Hablemos de Europa

[lectorhinfluyente1984]

Ya ganó a los alemanes en la primera entrega, tiene experiencia.

[burbunova]

[...]

Le hice notar que esa línea de pensamiento era la que habían alimentado los mass-media durante el último mes, que era ridículamente germanófoba, que era un pensamiento que bebía del orgullo nacionalista y que si quería protestar contra la austeridad igual debería protestar delante de la sede del PSOE/PP, del Congreso o del Banco de España. Ni los alemanes ni la Troika nos habían metido en esto; nos habíamos metido solitos y con actitudes como las que se vivían aquellos días en la sociedad española sólo se defendía a los responsables directos del descalabro.

Pues se cabreó muchísimo. Me empezó a hablar de una conspiración del capital y no sé qué más historias para hacernos súbditos de Frankfurt y del EEUU. Allí lo vi claro: los culpables ya no es que fueran anónimos, es que eran organizaciones abstractas de las que él conocía poco o nada. Pero joder, ¡qué útiles eran para descargar la ira!

[...]

Y se repite el cuento: antes conspiraciones "masónicas e izquiedistas", ahora un "complot desde Frankfurt"

! No longer available	Small | Large

Día de la marmota.

[juancoco]

Sabes que mi post es humorístico y satírico, ¿verdad?

Luego de un sesudo análisis, de leerme todas las transcripciones de eurogrupo, los informes del FMI, BM y en base a mis modelos, la conclusión es que todo este berenjenal de Grecia es porque Varoufakis liga mucho y el resto de los ministros de economía no, por eso lo excluyeron de las reuniones. Es que cuando salían por Estrasburgo de noche todas las chicas querían ir en su moto y los demás no se comían un rosco. Y encima en las cenas cuando los demás ministros veían a su mujer no hacían mas que cabrearse mas y mas.  Entenderéis que así no se puede negociar,  por allí si que no estaban dispuestos a pasar. Es que todo tiene un límite.....habrase visto.

....que se habrá creído el Varoufakis ese.
...comunista

[muyuu]

"I'm just a poor boy, nobody loves me. He's just a poor boy from a poor family, Spare him his life from this monstrosity. Easy come, easy go, will you let me go?"

[muyuu]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/07/01/the-forgotten-origins-of-greeces-terrible-crisis-will-make-you-think-twice-about-whos-to-blame/

The forgotten origins of Greece’s crisis will make you think twice about who’s to blame

Stop me if you’ve heard this one.

[foto de Merkel con una jarra de cerveza]

The Greeks, Italians, Spaniards and Irish walk into a bar, where the French and Germans are the bartenders. It’s happy hour, and the Germans and the French are serving half-price drinks. Although everyone quickly drinks too much, the bartenders keep on serving. Eventually, the inebriated customers head home and get into all kinds of trouble -- fights, car accidents, some broken windows.

So who’s to blame? Clearly, the Greeks shouldn’t have drunk so much. However, the French and Germans also shouldn’t have served the Greeks when they were clearly drunk -- especially if the French and Germans mind having broken glass in their neighborhood.

Unfortunately, this isn’t much of a joke. After an extended binge, Greece is now mired in financial crisis and is dragging the European economy down with it. In the last few days, Greece has defaulted on a important payment to the IMF and shuttered its banks to prevent massive flows of money from leaving the country. On Sunday, the country is slated to hold a referendum on whether to approve tough austerity measures demanded by Europe -- a decision that could determine whether Greece will stay in the euro zone.

Some of the reasons for the crisis are obvious to anyone who looks. Greece has a lot of well-recognized economic problems: Its public sector is bloated and marred by corruption, and many analysts say that the country cooked its books to hide the real amount of debt from the rest of Europe.


[vídeo]


There are also many well-documented problems stemming from the design of the euro zone itself – that the countries share a common currency even though they have different tax-and-spending policies. So that means that even though Greek workers aren’t as economically competitive as Germans, Greece can’t lower the value of its currency to make its products cheaper abroad and stimulate exports.

The same holds true for inflation, where Greece might benefit from a higher inflation rate that would make debt in today's prices become cheaper, while Germany has a historic unease with any policy that might stimulate inflation.

The deeper origins
There are some other ideas about the deeper origins of the Greek crisis that you may be less familiar with.

