Re:PPCC: Pisitófilos Creditófagos. Invierno 2025

[sudden and sharp]

...








... pero todabiah, no.

[sudden and sharp]

Symploké
https://www.filosofia.org/enc/dfc/symploke.htm







Y no diga que no es filosóficamente materialista.

[conejo]

EUR/USD hoy llegó a 1,0770…


]Los aranceles de Trump pasan factura: una encuesta de Reuters predice una mayor debilidad del dólar

5 mar 2025, 10:58 GMT-3
Invezz

Trump's tariffs take a toll: Reuters poll predicts further dollar weakness
El dólar estadounidense, que alguna vez fue el rey indiscutible de las divisas, podría estar perdiendo su brillo.

Si bien se espera que el dólar estadounidense mantenga una parte significativa de su fortaleza en los próximos meses, una encuesta de Reuters revela una creciente sensación de inquietud entre los estrategas de divisas, ya que una operación con dólares que alguna vez estuvo muy concurrida comienza a disminuir en medio de la incertidumbre política.

Impulsado por declaraciones políticas erráticas y crecientes tensiones comerciales, el dólar se enfrenta a vientos en contra cada vez más fuertes.

El presidente Trump ha iniciado una guerra comercial con los tres principales socios comerciales de Estados Unidos, imponiendo aranceles del 25% a sus aliados tradicionales Canadá y México, además de aplicar derechos de importación a los productos procedentes de China.

Estas agresivas tácticas comerciales, combinadas con semanas de liquidación de posiciones largas netas en dólares cercanas a máximos de una década por parte de los especuladores, ya han pasado factura a la divisa.

Datos de la Comisión de Comercio de Futuros de Productos Básicos revelan que el dólar estadounidense ha caído casi un 2,5% frente a una cesta de las principales divisas esta semana.

La encuesta de Reuters, realizada entre el 3 y el 5 de marzo, revela un creciente pesimismo sobre las perspectivas del dólar.

Casi el 60% de los estrategas de divisas (18 de 31) predicen que las posiciones largas netas en dólares disminuirán aún más para finales de marzo.

Ocho encuestados anticipan pocos cambios, mientras que solo cinco esperan un aumento en las posiciones largas netas.

El factor euro

Las respuestas a la última encuesta sobre divisas se recogieron tanto antes como después de los últimos anuncios sobre aranceles.

El euro también experimentó un repunte tras la noticia de que los partidos que aspiran a formar el próximo gobierno alemán acordaron crear un fondo de infraestructura de 500.000 millones de euros (534.750 millones de dólares) y revisar las normas de endeudamiento para modernizar el ejército y reactivar el crecimiento en la mayor economía de Europa.

Este cambio en la política fiscal alemana podría tener un impacto en la tendencia a largo plazo del dólar.

Una moneda de dos caras.

“Los riesgos para las perspectivas del dólar en los próximos meses están equilibrados”, dijo George Saravelos, jefe de investigación de divisas de Deutsche Bank.

Por un lado, los aranceles y la elevada incertidumbre geopolítica respaldan un dólar más fuerte. Por otro lado, los cambios en la política fiscal alemana y las perturbaciones en múltiples frentes plantean riesgos a la baja. Por lo tanto, mantenemos una postura neutral.
Saravelos concluye que “el alto grado de incertidumbre impedirá un aumento significativo de las posiciones en dólares en ambas direcciones”.

Perspectivas del euro: una previsión de debilidad

A pesar de sus recientes ganancias, se esperaba que el euro, que actualmente cotiza a 1,07 dólares y ha subido casi un 3% frente al dólar desde principios del lunes, cayera a 1,03 dólares en tres meses y cotizara a 1,04 dólares en seis, según las medianas de las encuestas.

Sin embargo, estas previsiones se mantienen prácticamente iguales que en una encuesta de febrero, lo que sugiere que podrían revisarse pronto para reflejar el cambiante panorama económico.

