PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[pianista]

Las drogas o la corrupción política no son legales pero están permitidas.
El pisito es legal y su estafa es lo que ha votado la mayoría natural en cada una de las elecciones que ha habido. Al menos eso decía ppcc , que la política nacional autonómica local estaba diseñada para contentar a la mayoría natural pisitofilacreditofaga,,, por lo tanto, democrática.
Los capitalistitas se creen capitalistas y democratitas porque están protegidos y amparados por ambas fuerzas

[breades]

Tan legal y democrático como prohibir a los negros sentarse en el autobús hace 60 años.
En este punto solo el Capital puede organizar algo ya contra esta estafa, y lo hará para socavar (aún mas) el poder de un Estado, a todas luces inoperante... por democrático.
Que Dios nos coja confesados, porque vamos a caer en manos del mercado,
Los primeros en disfrutarlo, los que tengan sus ahorros en ladrillo.
La vida del proletario sin esperanza de sublimación debe ser jodida.

No me seas asustaviejas, que mira que te gusta.

El Capital sin Estado no puede prosperar. Es una de las grandes lecciones de la historia contemporanea. Realmente, quienes están hoy más seducidos por una idea de Estado mínimo tipo minarquista son los pisitófilos creditófagos, y aquí ya sabemos que son los próximos en caer.

Estados hay de muchos tipos (cada uno con sus ventajas, sus inconvenientes y sus formas de gobierno). Podemos plantarnos en una dictadura capitalista de fuerte planificación central como China, o en un liberalismo salvaje como EEUU. No se necesita una democracia para prosperar. De hecho estamos viendo en lo que se convierte la democracia cuando se pervierte, y es descorazonador.

No.

Estado sólo hay uno, pero hay muchos Gobiernos.

Otra prueba irrefutable de que no hay democracia es que los Gobiernos moldean el Estado a su imagen y semejanza. La oposición institucional que se encuentren será lo que te indique si hubo un corpus social capaz de establecer límites y contrapesos a la tiranía. La oposición de la calle mola mucho (sólo a veces) pero sirve de nada.

Por lo demás, una oclocracia como la nuestra (que no democracia) ha sido hiperútil para prosperar, pero a la inversa, sease: prohperah. No soy historiador ni economista, pero me atrevo a decir que nunca en la historia se ha dado un proceso de concentración de recursos en tan pocas manos como se ha dado durante el popularcapitalismo.

Es que somos imbéciles, emberdá.

Aunque el Capital sigue necesitando estabilidad (de Estado) para reproducrise. Es un hecho constatado por la historia.

[Derby]

https://unherd.com/2026/02/rubios-charm-conceals-a-brutal-truth/

Rubio’s charm conceals a brutal truth Europe is on  its own Wolfgang Munchau


‘Europeans hated Vance’s speech. Yet they loved Rubio’s.’ (Liesa Johannssen/ POOL/AFP/Getty)

What a difference a year makes. At this weekend’s Munich Security Conference, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was given a standing ovation for a speech that echoed what Vice President JD Vance had said so scandalously 12 months earlier. Rubio accused Europeans of trying “to appease a climate cult” that has impoverished the continent by forcing it to adopt catastrophic energy policies. Like Vance, he also criticised Europe’s immigration policies and its dogmatic commitment to global free trade, which he said has fuelled deindustrialisation and hollowed out supply chains. He even lamented the transfer of sovereignty to international organisations — a swipe not just at the UN and international legal bodies, but at the EU itself.

Europeans hated Vance’s speech. Yet they loved Rubio’s. The difference was tone. Unlike Vance, Rubio sugar-coated the message. “For us Americans,” he said, “home may be in the Western Hemisphere, but we will always be a child of Europe.” Europeans just love it when Americans show respect for their cultural heritage. It flatters their sense of pride — and superiority.

Europe is deluded, though. And when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen popped up to say she felt very much reassured, it reminded me of that old quip about diplomacy, often, probably wrongly, attributed to Winston Churchill: “Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions.”

In the 12 months between those two Munich speeches, the transatlantic relationship has changed beyond recognition. As Matthew Whitaker, US ambassador to Nato, put it so bluntly last week, “We want Europe to take over the conventional defence of the European continent.” The US may remain part of the Nato infrastructure. But the truth is that today we are home alone in Nato. Our old security guards are watching over someone else’s house.

Instead of accepting this new reality, Europe is convinced there will be a return to the status quo ante: President Donald Trump is deemed an aberration; once he is gone, transatlantic relations will return to normal. Only half of this is true. Trump is no doubt an aberration. And he will be gone in three years. But his security doctrine will endure.

For even though Trump, with his tweets and tariffs, can be unpredictable, Washington’s security policy is remarkably consistent. We know from the White House’s National Security Strategy that the Western Hemisphere — the Americas — is the priority. Asia comes second. Europe third. The US has no interest in getting out of Nato. The alliance still serves an important purpose for Washington — albeit a different one from Europe.

The US disengagement from European security is part of a broader game plan as it prepares for a worst-case scenario: a Chinese attack on Taiwan, coupled with a simultaneous Russian attack on western Europe and a North Korean attack on South Korea. If you think strategically about such a war scenario, it is clear that the US cannot simultaneously fight a war in east Asia and in Europe. Burden-sharing in the Nato alliance would require the Europeans to look after their own turf.

As a result, Washington is locking in material changes that will be difficult to reverse. For one thing, Europeans are receiving a higher allocation of jobs in Nato’s command structure, and all three regional commands will be led by Europeans. Germany and Poland will share command of Joint Force Command Brunssum — responsible for central and eastern Europe — on a rotational basis.