Once the Greeks joined the euro in 2002, they could borrow at very cheap rates given they were now borrowing under the continent's implicit guarantee, and they dramatically over-borrowed.

"But given that there was high growth, no one was really worried about it,” says Matthias Matthijs, a professor at Johns Hopkins University SAIS and co-editor of the new book, “The Future of the Euro," who relayed the bar metaphor.

Between 1998 and 2007, Greece's annual economic growth per person was 3.8 percent -- the second fastest rate in Europe.

But there were weaknesses within.  The booming economy in Greece and other countries such as Ireland and Spain caused prices to rise, and the countries gave generous pay rises to their workers, which made their exports more expensive. That made the countries less competitive, but since they were growing so fast, it didn't matter too much.

Then the financial crisis hit. As economic growth slowed, these countries’ competitive weaknesses and unsustainable debt loads suddenly became glaringly obvious.

“It’s when the tide goes out that you see who’s swimming naked,” Matthijs says.


[fotos]

The lesser known story

Matthijs says there is a lesser known narrative he finds more compelling. Basically, he says, it helps to explain why the bartenders kept on serving.

In the mid-1990s, even before it came into existence, markets made a huge bet that the euro would be a reality. Specifically, investors, many in northern Europe, bet that interest rates in northern and southern Europe would converge. At the time, interest rates in southern Europe were much higher than in northern Europe, simply because people thought investing in countries like Greece was much riskier than investing in countries like Germany.

In anticipation of the euro zone, investors put lots of money in the cheap, high-yielding bonds of southern Europe. That helped to drive down yields and fueled borrowing and an economic boom in southern countries.

Ultimately, investors were right – Greek interest rates on 10-year bonds fell from around 20 percent in the early 1990s to only 3 percent in 2002. “They made a lot of money in the north betting against higher interest rates there. That fueled the boom, before the euro came, that overheated these economies."

As economies overheated, it’s not a surprise that their competitiveness suffered, says Matthijs.



In short, many in the north pushed for a financial regime that didn't fit the Greek economy, because they personally stood to benefit. Many rightly blame the Greeks for its current crisis, but some of the blame belongs farther north as well, he argues.

Matthijs compares the situation to the U.S. subprime crisis. Who was really at fault for the housing crisis in the U.S.: The subprime borrowers who bought houses they couldn’t afford, or the predatory lenders who encouraged them to take them out?

“The Germans don’t like that comparison. But they were greedy. They wanted the higher yielding bonds there, they wanted to invest there,” he says of southern Europe.

  jeje el final...

[R.G.C.I.M.]

Enesima vuelta del tiovivo.

Desde el 2000 España se lleva toda la pasta del interbancario para ladrillos.
Grecia mintio y es un pozo corrupto.
España esta plagada de triunfadores generacionales y perdedores.
La deuda española era privada y ahora es publica tambien.
La griega era publica.
Los sintomas de embraguez fueron los que cortaron el alcohol en el bar, con el 5,5 del BCE y el frenazo.
Hasta entonces no rompian nada sino que cantaban.

El vecindario esta destrozado, pero NHD para pagar los deztrozos; habra que pagarlos en el FUTURO.

Para poderlos pagar en el futuro, la unica solucion es hacerlo generando surplus porque ahora NHD.
Para generar ese surplus es NECESARIO tener las cuentas equilibradas.
Sin cuentas equilibradas, todo apaño sera mas acohol para reconstruirt mientras vamos borrachos.

LA MUTUALIZACION SERA, PERO ANTES DEBE SER EL EQUILIBRIO DE CUENTAS.

Y eso es todo amigos.
N o hay mas, ni dinero tampoco.

Por cierto;
Islandia 300.000hb.
Chipre 1,4 mill hb.
Irlanda 4,5 mill hb.
Grecia 11 mill hb.


Portugal 11 mill hb.
España 45 mill.
Italia 60 mill.
...

Sds.

[sudden and sharp]

Matthijs compares the situation to the U.S. subprime crisis. Who was really at fault for the housing crisis in the U.S.: The subprime borrowers who bought houses they couldn’t afford, or the predatory lenders who encouraged them to take them out?