Desde octubre hasta principios de enero, el dólar se disparó casi un 10% debido a la continua fortaleza de los datos económicos estadounidenses y a las expectativas de que a la Reserva Federal solo le quedaban una o dos bajadas más de tipos de interés por aplicar.

Sin embargo, desde entonces el dólar ha caído alrededor de un 5%, y la mayoría de esas pérdidas se han producido en las últimas semanas debido a señales de debilidad económica, lo que ha llevado a que los precios de los futuros de tipos de interés reflejen tres reducciones de los tipos de la Reserva Federal para finales de año.

“El mundo está sobreexpuesto a activos estadounidenses en un grado sin precedentes, y si se asustan de tener esos activos, ese será el principal factor que impulsará la debilidad del dólar en el futuro”, dijo Kit Juckes, jefe de estrategia de divisas de Société Générale, a Reuters.

Juckes sugirió además que su “mayor preocupación subyacente con el dólar es que, incluso después de tantos años de excepcionalismo que lo han llevado a niveles que no se veían desde 1985 en términos reales efectivos, solo se necesitan unas pocas grietas en la armadura para que parezca más débil”.

[Derby]

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-05/wall-street-banks-say-markets-are-flashing-rising-recession-risk

Wall Street Banks Say Markets Are Flashing Rising Recession Risk


Money managers and corporate executives are struggling to cope with the volatility created by Donald Trump’s threatened tariffs.Photographer: Win McNamee/Getty Images

Financial markets are signaling that the risk of a recession is growing as tariff-related uncertainty and indicators of economic weakness spread fear across Wall Street.

A model from JPMorgan Chase & Co. shows that the market-implied probability of an economic downturn has climbed to 31% on Tuesday, from 17% at the end of November. Key indicators like five-year Treasuries and base metals are showing an even higher — toss-up — chance of a contraction. While it’s far from the base case, a similar model from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. also suggests recession risk is edging up, at 23% from 14% in January.

After a wild ride in markets Tuesday, economic sentiment is darkening as money managers and corporate executives struggle to cope with the volatility created by President Donald Trump’s threatened tariffs. Trump defended his plan to remake the global trading order in his address to Congress Tuesday night, acknowledging the prospect of discomfort ahead.

“With softer economic activity data in the US and already weaker business and consumer confidence in recent weeks, the tariffs that came into effect on March 4th on Canada, Mexico and China are raising the risk of an even bigger hit to business and consumer confidence going forward,” said JPMorgan strategist Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou. “In turn this raises the specter of a US recession and markets have naturally priced in higher probability.”

S&P 500 futures struggled to hold onto to gains in Wednesday trading, even after US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick hinted at tariff relief for Mexico and Canada.



Data this week showed US factory activity last month edging closer to stagnation as orders and employment contracted. This came after reports showing consumer confidence hitting the lowest levels since 2021, personal spending unexpectedly decreasing, and disappointing prints about the American housing market.

Mohamed A. El-Erian, the president of Queens’ College, Cambridge and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, now sees a 25% to 30% chance of a recession, up from 10% at the beginning of the year. El-Erian is among a small but growing group of Wall Street worrywarts, focused on stubborn inflation pressures and the recent decline in consumer and business confidence.

JPMorgan calculates the prospect of a recession by comparing the pre-recession peaks of various classes and their troughs during an economic contraction. By this metric, the prices of five-year Treasuries, base metals and small stocks now suggest a recession probability of about 50%. Still, the investment-grade credit market suggests the chance remains low at 8%, though that’s higher than effectively zero at the end of November.

The Goldman model is based on multiple cross-asset indicators, including credit spreads and the Cboe Volatility Index. One metric, tracking expectations in the futures market on the Fed’s benchmark rate in 12 months time, suggests a 46% likelihood of an economic contraction.

