possible in close cooperation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, excluding Ukraine and its European allies. Ukraine and Europe will have to bear most of the political and material consequences, but they will have no say in negotiating the terms.

So, this is what Trump’s vision of international order looks like: back to spheres of influence, with great powers dictating the fates of smaller countries. It is a vision that delights Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, because it aligns perfectly with their authoritarianism and neo-imperial ambitions

To be sure, Trump’s revisionism has placed the US on a path to self-weakening or even self-destruction, starting with the destruction of the West. After all, NATO made the US strong and contributed decisively to the West’s victory in the Cold War. What national interest could the US possibly be advancing by laying the Alliance and Ukraine at Putin’s feet?

None of it makes any sense, and yet all of it was foreseeable. European leaders knew who and what they would get with a second Trump presidency, and that Trump was serious about transforming American democracy into an oligarchy and establishing a new, authoritarian world order. They knew that Putin in the East and Trump in the West would be a strategic nightmare scenario. Yet they did almost nothing to achieve greater political unity and stronger defense capabilities in anticipation of precisely this outcome.

As a result, Europe is completely unprepared. In the face of the historic shift Trump seems determined to carry out, Europe presents a pitiful picture, seemingly as hapless and hysterical as a henhouse when a fox enters. Europeans must ask themselves how they got here – and what to do now that the Trump administration has made its extremism plain. Nothing less than Europe’s security and freedom are at stake. It should be obvious to all that “business as usual” is a recipe for disaster.

Europe has the money, the technological capacity, and the people and companies needed to secure its future. But it must act now. The EU’s large and medium-size states must cooperate closely. The European Commission must redefine debt rules, and, together with the member states – and ideally involving the United Kingdom and Norway – finally create a combat-ready European army and a common European defense industry.

Europe is running out of time – and fast. Hesitation and procrastination were yesterday's world. The choice is clear: Brussels or Moscow, freedom or submission. For Europe, the answer can only be Brussels, only freedom. In his speech at the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President J.D. Vance made it brutally clear to Europeans how powerless they are and how alone they will be from now on.

Putin’s war in Ukraine and Trump’s impending betrayal of Ukraine demonstrate how dangerous European powerlessness is for all of us. In the future, peace and freedom on the European continent will have to be based primarily on our own strength and deterrence capacity. That is why Europe must act immediately. In Trump’s world, there is no substitute for hard power. Europe must spare no cost developing it. Or do Russian tanks have to roll toward Riga and Warsaw first?

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/db2c8c29-2f63-4fec-801e-7bca8d92992d

What Jamie Dimon’s viral leaked recording tells us

Blistering critique by JPMorgan’s chief of remote work and bureaucratic bloat resonates in banking

(...) The leak itself is also worth examining. It’s unlikely that the person or people who made and released the recording aimed to undermine Dimon. They probably expected his comments to land well, especially among finance types and perhaps even with a new US president deeply hostile to working from home. It amplified Dimon’s message and bolstered JPMorgan’s image as a no-nonsense, performance-driven powerhouse.

There’s also a generational dynamic at play here. Dimon’s takedown of remote work and lack of focus feels like a subtle pushback against the recent shifts in workplace culture, particularly among younger bankers. Over the past few years, junior investment bankers have successfully lobbied for higher pay, lighter workloads, and greater protections for their weekends.

Whatever the merits of these changes, they have created a noticeable rift within the industry. Many senior investment bankers — who endured gruelling hours early in their careers — grumble sotto voce that the younger generation has it too easy. Dimon’s comments tap into this sentiment, whether intentionally or not. By calling out the shortcomings of remote work and the lack of engagement during virtual meetings, he’s implicitly challenging the junior cohort to show their commitment and prove they’re not just coasting along.

At its core, this entire episode feels undeniably performative. Dimon’s philippic, though rooted in genuine frustration, serves a deeper purpose: reinforcing the relentless drive that defines a top-tier bank. Success comes from the constant pressure to push harder, do more and challenge one another. The enthusiastic reaction from the investment banking world underscores a cardinal truth on Wall Street: complacency is the ultimate sin.

[Derby]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg5erp7zw2o

BMW delays electric Mini over 'uncertainty'

BMW has confirmed it is delaying the reintroduction of electric vehicle production at its Oxford Mini plant.

The vehicle manufacturer said "multiple uncertainties facing the automotive industry" had led to its decision decision to pause work on the £600m upgrade of its plant in Cowley.

It said it had decided not to accept a related £60m grant from the government but remained in "close dialogue".

The UK automotive industry has been in a long-running debate with the government over its targets for electric vehicle production.(...)