De todos los que no intervinieron para nada en todo ese asunto. Por eso ahora deben pagarlo todo a escote. Lo hemos hablado mil veces.

[muyuu]

http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/02/imf-greece-needs-extra-50bn-euros

IMF says Greece needs extra €50bn in funds and debt relief

The International Monetary Fund has electrified the referendum debate in Greece after it conceded that the crisis-ridden country needs €50bn (£35bn or $55bn) of extra funds over the next three years and large-scale debt relief to create “a breathing space” and stabilise the economy.

With three days to go before a knife-edge referendum, the IMF revealed a deep split with Europe as it warned that Greece’s debts were “unsustainable”.

Fund officials said they would not be prepared to put a proposal for a third Greek bailout package to the Washington-based organisation’s board unless it included both a commitment to economic reform and debt relief.


Live Greek crisis: IMF says country needs €50bn more and debt relief - live
Greece’s finance minister tells Bloomberg TV he’d rather cut his arm off than agree to a deal without debt restructuring
 Read more


According to the IMF, Greece should have a 20-year grace period before making any debt repayments and that final payments should not take place until 2055.

The IMF’s analysis will be seized upon by Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, who has been insisting that he will only agree to tough new austerity measures if Greece is granted debt relief.

In a strong message to European leaders, the IMF said they would need to find extra money for Greece following the marked deterioration in the state of the economy since Tsipras’s Syriza coalition took over at the start of the year.

“Very signficant changes in policies and in the outlook since early this year have resulted in a substantial increase in financing needs. Altogether, under the package proposed by the institutions to the Greek authorities, these needs are projected to reach about €50bn from October 2015 to the end of 2018, requiring new European money of at least €36bn over the three-year period.

[2 años]

El problema puede ser que los Griegos han hecho los recortes y ahora les tocaría mutualización (o casi), pero como van los primeros destacados y el resto aún no hemos hecho los deberes les andan mamoneado para que los que quedan no pretendan saltarse el mal rato.

En cualquier caso lo que están pidiendo es un cambio de políticas porque sólo recortando no están saliendo del hoyo, y como ya han dicho por aquí, poquito más pueden austerizar.

Si esto es así, desde mi punto de vista hacen bien en pelearlo.

Y en la eterna pelea entre responsabilidades, mi opinión es que el deudor y el acreedor son responsables, ambos, el % de responsabilidad es lo que se puede discutir.

Ea.

[CHOSEN]

- La deuda contraída es impagable por definición y traerá consigo una crisis de impagados si o si.

Se que entramos en el terreno de la dialéctica pero los memes, de usarse, han de ser ciertos.
La deuda es cobrable por definición.
De hecho, un instante infinitesimal antes de que se convirtiese en incobrable, el prestamista cierra el grifo. Fíjate hasta que punto esto es cierto, que en Grecia están llegando a ese punto... AHORA!!! 

Es decir, todo lo anterior o es cobrable, o está descontado en los intereses del préstamo.
Por lo tanto, la deuda es pagable hasta el punto en que el prestamista estima que es pagable, el prestamista descuenta las probabilidades del impago a la hora de darte dinero (de ahí la prima de riesgo).
Desconozco de donde ha salido el meme de la deuda impagable pero es a todas luces incierto.

¿ Por que en Grecia no se hizo un referendum a la hora de endeudarse ?

Es que aunque se hubiera hecho... habría salido que si.
Diré mas: mi abuela no tiene porqué estar votando en referéndums cada 3 semanas, y mucho menos sobre cuestiones en las que es reconocidamente y a todas luces ignorante.
Salvo que quramos que las amas de casa empiecen a votar sobre como hay que realizar los bypass coronarios o si hay que vacunar a los niños. Cada día me escaman más las invocaciones al pueblo.

ante las formidables montañas de deuda impagable creada en el mundo y que nada tienen que ver con producir.

Perdoname amigo juancoco, pero estamos en el mismo caso de antes.
La deuda está asegurada.
Y detrás del seguro hay otro. Y luego otro. Y así hasta que el último seguro estima que no puede asegurar más. Y al final del toda esta cadena, encontramos una Sociedad Anónima donde los socios sólo responden del capital aportado.
Y a partir de ahí ya no hay más. Cero. Null.
Habría que acabar con el constructo llamado "sociedad de responsabilidad limitada" para acabar con el supuesto problema de deuda. Es decir: la solución propuesta al problema del capitalismo, es el anticapitalismo.
Pues para eso no hace falta tantas alforjas.
Digamos que preferimos un sistema comunista donde la deuda como tal no existe al ser asumida íntegramente por el Estado, y acabamos antes.