“The largest shifts have been in the pricing of Fed cuts and the yield curve, which tends to indicate latent recession risk,” said Christian Mueller-Glissmann, head of asset allocation research for Goldman Sachs said in an email. “There has also been a pick-up in the VIX, which tends to spike around recessions and is more of a coincident indicator.”

To be clear, financial markets have struggled to price in the direction of the business cycle since the disruption caused by the pandemic. Recession bets in markets misfired in 2023 after the US consumer proved more resilient than expected to monetary tightening. This time round, stagflation fears are rising amid signs of easing growth and elevated inflation. The latest survey of economists conducted by Bloomberg shows a 25% probability of a contraction in the next year.

While US stocks have erased their gains for the year, there are plenty of bright spots in the investment and consumption cycle, not least the unemployment rate hovering around 4% and income metrics showing strength. Additionally, a lot of bad economic news has come from reports based on surveys, according to Cayla Seder, a macro multi-asset strategist at State Street Global Markets.

“It would be premature to extrapolate the soft data-weakness into meaning economic growth is rolling over, as of now,” said Seder. Still, “drivers of economic growth have become more concentrated, which means there are fewer drivers of economic growth,” she added.

[asustadísimos]

[¿Esto qué es?:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nr0W6a3G2Zk]

[Hinel]

[¿Esto qué es?:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nr0W6a3G2Zk]

 No está equilibrada. Pero no es de ahora. Lleva bastantes años así. Es un tema de neurotransmisores.

[asustadísimos]

[Estamos ante una inflexión.





Esto va desprisísima.]

[Derby]

Cadavre ya copió un artículo que aludía a este otro publicado en "The Atlantic". Copio el artículo íntegro:

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/uk-needs-abundance/681877/

How the British Broke Their Own Economy

With the best intentions, the United Kingdom engineered a housing and energy shortage.
By Derek Thompson



What’s the matter with the United Kingdom? Great Britain is the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, which ushered in an era of energy super-production and launched an epoch of productivity advancements that made many life essentials, such as clothes and food, more affordable. Today, the country suffers from the converse of these achievements: a profound energy shortage and a deep affordability crisis. In February, the Bank of England reported an ongoing productivity slump so mysterious that its own economists “cannot account fully” for it. Real wages have barely grown for 16 years.  British politics seems stuck in a cycle of disappointment followed by dramatic promises of growth, followed by yet more disappointment.

A new report, titled “Foundations,”* captures the country’s economic malaise in detail. The U.K. desperately needs more houses, more energy, and more transportation infrastructure. “No system can be fixed by people who do not know why it is broken,” write the report’s authors, Sam Bowman, Samuel Hughes, and Ben Southwood. They argue that the source of the country’s woes as well as “the most important economic fact about modern Britain [is] that it is difficult to build almost anything, anywhere.” The nation is gripped by laws and customs that make essentials unacceptably scarce and drive up the cost of construction across the board.

Housing is an especially alarming case in point. The homeownership rate for the typical British worker aged 25 to 34 declined by more than half from the 1990s to the 2010s. In that same time, average housing prices more than doubled, even after adjusting for inflation, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies.

The housing shortage traces back to the postwar period, when a frenzy of nationalization swept the country. The U.K. created the National Health Service, brought hundreds of coal mines under state control, and centralized many of the country’s railways and trucking and electricity providers. In 1947, the U.K. passed the Town and Country Planning Act, which forms the basis of modern housing policy. The TCPA effectively prohibited new development without special permission from the state; “green belts” were established to restrict sprawl into the countryside. Rates of private-home building never returned to their typical prewar levels. With some spikes and troughs, new homes built as a share of the total housing stock have generally declined over the past 60 years.

The TCPA was considered reasonable and even wise at the time. Postwar Britain had been swept up by the theory that nationalization created economies of scale that gave citizens better outcomes than pure capitalism. “There was an idea that if we could rationalize the planning system … then we could build things in the right way—considered, and planned, and environmentally friendly,” Bowman told me.

