PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[Cadavre Exquis]

Jaime Palomera · 2025.12.27 · ¿Se puede prohibir comprar pisos para especular?

Saludos.

[grillo35]

Jaime Palomera · 2025.12.27 · ¿Se puede prohibir comprar pisos para especular?

[/center]

Saludos.

Min 8:20: "la propuesta actual deja algunos agujeros importantes"...nos ha jodido! pues claro que se dejan "algunos agujeros": con eso ya vale para que en las grandes capitales, donde la oferta es escasísima (y es imposible aumentarla, recordémoslo), los precios no bajen un ápice. 

[Derby]

https://www.ft.com/content/2d9ed75f-b149-4c1a-917a-1215dde5718e

China’s cash-strapped local governments drive record sales of asset-backed securities

ABS issues bring in badly needed money but some assets are of uncertain quality



Chinese offerings of asset-backed securities have hit a record high this year as cash-strapped local governments struggle to plug fiscal holes.

The number of deals in China involving sales of ABS — financial instruments based on the revenue streams of an underlying pool of assets such as property rentals or leases — reached 2,386 as of December 24, surpassing the previous record set in 2021, according to data provider Wind.

The rise in deals this year was driven by authorities at the provincial level and below, said a Chinese broker who advises companies on ABS issuance.

The value of new ABS deals in the country has totalled $2.3tn, the highest in four years, the Wind data shows.

Highly indebted local governments hope the sales will help solve liquidity problems stemming from a weakened economy and property market crisis and raise money for new investments to help them meet central government growth targets.

But the rush to securitise assets — some of which appear to have highly uncertain underlying value — is itself fuelling questions about the long-term sustainability of Chinese local government finances.

Such is the need for liquidity that one local leader, Li Dianxun, governor of central Hubei province, has coined the slogan: “Turn every possible state-owned resource into an asset, every possible state-owned asset into a security, and leverage all possible state-owned funds.”


A former flood management complex in Wuhan has been turned into a wedding centre, in line with calls to turn ‘every possible state-owned resource into an asset’ © Gilles Sabrié/FT


Another Wuhan state-owned group sold asset-backed securities based on a previously struggling property development, the Hongshan AI Building, for Rmb300mn ($42.6mn) © Gilles Sabrié/FT

“This emerging campaign reflects the surging need for local governments to address mounting debt and fiscal pressures,” said Yubin Fu, vice-president and senior analyst at Moody’s Ratings.

China’s local governments have been under pressure since the Covid-19 pandemic, which devastated their finances. A crackdown by the central government in Beijing on property developer leverage has also hit land sales that were previously a crucial source of revenue for provincial and city authorities.

Local governments’ official debt plus borrowings by their off-balance sheet financing vehicles — which raise money and build infrastructure on their behalf — soared to about 84 per cent of GDP in 2024 from 62 per cent in 2019, according to IMF figures released last year. 




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   https://www.ft.com/content/2d9ed75f-b149-4c1a-917a-1215dde5718e

   Beijing has helped settle local government financing vehicles’ maturing debt and improve liquidity conditions through a $1.4tn debt swap scheme, but liabilities associated with these vehicles remain vast at about $10tn, analysts say.

“Beijing wants to press the local governments to monetise their state assets to make them more efficient,” said Robin Xing, chief China economist with Morgan Stanley. “A lot of local governments do have state assets, but many of these are not running in the most efficient way to make money.”

Repackaging these holdings as asset-backed securities is attractive to local authorities, since it can bring forward the income they are expected to generate in the future while retaining state ownership.



Hubei’s Li spearheaded efforts to convert idle assets into cash in his previous role as deputy governor of neighbouring Hunan province. Under his leadership, Hunan began repurposing spaces under bridges and other unused properties as public amenities such as parking areas and sports grounds.

From 2022 to 2024, Li’s programme contributed nearly 11 per cent of Hunan’s total fiscal revenues, according to official data.

By the end of last year, Hubei had compiled an inventory of state assets that could possibly be securitised worth Rmb21.5tn ($3.06tn). Southern Guangdong province and central Anhui have also compiled inventories. 

While local authority ABSs offer investors — mainly government-backed institutions such as banks, wealth management funds and securities traders — an implicit state guarantee, analysts have raised concerns about the quality of the underlying assets.

“All the high-quality assets were largely sold or securitised early on, leaving mostly lower-quality assets. With local government finances under pressure, authorities are exploring every possible avenue to reduce debt,” said the Chinese broker. 

The government-owned public transport group in Hubei’s capital Wuhan, for instance, early this year sold a first Rmb600mn tranche of a planned total of Rmb4bn in securities backed by assets of the company that operates all regular bus routes in the city.