Que manda cojones, nadie niega que esa deuda se haya adquirido pero con toda la tranquilidad del mundo se dice que es impagable... 

Las deudas impagables son como los billetes de 500.
Se habla ed ellas pero pocos las tienen. Y cuando las tienen, las esconden. Por algo será.
(Fusión deudor-acreedor)

[saturno]

http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/12/12/graficos/1418410740_043679.html
En el gráfico de la deuda publica española que sube y baja, estaría bien comparar con la deuda privada.
- se vería la "socialización" de deuda privada ? (bancaria)
- pero, ¿es posible la comparación?

Sobre el articulo del http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/07/01/the-forgotten-origins-of-greeces-terrible-crisis-will-make-you-think-twice-about-whos-to-blame/
hay una cosa que se podría añadir, y que no consideramos

-- Los acreedores han prestado un dinero que previamente "extrajeron" de sus respectivas burbujas (Alemania es un caso especial, pero su supéravit europeo es lo mismo: una burbuja)
Es decir, los UE-27 están pidiendo a Grecia que respalde un dinero que, de no ser porque los Grecios lo sellaron, no exisitiría más que en un futuro hipotético. La ventaja de mantener contabilidades separadas, es que tienes un PIGS que hizo de primo, al ponerle fecha de devolución a una renta que -- de haber quedado dentro de cada contabilidad nacional -- no sería honrada porque supera la producción ordinaria.

Con Grecia, tenemos 27 esquemas rentistas nacionales, irreales, que una vez trasladados un esquemaa transnacional Grecia x (27UE) se pretende que sea real.

La relación entre UE-27 frente a GR reproduce exactamente el dilema de nuestras castuzas nacionales respecto de los laminados locales.

Por ejemplo, FR y ES extraen rentas inmobiliarias de sus propios mutilados. No es sostenible. Pero el valor del título de esa promesa a 10 o 20 años, se lo prestan a GR, y los Griegos lo convierten en un valor monetizable a 6 meses.

Igual con DE: Alemania se pone a producir con un supéravit que no es absorbible con cuentas nacionales. Pero al venderlo a préstamo a los PIGS, con contabilidades separadas, los Alemanes monetizan esa deuda como si fuese una exportación asumida por los PIGS.

El problema con Grecia es el mismo que para todos los rentismos extraordinarios:  para ser "monetizable" se necesita de un tercero como Grecia o los PIGS que le ponga fecha de realización. Sin ese tercero, los rentistas no podrían sostener el valor de las rentas extraidas sobre sus propios nacionales.

El rentismo funciona como si hubiera encontrado la piedra filosofal. Da igual lo que produzcas realmente, el papel de la promesa se convierte en oro, basta con encontrar un tercero que le ponga fecha de ejecución.

===

Bueno, mi tesis es la fusión contable. Pero hace falta una reforma constituyente de Europa, de forma que estas deudas "exteriores" extrañas (contabilidad separada, pero moneda común) se puedan tornar transferencias intracontinentales, es decir, un mecanismo de distribución de riqueza. Porque en el fondo, de eso se trataba, hasta que en los años 80 etc.

En esa perspectiva, la propuesta de Varoufakis es técnicamente correcta, y la propuesta de la U-27 (la de los gobiernos rentistas) no lo es.

Lo demás, es lucha mexicana, estoy de acuerdo. Pero se debe a que una parte pide union fiscal para beneficarse de la distribución, y la otra se niega a la union, porque supone declarar que las rentas extraidas a sus propios nacionales fueron abusivas. Prefieren seguir dando patadas adelante con Grecia interpuesta antes que asumir el hundimiento de su modelo extractivo.

¡Que son todos gobiernos del CP, gobiernos extractivos con los que hay que acabar y se resisten a morir!

Ambas partes tienen argumentos con parte de razón, pero técnicamente, la Modesta proposición me parece la única viable. NO seguirla, es reconocer que el rentismo, el CP fue un sistema economico legítimo, y viable.