It has, in any case, been the policy of successive US administrations, both Republican and Democrat, to push Europeans — or “free-riders” as Obama termed it — into shouldering a greater defence burden. But these efforts were repeatedly frustrated by Europe’s dishonest commitments on defence spending targets. That lamentable state of affairs ended under Joe Biden when Russia invaded Ukraine. Europeans would be naive to think that even a pro-European Democrat in the White House would want to reverse this.

Nor should the Europeans have their heads turned by those Democrats at the Munich conference, notably Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Gavin Newsom, who encouraged them to stand up to Trump. I think this is bad advice. They are abusing the international stage for domestic politics. Most US governors and lawmakers are unaccustomed to thinking in terms of foreign policy strategy until the moment they meet their security advisers and chiefs of staff in the White House Situation Room for the first time.

But as they move through the stages of grief over the death of the transatlantic relationship, the Europeans are struggling. They are not yet ready to accept this new world. Just look at the mess they created over Ukraine. Richard Shirreff, who served as Nato’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has castigated Europe and Canada for failing to develop and implement a strategy to support Ukraine. He wants the Europeans to distance themselves from the US, and organise their own defence, the very opposite of Mark Rutte’s “Trump whisperer” approach. Rutte later defended his attitude to “daddy”, telling the European Parliament: “If anyone thinks here … that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming.” While this is indeed a fair description of the status quo, I also think that Rutte’s desperate attempt to keep the US in its current role as Europe’s lord protector is a disaster.

“As they move through the stages of grief over the death of the transatlantic relationship, the Europeans are struggling.”

I am not going to rule out the possibility that the Europeans will eventually measure up to the challenge and take responsibility for their own security. But right now that looks unlikely. The main issue is not defence spending, but how we organise our mutual defence. And that is hopelessly inefficient. Each European country has its own command structure. Everybody has their own procurement policy. Many have their own weapons systems. The European Nato countries have 10 different battle tanks in operation; the US has one. The Europeans have different fighter aircraft, air defence systems, and howitzers.

The consequences of such fragmentation are costly. According to analysis by Bain, the average cost of 155mm ammunition is around $4,000, whereas the Russians pay $1,000 for 152mm shells. The figures are not strictly comparable, but they do indicate the scale of Europe’s disadvantage. To match Russia’s defence spending, we would have to spend four times as much as they do. Similar numbers also apply to other categories of defence spending. Simply increasing budgets without centralising procurement would be a waste of money.

The Europeans have started to increase their defence spending. But they are not willing to abandon their cherished sovereignty in favour of a common procurement policy, let alone a common command structure. Without that, I cannot see how Europe’s efforts to become self-reliant can conceivably succeed. Some of the largest European countries, like France, have no fiscal capacity left. Consolidation and pooling of procurement is the only low-hanging fruit. If your enemy has a one-to-four cost advantage over you, you will lose. Even if we turned ourselves into a war economy, we would struggle to buy what they can buy.

Right now, France and Germany care more about their own domestic defence industries and reject the pooling of defence procurement. The only scenario where I can see this changing is one in which such a decision were forced upon them through a war: it’s hardly one we should wish for.

This is why the situation is so bloody dangerous. We have exited one dysfunctional security framework, but we have yet to enter a new one. We are stuck between two worlds. Anything could happen.

Economists like to describe such scenarios — which concern three desirable but incompatible goals — using the metaphor of impossible triangles. Here is one for defence: a reduced American contribution to Europe’s conventional defence; a European reluctance to pool defence procurement and weapons systems; and a high degree of security. The first of these three — the US withdrawal from Europe’s defence — has become a reality. Europe must now reconcile the remaining two.

The Americans have just sent the Europeans to hell. And the Europeans are asking for directions.

[Derby]

piso que no pensaba vender sino poner en alquiler -a precio estratosférico-, y no vender nunca, ya que -palabras textuales-, un piso en esa zona es un cheque al portador, y solo puede subir.

La gente está muy desinformada...lo veo a diario. La renta de ese piso está topada por el índice de precios de alquiler o por el último contrato de alquiler vigente en los últimos cinco años. Y sí, muchos compran primero el piso y luego se informan de la rentabilidad. Más adelante vienen los lloros por la obligación del propietario de conservación del piso.

Edito para añadir que la Agència de l'Habitatge ya está resolviendo expedientes sancionadores por incumplimiento de la normativa de contención de rentas e imponiendo multas de a partir de 3.000€. Han dictado una nueva circular con criterios interpretativos y se mantienen firmes en una interpretación estricta de la normativa. Por ejemplo, en el caso de alquiler de temporada para finalidad vacacional (único caso que elude la contención de rentas) habrá que aportar junto al contrato, al depositar la fianza en Incasol (organismo oficial para el depósito de fianzas), un certificado de empadronamiento del inquilino en su domicilio habitual; para acreditar que el inquilino tiene un domicilio habitual que no es la vivienda arrendada con carácter temporal.

[senslev]

https://www.reuters.com/business/canadian-housing-starts-drop-15-january-2026-02-16/

TORONTO, Feb 16 (Reuters) - Canadian housing starts fell more than expected in January, dropping 15% from the previous month, data from the national housing agency showed on Monday.
The seasonally adjusted annualized rate of housing starts declined to 238,049 units from a revised 280,668 units in December, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) said. Economists had expected starts to fall to 257,500.

[senslev]

https://x.com/AleJacintoUrang/status/2023335000750584126?s=20

Alejandra Jacinto
@AleJacintoUrang

¿Quién hay detrás del anuncio de “ particular: compro piso” que aparece cada mañana en el parabrisas de tu coche?