Some of the assets of the lossmaking company that runs regular bus services in Wuhan have been securitised © Gilles Sabrié/FT

But the bus company is making a net loss, which deepened to Rmb821mn in the first half of 2025 from Rmb13mn for all of last year. The 10-year notes are already trading 5 per cent below their face value.

Another Wuhan state-owned group sold asset-backed securities based on a previously struggling property development, the Hongshan AI Building, for Rmb300mn last year. The group claimed that by adding unspecified artificial intelligence features it had changed the tower from a building with 30 per cent occupancy to an AI centre with three times as many tenants — including 60 AI companies.

When the Financial Times visited the address, office workers in the building said they could not identify new features that made it particularly suited to AI.

The tenants included several state-owned companies that had been relocated to the Hongshan building from other parts of a surrounding industrial park. There was also a tech company whose staff were mostly engaged in censoring posts on Kuaishou, a short-video online platform, work that is generally regarded as low-skilled.

In another case, the Wuhan city government-owned Bishui Group turned a former underground flood chamber into a wedding centre — the kind of move that fits Li’s programme of “turning every possible state-owned resource into an asset”.

The facility includes a “Monet Park” by the riverside for banquets and a Tang Dynasty-style reception hall underground.

hotlink image hosting

Analysts said that for local governments, tapping the ABS market offers a new funding channel as China’s slow domestic economy makes it ever more difficult to raise money.

But there is also a risk that if low-quality projects are securitised, they could become another source of financial vulnerability for local governments that Beijing has spent huge sums bailing out.  

At the Hubei marriage facility, for instance, there were no customers in sight in the vast facility during a recent visit. Marriages in Hubei are falling, reflecting a broader demographic decline across the country.

“The peak time was before 2022,” said a photographer from the wedding photo studio. “Now after Covid and weak consumption, people are less inclined to spend lavishly on weddings.”

[Derby]

https://www.baha.com/Trump-US-may-have-become-the-REAL-UN/news/details/65404135

Trump: US may have become the REAL UN

United States President Donald Trump claimed on Sunday that his country may have replaced the United Nations in its function as he and his administration stopped eight wars and conflicts since January.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump insisted that the UN "has been of very little assistance or help in any of them, including the disaster currently going on between Russia and Ukraine." He urged the organization to "start getting active and involved in WORLD PEACE!"

In the same post, Trump confirmed that Cambodia and Thailand will end their renewed hostilities immediately and "go back to living in PEACE, as per our recently agreed to original Treaty." "I want to congratulate both great leaders on their brilliance in coming to this rapid and very fair conclusion. It was FAST & DECISIVE, as all of these situations should be!" he concluded.

[Derby]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/overlooked-forces-may-herald-global-economic-realignment-by-dambisa-moyo-2025-12

Five Structural Trends Transforming the Global Economy, Dambisa Moyo

Amid rising instability, powerful demographic, technological, and financial forces are steering the global economy toward greater uncertainty. The best-prepared decision-makers will be those who recognize the stakes early and adjust accordingly.

LONDON – Slowing growth, escalating trade wars, tightening cross-border capital flows, and intensifying migration pressures have dominated news headlines – and for good reason. Together, these forces threaten to undermine multilateralism and accelerate the rise of blocs like the BRICS+ group of major emerging economies, setting the stage for a profound reordering of the global economy.

But five additional structural trends could prove equally, if not more, transformative. The first is demographic change. While the world’s population is projected to peak at around 10.3 billion by the mid-2080s, that headline figure obscures powerful underlying shifts. The global population is aging rapidly, and with the ratio of working-age individuals to retirees expected to fall from 9.4 in 1997 to just 3.9 by 2050, pension systems and public finances are set to come under growing strain.

To be sure, population trends differ dramatically across countries. India has overtaken China as the world’s most populous country, while China’s population – now about 1.4 billion – is expected to drop below 750 million by 2100. Italy’s population is projected to fall from 60 million to 27 million over the same period, and Japan’s could plummet from 128 million to 53 million. Nigeria’s population, by contrast, is set to triple to 791 million, making it the world’s second-most populous country after India.

The economic and geopolitical consequences could be profound. Hundreds of millions of people across the developing world are expected to enter the workforce over the next quarter-century, just as many advanced economies face long-term demographic decline. The widening gap will intensify labor and economic pressures, fueling migration at a time when global systems are already grappling with record levels of displacement.

These demographic shifts will also alter global consumption patterns, particularly when it comes to energy and foodstuffs. India may be more populous than China, but China’s per capita income – roughly $13,300, nearly five times that of India – suggests that population growth is shifting toward lower-income economies consuming lower-value goods.

The second structural trend is AI-driven labor-market disruption. While the AI super-cycle promises to boost productivity and growth, it could also displace millions of workers, particularly those in routine jobs involving repetitive tasks. Although economists’ projections vary, even conservative estimates point to the emergence of a jobless underclass, with serious social and macroeconomic consequences.