Y no, el rentismo, sea bueno o malo, no fue legítimo, porque no estaba correlado al crecimiento real, que es la única verdad del porquero.

[muyuu]

http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=29815

The American/European divide on Greece

Is it just my imagination, or is there considerably more support for Greece in the US than in Europe?  As far as I can tell there is almost universal outrage in Europe over the recent actions of the Syriza government, except perhaps on the extreme left.  In contrast, I see significant support for Greece among US pundits.  Why? (Keep in mind that in most respects, opinion in Europe is well to the left of mainstream opinion in the US.)  Here are some possibilities:

1.  Framing effects.  In this recent article, Anne Roiphe indicated that at an emotional level she found herself sympathizing with the escaped convicts in New York, even though the logical side of her mind knew they were not deserving of sympathy.

"""Don’t say it. I know that is a daydream without a shred of reality. This is not the way a grown up woman should think. And yet this Jewish woman, if honest, admits that the hunted and the chased evoke her worry, and the power of the state is not always benign, and that the day I loose my faint wish that these convicts or the next ones escape captivity is the day I loose my Jewish memory. So then I have to tolerate both the twinge of fear I feel for the escapees and the hatred I have for them as killers and thugs."""

Perhaps something like that is going on here.  Over at Econlog I have a post on the mezzogiorno, a failed region of 20 million people in southern Italy.  I’d guess that in Europe there’s not a lot of sympathy for this region, perhaps because outsiders feel that Sicilians and Neapolitans have only themselves to blame.  In America, progressives employ a sort of “victims and villains” framing, where poor minorities are seen as being poor precisely because they are oppressed by the dominant class.  Americans may see the Greeks as a “victimized” group, whereas the Europeans may see them simply as a country governed by irresponsible white males.

2.  Perhaps the difference is explained by the fact that it’s their money, not ours, which would be used to bailout Greece. (After all, there’s nothing stopping the US government from bailing out Greece.)  We have everything to gain from European stability, and avoiding another Lehman moment, and nothing to lose from a deal. We just want the two sides to agree on something.

3.  Maybe it’s because Americans have a better understanding of macro, and thus a better understanding of the fact that the Greek depression is partly caused by low AD, not just irresponsible Greek policies.  This is the point where my views are closest to Syriza.

4.  Perhaps Americans are less aware of just how extreme the Syriza party really is. There aren’t many Maoists in the governing coalition, but it’s kind of shocking that there are any.  In most European countries, extremists are not allowed into the ruling coalition, even if this exclusion results in a minority government, or another election.  The fact that they are sympathetic to Putin is also not widely understood here.  Europeans expect a certain degree of “seriousness” in their governments (recall they pressured the Berlusconi government to give up power), and Syriza just doesn’t have it.  We are a long way away, and maybe the fact that Syriza is a government more fitting for Argentina than a EU member is less worrisome to us.

5.  We’ve always had a sort of “debtors mentality” in America.  We have relatively lenient bankruptcy laws, compared to Europe. In America, people like Trump go bankrupt and just start over, as if nothing happened.  You can even run for president.  In many parts of Europe, a person’s responsibility to pay their debts is taken much more seriously.

6.  The Europeans (who often vacation in Greece) might think the Greeks are exaggerating the amount austerity, noting that Greeks are still about as rich as they were in 2000, while Italians are actually poorer.  In saying this, I don’t doubt that many individual Greeks are suffering, but is that because the Greek government has not spread the pain evenly? Even today, Greek pensions are far higher than pensions in Eastern Europe, and Greece is asking Eastern European taxpayers to subsidize them with debt relief.  That doesn’t go over well.  In contrast, all that Americans know is what we see on news reports showing individual Greeks who have been hurt badly by the austerity.

7.  Are there sentimental feelings in the US because western civilization began in Greece?  Would we be equally sympathetic to equal suffering in nearby Moldova?  I doubt it.  (A Greek depression would be like paradise for Moldovans, the world’s unhappiest people.)

What else?