But the costs of nationalization became clear within a few decades. With more choke points for permitting, construction languished from the 1950s through the ’70s. Under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives rolled back nationalization in several areas, such as electricity and gas production. But their efforts to loosen housing policy from the grip of government control was a tremendous failure, especially once it was revealed that Thatcher’s head of housing policy himself opposed new housing developments near his home.

Housing is, as I’ve written, the quantum field of urban policy, touching every station of urban life. Broken housing policies have a ripple effect. In London, Bowman said, the most common options are subsidized flats for the low-income and luxury units for the rich, creating a dearth of middle-class housing. As a result, the city is bifurcated between the über-wealthy and the subsidized poor. “I think housing policy is a major driver of a lot of anti-foreigner, white-supremacist, anti-Black, anti-Muslim attitudes among young people who are frustrated that so-called these people get free houses while they have to live in a bedsit or move somewhere an hour outside the city and commute in,” Bowman said.

Constrictive housing policy in Britain has also arguably prevented other great cities from being born. If the University of Cambridge’s breakthroughs in biotech had happened in the 19th century, Bowman said, the city of Cambridge might have bloomed to accommodate new companies and residents, the same way Glasgow grew by an order of magnitude around shipbuilding in the 1800s. Instead Cambridge remains a small city of fewer than 150,000 people, its potential stymied by rules all but prohibiting its growth.

The story for transit and energy is similar: Rules and attitudes that make it difficult to build things in the world have made life worse for the British. “On a per-mile basis, Britain now faces some of the highest railway costs in the world,” Bowman, Hughes, and Southwood write. “This has led to some profoundly dissatisfying outcomes. Leeds is now the largest city in Europe without a metro system.” Despite Thatcher’s embrace of North Sea gas, and more recent attempts to loosen fracking regulations, Britain’s energy markets are still an omnishambles. Per capita electricity generation in the U.K. is now roughly one-third that of the United States, and energy use per unit of GDP is the lowest in the G7. By these measures, at least, Britain may be the most energy-starved nation in the developed world.

Scarcity is a policy choice. This is as true in energy as it is in housing. In the 1960s, Britain was home to about half of the world’s entire fleet of nuclear reactors. Today, the U.K. has extraordinarily high nuclear-construction costs compared with Asia, and it’s behind much of Europe in the share of its electricity generated from nuclear power—not only France but also Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, and Romania.

What happened to British nuclear power? After North Sea oil and gas production ramped up in the 1970s and ’80s, Britain redirected its energy production away from nuclear power. Even this shift has had its own complications. In the past few years, the U.K. has passed several measures to reduce shale-gas extraction, citing earthquake risks, environmental costs, and public opposition. As a result, gas production in the U.K. has declined 70 percent since 2000. Although the country’s renewable-energy market has grown, solar and wind power haven’t increased nearly enough to make up the gap.

The comparison with France makes clear Britain’s policy error: In 2003, very large businesses in both countries paid about the same price for electricity. But by 2024, after decades of self-imposed scarcity and the supply shock of the war in Ukraine, electricity in the U.K. was more than twice as expensive as in France.

There is an inconvenient subcurrent to the U.K.’s scarcity crisis—and ours. Sixty years ago, the environmentalist revolution transformed the way governments, courts, and individuals thought about their relationship to the natural world. This revolution was not only successful but, in many ways, enormously beneficial. In the U.S., the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act brought about exactly that. But over time, American environmental rules, such as those in the National Environmental Policy Act and the California Environmental Quality Act, have been used to stop new housing developments and, ironically, even clean-energy additions. Similarly, in the U.K., any individual who sues to stop a new project on environmental grounds—say, to oppose a new road or airport—generally has their legal damages capped at £5,000, if they lose in court. “Once you’ve done that,” Bowman said, “you’ve created a one-way system, where people have little incentive to not bring spurious cases to challenge any new development.” Last year, Britain’s high-speed-rail initiative was compelled to spend an additional £100 million on a shield to protect bats in the woods of Buckinghamshire. Finding private investment is generally difficult for infrastructure developers when the path to completion is strewn with nine-figure surprise fees.