[Cadavre Exquis]

Hace mucho que no escribo nada así que para romper el hielo, copio un fragmento de un artículo de Niall Ferguson el el Wall Street Journal (si no le conocéis, es un historiador conservador es-es (escocés-estadounidense). Su teoría es que cuando los imperios gastan más en intereses de deuda pública que en defensa, no duran como imperios. Y USA ha empezado a pagar más por intereses de deuda que en defensa en 2024. Me gusta la idea por su sencillez. Correlación no es causación y tal, pero se pueden intuir confounding factors (jeje el AI versión Copilot traduce "factores de confusión" que suena así como un componente de la alienación marxista)

https://niallferguson.substack.com/p/debt-has-always-been-the-ruin-of

Debt Has Always Been the Ruin of Great Powers. Is the U.S. Next?
From Habsburg Spain to Trump’s America, there’s no escaping the consequences of spending more on interest payments than on defense.

Niall Ferguson, Feb 21, 2025

Is that the heady scent of hubris, wafting through the winter air of Washington, D.C.? So bold has President Trump been in the first month of his second term that nervous Europeans wonder if the American republic is now unabashedly an empire. Trump renames seas. He reclaims canals. He demands Greenland. He trolls Canada. His proposal for peace in Gaza is wholesale resettlement of its population. His plan for peace in Ukraine begins to look a lot like partition.

In the ancient Hellenic world, hubris was the kind of pride or arrogance that led a mortal to defy the gods. But hard on its heels there usually came Nemesis, the goddess of divine retribution. The historian prefers to exclude deities from his narrative. He discerns the more prosaic operation of budgetary constraints. For it is these, not gods, that set limits on the geopolitical ambitions of republics and empires alike.

What I call Ferguson’s Law states that any great power that spends more on debt service than on defense risks ceasing to be a great power. The insight is not mine but originates with the Scottish political theorist Adam Ferguson, whose “Essay on the History of Civil Society” (1767) brilliantly identified the perils of excessive public debt.

Ferguson understood what modern economists call the “tax-smoothing” properties of public debt: By borrowing to pay for a war or some other emergency, a government can spread the cost over multiple generations of taxpayers. But he also saw the catch. “The growing burden,” he observed, is “gradually laid,” and though a nation may “sink in some future age, every minister hopes it may still keep afloat in his own.” For this reason, public debt is “extremely dangerous…in the hands of a precipitant and ambitious administration.”

His conclusion was prophetic: “An expense, whether sustained at home or abroad, whether a waste of the present, or an anticipation of future, revenue, if it bring no proper return, is to be reckoned among the causes of national ruin.”

Economists have long sought in vain a threshold that defines how much debt is too much. My own formulation of Adam Ferguson’s idea focuses our attention on the crucial historical relationship between debt service (interest plus the repayment of principal) and national security (expenditure on defense, including investment in research and development).

The crucial threshold is the point where debt service exceeds defense spending, after which the centripetal forces of the aggregate debt burden tend to pull apart the geopolitical grip of a great power, leaving it vulnerable to military challenge.

The striking thing is that, for the first time in nearly a century, the U.S. began violating Ferguson’s Law last year. Annual defense spending—to be precise, national defense consumption expenditures and gross investment—was $1.107 trillion in 2024, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), while federal expenditure on interest payments (the government long ago gave up on paying down principal) topped out at $1.124 trillion.

These outlays can also be expressed as percentages of gross domestic product. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which uses a narrower definition of defense spending than the BEA, places it at 2.9% of GDP for last year. Net interest payments (adjusting for the interest received by bonds held by government agencies) amounted to 3.1%.

We have seen nothing like this since the era of isolationism. Between 1962 and 1989, U.S. defense spending averaged 6.4% of GDP; debt service was less than a third of that at 1.8%. Even after the end of the Cold War, the federal government was still spending, on average, roughly twice as much on national security as on interest on the debt.

The fact that the U.S. is currently projected to spend a rising share of its GDP on interest payments and a falling share on defense means that American power is much more fiscally constrained than most people realize. By 2049, according to the CBO’s latest long-term budget projection, net interest payments on the federal debt will have risen to 4.9% of GDP. If defense spending maintains its recent share of discretionary spending, it will amount to half that share of GDP.

Nor is there any real possibility that defense spending will increase dramatically. Because such spending is discretionary, it has to be appropriated by Congress every year, unlike spending on entitlement programs (which is mandatory) and interest payments (nonpayment of which would be default). If anything, budgetary constraints are likely to put downward pressure on defense spending in the decades ahead.

Read more here:

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/debt-has-always-been-the-ruinof-great-powers-is-the-u-s-next-02f16402

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/debt-has-always-been-the-ruinof-great-powers-is-the-u-s-next-02f16402

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.pressreader.com/spain/el-economista/20250222/page/3/textview

Acceso a la vivienda aún más difícil

https://www.eleconomista.es/vivienda-inmobiliario/noticias/13232111/02/25/vicalvaro-y-villaverde-unicos-reductos-de-la-vivienda-de-obra-nueva-y-barata-en-madrid.html

Saludos.

[Cadavre Exquis]

https://www.pressreader.com/spain/el-economista/20250222/page/47/textview

La verdadera vivienda asequible tiene inquilino o está okupada

Saludos.