[saturno]

En v/F (traduccion cutre, pero correcta)

Carta abierta de Alexis Tsipras al ciudadano alemán sobre lo que nunca le explicaron acerca de la deuda
Premier Ministre de Grèce - 02/02/2015 12:55:00

Estimados lectores de Handelsblat  (un periodico...)

http://www.newspress.fr/Communique_FR_286047_6425.aspx

[R.G.C.I.M.]

http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/12/12/graficos/1418410740_043679.html
En el gráfico de la deuda publica española que sube y baja, estaría bien comparar con la deuda privada.
- se vería la "socialización" de deuda privada ? (bancaria)
- pero, ¿es posible la comparación?

Sobre el articulo del http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/07/01/the-forgotten-origins-of-greeces-terrible-crisis-will-make-you-think-twice-about-whos-to-blame/
hay una cosa que se podría añadir, y que no consideramos

-- Los acreedores han prestado un dinero que previamente "extrajeron" de sus respectivas burbujas (Alemania es un caso especial, pero su supéravit europeo es lo mismo: una burbuja)
Es decir, los UE-27 están pidiendo a Grecia que respalde un dinero que, de no ser porque los Grecios lo sellaron, no exisitiría más que en un futuro hipotético. La ventaja de mantener contabilidades separadas, es que tienes un PIGS que hizo de primo, al ponerle fecha de devolución a una renta que -- de haber quedado dentro de cada contabilidad nacional -- no sería honrada porque supera la producción ordinaria.

Con Grecia, tenemos 27 esquemas rentistas nacionales, irreales, que una vez trasladados un esquemaa transnacional Grecia x (27UE) se pretende que sea real.

La relación entre UE-27 frente a GR reproduce exactamente el dilema de nuestras castuzas nacionales respecto de los laminados locales.

Por ejemplo, FR y ES extraen rentas inmobiliarias de sus propios mutilados. No es sostenible. Pero el valor del título de esa promesa a 10 o 20 años, se lo prestan a GR, y los Griegos lo convierten en un valor monetizable a 6 meses.

Igual con DE: Alemania se pone a producir con un supéravit que no es absorbible con cuentas nacionales. Pero al venderlo a préstamo a los PIGS, con contabilidades separadas, los Alemanes monetizan esa deuda como si fuese una exportación asumida por los PIGS.

El problema con Grecia es el mismo que para todos los rentismos extraordinarios:  para ser "monetizable" se necesita de un tercero como Grecia o los PIGS que le ponga fecha de realización. Sin ese tercero, los rentistas no podrían sostener el valor de las rentas extraidas sobre sus propios nacionales.

El rentismo funciona como si hubiera encontrado la piedra filosofal. Da igual lo que produzcas realmente, el papel de la promesa se convierte en oro, basta con encontrar un tercero que le ponga fecha de ejecución.

===

Bueno, mi tesis es la fusión contable. Pero hace falta una reforma constituyente de Europa, de forma que estas deudas "exteriores" extrañas (contabilidad separada, pero moneda común) se puedan tornar transferencias intracontinentales, es decir, un mecanismo de distribución de riqueza. Porque en el fondo, de eso se trataba, hasta que en los años 80 etc.

En esa perspectiva, la propuesta de Varoufakis es técnicamente correcta, y la propuesta de la U-27 (la de los gobiernos rentistas) no lo es.

Lo demás, es lucha mexicana, estoy de acuerdo. Pero se debe a que una parte pide union fiscal para beneficarse de la distribución, y la otra se niega a la union, porque supone declarar que las rentas extraidas a sus propios nacionales fueron abusivas. Prefieren seguir dando patadas adelante con Grecia interpuesta antes que asumir el hundimiento de su modelo extractivo.

¡Que son todos gobiernos del CP, gobiernos extractivos con los que hay que acabar y se resisten a morir!

Ambas partes tienen argumentos con parte de razón, pero técnicamente, la Modesta proposición me parece la única viable. NO seguirla, es reconocer que el rentismo, el CP fue un sistema economico legítimo, y viable.

Y no, el rentismo, sea bueno o malo, no fue legítimo, porque no estaba correlado al crecimiento real, que es la única verdad del porquero.

Yo lo tengo claro como VD.
Pero ese sistema exige:
 gradualidad para no colapsar.
 aquiescencia de los subditos.

No es que los gobiernos CP no quieran; es que los gobiernos CP estan respaldados por las MNs.

Solo mediante cambio generacional, de intereses , y consecuentemente de voto, podra Vd llevarlo a cabo.

