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Monetary Policy Transmission in the The Korean Jeonse SystemOr, how wealthy landlords in Korea may soon default on hundreds of millions of dollars borrowed from their poorer tenantsA tragic recent event in Korean housing markets is that a huge landlord, owning hundreds of properties, suddenly passed away. This landlord somehow managed to borrow hundreds of millions of dollars from his tenants — many tenants were lending around 10 times their annual salary to their landlord!So what is going on here? How could landlords, who generally are pretty wealthy, have borrowed so much from their poorer tenants? The key here is a unique institution in Korean housing markets, called the Jeonse system. I'll discuss some thoughts on the situation, based on a paper I wrote with Baiyun Jing and Seongjin Park. Here’s a link to the paper.In Korea, there are two ways you can rent an apartment. You could do the standard thing where you pay, say, 1.2mil KRW ($1,000 USD) per month in rent. Or, you can make a huge security deposit, of like $300,000 USD, to the landlord. The deposit is returned at the end of the lease term, usually 2 years In exchange for the deposit, you pay no rent! This is called the Jeonse, or "key money", system.So what is really going on here? If you're the tenant, you're basically choosing between paying rent, or giving a big zero-interest loan to landlords. Your opportunity cost of that loan is you could be investing those funds in something that pays you interest instead.If you're the landlord, especially the professional landlord speculating on housing, you're basically borrowing a mortgage from your tenant! If the house costs $400k, but you borrow $300k from your security deposit, you only need $100k to buy the house. Sure, you need to give the $300k back when the tenant leaves — but you can just get a new tenant...What determines how big Jeonse deposits are? We write down a simple theory of this: tenants trade off the foregone interest on Jeonse deposits and rent, so in market equilibrium, the two have to be equal. Suppose the interest rate is 5%, and annual rent is $10,000. Then the Chonsei size must be $200,000, since this means tenants give up (200k * 0.05 = $10k) in interest per year on Jeonse deposits, which is just equal to rent.But what this means is that Jeonse deposit size is very sensitive to interest rates. When rates go down, the opportunity cost of Jeonse deposits is low, so Jeonse size grows massively. We see this happening in Korea for the past 20 years: interest rates, the dashed line, fell, and Jeonse deposit size, the red line, grew significantly.Landlords are pretty happy in this situation! They buy a $400k house, taking $300k as a Jeonse deposit. As rates go down, Jeonse size goes up, say to $500k. When one deposit expires, they can "roll" it into bigger and bigger deposits!But what goes up... must come down. Post-COVID, the Bank of Korea increased rates. Capital is now more expensive for tenants, and our theory predicts that Jeonse deposit size should then come down: here's what our fitted model predicts.When deposit size comes down, landlords now face the unenviable situation of trying to pay back a $500k security deposit... when the next tenant will only give you $300k. Not a fun situation to be in. And if the landlord goes bust, the $500k security deposit made by the tenant — often worth years, even decades, of the tenant’s savings — is gone.So, how does our paper help understand what's going on in Korea right now? Through the lens of our paper, it's all about monetary policy interest rates. The size of Jeonse loans is very sensitive to rates, leading landlords to lever up when rates go down and Jeonse size is big, and potentially face defaults when rates rise and Jeonse size decreases.How might we fix this? A simple solution, of course, is just to ban Jeonse deposits. But these were for long periods of time more popular than rental agreements, so this may be operationally difficult.We propose another solution in the paper: governments could tax Jeonse deposits, making all contracts "partial Jeonse". Instead of paying either $1000 a month in rent and no deposit, or $300k in deposit and no rent, tenants could for example pay $500/mon in rent with a $150k deposit. It's a half-rent, half-Jeonse system.This maintains the ability of landlords to borrow through deposits, but decreases the size of the deposits, also making them less sensitive to interest rates, which might be beneficial for financial stability.