Moreover, if AI-driven growth disproportionately benefits capital over labor, inequality will increase, and governments will come under pressure to intervene. Consequently, corporations – particularly the tech sector – may face higher tax burdens to fund welfare programs, including universal basic income.

The third structural trend involves natural-resource constraints, which threaten to slow economic growth and widen geopolitical rifts. Copper, for example, is already in structural deficit, and the International Energy Agency warns of a 30% shortfall by 2035 without significant investment in new mining projects. Other critical inputs like lithium, nickel, and cobalt face similar supply pressures, raising the risk of severe shortages that could cripple battery manufacturing and derail the clean-energy transition.

Water scarcity is another major resource constraint. Roughly 25% of global agriculture takes place in high-water-stress areas, leaving food systems vulnerable to shortages and price spikes. And because water is also essential for data-center cooling and semiconductor manufacturing, rapid AI adoption will further strain supplies.

Fourth, risk appetite in the United States has risen sharply, fueling a new wave of speculative investment. In contrast to the European Union, the US regulatory environment continues to encourage greater risk-taking among both retail and institutional investors. As a result, stock markets remain near historic highs, with the S&P 500 price-to-earnings (PE) ratio at about 30x – far above the historical average. Investors are also pouring more money into private equity, private credit, venture capital, cryptocurrencies, meme coins, and gold (which has climbed by more than 50% over the past year).

The surge in short-term speculation is unlikely to slow, as baby boomers are projected to pass an estimated $100 trillion to younger generations by 2048. This massive intergenerational wealth transfer will inject more investment capital into financial markets, inflating asset prices, even as the sheer volume of savings puts downward pressure on real interest rates.

The influx of new capital carries significant risks. Leveraged bets are increasingly routed through the shadow-banking system, far from regulatory oversight, creating vulnerabilities that could spill over into the real economy. The migration of credit activity from traditional banks weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy. Even if the Federal Reserve lowers interest rates, those cuts may never reach borrowers, limiting policymakers’ ability to stimulate growth.

Lastly, heightened risk aversion in the United Kingdom and Europe is becoming a structural problem in its own right. For decades, Europe’s growth prospects have been weighed down by bureaucratic hurdles, stringent regulatory requirements, and fragmented capital markets. The numbers speak for themselves: venture-capital investment in the US is typically 8-10 times higher than in the EU, and about 70% of eurozone households say they are unwilling to take financial risks, compared with fewer than 40% of Americans.

London’s stock market underscores the depth of this financial malaise. In the first half of 2025, companies raised just £160 million ($214 million) in London listings – a 30-year low – pushing the City out of the world’s top 20 IPO markets. UK pension funds have also reduced their domestic equity allocation from 53% to 6% over the past 25 years, shrinking the pool of capital available to British companies.

This is not simply a financial problem, as Europe’s diminishing economic role is eroding its long-term competitiveness. Without a dramatic shift, the continent risks missing the AI super cycle and becoming a technology colony rather than a driver of innovation.

Each of these five structural trends could transform the global economy – redrawing trade routes, redirecting investment flows, altering the distribution and pricing of key foodstuffs and critical minerals, and forcing governments to rethink supply-chain management, capital allocation, and cross-border investment. The best-prepared decision-makers will be those who recognize the stakes early and adjust accordingly.

[sudden and sharp]

https://www.baha.com/Trump-US-may-have-become-the-REAL-UN/news/details/65404135

Trump: US may have become the REAL UN

United States President Donald Trump claimed on Sunday that his country may have replaced the United Nations in its function as he and his administration stopped eight wars and conflicts since January.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump insisted that the UN "has been of very little assistance or help in any of them, including the disaster currently going on between Russia and Ukraine." He urged the organization to "start getting active and involved in WORLD PEACE!"

In the same post, Trump confirmed that Cambodia and Thailand will end their renewed hostilities immediately and "go back to living in PEACE, as per our recently agreed to original Treaty." "I want to congratulate both great leaders on their brilliance in coming to this rapid and very fair conclusion. It was FAST & DECISIVE, as all of these situations should be!" he concluded.

Madre mía, "Los dioses ciegan a quienes quieren perder"...



... igual se queda corta.

[neutron_mortgages]

La presidenta de Casa 47: harán falta 5 años para ver un impacto importante en los precios de la vivienda https://share.google/ZetqhZzVQwZQlVf8f

A mi esto me demuestra que el PSOE no está haciendo lo que Asustadísimos espera de él, sino todo lo contrario, mantener el mecanismo de extracción de rentas sine die -5 años es como decir indefinidamente-. Por tanto, no cumple el rol de la socialdemocracia de amortiguar las contradicciones.