Lo unico que vamos a vivir a el deshinchamiento del globo, despues la proxima generacion volvera a empezar de CERO.
Vd quiere preservar Capital para esa etapa.
No lo tendra. Esa etapa empezara sin Capital (en un sentido de flujo), probablemente como Stock si lo tendra, pero tendra que resetear su valor contable.
Eso es lo que esta haciendo la EU todo a la vez, y a la velocidad que le permite la economia y la politica.

Porque ahi afuera hay una china muy activa, y una USA muy nerviosa; asi que si hace reset interno ahora se nos comen con patatas.

Lo unico que puede hacer esta generacion por las siguientes es dejar lo maximo pagado, dejar capital stock, y dejarnos credit worthy.
No le pida que construya el nuevo sistema , ni el reseteo, ni la union fiscal antes de hora.
NO PUEDE.

La tormenta no ha pasado para hacer un barco nuevo, estamos inmersos en la tormenta y nos queda mucho por pasar.

Sds.

[muyuu]

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/what-price-the-new-democracy-goldman-sachs-conquers-europe-6264091.html

What price the new democracy? Goldman Sachs conquers Europe

The ascension of Mario Monti to the Italian prime ministership is remarkable for more reasons than it is possible to count. By replacing the scandal-surfing Silvio Berlusconi, Italy has dislodged the undislodgeable. By imposing rule by unelected technocrats, it has suspended the normal rules of democracy, and maybe democracy itself. And by putting a senior adviser at Goldman Sachs in charge of a Western nation, it has taken to new heights the political power of an investment bank that you might have thought was prohibitively politically toxic.

This is the most remarkable thing of all: a giant leap forward for, or perhaps even the successful culmination of, the Goldman Sachs Project.

It is not just Mr Monti. The European Central Bank, another crucial player in the sovereign debt drama, is under ex-Goldman management, and the investment bank's alumni hold sway in the corridors of power in almost every European nation, as they have done in the US throughout the financial crisis. Until Wednesday, the International Monetary Fund's European division was also run by a Goldman man, Antonio Borges, who just resigned for personal reasons.

Even before the upheaval in Italy, there was no sign of Goldman Sachs living down its nickname as "the Vampire Squid", and now that its tentacles reach to the top of the eurozone, sceptical voices are raising questions over its influence. The political decisions taken in the coming weeks will determine if the eurozone can and will pay its debts – and Goldman's interests are intricately tied up with the answer to that question.

Simon Johnson, the former International Monetary Fund economist, in his book 13 Bankers, argued that Goldman Sachs and the other large banks had become so close to government in the run-up to the financial crisis that the US was effectively an oligarchy. At least European politicians aren't "bought and paid for" by corporations, as in the US, he says. "Instead what you have in Europe is a shared world-view among the policy elite and the bankers, a shared set of goals and mutual reinforcement of illusions."

This is The Goldman Sachs Project. Put simply, it is to hug governments close. Every business wants to advance its interests with the regulators that can stymie them and the politicians who can give them a tax break, but this is no mere lobbying effort. Goldman is there to provide advice for governments and to provide financing, to send its people into public service and to dangle lucrative jobs in front of people coming out of government. The Project is to create such a deep exchange of people and ideas and money that it is impossible to tell the difference between the public interest and the Goldman Sachs interest.

Mr Monti is one of Italy's most eminent economists, and he spent most of his career in academia and thinktankery, but it was when Mr Berlusconi appointed him to the European Commission in 1995 that Goldman Sachs started to get interested in him. First as commissioner for the internal market, and then especially as commissioner for competition, he has made decisions that could make or break the takeover and merger deals that Goldman's bankers were working on or providing the funding for. Mr Monti also later chaired the Italian Treasury's committee on the banking and financial system, which set the country's financial policies.

With these connections, it was natural for Goldman to invite him to join its board of international advisers. The bank's two dozen-strong international advisers act as informal lobbyists for its interests with the politicians that regulate its work. Other advisers include Otmar Issing who, as a board member of the German Bundesbank and then the European Central Bank, was one of the architects of the euro.