Death of Korea's 'apartment king' leaves 100s in property purgatoryAn audacious gamble using a real estate trick possibly unique to Korea failed to pay off for one man, leaving hundreds of tenants in legal limbo and unable to get their hands on massive deposits they put down for the privilege of living rent free for two years. The collapse of the scheme exposes a fundamental but largely ignored flaw in the country's jeonse system — where apartments are leased for a fixed term in exchange for a sizable but refundable deposit — and has systemic implications, as individuals, banks, insurance companies and the entire property market are exposed. In the "apartment king" case — as it has become known in Korea — a man in his 40s purchased more than 1,000 units in low-rise buildings in and around Seoul. He employed the often used maneuver of taking the joense deposits to fund the purchase. For cheaper apartments in Korea, the jeonse amount is often close to the market price of the property itself, so the deposit can almost pay for the property. Real estate empires can be amassed with little capital and no need to go to the bank. It all works if real estate prices keep rising, if the owner can get one tenant to replace another without any vacancy, if the rules of the game remain the same and if the mastermind can manage the accounting nightmare of dealing in and keeping track of so much unsecured debt. It fails if any one of the many participants fails to play their part, or if any of the conditions change. The apartment king's grand plan went awry when property prices started to fall, taxes increased and the king himself died in October. The higher taxes meant he did not have the money to roll over the flats. His death means the tenants will have difficulty getting their money back. Tenants often borrow the money they use to make the deposit, so if they don't get their money back, they could be in default. A daisy chain of delays and defaults could be set in motion. In a press conference on Monday, Won Hee-ryong, minister of land, infrastructure and transport, said it will take time before the tenants are made whole. When a joense deal fails, recourse is limited and remedies are complicated. Many of the contracts are insured, and in the case of the apartment king, some tenants had policies from state-owned Korea Housing & Urban Guarantee Corporation on Monday (HUG). The problem is the insurance only kicks in if the owner of the apartment cancels the contract, and the apartment king being deceased is in no position to do that. His heirs could if they are willing to inherit the property, which might not happen. The apartments have been seized by the National Tax Service and HUG, and 6.2 billion won ($4.8 million) of comprehensive real estate tax is owed. The properties are also falling in value due to rising interest rates and a weak property market. The parents of the apartment king told HUG that they will consider the inheritance. They also told the company not to contact them, according to Koo Ja-hak, deputy head of the public relations department at HUG. If the family decides not to inherit the apartments, the court designates an administrator. This process could take as long as two years, and tenants cannot vacate the premises until the administrator cancels the contract. “A lot of the tenants are those in their 20s and 30s. Some of them have asked for a return of the deposit in advance, while others have requested an extension of bank loans taken out for the deposit,” Koo added. HUG is negotiated with the financial institutions for loan extensions. "The victims will be able to live in their apartment for months until the inheritance procedure continues, and the guarantee on jeonse deposit can also be extended so they don't have to be worried too much for the time being," Won added. About 200 contracts related to the apartment king have expired or will expire from his death to the end of the year, and HUG provided about 20 billion won in compensation before the death of the property kingpin. “I spent 237 million won on a jeonse deposit” for an apartment in Gangseo District, western Seoul, one of the tenants said Tuesday in a radio interview. He asked for the contract to be canceled — when the owner was still alive — but the owner “had the audacity to tell me to either find a new tenant myself or to buy the house.” He added that the victims have “created a community, and there are only around 450 members. So it seems a lot of people aren't even aware that they have suffered damages.” “The family isn't likely to inherit the properties because of the debt,” Jeong Min-kyung, an attorney at MyongDo, said. “If the properties aren't inherited, the ownership will be transferred to the country, and the apartments will be auctioned." Jeong added that the owner “took advantage of the jeonse system,” which he did based on the belief that the value of the units and their rent will continue to rise following the real estate rally in 2020. “Jeonse is one of the many types of rent in Korea that has developed over the years,” Pong In-shik, a researcher at the Gyeonggi Research Institute, said. “It is agreed based on a mutual trust, which then becomes legally binding through a contract. Diversity in rent measures cannot be blamed” for a single incident. President Yoon Suk-yeol said Thursday that the land and justice ministries will create a task force to provide legal services for the tenants.
¿Quieres compran? Los residentes en España protagonizaron el 55% de esas compraventas realizadas por extranjeros. Entre ellos, destacan como la nacionalidad predominante los marroquíes (4.629 viviendas) y los rumanos (4.312 operaciones) . Se trata de trabajadores locales, que compran viviendas que, de media, según los notarios, rondan los 680 euros por metro en el caso de la nacionalidad marroquí y de 1.036 euros por metro en la rumana.