Some of Britain’s problems echo across the European continent, including slow growth and high energy prices. More than a decade ago, Germany began to phase out nuclear power while failing to ramp up other energy production. The result has been catastrophic for citizens and for the ruling government. In the first half of 2024, Germans paid the highest electricity prices in the European Union. This month, Social Democrats were punished at the polls with their worst defeat since World War II. Bowman offered a droll summary: “Europe has an energy problem; the Anglosphere has a housing problem; Britain has both.”

These problems are obvious to many British politicians. Leaders in the Conservative and Labour Parties often comment on expensive energy and scarce housing. But their goals haven’t been translated into priorities and policies that lead to growth. “Few leaders in the U.K. have thought seriously about the scale of change that we need,” Bowman said. Comprehensive reform is necessary to unlock private investment in housing and energy—including overhauling the TCPA, reducing incentives for anti-growth lawsuits, and directly encouraging nuclear and gas production to build a bridge to a low-carbon-energy economy.

Effective 21st-century governance requires something more than the ability to win elections by decrying the establishment and bemoaning sclerotic institutions. Progress requires a positive vision of the future, a deep understanding of the bottlenecks in the way of building that future, and a plan to add or remove policies to overcome those blockages. In a U.S. context, that might mean making it easier to build advanced semiconductors, or removing bureaucratic kludge for scientists while adding staff at the FDA to accelerate drug approval.

In the U.K., the bottlenecks are all too clear: Decades-old rules make it too easy for the state to block housing developments or for frivolous lawsuits to freeze out energy and infrastructure investment. In their conclusion, Bowman and his co-authors strike a similar tone. “Britain can enjoy such a renewal once more,” they write. “To do so, it need simply remove the barriers that stop the private sector from doing what it already wants to do.”

*https://ukfoundations.co/

[asustadísimos]

[«Está loca, pero nos da votos»:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nr0W6a3G2Zk]

[Derby]

https://x.com/ChineseEmbinUS/status/1897132043362034153

[asustadísimos]

[«Housing is the quantum field (la física cuántica, diríamos en español) of urban policy.  Is a major driver of a lot of anti-foreigner, white-supremacist, anti-Black, anti-Muslim attitudes. (Poned aquí el nombre de cualquier país a las puertas de una recesión, p. ej., Reino Unido, EE. UU.) desperately needs more houses».

Está claro que un tratamiento de shock de construcción de viviendas con financiación pública será con lo que la política económica va a administrar la recuperación. Pero primero hay que dar la recesión, ¿no?

¿Y cómo vas a dar una recesión hoy en día sin corrección valorativa inmobiliaria?

No vale decir que la economía va genial, pero está en peligro no sé qué metafísico —la democracia, el ser, la mente, la existencia de la Nación como unidad de destino en lo universal—.]

[asustadísimos]

[EE. UU., perdedor ante Rusia, no es capaz de ser fuerte con el fuerte. Lo vimos el día 28-02-2025, gran gran día histórico. Y el chino, que es un imperio muy muy antiguo, se le sube a la chepa, lógicamente.]

[Derby]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/04/germanys-future-coalition-partners-to-relax-debt-rules-to-boost-defence-budget

Germany’s future coalition partners to relax debt rules to boost defence budget

Conservative alliance and Social Democrats to propose exempting spending of more than 1% of GDP on defence


Friedrich Merz, left, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Lars Klingbeil, co-leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) address the media in Berlin about joint proposal on defence spending. Photograph: Carsten Koall/AP

The prospective partners in Germany’s next government have said they will seek to loosen rules on running up debt to allow for higher defence spending.