Perhaps the most prominent ex-politician inside the bank is Peter Sutherland, Attorney General of Ireland in the 1980s and another former EU Competition Commissioner. He is now non-executive chairman of Goldman's UK-based broker-dealer arm, Goldman Sachs International, and until its collapse and nationalisation he was also a non-executive director of Royal Bank of Scotland. He has been a prominent voice within Ireland on its bailout by the EU, arguing that the terms of emergency loans should be eased, so as not to exacerbate the country's financial woes. The EU agreed to cut Ireland's interest rate this summer.

Picking up well-connected policymakers on their way out of government is only one half of the Project, sending Goldman alumni into government is the other half. Like Mr Monti, Mario Draghi, who took over as President of the ECB on 1 November, has been in and out of government and in and out of Goldman. He was a member of the World Bank and managing director of the Italian Treasury before spending three years as managing director of Goldman Sachs International between 2002 and 2005 – only to return to government as president of the Italian central bank.

Mr Draghi has been dogged by controversy over the accounting tricks conducted by Italy and other nations on the eurozone periphery as they tried to squeeze into the single currency a decade ago. By using complex derivatives, Italy and Greece were able to slim down the apparent size of their government debt, which euro rules mandated shouldn't be above 60 per cent of the size of the economy. And the brains behind several of those derivatives were the men and women of Goldman Sachs.

The bank's traders created a number of financial deals that allowed Greece to raise money to cut its budget deficit immediately, in return for repayments over time. In one deal, Goldman channelled $1bn of funding to the Greek government in 2002 in a transaction called a cross-currency swap. On the other side of the deal, working in the National Bank of Greece, was Petros Christodoulou, who had begun his career at Goldman, and who has been promoted now to head the office managing government Greek debt. Lucas Papademos, now installed as Prime Minister in Greece's unity government, was a technocrat running the Central Bank of Greece at the time.

Goldman says that the debt reduction achieved by the swaps was negligible in relation to euro rules, but it expressed some regrets over the deals. Gerald Corrigan, a Goldman partner who came to the bank after running the New York branch of the US Federal Reserve, told a UK parliamentary hearing last year: "It is clear with hindsight that the standards of transparency could have been and probably should have been higher."

When the issue was raised at confirmation hearings in the European Parliament for his job at the ECB, Mr Draghi says he wasn't involved in the swaps deals either at the Treasury or at Goldman.

It has proved impossible to hold the line on Greece, which under the latest EU proposals is effectively going to default on its debt by asking creditors to take a "voluntary" haircut of 50 per cent on its bonds, but the current consensus in the eurozone is that the creditors of bigger nations like Italy and Spain must be paid in full. These creditors, of course, are the continent's big banks, and it is their health that is the primary concern of policymakers. The combination of austerity measures imposed by the new technocratic governments in Athens and Rome and the leaders of other eurozone countries, such as Ireland, and rescue funds from the IMF and the largely German-backed European Financial Stability Facility, can all be traced to this consensus.

"My former colleagues at the IMF are running around trying to justify bailouts of €1.5trn-€4trn, but what does that mean?" says Simon Johnson. "It means bailing out the creditors 100 per cent. It is another bank bailout, like in 2008: The mechanism is different, in that this is happening at the sovereign level not the bank level, but the rationale is the same."

So certain is the financial elite that the banks will be bailed out, that some are placing bet-the-company wagers on just such an outcome. Jon Corzine, a former chief executive of Goldman Sachs, returned to Wall Street last year after almost a decade in politics and took control of a historic firm called MF Global. He placed a $6bn bet with the firm's money that Italian government bonds will not default.

When the bet was revealed last month, clients and trading partners decided it was too risky to do business with MF Global and the firm collapsed within days. It was one of the ten biggest bankruptcies in US history.

The grave danger is that, if Italy stops paying its debts, creditor banks could be made insolvent.  Goldman Sachs, which has written over $2trn of insurance, including an undisclosed amount on eurozone countries' debt, would not escape unharmed, especially if some of the $2trn of insurance it has purchased on that insurance turns out to be with a bank that has gone under. No bank – and especially not the Vampire Squid – can easily untangle its tentacles from the tentacles of its peers. This is the rationale for the bailouts and the austerity, the reason we are getting more Goldman, not less. The alternative is a second financial crisis, a second economic collapse.

Shared illusions, perhaps? Who would dare test it?