Esa falsedad del discurso de asustadisimos quedó clara hace mucho, mucho tiempo. El PSOE no es lo q nos quiere vender, ni de lejos.

[Derby]

https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/powerful-headwinds-facing-global-economy-in-2026-by-kenneth-rogoff-2025-12

Expect Turbulent Asset Markets in 2026, Kenneth Rogoff

After three years of extraordinary returns, investors should start worrying about the inevitable crash that follows periods of sustained euphoria. But while the odds of a major market correction in the next few years appear uncomfortably high, heading for the exits now could be premature.

CAMBRIDGE – The biggest surprise of the past year is not that global asset prices have risen so sharply but that investors have shown so little concern about risk, apart from a brief scare following US President Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement in April. The question now is whether 2026 will break the spell.

One might expect that, after three years of extraordinary returns, markets would start worrying about the inevitable crash that follows periods of sustained euphoria. AI may be full of promise (at least for firms, if not always for workers), but the long history of transformative technologies – from railroads and internal combustion engines to the internet – has been marked by booms and busts. Early entrants often collapse spectacularly, only to be replaced later by second-generation firms that “get it right.” And while a few companies may come to dominate, as IBM once did in computing, that does little to reduce uncertainty, since longevity is never guaranteed.

As investors struggle to assess how AI will affect growth and corporate profits, the odds of a global stock-market crash in the next few years appear uncomfortably high. Does that mean it is time to sell? Not necessarily, as stock prices can continue to rise long after warning signs start flashing red. That is what happened in 1996, when then-Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan – drawing on the work of future Nobel laureate Robert J. Shiller – warned of the stock market’s “irrational exuberance.” Greenspan and Shiller were ultimately proven right, but their timing was off: the dot-com bubble did not burst until March 2000, after stocks had more than doubled.

The same thing could easily happen now. Yet the pressures on the system are becoming increasingly harder to ignore as we head into 2026, starting with the geopolitical uncertainty looming over the global economy. Even if Ukraine and Russia reach a ceasefire agreement, Europe’s eastern frontier will probably continue to simmer for years. Meanwhile, China is expanding its naval fleet at a breathtaking pace, and no matter how many drones the United States plans to buy – one million, if recent reports are to be believed – China will almost certainly produce more, and better, ones.

Then there is Trump, whose return to the White House has been deeply disruptive. Health permitting, he is likely to be just as ambitious – or heavy-handed, depending on who you ask – in 2026 as he was in 2025.

Trump’s predecessor, Joe Biden, also presented himself as a transformative president in the mold of Franklin Roosevelt, but his macroeconomic policies were largely predictable, aside from his perplexing open-borders approach. The policy debate during his term centered on whether his agenda would boost GDP growth or drive up consumer prices.

With Trump, by contrast, each day brings a new surprise, setting the stage for an extended period of policy volatility. Adding to the uncertainty is the end of Jerome Powell’s term as Fed chair. Trump has made it abundantly clear that he expects Powell’s successor to cut interest rates, even at the risk of stoking inflation.

Trying to capitalize on volatility turned out to be a losing proposition in 2025, as many investment products that claimed to offer insurance against sharp market swings failed to deliver. The coming year is shaping up to be far riskier, as global indebtedness and equity valuations are increasingly out of line with economic fundamentals.

Moreover, the negative impact of Trump’s tariff and immigration policies will be felt more acutely in 2026. Structural reforms typically take years to bear fruit, which is why politicians often avoid them despite the long-term payoff. But this reality cuts both ways: dismantling or undermining key reforms can inflict serious long-term damage, even if the short-term effects seem benign. As markets begin to sense that growth is slowing, possibly accompanied by rising inflation, today’s euphoria could quickly fade.

The European Union faces its own moment of truth in 2026. The best-case scenario would be a decisive move toward a fiscal union, at least among a subset of member states. Failing that, any serious reform will require major treaty changes, beginning with the elimination of the unanimity rule that paralyzes the bloc’s decision-making. Imagine if the US could pass laws or wage war only with the unanimous consent of California, Mississippi, and Texas. As I argue in my recent book Our Dollar, Your Problem, should Europe finally get its geopolitical act together, the euro could play a much larger role in global finance.

Japan is another wildcard. No one knows how far the Bank of Japan will go in raising interest rates or how quickly the unwinding of the yen carry trade – whereby investors borrow in yen to invest in higher-yielding assets, fueling the surge in global prices – will unfold.

One potential stabilizing factor is the likely depreciation of the dollar, which remains substantially overvalued despite modest declines against some of America’s main trading partners in 2025. A weaker dollar tends to support global stability by making dollar-priced exports cheaper relative to domestic alternatives.

Still, there’s a high likelihood that investors will wake up on New Year’s Day to a far more volatile global economy than they experienced in 2025. And when that realization suddenly hits, don’t be surprised if the instability feeds on itself.