They said they will also seek to set up a huge €500bn ($533bn ) fund to finance spending on Germany’s infrastructure over the next 10 years.

Centre-right election winner Friedrich Merz, who is trying to put together a coalition government with the centre-left Social Democrats of the outgoing chancellor, Olaf Scholz, said the two sides would propose exempting spending of more than 1% of gross domestic product on defence from rules that limit the government’s ability to borrow money.

“In view of the increasing threat situation, it is clear to us that Europe – and with Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany – must now very quickly make very big efforts very quickly to strengthen the defence capability of our country and the European continent,” Merz told reporters at a hastily convened news conference.

“We are counting on the United States of America standing by our mutual alliance commitments in the future as well,” he said. “But we also know that the funding for the defence of our country and alliance must now be expanded significantly.”

The necessary decisions “no longer tolerate any delay, at the latest since the most recent decisions by the American government,” Merz said.

He added that his bloc and the Social Democrats will bring legislation on the exemption for defence spending and the infrastructure package, which will be financed by loans, to Germany’s outgoing parliament next week.

Merz also said on Tuesday that he would support the immediate approval of a €3bn aid package for Ukraine that had been held up in parliament for weeks.

Merz told reporters at a press conference that he would meet Scholz on Wednesday “to speak about the urgent help needed for Ukraine, around 3.0 or €3.5bn , which … can be approved now as off-budget expenditure”.

Shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Scholz pledged to increase Germany’s defence spending to the current Nato target of 2% of gross domestic product and announced the creation of a €100bn special fund to modernise the military.

But that fund, with which Germany has met the 2% target, will be used up in 2027, and the advent of the new US administration has brought a new sense of urgency to efforts to further beef up the military and defence spending.

Germany’s “debt brake”, introduced more than a decade ago, allows new borrowing to the tune of only 0.35% of annual gross domestic product, though it can be suspended for emergencies that are out of the state’s control.

It was suspended for three years after the Covid-19 pandemic started in 2020 to allow for large amounts of borrowing to finance various support and stimulus packages.

[Derby]

Cambio de estrategia...

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-05/kkr-to-expand-long-term-ownership-to-infrastructure-real-assets

KKR to Expand Long-Term Ownership to Infrastructure, Real Assets

KKR & Co. is planning to expand its long-term ownership unit to include investments in infrastructure and real assets.

What the firm is trying to build at its Strategic Holdings arm “is in some ways a mini Berkshire Hathaway,” Co-Chief Executive Officer Joe Bae said Wednesday at the Bloomberg Invest conference in New York. KKR created the unit to hold 18 long-term private equity bets that pay out regular dividends.

“Over time, it’s going to include certain platforms, probably in infrastructure and real assets, maybe certain buildups that we’re going to do in different sectors,” Bae said.

KKR created Strategic Holdings just over a year ago to house investments in companies that it plans to keep for a decade or two. While the division is small now, it’s a big piece of KKR’s plans to more than quadruple earnings per share over the next 10 years.

Last month, the company said it’s boosting its stakes in USI Insurance Services, 1-800 Contacts and Heartland Dental by a total of about $1.1 billion. That will lift operating earnings at Strategic Holdings by $50 million, to at least $350 million next year, and by at least $100 million annually to $1.1 billion by 2030.

Bae noted that Berkshire Hathaway Inc. had a market value of $40 billion in 1996, when he and Co-CEO Scott Nuttall joined KKR.

Now, Warren Buffett’s conglomerate is worth more than $1 trillion.

That’s “on the back of long-term compounding of their balance sheet and their investments,” Bae said. “Some version of that is what we’re going to be doing.”

[asustadísimos]

[Alemania sí puede ser proveedor de armamento sustitutivo del norteamericano.

Eurofighter Typhoon

España participa

Además, Alemania tiene ya dada la recesión.

La verdad es que la Era Cero empieza francamente divertida.]